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ABSTRACT PAGE

In 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent nine
African American teenagers from attending Little Rock Central High School. This
dissertation examines how this watershed event has been commemorated over the last
fifty years, and how historical narratives about the crisis have evolved in relation to debates
about education and public policy. The struggle to desegregate Little Rock's public schools
has been ongoing in the years since 1957, and those with a vested interest in this process
articulate different arguments about the crisis as a historical event and its relationship to
the present in courtrooms, political debates, state-sponsored documentary films,
newspaper articles, memoirs, museums and other commemorative forums.
This study places an emphasis on the contested nature of public memory, and examines
what is at stake in these conversations about the past. The public memory of the 1957
Little Rock school desegregation crisis has been contested since its inception and
deployed continuously to either undermine or legitimize ongoing battles for civil rights and
social justice in Little Rock and the nation-at-large. Civil rights advocates continue to draw
connections between past and present, pointing to the unfinished business of the
movement, while their opponents argue that the tensions that gave rise to massive
resistance have long since been resolved. These debates have had an impact on school
desegregation litigation and have had real consequences for thousands of school children
in Little Rock and their peers across the nation.
Consequently, this study examines the struggle over the public memory of the Little Rock
school desegregation crisis within the context of a half-century long effort to integrate the
Arkansas capital's schools. In doing so, it highlights the distance between the rhetoric of
American progress and the reality of American race relations. It also illuminates how the
city's ongoing struggles with school desegregation have shaped the memorial arena and
vice versa.
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IV

INTRODUCTION

THE "WON CAUSE"?:
PUBLIC MEMORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUITY

In 1957, the city of Little Rock became an international byword for American
racial discrimination and resistance to school desegregation when Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent nine African American teenagers
from attending Central High School. The public memory of the 1957 Little Rock school
desegregation crisis has been contested since its inception and deployed continuously to
either undermine or legitimize ongoing battles for civil rights and social justice in Little
Rock and the nation-at-large. This dissertation examines how this watershed event has
been commemorated over the last fifty years, and how historical narratives about the
crisis have evolved in relation to debates about education and public policy. The struggle
to desegregate Little Rock's public schools has been ongoing in the years since 1957, and
those with a vested interest in this process articulate different arguments about the crisis
as a historical event and its relationship to the present in courtrooms, political debates,
state-sponsored documentary films, newspaper articles, memoirs, museums and other
commemorative forums.
These debates have had real consequences for thousands of school children in
Little Rock and their peers across the nation. Civil rights advocates continue to draw
connections between the past and the present, pointing to the unfinished business of the
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movement, while their opponents argue that the tensions that gave rise to massive
resistance have long since been resolved. This "won cause" mythology can and does
have an impact on school desegregation litigation. As federal judges make decisions
about whether the racial separation in our schools today is a vestige of past discrimination
or the product "natural" preferences, their determinations are written into court decisions
that become important and binding precedent.
This study moves discussion about the public memory of civil rights away from a
focus on the dominance of triumphal narratives, towards an emphasis on the contested
nature of public memory and a concrete examination of what is at stake in these
conversations about the past. Arguably, the battle to claim the legacy of the civil rights
movement is a key site in the present-day struggle to eliminate educational apartheid.
Consequently, the struggle over how school segregation and integration is remembered
and understood- and its implications for the present and the future-- is the focus of this
study.
"Won Cause" Mythology and Public Memory: Why It Matters
Other scholars have emphasized the dominance of what they call the "master
narrative" ofthe civil rights movement, and documented the prevalence of"won cause"
mythology in museums, movies, and the media. The dominant memory of the civil rights
movement that is reiterated and perpetuated- although not uncontested-- in popular
histories, public celebrations, feature films, documentaries, and even national civil rights
museums links the movement to a national narrative of ever-expanding democracy and

2

progress. 1 The story is narrated through of a series of clashes between good and evil"unimpeachable heroes and unspeakable villains"- "unequivocal rights and
incontrovertible wrongs"- which galvanized the nation to correct injustice. 2 Essentially,
this narrative of redemption presents the movement as a unified pursuit of integration and
voting rights that culminated in the passage of corrective legislation which brought the
nation's practices in line with its promises. 3

In the popular memory of the black freedom struggle, there is a remarkable degree
of consensus about which civil rights campaigns were significant and deserve to be
commemorated, what the movement meant, and who its protagonists were. This selective
history is preserved and reproduced in documentaries, civil rights museums, the mass
media, and other commemorative forums. 4 Chronologically, the dominant version of the
civil rights story begins with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People's (NAACP) campaign to integrate schools and the Supreme Court's Brown v.
Board ofEducation decision in 1954 and 1955. When integration did not precede "with
all deliberate speed," civil rights activists demanded change in a series of nonviolent

1

Glenn Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of Tolerance," in
The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2006), 52-53.
2

Bryan Ward, "Introduction: Forgotten Walls and Master Narratives: Media, Culture, and
Memories of the Modem African American Freedom Struggle" in Media, Culture, and the Modern African
American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian Ward (Gainesville: University Press ofFlorida, 2001), 8-9.
3

Owen J. Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins: Alabama's Civil Rights Journey as a Memorial
Text," in Mapping Tourism, ed. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2003), 37-38.
4

Owen J. Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confirmation, and the
Cultural Landscape," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh
Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 7.

3

direct action campaigns- Montgomery, Little Rock, the Sit-ins, the Freedom Rides,
Birmingham, the March on Washington, and Selma. In this narrative, spectacular,
confrontational campaigns orchestrated by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) attracted
sympathetic media coverage that moved the nation and placed pressure on political
leaders. Civil rights activism resulted in the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
1965 Voting Rights Act. By a stroke ofthe pen, this legislation (in public memory, at
least) put an end to segregation, political disenfranchisement, and overt racism in the
South. 5 Attempts to move beyond token integration or efforts to dismantle anything
other than de jure barriers to equality are marginalized in this narrative- the result is a
selective vision of the movement that excludes consideration of some of the nation's most
enduring racial problems and concerns.
In the dominant narrative, noteworthy campaigns were led by national civil rights
organizations and their charismatic leaders, particularly Martin Luther King Jr. Indeed, a
selective vision of King's image, philosophy, and words occupies center stage in popular
memory, overshadowing local leaders, grassroots mobilization, friction among civil rights
organizations, and philosophical differences over the means and ends of black liberation. 6
5

Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,"
Journal ofAmerican History 91, no. 4 (March 2005), 1234. See also Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins:
Alabama's Civil Rights Journey as a Memorial Text," 37-38.
6

As Jacqueline Dowd Hall has noted, "Martin Luther King Jr. is this narrative's defining figurefrozen in 1963, proclaiming "I Have a Dream" during the march on the Mall. Endlessly reproduced and
selectively quoted, his speeches retain their majesty yet lose their political bite" (Hall, "The Long Civil
Rights Movement," 1234). In the final years of his life, King turned his attention to economic injustice,
poverty, and the war in Vietnam. His struggle to "redeem the soul of America" increasingly led him to call
for a "reconstruction of the entire society, a revolution of values" and "a radical redistribution of economic
and political power." But this King has no place in the dominant memory of civil rights. In his essay,
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In some accounts, the trajectory of the civil rights movement seems to follow the course

of King's life and activism. In one version of the story, the movement is born in
Montgomery with the civil rights leader's appearance on the national stage and seems to
die a natural death following his assassination in 1968. Alternatively, the movement selfimplodes in urban riots, student rebellions, or a virulent black nationalism which
purportedly betrays King's integrationist dreams and nonviolent activism.
This periodization draws sharp distinctions between legitimized civil rights
activism in pursuit of integration and voting rights and "illegitimate" struggles for
economic justice and political power before and during the black power era, despite the
fact that King himself was increasingly preoccupied with these issues toward the end of
his life. As Peniel Joseph has recently noted, "such a description creates a situation in
which the BPM [Black Power Movement] can be conveniently blamed for the demise of
the Civil Rights Movement, rather than being viewed as an alternative to the
ineffectiveness of civil rights demands in critical areas of American life. " 7 Although

"Beyond Amnesia: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Future of America," Vincent Harding notes, "It appears
as if the price for the first national holiday honoring a black man is the development of a massive case of
national amnesia concerning who that black man really was" (Vincent Gordon Harding, "Beyond Amnesia:
Martin Luther King Jr. and the Future of America," The Journal ofAmerican History 74, no. 2 [September
1987]: 469). Malcolm X may be the only postwar leader who comes close to rivaling the dominance of
King's memory in this arena. Even then, Malcolm X's memory is frequently evoked within the context of
unflattering "Martin v. Malcolm" storylines that elevate King's "righteous" nonviolent philosophy at the
expense of Malcolm X's legacy and teaching (Edward P. Morgan, "The Good, The Bad, and the Forgotten:
Media Culture and the Public Memory of the Civil Rights Movement," in The Civil Rights Movement in
American Memory, ed. Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford [Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006],
137-166).
7

Peniel E. Joseph, "Introduction: Toward a Historiography ofthe Black Power Movement, " in
The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era, ed. Peniel E. Joseph (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 3. See also Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1254.
And George Lipsitz, American Studies in a Moment ofDanger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2001), 78.
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many activists have stressed the continuity between the "struggles to gain political rights
for southern blacks and the struggles to exercise them in productive ways," these
connections are rarely explored in the nation's commemorative spaces. 8
Within this narrative, discussion of the campaign to desegregate and integrate the
nation's public schools is largely limited to the immediate impact of the Supreme Court's
Brown v. Board ofEducation decision. The NAACP's direct attack on school

segregation as inherently unequal is recalled and praised, but its long campaign to achieve
educational equity before and after the end of de jure segregation is marginalized.
Although the 1957 stand-off at Little Rock Central High is replayed in documentaries~
news stories, and racial reconciliation celebrations, local struggles to achieve more than
token desegregation that lasted for decades in Arkansas' capital and countless
communities throughout the South are neglected. Moreover, northern controversies
about busing and community control of neighborhood schools that kept education at the
center of public debate throughout the 1970s are not considered to be part of the civil
rights movement- chronologically, ideologically, or geographically. Thus, the struggle to
desegregate and integrate schools is defined as a southern issue, despite the fact that the
most segregated school systems in the country today are located in the nation's urban
centers- south, north, and west. Finally, the resegregation of public schools following
Supreme Court decisions that have permitted formerly "unitary" school systems to
dismantle desegregation plans as long as all "practicable" actions to end state-supported

8

Clayborne Carson, "Civil Rights Reform and the Black freedom Struggle, " in The Civil Rights
Movement in America, ed. Charles Eagles (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 28.
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discrimination have been undertaken has no place in the dominant narrative of progress.
This is particularly the case in cities like Little Rock where identifiably white and black
schools have quickly re-emerged on the landscape.
Some contemporary activists contend that the way the civil rights movement is
remembered has fed white denial and indifference in the post-civil rights era. According
to recent surveys, most white Americans believe that black-white integration and equality
is an accomplished reality. 9 Media and cultural studies scholars Leonard Steinhom and
Barbara Diggs-Brown have recently suggested that "it is hard to blame people" for
believing that racial problems are a thing of the past "when our public life is filled with
repeated affirmations of the integration ideal and out ostensible progress towards
achieving it." 10 Pointing to past civil rights victories, many white Americans contend that
the nation has "bent over backwards" to provide African Americans and other minorities
with equal opportunity. Education activist Paul Street warns,
More than simply outliving the explicit open and public racism of the past,
it [covert racism] is partly strengthened by past civil rights victories.
Those triumphs encourage the illusion of racism's disappearance and the
notion that the only barriers left to black equality in the United States are
internal to the black community and that disadvantaged African Americans
are personally responsible for their presence at the bottom ofthe U.S.
hierarchy. 11
These arguments perpetuate the belief that persistent racial disparities in income, security,

9

Paul Louis Street, Segregated Schools: Educational Apartheid in Post-Civil Rights America
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 36-37.
10

Leonard Steinborn and Barbara Diggs-Brown, By the Color of Our Skin: The Illusion of
Integration and the Reality ofRace (New York: Dutton, 1999).
11

Street, Segregated Schools, quote 5-6, 36-37. See also Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil
Rights Movement," 1237.
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housing, health care, and education are the product of a "culture of poverty" and "selfsabotaging" behaviors rather than enduring racism and structural inequalities. 12 Certainly,
the notion that enduring racial disparities in American education are not the vestiges or
byproducts of discrimination but rather of "external factors" beyond the control of local
school systems has underwritten the Supreme Court's tum away from active and ongoing
school desegregation programs.
The triumph of this perspective in the federal courts is not an accident. So-called
"color blind" conservatives have actively cultivated and deployed this narrative to derail
or reshape the hard-won victories of the civil rights era and the legislative initiatives of
the Great Society. Claiming the legacy of the movement for themselves, color blind
conservatives have defined its singular objective as "the elimination of racial
classification and the establishment of formal equality before the law." In her essay, "The
Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses ofthe Past," Jacqueline Dowd Hall
notes that this rhetoric has been used to dismantle majority-minority voting districts,
affirmative action, two-way busing and the court-ordered integration of schools.
According to color blind conservatives, these "race conscious" policies betrayed the
movement, subverted self-reliance among African Americans, and created special group
privileges, making some people "more equal" than others. 13 More recently, this logic
was clearly reflected in the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in Parents
12

More broadly, this kind of rhetoric also provides convenient camouflage for the real
consequences ofneoliberal policies that have elevated the free market, laissez-faire economic policy, and
privatization over democratic participation, government regulation, social justice, and public welfare
(Lipsitz, American Studies in a Moment ofDanger, 77 -78).
13

Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement,"l235-1238.
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Involved (2007), which held that attempts to voluntarily maintain diversity within school
districts by acknowledging race as a factor in student assignment were a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a betrayal of the NAACP's
original intent in Brown. 14 As Hall warns us, and as this decision illustrates, this
interpretation of the purpose and intent of the civil rights movement and its legacy
frequently "impoverishes public discourse, discourages investment in public institutions,
and undermines our will to address the inequalities and injustices that surround us
now." 15
These uses of the civil rights movement and its legacy underscore the point that
the battle over the public memory of the black freedom struggle has significant
ramifications. As Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano remind us in their introduction to

The Civil Rights Movement and American Memory (2006),
the struggles over the memory of the civil rights movement are not a
diversion from the real political work of fighting for racial equality and
equal rights in the United States; they are key sites of that struggle. The
contests over the meanings of the movement must be understood as a
crucial part of the continuing fight against racism and inequality. 16
The stories we tell about our past become our frameworks for understanding the present
and shaping the future, in education and other areas of American life. Consequently,
efforts to define the meaning of the civil rights movement merit careful scrutiny and

14

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, 127 Sup. Ct. 2738 (2007).

15

Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1262.

16

Leigh Raiford and Renee C. Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory," in The Civil
Rights Movement and American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2006), xxi.
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study.
Justice is a Perpetual Struggle: Resistance, Contest, and Controversy
Recently, several scholars have illuminated the pervasive presence of"won cause"
mythology in museums, movies, the media, political debate and even courtroom
testimony. This work has pointed to significant gaps and elisions in the dominant
narrative of the civil rights movement, underscoring the great distance between the
popular consensus and the contradictions, complexities, and continuities that have
emerged in civil rights historiography. Drawing on academic studies of the movement,
scholars like Owen Dwyer, Glenn Eskew, Allison Graham, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, and
Brian Ward have problematized the marginalization of grassroots mobilization over
national leadership, unknown local struggles over media-savvy national campaigns, and
women's participation. The exclusion ofthese events and social actors limits our
understanding of the roles that ordinary people played in the movement and the strength
of their commitment toward changing their own communities. Scholars have also noted
the lack of attention to struggles against economic inequality and social injustice,
northern and urban struggles against de facto segregation, and black nationalism. It is
precisely these narrative gaps and elisions that foster the illusion that the struggle for
black freedom is complete, undermining serious reflection about enduring disparities and
problems. Indeed, discussion of present-day racism is noticeably absent from the
nation's commemorative spaces. 17

17
See Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movemenf'; Harding, "Beyond Amnesia";
Raiford and Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory." On museums and public sites see
Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confmnation, And the Cultural
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"Won cause" mythology serves a variety of constituencies, and although previous
work has primarily focused on documenting the dominance of this verison of the civil
rights story, the best of this scholarship has also turned its attention to the interests which
sustain it. As noted earlier, Jacqueline Dowd Hall has demonstrated how "color-blind"
conservatives utilize "won cause" mythology to support their political agenda. 18 Glenn
Eskew and Owen Dwyer have explored how the dominant narrative serves the interests of
heritage tourism, urban renewal, and the "new" new South. They argue that southern
politicians have supported civil rights museums, tours, and guidebooks because they "turn
a stigmatized past into a commercial asset," simultaneously attracting tourist dollars and
generating positive public relations. 19 Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano have suggested

Landscape"; Owen J. Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict,"
Professional Geographer 52.4 (2000): 660-71; Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins"; Owen J. Dwyer,
"Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement" (Ph. D. diss., University of Kentucky,
2000); Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute"; Glenn T. Eskew,"From Civil War to Civil Rights:
Selling Alabama as Heritage Tourism," in Slavery, Contested Heritage, and Thanatourism, ed. Graham
M.S. Dunn andA.V. Seaton (New York: Haworth Press, 2001); Glenn T. Eskew, "The Won Cause:
Memorializing the Movement through the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute," in Mapping Tourism, ed.
Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003);
Mariko Morita Hughes, "The National Civil Rights Museum's Memorial Message: The Cultural Politics of
Historical Representations and the Civil Rights Movement" (B.A. thesis, Whitman College, 2005); Joseph
Tilden Rhea, "Memory of a Nation: The Race Pride Movement and American Collective Memory" (Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 1995). On film and television see Allison Graham, Framing the South:
Hollywood, Television, and Race during the Civil Rights Struggle (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 2001); Jennifer Fuller, "Debating the Present Through the Past: Representations of the Civil Rights
Movement in the 1990s," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and
Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006). On media see Morgan, "The Good, the Bad,
and the Forgotten"; Ward, "Introduction: Forgotten Walls and Master Narratives." On courtroom
testimony see Leigh Raiford, ''Narratives of Redemption: The Birmingham Church Bombing Trials and the
Construction of Civil Rights Memory," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee
Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006).
18

Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movemenf'; Lipsitz, American Studies in a

Moment ofDanger.
19

Quote from Glenn Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute," 29-30. See also Dwyer,
"Memory on the Margins" and "Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement."
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that ''won cause" mythology serves the state more generally- "held up as a shining
example of the success of American democracy" the movement functions at proof of ''the
vitality of America's legal and political institutions, and evidence of the nation's ongoing
quest to live up to its founding ideals of egalitarianism and justice. " 20 Allison Graham
and Edward P. Morgan have suggested that this narrative generates substantial profit for
the commercial culture industry because it fulfils the desires of white audiences, who
wish to believe that equality has been achieved (with generous contributions from
moderate white liberals who often star in cinematic versions of the movement). 21 W.
Fitzhugh Brundage and Joseph Tilden Rhea contend that this narrative is the product of a
black struggle to have African American history recognized in public spaces. They argue
that while black political power has resulted in increased awareness of the black freedom
struggle, representations of the civil rights movement have not entirely escaped from the
customary leitmotifs of public history and national narratives of progress. 22
This study draws and builds upon this previous scholarship by illuminating and
critiquing the dominant memory of school segregation and integration. In Silencing the

Past: Power and the Production ofHistory, Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes, "History is
the fruit of power, but power itself is never so transparent that its analysis becomes
superfluous. The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge,

20

Raiford and Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory," xvii.

21

Graham, Framing the South, 13; Morgan, "The Good the Bad and the Forgotten," 138.

22

Rhea, "Memory of a Nation," 153-168; W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A Clash of
Race and Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 293-306. See also Owen Dwyer
"Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confirmation, and the Cultural Landscape," 7.
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the exposition of its roots. ,,n Indeed, rather than simply documenting the prevalence of
''won cause" mythology, this study tracks the development of this narrative over time.
By exploring the evolution of the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation
crisis over the course of more than fifty years, this project highlights the elevation of
some narratives and memories and the suppression of others, demonstrating that specific

coalitions of interests have coalesced and diverged, supporting or undermining dominant
memory. This approach also permits close examination of how memories of the 1957
crisis and other battles for educational equity have been deployed in ongoing political
struggles from the 1950s to the present.
Indeed, this study places contest, conflict, and controversy at the center of the
story. Previous work has placed almost exclusive focus on dominant memory and
popular consensus. While other scholars occasionally acknowledge that this story is
contested, for the most part, they do not explore fissures in civil rights consensus history
or resistance to the "master" narrative. The resulting studies analyze museum displays,
movies, or historical novels that reiterate the dominant narrative, but they do not always
explore their construction and reception. They also ignore or downplay alternative sites
of memory that preserve a more radical perspective on the civil rights movement. At
times, this scholarship presents a collective memory of the civil rights movement that is
being imposed on the public by culture industries and political elites, but not struggled for
by activists, intellectuals, or other concerned citizens. Ironically, the popular activism
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and agency these scholars seem so interested in incorporating into the dominant narrative
is absent in their accounts of how the movement itself is being remembered.
In exploring resistance to or reinterpretation of the dominant public memory of

the civil rights movement, this study challenges some of the implications of previous
work. For example, while it may be the case that the dominant memory of the civil rights
movement fosters indifference and denial of current racial problems, it could also be
argued that for some audiences even a "bowdlerized" version of the movement inspires
direct action and participatory democracy. In Making Malcolm, Michael Eric Dyson
notes that a history of black heroism and achievement has been "ceaselessly evoked in
black communities in oral and written form as an inspiration to continued thought and
action in the same vein. " 24 Building on this insight, one could argue that the dominant
narrative of civil rights triumph and progress may be received differently, pointing in
different directions for different audiences. In Little Rock and elsewhere, those who can
"not not know" that racism persists, whose lived experiences contradict "won cause"
mythology, may nevertheless find hope and take inspiration from the victories of the past
as they face the challenges of the future.
In addition to addressing issues of reception and meaning making, I am also

interested in locating alternative and oppositional sites of memory that preserve a broader,
more inclusive, and more expansive version of the struggle for black freedom. These
sites of memory cultivate what Genevieve Fabre has referred to as "memory for the
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future"- commemorative traditions that are primarily concerned with using historical
narratives "in anticipation of action to come" in order to force change and invent a more
viable future. According to Fabre, the tone of these traditions in African American
communities is often "subjunctive"- focused on what should have happened and what
ought to happen as much as on what did happen. 25 Similarly, in Living Black History:

How Reimagining the African American Past can Remake America's Racial Future,
Manning Marable has argued that African American historical traditions continue to be
"descriptive," "corrective," and "prescriptive," connecting "scholarship with collective
struggle, social analysis with social transformation."26 Certainly, the Little Rock Nine's
published memoirs and efforts to use their history to address the state of American race
relations and education in Arkansas' capital today indicate that these traditions persist and
"won cause" mythology is not as uncontested as some of its chroniclers make it out to be.
Moreover, it should be noted that African American communities and their allies
are not the only groups fostering and nurturing oppositional understandings of the civil
rights movement. White racists steeped in southern "lost cause" mythology have defined
the civil rights movement as the "second reconstruction"- yet another example of federal
interference and "racial engineering." For these "unreconstructed southerners," as Tony
Horowitz has called them, the victories of the civil rights movement and the decline of
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massive resistance were the ultimate betrayal of southern heritage and white privilege. 27
In this context, the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board ofEducation decision is not
heralded and celebrated, but derisively referred to as "Black Monday," and Eisenhower's
deployment of the 101 st Airborne to enforce that decision in Little Rock is viewed as an
unjustified federal occupation. Moreover, although scholars like Jason Sokol have
documented the transformative impact of the black freedom movement and "interracial
revolution" on whites and blacks throughout the nation, many whites with means
continue to resist school desegregation and undermine educational equity through flight
to the suburbs, gated communities, and private academies. 28 Indeed, even as the city of
Little Rock has officially embraced the public memory of the school desegregation crisis
and repackaged it in the name of heritage tourism and racial "reconciliation," the school
district itself has struggled against resegregation caused by these trends.
My approach to the public memory of the civil rights movement is informed by
recent work in the study of collective memory, public history, and popular culture. This
scholarship emphasizes that historical narratives created outside of the academy by
novelists, artists, politicians, journalists, curators, movie-makers, and citizens wield
considerable influence and merit close and careful study. Drawing upon the work of
Antonio Gramsci, Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams and Frederick Jameson, much of this
scholarship examines collective memory within the framework of hegemony theory,
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envisioning popular culture and public memory as a battlefield where dominant and
subaltern groups fight for representation. 29 Dominant and politically powerful groups can
manipulate collective memory to cultivate consent and manage resistance, using historical
narratives to legitimate the status quo. However, as George Lipsitz has emphasized,
hegemony is not simply imposed from the top down, it is also struggled for from the
bottom up. In his book Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular
Culture, Lipsitz demonstrated that people utilize residual counter-memories based on
lived experience to challenge and interrogate the "false promises" of dominant popular
culture. He has also argued that some alternative cultural forms "retain memories of the
past" that "rebuke the injustices and inequities of the present."30
Recent studies of public memory emphasize that the construction of popular
historical narratives is a collective enterprise rooted in broader political, social, and
cultural contexts. Within a historical discipline increasingly engaged in debate about
historical "objectivity" and "relativism," most of this scholarship does not primarily
concern the "accuracy" of public memory. Rather, scholars have focused on why and
how people construct collective memories in particular places at particular times.
Scholars like Michael Kammen, David Lowenthal, John Gillis, David Blight, W.
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Fitzhugh Brundage, Roy Rosenzweig, and David Thelen have portrayed collective
memory as an active, ongoing process that continuously shapes and reshapes our
understanding of the past in relation to the concerns of the present. 31 This work places an
emphasis on how public memories have been shaped by power, race, gender, and class
hierarchies. As John Gillis has noted, these factors "determine what is remembered (or
forgotten), by whom, and for what end." This analytical framework, which explores the
interrelationship between past, present, and future, has challenged older definitions of
memory as "a passive process of storing and retrieving objective recollections of lived
experiences.'m Gillis emphasizes, "identities and memories are not things we think

about, they are things we think with. "33
These scholars contend that public memory both constitutes and is constituted by
the world we live in. While recognizing the privileged position of some history-makers
over others, scholars have also emphasized the fluidity of popular historical narratives as
power relations change over time. As Pierre Nora has argued, "Memory is life, borne out
of living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the
dialectic of remembering and forgetting ... vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation,
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susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived." 34

Collective memory is

contested terrain and the work George Lipsitz, John Bodnar, W. Fitzhugh Brundage,
Genevieve Fabre, and David Blight demonstrates the importance of not only focusing on
dominant narratives, but also acknowledging the existence of alternative and even
oppositional frameworks that seek to shift the balance of power in the future by rewriting
our understanding of the past.
This study also draws upon civil rights movement historiography. In the 1970s
and early 1980s, movement scholarship built on interpretations crafted in early media
accounts, and was shaped by traditional institutional and biographical approaches.
Consequently, this work emphasized the national leaders, organizations, and events that
captured media attention in the 1950s and 1960s. Also following the media, this work
defined the goals and successes of the movement in terms of a unified struggle for
integration and voting rights, drawing distinctions between the activism that preceded and
followed the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts. 35 The dominant popular memory of the
civil rights movement, as outlined above, follows the basic outlines of this early
scholarship but is now out of date. In recent years, scholars have placed increasing
emphasis on local activism and grassroots organization, the pursuit of economic equity,
and the battle against de jure and de facto segregation in all parts ofthe country. This
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scholarship has also complicated the periodization of the movement. After shifting the
focus from media-savvy national campaigns, scholars have begun to sketch the outlines
of a "long civil rights movement" or a mid-century "black freedom struggle" that places
what has been called the "heroic period" of the civil rights era within a longer timeline of
activism and the pursuit of social justice. 36 The result is a much more nuanced picture of
the movement that underscores and emphasizes its relevance in relation to contemporary
racial problems.
My emphasis on the ongoing struggle for educational equity and integration draws
upon this new understanding of a long civil rights movement. Despite the claims of
color blind conservatives, school integration and equity was not achieved during the
"heroic" period of the civil rights struggle. In many communities, including Little Rock
itself, the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board ofEducation decision and the stand-off at
Central High resulted only in token integration well into the 1960s and 1970s. Protests
against busing, attempts to counter the effects of de jure and de facto segregation, and
debates over the community control of neighborhood schools continued to place
education at the center of public debate well past the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil
Rights Acts. Indeed, debate over these issues persists to this day. Across the nation,
most black students still find themselves in underfunded and deteriorating majority-
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minority schools.37 After the elimination of apartheid in South Africa, the United States
has the dubious distinction of being the only developed country to systematically spend
more on the education of wealthy children than poor children. 38 This privilegereinforcing system perpetuates race and class-based hierarchies, leading some activists
and scholars to conclude that beyond achieving the intent of Brown v. Board of

Education, the nation still has not met the standard of Plessy v. Ferguson! 39
The "heroic" period of the civil rights movement associated with Brown v. Board
and Little Rock is connected to the ongoing struggle for educational equity not only
because of enduring concerns about equal access to public education, but also because of
the way memory of these iconic events is deployed in public debates about the present
and future. As noted above, activists have identified the battle over the memory and
legacy of the heroic period of civil rights as a key site of the contemporary struggle for
educational equity. This study examines the struggle over the public memory ofthe Little
Rock School desegregation crisis within the context of the effort to integrate the city's
schools. In order to do so, its analysis of lieux de memoire (sites of memory) and
historical narratives describing the crisis are situated in their temporal context and in
relation to the evolution of educational policy in Arkansas' capital and the rest of the
nation.
The long course of school desegregation in Little Rock has been reconstructed in
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the pages that follow through court documents, newspaper clippings, school board
minutes, public reports, congressional hearings, and the written recollections of school
district officials, African American students, and others involved in the case. 1bis study
also draws on existing scholarship related to school desegregation in the United States in
general and Little Rock in particular.
David Gene Vinzant's excellent dissertation, "Little Rock's Long Crisis: Schools
and Race in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1863-2009" was not available at the time this study
was drafted. While this dissertation and Vinzant's work both adopt a chronological
framework to explore the development of court litigation, public opinion, and educational
policy in the Little Rock school district, there are significant differences in emphasis and
interpretation. Vinzant's work provides excellent context for those interested in
educational segregation in Little Rock before the 1957 school desegregation crisis, and he
also provides extended discussion of developments between 1957 and 1976. However,
his study is less attentive to and less critical of the turn away from the desegregation
paradigm that developed during those years and the weakening of court oversight over the
course of the last three decades. Indeed, Vinzant questions whether "the struggle to
integrate schools was the best way to help educationally disadvantaged black children"
given the persistent achievement gap and suggests that African American students could
achieve better educational outcomes in predominantly black schools. Vinzant also
underscores the effect of "mandatory school assignments" on white flight. He argues that
court-ordered desegregation effectively "drove whites out of Little Rock" and "made the
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metropolitan area more segregated than it would have otherwise been."40 In contrast, by
taking a closer look at the way school desegregation policy has evolved in the Little Rock
school district since the 1980s, this study suggests that it is not court-ordered
desegregation per se but rather the way the process of school desegregation has been
implemented and evaded in the city that has produced white flight, disinvestment in
public education, and persistent disparities in student achievement.

Debating Little Rock
Even more than fifty years later, any account of the Little Rock school
desegregation crisis that moves beyond the most skeletal description of well-documented
"facts" is subject to constant challenge in Arkansas' capital. Nevertheless, although
interpretive questions continue to provoke discussion and debate in Little Rock and
elsewhere, most'parties with a vested interest in this history can agree on a basic timeline
of events as they unfolded over the course of the 1957 and 1958 academic years.

In response to the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board ofEducation decision,
which declared that school segregation was unconstitutional, the Little Rock School
Board and Superintendent Virgil Blossom developed a plan designed to respond to the
Court's mandate and desegregate the city's schools over the course of several years.
Despite making a "prompt and reasonable start" towards complying with the high court's
mandate, civic leaders in Little Rock proposed to move forward with more deliberation
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than speed.41 School officials insisted that integration could not proceed until two new
high school facilities were built. Previously, the high schools for white and black
students had city-wide attendance areas. Before the inauguration of the integration plan,
two new facilities were constructed- West End (Hall) High School in Little Rock's
almost completely white "silk stocking" district and Horace Mann High School for black
students on the far eastern edge of the city.42 Due to residential segregation, integration at
the high school level would largely be limited to Little Rock's Central High School and
would proceed at the beginning of the 1957-58 school year. After "successful
integration" at the high school level (Grades 10-12) had been completed, it would be
phased into junior high schools (Grades 7-9). During the third phase of the plan,
elementary schools (Grades 1-6) would be desegregated. 43
This plan was greeted with criticism on all sides. Vocal segregationists in Little
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Rock opposed the introduction of any African American students into Central High,
particularly when wealthier residents of the city would be insulated from the change by
enrolling their children in the newly constructed Hall High School. 44 The plan was also
opposed by members of the civil rights community who objected that it did not contain a
time table for the completion of integration in the district, nor did it define "successful
integration." From the perspective of Daisy Bates, Arkansas State President ofthe
NAACP, the Brown decision signaled that "the time for delay, evasion, and
procrastination was past."45 Consequently, the civil rights organization filed a complaint
in federal court, arguing that the plan was too vague and did not move quickly enough to
eliminate educational apartheid in the Arkansas' capital. Nevertheless, despite these
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challenges, the school district's plan- known as the "Blossom Plan"- was approved by
the federal courts in August 1956.46
Although over 200 black students lived within Central High School's attendance
area, a handful of African American students were screened and selected from a list of
volunteers to transfer to Central High over the course of the summer of 1957.47 As the
beginning of the school year approached, racial tension in the city increased and
segregationist organizations like the White Citizens' Council an~ the Mothers' League of
Central High School placed pressure on political leaders and school officials to abandon
their plans. 48 Citing this resistance, and rumors of potential violence, Arkansas Governor
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Orval Faubus intervened, stationing members of the Arkansas National Guard outside of
Little Rock's Central High School "to maintain or restore order and to protect the lives
and property of citizens" on the eve of the first day of classes. 49 These troops were given
orders not to protect, but to prevent the African American students who planned to enroll
in the school from entering the campus. On September 4, 1957, ten African American
students attempted to attend classes at Little Rock Central High School. They were
blocked from the grounds by the National Guard. A large mob of white citizens also
assembled outside of the building, and some of these onlookers actively harassed and
intimidated the black students and their adult escorts in full view of the national media. 50
In the weeks that followed, the Little Rock Nine- as they became known- were

kept out of school while the NAACP pursued their case through the court system. Under
the circumstances, Minnijean Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Ernest Green, Thelma
Mothershed, Melba Pattillo, Gloria Ray, Terrence Roberts, Jefferson Thomas, and
Carlotta Walls tried their best to keep up with their classes. They gathered at the home of
Daisy Bates, President of the Arkansas NAACP, for updates from the attorneys involved
in the case and to receive assistance from educational tutors.
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The stand-off at Central High School was viewed by many as a constitutional
crisis precipitated by conflict between state and federallaw. 51 Congressman Brooks
Hays' efforts to broker a political resolution to the crisis in a conference between Faubus
and President Eisenhower failed to produce results. 52 Soon thereafter, a federal judge
issued an injunction directly ordering the Governor to stop interfering with the integration
plan approved by the courts. Although the injunction explicitly stipulated that Faubus
could maintain the National Guard outside the high school to preserve the peace as long
as they did not interfere with the constitutional rights of the Little Rock Nine, the
governor elected to remove the troops from outside of Central Bigh School. 53
After weeks of stalemate, the Little Rock Nine returned to Central and attended
classes for the first time on September 23, 1957. However, due to the large and hostile
crowd that gathered outside the building and the inability of local police to constrain it,
officials feared for the students' safety and they were removed from the campus before
the end of the school day. Local officials appealed to President Eisenhower for
assistance. In response, the President deployed members of the 101 st Airborne to Little
Rock to support the rule of law and enforce the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision.
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The 101 st established a perimeter outside of Central High and provided each of the
African American students with an escort between classes inside the building. 54
Despite this protection, a group of segregationist students inside the school
continued to harass the Little Rock Nine for the duration of the school year. School
officials adopted a policy of only punishing incidents of harassment witnessed by a
teacher. Disciplinary problems continued after the withdrawal of the 101 st Airborne. For
the duration of the school year, members of the federalized Arkansas National Guard
were assigned to help maintain order inside the building. 55 Eight of the nine African
American students who had enrolled in classes at Central in the fall completed the school
year. Minnijean Brown was placed on probation and then expelled for responding to
provocation from white students. 56 Ernest Green, the only senior of the group, became
the first African American student to graduate from Little Rock's Central High School in
May of 1958.57
The school desegregation crisis in the city continued the following year. School
officials contended that the educational standards ofthe school district were being
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"seriously impaired" by the turmoil surrounding the desegregation process, and petitioned
the federal courts for a two-and-a-half year postponement of their integration plan. This
delay was granted by the federal district court, which found that "popular opposition in
Little Rock to the principle of integration" had resulted in the harassment of the nine
African American students and the destruction of their belongings, numerous bomb
threats, vandalism of school property, increased strain on teachers and administrators, and
the disruption of educational standards. In balancing the personal rights of African
American students in the district against the "public interest," the district court granted a
"tactical delay" that would enable the conflict between federal and state law to be
resolved in the courts and tempers to cool in the city-at-large. 58
The district court's order was overturned by the gth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the U.S. Supreme Court. Although they acknowledged the "bedlam and turmoil" which
had marked the 1957-58 school year, the higher courts rejected the school board's petition
for a "cooling-off' period. The 8th Circuit found that the school district might have been
able to ameliorate its problems if it had deployed stricter disciplinary measures inside the
school or asked for court injunctions against those interfering with the integration plan
outside of the school. More importantly, the Circuit Court underscored the importance of
maintaining the rule of law. "The issue plainly comes down to the question of whether
overt public resistance, including mob protest, constitutes sufficient cause to nullify an
order of the Federal court directing the board to proceed with its integration plan," the
Court wrote. "We say the time has not yet come in these United States when an order of
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a federal court must be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in the
face of violent and unlawful acts of individual citizens." If such a delay was granted in
Little Rock, the

gth

Circuit concluded, it would set a dangerous precedent, and every

school district which met with public opposition to integration would have a ''justifiable
excuse" for postponing the process indefinitely. This was unacceptable. 59
The Supreme Court reviewed the arguments in the case Aaron v. Cooper in a
special term convened to reach a decision before the beginning of the 1958-59 school
year. 60 In affirming the 8th Circuit decision, the Court found that "law and order" would
not be restored in Little Rock "by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional
rights," but rather by concerted state action directed at applying and enforcing the Brown

v. Board ofEducation decision in the state of Arkansas. The Court rejected the school
board's argument that additional time was needed to resolve the conflicts between state
and federal law related to school desegregation. "Article VI of the Constitution makes
the Constitution the 'supreme law of the land,"' the Court flatly stated; and since

Marbury v. Madison, it had fallen to the federal judiciary ''to say what the law is." The
Court's interpretation of the purpose and intent of the 14th Amendment and its decision in
the Brown case were "binding.... on the States."61
Governor Faubus remained unpersuaded by this ruling. In 1957, the Arkansas

Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (81h Circ., 1958), as reproduced in Race Relations Law Reporter
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State Constitution had been amended, directing the General Assembly to "pass laws
opposing ... the Un-Constitutional desegregation decisions ... of the United States Supreme
Court," in reference to Brown I and Brown Il. 62 In advance of the 1958-59 school year
and in direct response to the denial of any further delay in the integration process, several
new statutes were added to the books which provided the Governor with power to close
schools under court order to desegregate, and allowed public money to be redirected
private schools operated on a segregated basis. Another statute permitted students living
in communities under integration orders to transfer to segregated school districts. The
Assembly also outlined procedures for recalling school board members.63
In the aftermath ofthe Supreme Court's decision in Aaron v. Cooper, Governor

Faubus activated this newly passed legislation and closed all of Little Rock's high
schools under court order to desegregate. In a special election, the majority of Little Rock
voters ratified his decision by a vote of 19,000 to 7,500. With the encouragement of the
Governor, the Little Rock School Board entered into negotiations to lease the public
school buildings and all the instructional materials they contained to a private corporation
established to provide segregated education in the city. In doing so, federal courts
determined that the Board had violated their obligation to proceed with their court-
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approved integration plan, and they were enjoined from proceeding with the leasing
agreement any further. 64
As a result ofthese actions, the city's high schools remained closed for the
duration ofthe 1958-59 school year and the many of the district's students were forced to
transfer to other schools or go without an education. 65 Moreover, public opposition to
desegregation encouraged segregationists on the school board to fire 44 teachers who had
shown some sympathy with the integration process. This purge and the closure of the
schools provoked a struggle to control the school board between advocates of massive
resistance and more moderate members of the community who did not necessarily
support integration but promoted the importance of public education. 66 Although
moderates gained control of the school board in a special recall election, Little Rock's
high schools were not reopened until the fall of 1959, after federal courts declared the
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school closing law activated by Governor Faubus unconstitutional. 67 Struggles to achieve
more than token integration in Little Rock would continue for decades to come.
While the narrative represented in this brief outline is widely documented and
generally accepted in the city of Little Rock and elsewhere, efforts to interpret the causes
and effects of these events, the motivations of various actors, or to define the meaning of
this history in relation to the present are subject to considerably more debate.
•

Was the "Blossom Plan" a cynical attempt to minimize integration in the city or
an effort to make Little Rock a model city of compliance with the Brown v. Board
ofEducation decision?

•

Did the Little Rock Nine volunteer to attend Central High School, or were they
pressured by representatives of the NAACP or even paid to enroll?

•

Did Orval Faubus act to "preserve the peace" or to gain political advantage in his
upcoming re-election campaign? Was there a real threat of racial violence in the
city of Little Rock, or were the rumors orchestrated to justify Faubus' decision to
deploy the National Guard?

•

Was Little Rock a relatively "progressive" city in the South or a stronghold of
segregation? Were the mobs that gathered outside of Central High School
composed of local residents or "rednecks" from more rural parts of Arkansas?

•

What kinds of harassment did the Little Rock Nine experience throughout the
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school year and who was culpable? How should the positions staked out by white
segregationists and moderates in 1957 be viewed in retrospect?
•

Did the national media capture real scenes of massive resistance outside the high
school or were the events staged and selectively edited by reporters or even
communist sympathizers?

•

Should the deployment of the 101 st be viewed as a legitimate means of enforcing
the edicts of the Supreme Court, or as a illegitimate use of military force to
suppress democratic dissent?

•

Were Governor Faubus, the citizenry of Little Rock, the NAACP, or the federal
courts responsible for the closure of the city's schools during the 1958-59 school
year?

•

How should the effort to reclaim the school board by business elites and women's
organizations be interpreted, in light of the fact that many of those who
participated in this effort did not necessarily support the principle of integration?

These and other questions continue to resonate with varying degrees of force in private
conversations, public debates, and commemorative forums in Arkansas' capital city.
'"Unreconstructed southerners," civil rights activists, moderates, and business and
political elites have approached the answers to these queries differently over the course of
the last fifty years. Their analysis of the school desegregation crisis and its immediate
aftermath has been informed not only by their participation in or perspective on the events
that made Little Rock famous, but also by their assessment of the legacy of the crisis in
the present- particularly in relation to the city's schools. As circumstances in Little
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Rock and the nation have evolved, so too have the historical narratives used to describe
the events of 1957.

In order to reconstruct this memorial landscape and its evolution over the course
of the last fifty years, this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach. Public memory is
profoundly intertextual; historical interpretations and arguments crafted in one media
reverberate in and inform others. Consequently, this study explores and examines a
variety of lieux de memoire, including state-sponsored documentary film, retrospective
media coverage, political and legal debate, memoirs and oral histories, television
docudrama, museum exhibitions, and commemorative ceremonies. During the course of
research, I immersed myself in the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation
crisis while attending the 50th anniversary commemoration in 2007. The memorial
landscape of preceding decades was reconstructed through archival collections held at the
University of Arkansas Little Rock, University of Arkansas Fayetteville, Columbia
University, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives. Public debate and
discussion about the events of 1957, especially in relation to contemporary concerns, was
also uncovered in national and local newspaper coverage, particularly the Arkansas

Democrat, Arkansas Gazette, Arkansas Times, and Little Rock's two black newspapers
the Arkansas State Press and Southern Mediator Journal. Over the intervening half
century, more than a dozen published and unpublished memoirs related to the crisis have
been written. These texts and the reactions to them provide insight not only into the
events of the 1950s but also the historical questions and debates which animated the
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times in which they were written. Finally, I conducted interviews with individuals
involved with the creation of the Little Rock Central High School Visitor Center, as well
as two members of the Little Rock Nine- Terrence Roberts and Minnijean Brown
Trickey- to learn from their perspectives on how the memory of their experience has
changed over time.
Certainly, some ofLittle Rock's storytellers have more political leverage than
others and have been able to advance their version of this history as the city's "official"
public memory. Various iterations of"won cause" mythology have graced films and
museum displays produced about the crisis or marked racial reconciliation celebrations.
However, it would be difficult to describe these interpretations of the crisis as
uncontested.
For half a century, ongoing school desegregation litigation in the city and the glare
of the media spotlight has revealed that Little Rock-like many communities throughout
the nation- continues to struggle with racial disparities in student achievement and racial
isolation in its schools. Perhaps because of its iconic status in the history of school
desegregation, Arkansas' capital has been forced to confront its shortcomings more than
most. Although the school district was released from court oversight in 2009, the city's
civil rights community, and perhaps even more significantly, the Little Rock Nine
themselves continue to point to the work that remains to be done. In this context, efforts
to apply "lessons from Little Rock" to the present, and the tradition of "preserving
memory for the future," have continually countered and resisted efforts to declare Little
Rock's history a thing of the past.
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As early as 1964, one of the first retrospective accounts of the Little Rock school
desegregation crisis was deployed to counteract negative perceptions ofU.S. race
relations abroad by the United States Information Agency (USIA). A decade after the

Brown v. Board ofEducation decision, school desegregation still proceeded at a glacial
pace, and communities like Little Rock continued to passively resist the full implications
of the Supreme Court's edict by deploying strategies like pupil placement laws and
freedom-of-choice plans designed to keep integration to a minimum. The USIA, the
nation's "public diplomacy" agency abroad, sought to obscure these dismal statistics by
constructing a "where are they now" documentary that focused on positive changes in
racial attitudes in Little Rock and elsewhere in the years since 1957. In constructing this
rosy picture, USIA filmmakers and producers knowingly misrepresented the sentiments
of the Little Rock Nine who participated in the project and failed to acknowledge that
only 33 black pupils were attending Little Rock's Central High School during filming. At
a time when only 1.18% of African American students in the South were attending
schools with their white peers, the construction ofthis misleading narrative of progress in
1964 demonstrates how detached "won cause" mythology can be from the reality of
school desegregation. However, surveys conducted abroad also revealed that this
narrative was not always received as its creators intended- while foreign viewers were
persuaded that race relations were "better" in America after seeing the film, they did not
attribute this to positive shifts in attitude (as the USIA hoped) but rather to the forceful
intervention of the federal government.
During the 1970s, the terrain of the struggle to integrate American schools shifted.
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After fmding that many urban school districts- north and south- had manipulated school
attendance zones to maintain racial segregation, federal courts demanded that school
districts take affirmative steps to dismantle their dual school systems, even if this meant
busing students. As an urban school district in the South, Little Rock was one of the first
communities to be affected by this change, and under a busing plan the city experienced
meaningful school desegregation for the first time. However, as the focus of the black
freedom struggle expanded to include northern communities, economic barriers, and
efforts to exercise political power, national resistance to black activism grew. In part, this
was expressed in attacks on school busing. As conflict erupted around the nation, in
Boston and elsewhere, the memory of the 1957 school desegregation crisis and massive
resistance in Little Rock functioned as a kind of rhetorical anchor- a cultural lodestone
against which new attacks on black students and school integration efforts were
measured. Analysis of media coverage of these events reveals the increasingly negative
tone adopted by the white media, and the emergence of what Jacqueline Dowd Hall has
called a "narrative breech" between efforts to achieve token integration in the South and
more wide-ranging attempts to restructure America's educational system nationally. 68
Increasingly, distinctions were drawn between the events of 1957 and those of the 1970s,
as reporters, cultural observers, and politicians insisted that what was at stake in busing
cases was fundamentally different. In Little Rock, the city's black media as well as civil
rights veterans like Daisy Bates and organizations like the NAACP attempted to cross this
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chasm, drawing connections and arguing that busing was a fulfillment of the goals they
had struggled for more than a decade earlier. In making these arguments, they deployed
the symbol of Central High School itself in public ceremonies decrying President Nixon's
proposal to place a moratorium on school busing as a betrayal of the sacrifice of the Little
Rock Nine and other African American pioneers.
Despite these efforts, by the 1980s the "narrative breech" that had emerged in the
1970s was firmly entrenched and reinforced by the passage of time. In a nation
transformed by the Reagan revolution, many white Americans appeared eager to believe
that the civil rights turbulence of the preceding decades was a distant relic of the past.
Indeed, in Arkansas' capital itself, where the school district attempted to ameliorate the
effects of white flight by aggressively pursuing an interdistrict urban-suburban remedy in
the courts, it appeared that perhaps an important comer had been turned. In this context,
the Little Rock school desegregation story was repackaged and marketed as "history" for
the first time. However, as a series of memoirs, documentaries, and a made-for-tv
docudrama appeared, debate about how and by whom this history should be told took
hold in Arkansas' capital. The narratives that were most warmly embraced by publishers
and producers were not those of figures like Governor Orval Faubus, who continued to
try to justify his intervention in 1957, but those of more "moderate" southern whites like
U.S. Congressman Brooks Hays and Central High Vice Principal of Girls Elizabeth
Huckaby. Their stories were circulated as eyewitness accounts of"good people" who
tried to do the right thing under difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, even Hays and
Huckaby faced criticism that their narratives focused too much attention on
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"embarrassing" events, and that the depiction of their heroism came at the expense of the
majority of the citizens of Little Rock. However, by and large the valorization of
moderates in the city continued unabated, as other "heroes" were identified including
white members of the Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools who had
been active during the lost year of 1958-59.
This embrace of moderation coincided with a retreat from efforts to achieve
sweeping change in the city's school system. When federal courts ordered only a limited
interdistrict remedy, and white enrollment and investment in the city's schools continued
to fall, Little Rock's school administrators would recommit themselves to some of the
principles southern "moderates" had always stood for in relation to school integrationgradual change, minimal compliance with court orders, local control of school
desegregation, residential school attendance, the integration of "exceptional" students in
"special" programs, and flexible application of federal law. Increasingly they argued that
efforts to raise test scores, address disciplinary problems, or remedy racial isolation in the
city's schools were futile in the face of"extemal factors" like poverty that were beyond
the control of the school district. Like their predecessors in the 1950s, they suggested,
they were doing the best they could under difficult circumstances.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, various constituencies in the city were interested
in marking the fortieth anniversary of the crisis. Political elites in Little Rock hoped to
recast the 1957 stand-off, reshaping it into a symbol of the transformative changes that
had swept the city and the south in the intervening decades. However, some members of
the city's civil rights community believed the official anniversary commemoration was
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little more than a public relations ploy designed to mask the real face of race relations in
Little Rock and the problems that continued to grip the city's schools. In the midst of this
controversy, plans to develop a visitor's center dedicated to interpreting the history of the
crisis emerged. The planning process surrounding the museum reveals precisely how
political and cultural elites are able to utilize their connections to dominate public
discussion and debate and to elevate some historical narratives over others. Although a
community-based planning committee envisioned the construction of a larger civil rights
institute, their wishes were sidelined by the museum's board. Without control over the
funds that would make the project a reality, the planning committee was recast as a "focus
group" charged with responding to the work of professionals and students associated with
University of Arkansas Little Rock's public history program. As the exhibit developed,
museum planners strove to side-step controversy rather than providing a foru!n for debate
and discussion of the multiple interpretations of the crisis and its legacy that continued to
circulate in the city. However, these different perspectives emerged at the formal
commemoration of the anniversary held on the steps of the Central High School as well
as in editorials and op-eds that surfaced in the days at followed.
Some of the strongest voices to emerge during the fortieth anniversary were those
of the Little Rock Nine themselves. After decades of struggling to reconcile themselves
to their experience, the Little Rock Nine collectively trademarked their name and
developed a foundation dedicated to sharing the history of their experience and promoting
the importance of academic excellence. Several of the Little Rock Nine have publicly
asserted that they were motivated to start sharing their stories out of a desire to counteract
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histories that downplayed the strength ofLittle Rock's commitment to segregation in
1957 or dismissed the harassment they experienced as students. Others were troubled by
triumphal "won cause" narratives that seemed to prevent young people from drawing
connections between their own circumstances and those of the past. In public speeches
and published memoirs, members of the Little Rock Nine have articulated their hope that
their own struggle can serve as a source of inspiration in the post-civil rights era. They
reject the fatalism that imbues most discussions of racial inequality in the nation's
schools today, especially arguments that all "practicable" actions have been taken to
address persistent double-digit achievement gaps and racially isolated schools. In their
view, these problems require people of conscience to do something and take action.
Their work falls well with the "corrective" or "prescriptive" African American historical
tradition, and the lessons they hope to share from Little Rock are very clearly designed to
preserve "memory for the future."
This dissertation explores the evolution of the public memory of the Little Rock
school desegregation crisis as it unfolded over time. Its discussion of the themes outlined
above is coupled with analysis of the concrete conditions in Little Rock's public schools
and the evolution of desegregation in the district. Chapters addressing the city's
relationship to national trends in school desegregation are coupled with those that more
explicitly address debates related to public memory. In part, this format was adopted to
provide readers with insight into the distance between the rhetoric of American progress
and the reality of American race relations. However, it is also rooted in the belief that the
city's ongoing struggles with school desegregation have shaped the debates that have
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emerged in the memorial arena and vice versa. The narratives we tell about the civil
rights movement and its relationship to the present can have profound consequences,
supporting or undermining struggles for racial justice and equality.
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CHAPTER ONE
"TOKENISM PLUS":
MINIMAL COMPLIANCE THROUGH PUPIL PLACEMENT, 1959-1964

In 1958, the Supreme Court had refused to grant the Little Rock school board its

request for a "cooling-off' period. In Cooper v. Aaron, the justices held that mob
violence and public protest could not undermine school desegregation plans approved by
federal courts. The court affirmed that desegregation orders could not be "whittled away,
watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in the face of violent and unlawful acts of
individual citizens." However, if the Court stood firmly against mob violence in 1958, it
did provide southern segregationists with another means to whittle away and water down
meaningful school desegregation. In Shuttlesworth v. Alabama (1958), the Court upheld
the state of Alabama's pupil placement law, which provided local school board's with
considerable power over student assignment. This statute, like others across the South,
was written in race neutral language and the federal courts found that it was constitutional
"upon its face." However, in application, pupil placement laws were designed to evade
the full import of the Brown decision just as surely as other strategies of resistance. 1 In
the 1960s, the Little Rock school board used its power over student assignment to hold
integration of the city's schools at token levels.

1
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Although the African American civil rights community in Little Rock was
determined to move integration in the city's schools forward with the reopening of
schools in 1959, school officials who wanted to minimize integration used Arkansas'
pupil placement provisions to place obstacles in their path. Their intentions became clear
in August when fifty-nine black students who lived in the appropriate attendance zones
applied for admission at Central, Hall, and Technical High Schools. Most of the
applicants were denied admission and were informed that they had been assigned to the
all-black Horace Mann High School. In response, African American plaintiffs filed
another complaint with the federal courts, arguing that the school board was continuing to
discriminate against them. Concerned parents concluded that the "moderates" on Little
Rock's school board "were genuine segregationists whose actions were just as
unscrupulous and much more effective than those of the racists." 2 They observed that the
court-approved Blossom plan in the school district had established three clearly
demarcated geographic attendance zones and had outlined no other qualifications for
admission to the city's regular high schools other than residence within those zones. In
departing from this plan, black students and their representatives argued that the school
board was violating their constitutional rights under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3
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School Reopens

Indeed, initially, only six African American students were admitted to Little
Rock's formerly white high schools in 1959- three at Hall High School and three at
Central. As many observers noted, this was a reduction in the number of black pupils
assigned to Little Rock's traditionally white schools. Moreover, with students divided
between the two high schools, Little Rock's pioneers in school integration would find
themselves even more isolated in classrooms and hallways. The three students admitted
to Central were veterans of the 1957-58 school year: Elizabeth Eckford, Jefferson
Thomas and Carlotta Wails. But two other members of the original Little Rock Nine,
Thelma Mothershed and Melba Patillo, were denied readmission. The rest of the Little
Rock Nine had left the state. While the schools in Little Rock were closed, graduate
Ernest Green had enrolled at Michigan State to continue his studies, the families of
Terrence Roberts and Gloria Ray had relocated to Los Angeles and Kansas City
respectively, and Minnijean Brown continued to attend high school in New York the year
after her expulsion. When the schools reopened in the fall of 1959, Eckford had earned
enough credit through correspondence courses to graduate and only Thomas and Walls
would return to Central. Ultimately, after making appeals to the school board, three
additional requests for reassignment from Horace Mann to Central were approved, and
Sybil Jordan, Frank Henderson, and Sandra Johnson would join them. 4
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In its assessment of conditions in Arkansas in August 1959, the Southern
Regional Council (SRC) believed that conditions in Little Rock had improved over the
proceeding two years and that city officials were better prepared to implement and
enforce the integration plan than they had been in 1957. The organization believed that
"disenchantment" with the course of massive resistance had emerged in the city of Little
Rock during the school closures, and that the recall of segregationists on the school board
provided evidence of "popular unwillingness" to follow the course of massive resistance
outlined by Governor Faubus. The civil rights organization concluded that "the stiffening
of local opposition" was motivated by "the growing feeling that the administration was
irresponsible and oppressive," apprehension "over the effects of the controversy on the
local economy," concern about the "hardship being imposed on... children,"
acknowledgment that the federal courts were an "immovable object," and a general
distaste for the "notoriety" that accompanied resistance to school integration. However,
the SRC also observed that Governor Faubus continued to inflame sentiment in the city
by predicting that the federal government would need "live ammunition" to carry out
desegregation in Little Rock and publicly stating that he would not intervene in the event
of violence. 5
On the opening day of classes, a crowd of recalcitrant segregationists gathered at
the Arkansas State Capitol to hear the Governor make a speech and then proceeded
toward Central High School with the intention of disrupting desegregation once again.

5
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Capital Citizens' Council leader Amis Guthridge protested that the board's pupil
placement plan was little more than a scheme designed to "deceive local white parents."
He asserted, "If six Negroes can force their entrance unnecessarily into two white high
schools, than 600 will have the same right."6 Sentiments like these animated the crowd of
demonstrators. When the mob refused to disperse, Police Chief Eugene G. Smith
unleashed fire hoses to control the crowd, and arrested two dozen of those who resisted
his authority. Shortly thereafter, classes began at Central High School. Of the original
Little Rock Nine, Carlotta Walls had not yet returned to the city from summer school, but
Jefferson Thomas returned and climbed the steps of the building once again. He was
accompanied by a friend who understood more than most what it meant to go to school
under threat of mob violence- Elizabeth Eckford. She did not want him to have to face
the day alone. 7
Pupil Placement and Selective Screening
In the days, months, and years that followed, Faubus and other promoters of
"massive resistance" would not be able to bring public education or the integration
process in the city of Little Rock to a complete standstill ever again. In the immediate
aftermath of Brown, southern states, including Arkansas, had adopted a wide array of
measures to prevent any integration of the schools. Legislatures passed laws to close
public schools or withhold state funds from districts ordered by courts to desegregate.
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They repealed compulsory attendance laws, and encouraged or authorized the
development of private schools, while providing students with tuition grants to defray
expenses. They provided public funds to school districts to fight desegregation cases in
the courts, passed anti-barratry laws targeted at the NAACP, and authorized segregation
committees and sovereignty commissions to investigate those calling for integration or
even the preservation of the public school system. 8
However, as these measures were declared unconstitutional by federal courts, an
increasing number of states, led by the example of North Carolina, permitted token levels
of integration to defuse the threat oflegal action. However, in doing so, they adopted
pupil placement laws and so-called freedom-of-choice plans designed to keep
desegregation to a minimum. The burden was placed on black parents and civil rights
organizations, like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, to exhaust "available administrative
remedies" and then file law suits seeking court orders to proceed with substantial
integration. When this was accomplished, another obstacle was frequently erected in their
place. 9
The situation was no different in Little Rock, Arkansas. As noted above, after the
futile gesture of closing its public high schools for the 1958-1959 school year, the city

8
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continued to proceed with its court-ordered desegregation plan by admitting a handful of
students to Central and Hall High Schools. However, under Little Rock's pupil
placement plan, the number of students admitted was kept as low as possible. Students
applying for transfer were required to fill out a 17-section questionnaire with their parent
or guardian and to submit to an oral examination. In the early 1960s, these applications
were weighed individually by the school board, and requests could be denied for any
number ofreasons. 10 The most liberal member ofthe board, Ted Lamb, publicly accused
his colleagues of using this procedure as a "devious means" by which they hoped to "outtrick, out-maneuver and defy the federal government." 11

However, the majority of white

moderates in the city embraced this token approach to integration. 12
The school board adopted these procedures under Arkansas' pupil placement
statutes. These laws were adopted to prevent the assignment of students- black and
white- to schools based on their geographic residence alone. Although they were written
in race-neutral language in the hope of escaping constitutional review, they were designed
to prevent rapid desegregation. 13 The legislature argued that assignment based on the
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"rigid rule of proximity of residence or in accordance solely on behalf of the pupils would
be disruptive to orderly administration, tend to invite or induce disorganization and
impose an excessive burden on the available resources and teaching and administrative
personnel of the schools." The Act passed in 1959 allowed for the use of criteria like the
"qualifications, motivations, aptitudes, and characteristics" of individual pupils to be
considered in student registration. In 1959 and 1960, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that pupil placement laws were "facially valid" and that school boards, like
the one in Little Rock, could utilize pupil placement criteria like these "so long as they
are not applied in an artificial manner and for the purpose of continuing segregation." 14
However, in Little Rock, the selective criteria suggested in the pupil placement
statutes were clearly being used to maintain a dual school system. Only the registration
forms of African American pupils who chose not to enroll at Little Rock's black high
school, Horace Mann, were marked with a "C/PP"- an abbreviation for "Colored/Pupil
Placement." Forty-nine students- 32 white and 17 black- appealed their assignment
through procedures outlined by the board. All of the African American students, but

resistance and minimum compliance first appeared quite different approaches, in the years following Brown
those differences quickly narrowed as the two combined to undermine the process of school desegregation
across the South" (Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 93, 101-103). Karen Anderson has noted that the use
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only three of the white students, were subjected to psychological and intelligence testing,
and home visits from social workers. 15 lbree-quarters of the white applications were
approved, while more than four-fifths of the applications submitted by black students
were denied. As noted above, only three additional African American students were
assigned to Central High School as a result of this process by the beginning of the 195960 school year. The racial disparity in the board's treatment of transfer requests is even
more evident when one considers that all of the white students seeking reassignment were
applying to attend schools outside their attendance zone, while all but one of the black
students seeking reassignment were attempting to attend schools within their residential
neighborhoods. 16
While oral hearings were conducted as a routine part of reassignment procedures
for both white and black students, only the African American students were extensively
cross-examined. The board found several of the black applicants "'evasive,'
'disrespectful,' 'hostile,' 'uncooperative' or as having 'improper attitudes."' One ofthe
plaintiffs who accused the board of racial discrimination was denied reassignment on the
grounds that "While an attitude of 'sticking up for one's rights' is normally to be
commended, this attitude could create an unbearable problem from the standpoint of the
Board's efficient and effective operation of the schools in an extremely difficult transition
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period." 17 Under the guise of"all deliberate speed," the Little Rock school board
believed it had significant leeway to control the pace of change in the district. Indeed,
this comment revealed that district officials believed their prerogatives even permitted
them to the deny the exercise of the constitutional rights recognized in the Brown
decision.
These practices continued during reassignment hearings for the 1960-1961 school
year. School board minutes reveal how "selective" criteria could be utilized to minimize
the number of transfer requests granted. In July of 1960, tenth-grader Howard Leon
Bryels and his mother were subjected to close questioning from school board members.
Bryels expressed a desire to attend Central because it was closer to his home and he
would be able to walk or ride a bus to attend classes. The board dismissed this request
on the grounds, in part, that Bryels home was only seven blocks closer to Central than
Mann and that proximity was "not a factor of any significance in his case." Moreover,
despite the fact that the student had an "average academic record" and "good adjustment
inventory," the board concluded that his transfer would be "detrimental to his best
interests and would undoubtedly adversely affect the curriculum and academic program
and standards and academic progress of other students at Central." Perhaps most
significantly, the board frowned on the revelation that Bryels had attended "mass
meetings" and consulted with Attorney John Walker, who represented African American
plaintiffs in the school desegregation litigation, as well as L.C. Bates, the husband of the
Little Rock Nine's mentor Daisy Bates. The board used this information to argue that
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Bryels' statements in his oral hearing had been unduly influenced by outside forces and
were not a true reflection of his preferences. Other students were also closely questioned
about their contacts with Walker and Bates, and the purpose of any meetings they had
attended related to their requests for reassignment. 18 District officials seemed determined
to screen out any students who had contact with local civil rights leaders.
School administrators insisted that the use of selective criteria, and the admission
of only a small number of hand-picked African American students, was necessary. The
school board consulted with high school counselors on the academic success and social
"adjustment" of each of the black students attending Central and Hall High Schools
during the 1959-60 school year. Oriana Hensley, a counselor at Central High, contended
that a "selective procedure" in the admittance of African American students was critically
important. If students were admitted on the basis of their geographic residence, "the
entire educational program would be disrupted," she argued. In part, this was because
Arkansas law permitted white students to transfer out of integrated classrooms into
segregated classes. If large numbers of African American pupils were admitted to
Centrai, Hensley contended, "scheduling would be most <Jifficult, if not impossible."
Minnie Lee Mayhan of Hall High, argued that careful selection of the "best youngsters"
might have a positive impact on their "acceptance" in white schools over a long period of
time. Although both counselors acknowledged that the students who had applied for
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admission to white schools were motivated by a desire for better education, rather than
"publicity," they questioned the academic ability of most black students in the district.
Mayahan contended that the "average colored youngster can't survive at Hall." However,

with the retention of selective admissions, both women recommended that the integration
program should proceed at the high school level. 19
As the complaints of the African American students wound their way through the
federal court system, these rationalizations proved to be insufficient. Upon reviewing the
way the pupil placement statute was being applied in the Little Rock School District, the
gth

Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the school board was utilizing its procedures

"for the purpose of impeding, thwarting, and frustrating integration." The "educational
principles and theories" advanced by the board and school administrators in defense of
their program could not be used to "justify such a result." Even if the pupil placement
statutes were facially valid, their application was not. If the board intended to continue to
assign students under the pupil placement statutes, they were responsible for applying
them objectively in initial student assignments as well as in requests for transfer or
reassignment. They could not treat white and black students differently. Moreover, the
board was obligated to take "affirmative action" towards achieving "more than token"
integration in its schools. The judges on the

gth

Circuit warned the district that if their

pupil placement provisions stymied or failed to dismantle the dual education system in
Little Rock, the board would have to develop other means to desegregate its schools.20

19

LRSB, Special Meeting, August 5, 1960.

20

Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961).

56

"Painfully Slow" Desegregation

In response to this legal pressure, the city's junior high schools were
"desegregated" in 1961-62. Liberal school board member Ted Lamb publicly insisted
that it was time the board complied with the intention of federal court orders and
"awakened" to its "moral and legal responsibilities, that are part of participating in and
living in the Twentieth Century." The Arkansas Council on Human Relations applauded
this stance and credited Lamb with "spearheading" the effort to expand school
desegregation in the district. 21 Even so, only 48 African American students were assigned
to white junior and senior high schools the next year despite overcrowding in Little
Rock's black schools. Civil rights attorney Wiley A. Branton argued that this slow
progress hardly amounted to a serious commitment to move beyond token integration.
For their part, school board representatives continued to argue that the success ofthe
desegregation program should not be measured by the number of black students attending
white schools but rather by their acceptance at those institutions. 22

In 1963, the plan was extended to the first and fourth grades, and a year later,
African Americans students were theoretically able to apply for transfers to attend any of
the city's formerly white schools. 23 Even so, by the 1963-1964 academic year, in a school
district with approximately 16,000 white students and 7,000 black students, only 118
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black students attended classes at 15 formerly all-white schools. Seven years after the
Little Rock Nine endured harassment inside and outside Central High School, the number
of African American students attending classes there had only increased to 33 out of a
student body of2,100. No white students attended any of the city's traditionally black
schools. 24

In 1963, New York Times reporter Gertrude Samuels visited the city and
concluded that the city's integration plan was little more than "tokenism plus." Samuels
concluded that the school board had taken a "negative and resistant" approach to school
integration, "doing as little as humanly possible" to comply with court orders. She found
that the limited changes that had taken place were the result of sustained pressure from
the black community. During her visits to Central, Samuels contended that the few black
students there were "lost in the crowd," rebuffed by their fellow students and isolated
during assemblies and in the cafeteria. She also reported that communication between
white and black pupils was strained, and those few interracial friendships that developed
in the hallways ended "at the final bell and the school door." White students who were
interviewed said that they chose not to cross the color line because they were afraid of
being "stigmatized or scorned by their friends. " 25
Social barriers were most frequently breached on the athletic field, but African
American students were still discouraged from participating in other extracurricular
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activities like the high school's band. Moreover, no black student had ever attended a
Central High class banquet or prom. During an interview with Samuels, graduating
senior Leslie Jordan reflected, "I guess we will miss Central- but not like you'd normally
miss a school." Jordan felt she had "missed a lot" during high school, but believed she
had learned important lessons about racism in American society. She believed the
obstacles she encountered at Central prepared her for the larger challenges that lay ahead.
"At least we know what to expect as we go ahead now," she said. 26
The civil rights community in Little Rock was increasingly disheartened by the
"painfully slow" pace of progress in the district. African American school patronsstudents, parents, and their friends- met once a month to discuss their grievances. The
Committee on Better Education, as this group was called, was led by L.W. Jordan, the
father of two students who had attended Central High School. The parents on the
committee shared their first-hand knowledge of the conditions confronting African
American pupils in the district with the larger civil rights community in Little Rock,
including the NAACP, the Urban League, and the Arkansas Council on Human
Relations. 27
In August 1963, Little Rock's Negro Council on Community Affairs (COCA)
formally filed a complaint based on the committee's findings with the school board,
noting that at the present rate of progress it would take "450 years to completely
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desegregate our school system." By the early 1960s, COCA functioned as an umbrella
organization designed to help coordinate civil rights activity in the city. 28 The
organization urged the board to abandon its pupil assignment procedures and assign
students to school solely on the basis of geographic residence. The organization accused
school officials of continuing to apply selective criteria in a discriminatory manner. Even
after the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals had issued its stem warning to city officials to apply
its criteria with an even hand, COCA observed, "White children are always assigned to
the 'white' school of their attendance area and run the gamut of assignment plan
procedures only when seeking to attend a school outside their attendance area." In
contrast, "A Negro child is always initially assigned to a segregated Negro school
regardless ofhis proximity to a white school. He must travel the route of pupil
assignment procedures should he choose not to attend a distant segregated [N]egro school
even though he lives next door to a desegregated school." In essence, the civil rights
organization was serving notice that it had not escaped their attention that these practices
continued in direct violation of federal court orders. 29
The Council on Community Affairs also called for the correction of other
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problems in the district. It asked the school board to recognize the constitutional right of
African American pupils to participate in all school activities, including extracurricular
activities and vocational training programs. The organization called for the employment
of African American educators in administrative offices, raises for teachers and nonprofessional staff working in the schools, and the development of an interracial advisory
committee dedicated to resolving racial tension in the district. If the school board
harbored the hope that "racial harmony" would emerge in the city without confronting
these issues or moving "swiftly toward the noble objective of a better education for all
children free from the eroding effects of segregation," they were mistaken. COCA
asserted, "There is no reason to encourage the belief that Negroes will relent in their
natural aspirations for full and complete citizenship rights." While the board might have
adopted its pupil placement criteria to minimize integration and white resistance to
desegregating the city's schools, the civil rights organization's perspective was different.
"Peace is not to be desired over justice," the group wamed. 30
The school board summarily rejected this appeal in November of 1963. The
board argued that it operated well within its bounds when it assigned students to schools
according to its own criteria. Moreover, board members contended that assignment based
on geographic attendance zones would result in "hundreds of children of each race" being
"forced" at attend integrated schools regardless of their preferences. 31 In other forums,
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district attorneys had contended that reliance on geographic attendance zones would
produce "compulsory integration," an outcome that they believed was not mandated by
the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision or desired by white or black pupils in the
district. 32 In its response to COCA's petition, the board noted that pupil placement
procedures had not been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, nor had "nonoverlapping attendance zones" been required by the Court's decisions to date. The board
also suggested that the low number of African American students attending classes in
Little Rock's formerly all-white institutions was not the result of institutional
discrimination, but rather the low number of black pupils who chose to appeal for
reassignment. "As you know," the board wrote, ''the proper measure of progress in
desegregation is not the number that have exercised a right to attend a school with another
race, but the number to whom this right is available." The board also rejected COCA's
other suggestions, contending that decisions related to employment, salary and wage
increases, as well as decisions related to school desegregation fell within their purview
and were not the concerns of outside organizations or an interracial advisory committee. 33
By the spring of the 1963-1964 school year, COCA had resolved to press its
complaint forward by other means. Without the financial or legal support of the NAACP,
COCA was not equipped to move integration forward through court litigation. However,
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with the assistance of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the
organization began to plan a boycott ofLittle Rock schools scheduled for April6, 1964.34
This threat proved to be more effective in provoking the desired response from the school
board. Three days before the boycott, the Little Rock school board issued a series of
"policy statements" designed to demonstrate their "good faith" effort towards making
"peaceful and satisfactory progress" with school desegregation. The board promised to
apply pupil placement laws and comply with federal court orders "without prejudice or
bias," and to allow students to participate in all school activities and organizations
"provided the student meets all requirements and qualifications." Board members also
pledged to desegregate the district's vocational programs, to increase the salaries of
cafeteria employees, and to make "an effort to find fully qualified negro [sic] applicants
for vacancies at the central administrative leveL" Although the board suggested that their
statement merely reaffirmed existing policies, they had made concessions on several
points. Nevertheless, the board continued to express "satisfaction with the pace of school
desegregation. " 35
The board's desire to demonstrate its "good faith" in relation to school
desegregation may have been motivated by more than the hope that it would be able to
avert an embarrassing school boycott. By the mid-1960s, it was becoming evident that
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the nation's patience with the slow pace of school desegregation in the south was wearing
thin. Pupil placement statutes would become increasingly difficult to defend in the wake
ofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act, which threatened to withhold funds from school districts
that refused to comply with federal law. Indeed, in the absence of significant progress
towards dismantling dual school systems, federal courts viewed such assignment
procedures with increasing suspicion. By the end of the decade, the Supreme Court
would resoundingly reject the Little Rock school board's contention that "the proper
measure of progress in desegregation is not the number that have exercised a right to
attend a school with another race."36 In the future, school boards would have to
demonstrate that they were taking effective action in relation school desegregation by the

results their plans produced. In the meantime, the sobering fact that only 1.18% of
African American school children in the 11 former states of the Confederacy were
attending schools with whites ten years after the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision
continued to be a source of national and international embarrassment. 37
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CHAPTER TWO
"IT IS ONLY CONVINCING IF THEY SAY IT IS":
COLD WAR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS,
AND DOCUMENTARY FILM

In 1964, America's propaganda arm abroad- the United States Information

Agency (USIA)-- produced one of the first retrospective assessments of the Little Rock
school desegregation crisis and its impact. In partnership with writer and director
Charles Guggenheim, the agency designed the motion picture Nine From Little Rock to
reshape the way international audiences interpreted the events of 1957, while presenting
a picture of American progress in race relations, particularly in the field of education.
The film adopted a biographical approach, revisiting Central High School and several
members of the Little Rock Nine to document the opportunities they had pursued after
graduation. The film's carefully scripted and edited vignettes were meant to demonstrate
that the nine students, the city of Little Rock, and America itselfhad transcended the
racial violence and discrimination that remained a "blot upon the fair name and high
honor" of the nation.
This narrative of progress served the interests of the state at home and abroad. As
the civil rights movement and the Cold War unfolded concurrently, questions and
concerns about American race relations acquired increased importance. The USIA
struggled to reshape unfavorable foreign public opinion by recasting the way the civil
rights movement was presented to international audiences. Rather than focusing on the
violence and domestic unrest that marked the African American struggle for equal access
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to educational opportunity and civil rights, the agency chose to focus on the intervention
of the federal government and even the most modest improvements in American race
relations. In films like Nine From Little Rock, U.S. officials did so by highlighting the
achievements of exceptional individuals to illustrate that life for African Americans was
improving in the United States, and that the nation's commitment to the rule oflaw and
democratic government provided the framework for such change to take place. As
Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano noted in their introduction to The Civil Rights

Movement in American Memory, describing the civil rights struggle "as a shining
example of the success of American democracy," allows the movement to become "proof
of the vitality of America's legal and political institutions, and evidence of the nation's
ongoing quest to live up to its founding ideals of egalitarianism and justice."1 Whether
international audiences would embrace the USIA's reinterpretation of events in Little
Rock remained an open question.

Little Rock's International Impact
The school desegregation crisis provoked international outrage when Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent nine African American
students from attending classes at Little Rock Central High School. As reports and
images of the military guard and the mob that harassed the students on the school
grounds circled the globe, the incident revealed that American race relations had not
improved as much as the United States had led the world to believe. Within days, "Little
Rock" became a symbol of American racism, and a standing rebuke to the United States'
efforts to project itself as a beacon of freedom, democracy, and equality. A newspaper in
1
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Indonesia remarked, "Americans should ask themselves ... whether Governor Faubus
should not be hauled before the Un-American Activities Committee for alienating half
the world from the United States."2 While the Soviet Union made the most of the crisis,
often simply republishing wire reports from American news organizations, editorial
writers around the world commented on the impact the event ~ould have on nation's
standing in the Cold War. 3
President Eisenhower himself recognized the international implications of the
crisis in his televised address to the American people explaining his decision to intervene
and send federal troops to Arkansas to patrol the school grounds, control the mob, and
escort the Little Rock Nine to and from school. Eisenhower never publicly supported the
Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision, and he only deployed the 101 st
Airborne reluctantly after attempts to broker a solution to the crisis with Governor
Faubus had failed. 4 In his address, the President acknowledged the authority of the
Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and the responsibility of the Executive
branch ofthe federal government to enforce the law as the court defined it. However, he
also emphasized the importance of resolving the crisis in order to "restore the image of
America" around the globe. The President asserted, "At a time when we face grave
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situations abroad because of the hatred that Communism bears toward a system of
government based on human rights, it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is
being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation in the
world." He contended that the nation's enemies were "gloating over this incident and
using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation" by suggesting that the United
States was violating the Charter of the United Nations. America could only redeem itself
in the "eyes of the world" by restoring the city of Little Rock to its "normal habits," and
preserving and respecting the law. 5 Radio Moscow picked up on the President's
emphasis on this point and mockingly suggested that Eisenhower "showed more concern
with the international repercussions of the events in Little Rock than with the actual
violations of human rights and democratic practices there." 6 Indeed, Eisenhower had not
used the occasion to affirm the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board ofEducation
or to underscore the importance of protecting African American civil rights.
Eisenhower's intervention received applause from some comers, but overall the
Little Rock school desegregation crisis had a negative impact on foreign public opinion.
An Indonesian newspaper reported that "all the patient good will garnered by the
American Foreign Service, ICA, and USIS dissipated in a manner of minutes" when
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news of the event reached the region. 7 The State Department received critical letters
from a wide spectrum of individuals abroad, but the department was particularly sensitive
to those written by "opinion makers" such as labor unions, professional organizations,
university students, cultural elites, political parties, and government leaders. 8 In addition
to strongly condemning the mob violence in Little Rock, these letters revealed that the
United States' credibility and authority in international affairs had been severely
damaged. "Before America can tackle any international problem, she should first and
foremost show a clean record at home and we believe this is a prerequisite to American
success abroad," the Uganda National Congress wrote President Eisenhower. "We are
aware of the American policy of establishing influence in the emergence of African
countries but we would like to inform you and the people of American that such attempts
are incompatible with events in your country. Mr. President, your Congress has been
scandalized and the American prestige and respect are at stake... [We] will never
cooperate with any country whose racial policy is short of equality and our emphasis is
doubled in the event of treating [N]egroes on a standard short ofhuman dignity." 9
Likewise, figures like Nelson Mandela dismissed U.S. warnings about communist
influence in Africa by asserting that African National Congress did "not require any

7

As quoted in Michael Krenn, Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department,
1945-1969 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 105.
8

Azza Salama Layton, "International Pressure and the U.S. Government's Response to Little
Rock," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 263.
9

As quoted by Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 122-130.

69

school from the U.S.A., which should learn to put its own house in order before trying to
teach everyone else."10
Public affairs officers, American diplomats, and foreign service agents reported
that the fallout from Little Rock was having an immediate impact on American foreign
policy objectives abroad. Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations
wrote the President, "Here at the United Nations I can see clearly the harm that the riots
in Little Rock are doing to our foreign relations. More than two-thirds of the world is
non-white and the reactions of the representatives of these people are easy to see."
Objections to conditions in the United States were more than just rhetoric; Lodge
suggested that the United States had lost votes on critical issues because of the crisis.n
Moreover, the crisis had provided the Soviet Union with a counterweight to challenge the
United States in debates over the USSR's violations of human rights in Hungary. In the
United Nations, the Soviets questioned the sincerity of the United States' moral
objections given the "unbelievable crimes and violations of the most elementary human
rights taking place in the southern United States."12 Lodge advised the Eisenhower
administration to take action to defuse the damage done to American prestige and
influence, not by moving forward with serious reforms, but rather by extending a loan to
India and reaching out to nonwhite dignitaries around the globe. 13
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Average citizens abroad expressed overwhelmingly negative opinions about the
crisis and American race relations. In a "flash" survey conducted during the first week
of October 1957, the United States Information Agency measured reactions to the events
in Arkansas in Amsterdam, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Helsinki, London,
Mexico City, New Dehli, Oslo, Paris, and Stockholm. The agency discovered that very
large majorities (in some cases as high as 99% of those surveyed) were aware of the
Little Rock incident and that most of these individuals were aware that the dispute
involved racial conflict about schools. The survey also confirmed that "unfavorable
news" about the United States had overwhelmed any positive indicators of change, like
the civil rights legislation that had recently passed Congress. The USIA found that
opinion varied considerably from city to city as to whether those polled believed that the
majority of United States citizens approved or disapproved of school integration.
However, majorities in every locale agreed that treatment of African Americans in the
United States was poor, and that despite the efforts of the U.S. federal government, "on
balance, Negro-white relations have been worsening rather than improving over the past
few years. " 14 Indeed, trend indexes indicated that public opinion on American race
relations had been suppressed prior to the Little Rock school desegregation crisis due to
the Autherine Lucy case at the University of Alabama in 1956. According to the USIA,
Lucy's case had become an "international cause celebre" that had lowered American
standing on the subject of race to such a degree that it was "not readily susceptible to
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further decrease." However, the agency believed that Little Rock may have "had
considerable effect in confirming and solidifying already held unfavorable attitudes." 15
By December 1958, the State Department concurred with this assessment and
concluded that Little Rock was "definitely adverse to our interests." The Department
admitted that the conflict had created a "solid target for anti-American propaganda."
This impact of the crisis was particularly troubling in emerging nations in Asia and
Africa. American political leaders, information agency bureaucrats, and diplomats
identified these areas as the "critical periphery"- the places the Cold War could be won
or lost. In nations recovering from decades of Western colonialism and racial
discrimination, the State Department concluded that the school desegregation crisis had
the effect of ''weakening ... our moral position as the champion of freedom and
democracy, and in raising and reinforcing doubts as to the sincerity of our professions of
concern for the welfare of others particularly in the non-white world." 16
In the years that followed, the American government worked to mitigate the

impact of the crisis and reshape international interpretations of other civil rights conflicts
as part of its broader effort to outmaneuver the Soviet Union and communist China.
With significant numbers of people living outside of the U.S. expressing the opinion that
race relations in the nation had sunk to a new nadir, American diplomats faced a difficult
road ahead. As America's propaganda arm, the United States Information Agency
(USIA), would take the lead in charting a new course forward. In an effort to counteract
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public belief that American race relations were rapidly deteriorating, the USIA
concentrated its efforts on demonstrating that the nation was steadily improving its record
on civil rights. In 1964, the film Nine From Little Rock was designed to achieve this
overarching goal, as well as to defuse the negative images that continued to be associated
with the school desegregation crisis.
American Race Relations on a Global Stage

The diplomatic stakes involved in the USIA's effort to recast the Little Rock
school desegregation crisis were high. By 1957, the U.S. had already dedicated
significant amounts of time and resources to painting a more positive picture of
American race relations. The USIA was established by President Eisenhower in 1953 to
oversee "overt" propaganda activity and conduct public diplomacy. Traditionally,
international treaties and diplomatic relationships had been developed behind closed
doors. However, as media technologies and international information networks spread
across the globe in the mid-twentieth century, governments began to engage in a more
public form of diplomacy through their attempts to influence foreign public opinion. The
United States hoped to use the mass media to create a receptive environment for
American philosophical ideals as well as concrete foreign policy objectives. Under the
purview of the Office ofWar Information, the State Department, and then the USIA,
American propaganda targeted diplomats, elites, journalists, and the public-at-large with
the expectation that mass public opinion would have a substantial effect upon the
positions of government officials. 17
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During World War II, thousands of Americans underwent training in
psychological warfare and propaganda operations. Moreover, it had produced a
generation of military and political leaders who had embraced the efficacy and necessity
of public "information" campaigns. 18 As commander of Allied forces in Europe during
World War II, President Eisenhower had witnessed the effective use of propaganda to
undermine enemy morale and inspire local resistance movements. Eisenhower considered
psychological warfare an important weapon in the arsenal of American democracy that
could complement the use of military strength, economic aid, and political actions in the
field of international relations. He was convinced these strategies had an important role to
play in the Cold War. 19
However, Eisenhower also believed that in order for American propaganda to be
most effective "the hand of government must be carefully concealed, and, in some cases ...
wholly eliminated." He supported the continuation of CIA covert operations, and insisted
that materials attributed to the United States and distributed through the USIA adopt a
more informational tone that disguised the ideological thrust of the message distributed
abroad in a cloak of impartiality. As Kenneth Osgood has put it, Eisenhower "wanted
official voices of America to sound more like the seemingly neutral British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) than the propagandistic Pravda."20 In its information programs, the
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new agency adopted the less strident and seemingly neutral tone preferred by the
President. However, as the USIA's first director Theodore Streibert explained, "We are
no less engaged in propaganda because we are to minimize the propagandistic." The
agency adopted a "posture of objectivity" in order to enhance its credibility. While most
of the information distributed in USIA pamphlets, movies, and exhibits was factually
correct, it was carefully selected and manipulated to suit American foreign policy
objectives. 21
At the height of the Cold War, the USIA and its overseas posts operated across
the globe in nearly 300 cities and towns. While the Voice of America radio broadcasts
were its most well-known activity, the USIA also distributed thousands of press releases
and planted news stories in local media outlets. Additionally, the agency disseminated
magazines, pamphlets, and news bulletins in over 100 languages. It promoted the
translation and publication of American books overseas, and operated open-stack
libraries in 150 countries that provided free access to these publications as well as the
work of other authors. The libraries also served as important "information centers"
abroad. For example, the USIS invited students, community leaders, and opinion-makers
to attend lectures or view USIA films on site. Indeed, the agency produced hundreds of
documentary films, newsreels, television programs and even soap operas. USIA officials
also assembled exhibits on various aspects of American life to be shown at international
fairs and tours behind the Iron Curtain. Moreover, the agency mounted a large program
to train English teachers abroad, oversaw exchange programs for students, academics,
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artists, musicians, and other professionals, and promoted the creation of American
Studies programs in universities all over the world. 22
Through these outlets, USIA officials attempted to discredit the Soviet Union and
counter negative communist propaganda, while promoting the superiority of the
"American way oflife."23 However, the agency struggled to address the subject of race
relations. As the leader of the "free world," American public information campaigns
touted the nation's commitment to ideals like freedom, democracy, and liberty, but
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the civil rights movement (and white resistance to it)
exposed the long distance between America's stated ideals and daily practices. The same
international information channels and media networks that the agency used to circulate
positive portrayals of the nation also disseminated postwar reports about racial violence,
segregation, and discrimination in the United States. These stories provoked criticism of
American domestic policy and raised foreign policy concerns for emerging nations in
Asia and Africa. Consequently, the nation's record on race relations threatened to
undermine the USIA's efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of peoples around the
globe. 24
After the 1955 Bandung Conference, developing countries in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America could no longer be ignored. They wielded significant influence in
international affairs by voting as a bloc in the United Nations and placing pressure on the
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two superpowers. 25 As Harold R. Isaacs observed in 1958, this new diplomatic muscle
was precisely what lent "American race problems their sharp new international edge" in
the Cold War era. He noted, "In vast parts of the world that have suddenly become so
important to us, there are people who have had experience of Western white racism,
whose whole lives and personalities, indeed, were largely shaped by it. These people
have ceased allowing themselves to be demeaned by white foreigners in their own
countries and they are acutely sensitive to the race aspect of all their new relationships,
especially with Americans, heirs to the declining power of Western white man. Most of
the reasons for Asian and African responses to the race question should leap plainly
enough to the eye. They are not 'new' but have been present for generations. What is
new is their new importance, their new visibility, and the fact that they can no longer be
disregarded. " 26
Over time, the USIA shifted its resources from Europe and Japan and
concentrated its efforts on reshaping public opinion in these regions. However, the
agency's efforts were often stymied by reports of racial discrimination in the United
States that raised serious questions about the nation's commitment to its stated ideals and
the sincerity of its declared aims. Communist propaganda publicized racial incidents in
the United States as much as possible, particularly in the non-aligned "Third World." In
publications and radio broadcasts, the Soviet Union drew connections between
imperialism and exploitation, and capitalism and racial discrimination. The USIA's
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counterpart also pointed to parallels between the treatment of African Americans at home
and the United States' approach to nonwhite peoples abroad. "The ideas of racial and
national inequality find concrete expression in the policy which capitalistic governments
adopt in connection with colonial and dependent peoples and with minorities within the
parent countries," Pravda proclaimed. 27
The USIA feared that these arguments were gaining traction, and that America's
record on race relations tied it to the legacy of decades of Western colonialism and cast
the United States' influence in the world as another form ofimperialism. 28 After a trip to
Southeast Asia on the behalf of the State Department's International Educ~tional
Exchange Program in 1955, prominent African American journalist and future director of
the USIA Carl T. Rowan warned Americans that the U.S. was on the defensive
throughout the region because it failed to comprehend that Asian independence
movements were not the product of"Communist skulduggery." Instead, he argued, the
United States' real challenge was that communists were more effectively harnessing the
explosive power of anti-colonialist and anti-racist sentiment, and exploiting American
vulnerabilities as "the vehicle" by which they could "ride to power in Asia today." 29
United States government representatives and diplomats believed that foreign criticism of
American race relations was so damaging that one official asserted that attempts to
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address the subject "interlards almost everything we do in the State Department and the
United States Information Agency."30
In the 1950s and 1960s, the USIA confronted this challenge directly, crafting a
careful image of American progress in the field of civil rights that was designed to
correct "misunderstandings" about race relations in the United States, while
simultaneously appeasing powerful Southern Democrats in Congress. In internal
memoranda and widely-circulated publications, broadcasts, and films, the USIA
acknowledged that discrimination was a problem but suggested that the extent and
significance of racial violence, segregation, and inequality had been exaggerated by
communist propagandists. The agency pointed to statistical trends and the achievements
of exceptional individuals to illustrate that life for African Americans was improving in
the United States, and that the nation's commitment to the rule of law and democratic
government provided the framework for such change to take place.
Reshaping foreign public opinion about American race relations proved to be
what one USIA insider has called the "information agency's most challenging policy
problem." The agency's position, as stated to Congress, was that "the facts could not be
denied but they could be placed in perspective."31 Instead of responding defensively to
criticism of American practices, the USIA cultivated an image of progress that reframed
developments in civil rights as an inspirational American success story. This approach
was outlined as early as 1953 in a report Captain John Silvera prepared for the
Psychological Warfare School at Fort Bragg. Silvera noted, "America's treatment of its
30
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Negro minority has been an Achilles heel, and needlessly so." 'Through the "proper use
of the Negro in propaganda themes," African American history and achievement could
be transformed into the "saga of America." Silvera claimed, "It is a rags-to-riches' idyll
which could literally inspire millions of people in other parts of the world. " 32

Although

life for most African Americans could hardly be characterized as idyllic, the USIA would
do its best through ''judicious selection of content, audiences, and emphases" to paint a
positive portraif.33
An early, and frequently cited, example of the international information agency's

approach to civil rights was the illustrated pamphlet The Negro in American Life/4 which
was first published in 1952 and widely-circulated around the world. Written in
collaboration with the NAACP, the text began by acknowledging that "the single aspect
of the United States that is most disconcerting to her friends and most frequently cited by
her enemies is the position of the Negro." Communist propagandists had cultivated this
image by pointing to mob violence, racial segregation, black slums, and lynching. The
USIA criticized "certain foreign writers" for picking "intemperate or even fanatical
statements on the question of race from the lunatic fringe" and presenting this "provincial
chauvinism" as representative of the nation as a whole. In contrast, the agency stated that
American anthropologists, geneticists, journalists, psychologists, and sociologists were
committed to exposing "race myths" and demonstrating that prejudice is "harmful and
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unjustified." These forces had prepared the American public for change, and recent
legislative actions and court decisions reflected this shift in American attitudes. "Honest
and informed" observers were aware "that over the past fifty years the average Negro has
made progress on every front- social, economic, educational- at a tremendous pace.
This progress has been fostered by the vigorous efforts ofNegro and white citizens in
every part of the country and supported by the programs of the United States government
aimed at eliminating racial discrimination from national policy."
At its core, the premise of the publication was that the state of American race
relations in the present could only be accurately measured against conditions as they had
existed in the past. Consequently, the pamphlet placed a large amount of emphasis on
the tremendous strides the nation had made since the days of slavery, and like other
USIA materials, it commented on the enormous burden the legacy of those days had on
contemporary social relations. "The parents of men and women alive today were born
slaves and slave owners," the agency noted. "Although they and their children scarcely
remember those days, part of their heritage is the emotional attitude of both races passed
on from generation." Viewed against this backdrop, the USIA hoped that the nation
would be applauded for the steps it had made toward equality rather than derided for its
shortcomings.

The Negro in American Life illustrated American progress in the field of civil
rights by documenting an increase in school attendance, literacy, and enrollment at
institutions of higher-learning. "The Negro is well on the way to equal opportunity in the
field of education," the USIA confidently claimed two years before the Supreme Court's

Brown v. Board of Education decision. The pamphlet made no mention of widespread
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school segregation in the South or the inadequate financing of black education. Instead,
the publication emphasized that access to American educational institutions meant rising
levels of employment and economic status for black Americans, that the gap between the
incomes of black and white Americans was shrinking, and that African Americans were
participating in nearly every sphere of economic and professional life. Moreover, a new
cadre of black leaders was emerging prepared to meet the challenges of the twentieth
century- men and women like Walter White, William Hastie, Mary McLeod Bethune,
Alain Locke, and Ralph Bunche.

The Negro in American Life noted that racial discrimination was still a part of life
in America, but attempted to turn even the last "dying vestige of a post-Civil War
vigilante spirit" into an asset. These feelings still existed because the U.S. government
refused to make "fundamental changes in human attitudes by commands from a central
source" and would not attempt ''to alter psychology by fiat." The USIA implied that a
communist regime might be able to artificially impose a semblance of equality, but
suggested that a democratic government had to nurture it through public education and
political procedures. In this regard, the momentum of the civil rights struggle was
moving forward not only because of"enlightened white attitudes," but also because black
Americans were "using their votes to demand their fair share of democracy." Although
government officials frequently frustrated African American efforts to vote, the USIA
confidently asserted in 1952 that impediments to the free use of the franchise were being
removed and declared unconstitutional because leaders of civil rights organizations were
exercising the "American rights of political organization and dissent, the civil liberties
guaranteed in the Constitution and enforced by the federal court system." Their efforts
82

were supported by the "devoted labor of members of both races." This kind of change
evolved slowly, but it would be more lasting and far-reaching because it developed
through a democratic process. 35
Historian Kenneth Osgood has argued that the distortions embedded in The Negro

in American Life, as well as the publications and broadcasts that followed it, reveal the
limits to the USIA's "campaign of truth" strategy. Although the agency retained a
posture of objectivity through the careful deployment of statistics and its neutral tone,
and even enhanced its credibility by openly discussing racial discrimination, Osgood
concludes, "On this subject at least, the agency clearly privileged a factual tone over the
actual facts." He notes that the USIA's suggestion that "African Americans were not
impeded from voting in the South, that racial segregation did not mean worse schools for
black children, and that racial violence was virtually nonexistent in the United States
misrepresented the daily lives of many African Americans. " 36
The agency's desire to mask or least mitigate the reality of racial discrimination
in the United States continued to manifest itself throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Repeatedly, the USIA would attempt to provide "perspective" on news stories about
racial segregation, discrimination or violence by emphasizing progress in American race
relations. This was done directly through publications like The Negro in American Life,
or films like Nine From Little Rock, and indirectly through the promotion of African
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American music. The agency also adopted other tactics like including photographs of
black citizens in USIA publications "as a normal part of the whole American societywithout drawing attention in text or caption to the Negro." 37 Similarly, the Office of
Policy and Plans urged USIA officials to show "progress in entertainment, art, housing,
business, and government by individuals and groups, with major emphasis on
international cooperation," but to do so "without too much obviousness."38 The USIA
and State Department subsidized the travel of African American citizens they believed
embodied and communicated their narrative of accomplishment, while actively silencing
voices that threatened this carefully crafted image, canceling the passports of vocal critics
like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. DuBois. 39 These actions illustrated that despite the
USIA's rhetoric of freedom, equality, and due process, the nation was willing to sacrifice
these ideals in the name of national security and the imperatives of the Cold War when
they proved to be inconvenient.
Despite the efforts of the USIA, international public opinion polls continued to
record persistently negative perceptions of American race relations, suggesting that
foreign observers either ignored or saw through the United States' message. As the 1950s
and 1960s unraveled, international pressure and Cold War politics provided an incentive
for the American government, particularly the executive branch, to support limited
changes in the field of civil rights. Government officials and politicians frequently
framed their support for federal intervention and civil rights reform by stressing the
37
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significance of this issue around world. As early as 1948, the report of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights made the case for the elimination of segregation in housing
and education, anti-lynching legislation, a fair employment act, and other measures by
warning, "The United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal not
so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us and our record."40
Increasingly, civil rights activists also pressed for change within this context, pointing to
the emergence of nations in Asia and Africa and the importance of their new role in
international affairs. 41 These kinds of arguments, which situated civil rights reform as
part ofthe struggle against communism in a global Cold War, cultivated what historian
Robert Frederick Burk has called a "emerging consensus" for limited changes that would
"cleanse the American democratic image ofthe stain ofracism."42
However, strident anticommunism also dictated the acceptable boundaries of civil
rights reform, limiting serious discussion about connections between race and class.
Moreover, change motivated by a desire to placate critics created a culture in which
symbolic gestures and tokenism stood in for more substantive reforms in American
informational campaigns and diplomatic efforts. 43 For example, in Little Rock, President
Eisenhower had used federal troops reluctantly and forcefully, but it quickly became
evident that their presence in the city was a political liability and he wanted them
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withdrawn as quickly as possible. As historian Robert Frederick Burk has noted,
Eisenhower was "acutely aware of the political risks inherent in a public leadership role
in civil rights," and consequently limited his administration's actions to "areas of clear
federal jurisdiction, greatest international propaganda value, and minimum risk of
political fallout or domestic unrest."44 Within months, protection of the nine African
American students was turned over to a less vigilant federalized Arkansas National
Guard. The Little Rock Nine endured physical and psychological harassment at school
and at home for the remainder of the academic year. In the absence of more that
symbolic action, progress with school desegregation had come to a grinding halt in
Arkansas and elsewhere after several years of swift action in the border states.
Nevertheless, the USIA made the most of token changes and civil rights reforms
that gave them "a better story to tell" during this period. The agency publicized federal
court decisions, executive orders, and legislative developments that seemed to affirm the
narrative they were promoting abroad. As Mary L. Dudziak has noted, "While civil
rights reform in different eras has been motivated by a variety of factors, one element
during the early Cold War years was the need for reform in order to make credible the
government's argument about race and democracy."45

For example, within an hour of

the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954) decision declaring segregation
in public school unconstitutional, the USIA's Voice of America had broadcast the news
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in thirty-four languages to countries all over the world. 46 The USIA also placed articles
in foreign newspapers and planned to follow up with reports about how the decision
would be implemented. Unsurprisingly, the agency described the Brown decision as "the
logical culmination" of American progress toward racial equality. 47 Later that summer,
the National Security Council confirmed that the information agency had "exploited to
the fullest the anti-desegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court." The NSC
remarked, "the decision is regarded as the greatest event since the Emancipation
Proclamation, and it removes from Communist hands the most effective anti-American
weapon they had in Black Africa." By 1956, the State Department noted that criticism
of American race relations had "markedly declined .... partly as a result of the Supreme
Court decisions in the school desegregation cases."48
This welcome uptick in foreign public opinion quickly dissipated as white
resistance to the court decision mounted. While the USIA described the 1954 decision as
a triumph of the democratic process, southern political and civic leaders publicly
denounced it as change by dictatorial fiat. The emergence of white citizens' councils, the
passage of new statutes throughout the South designed to preserve "separate but equal"
public accommodations and stymie school desegregation, and the adoption of the
Southern Manifesto in opposition to the Supreme Court's Brown decision by southern
representatives in Congress raised questions about whether the Court's opinion really

46

Borstelmann, The Cold War and The Color Line, 94. Layton, International Politics and Civil
Rights Policies, 117-118.
47

Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 165.

48

As quoted by Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 1645-1646.

87

reflected a broad change in American society.

49

In a rearguard action, the information

agency tried to put a positive spin on public resistance to the Court's decision by framing
it as an example of the right to dissent, petition, and seek redress for grievances in a
democratic government.
However, as noted above, the edifice the USIA had constructed to reassure
foreign audiences came tumbling down in September 1957. Public opinion polls and
surveys revealed that people around the world believed that minorities in the United
States were treated poorly, and that American race relations had been "worsening rather
than improving over the past few years."50 These figures indicated that the USIA's
efforts to frame the nation's struggle with racial discrimination as an inspiring tale about
American democracy and progress, and to discuss racial incidents as aberrations in a
generally improving picture, were losing ground.

Placing Little Rock in Perspective
In effort to place the agency back on track, USIA personnel and American

diplomats experimented with various ways to recast negative perceptions of the Little
Rock school desegregation crisis. At first, the agency attempted to suture the crisis into
its pre-existing narrative of progress, downplaying the extent of massive resistance to
school desegregation and emphasizing forceful federal intervention. However, this
approach became less tenable by the early 1960s when it was evident that progress was

not being made in the arena of school desegregation, that resistance to the Supreme
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Court's mandate in Brown v. Board ofEducation persisted, and that the federal
government did not act swiftly to enforce integration. In this context, a statistical or
"factual" approach to the problem delivered in a dry "informational" tone did not serve
the agency well. Instead, the USIA would turn to a new emphasis on the "emotional"
aspects of desegregation in the South, and decidedly "subtle" or subjective indicators of
social change.
As early as October 1957, the State Department developed ''talking points"
designed to "overcome adverse reaction to the Little Rock incident." This document
reflected the USIA's traditional approach to dealing with American race relations. The
Department acknowledged that public opinion about the school desegregation crisis
could not be repaired "overnight," but urged American public affairs officers and USIS
posts "to start the long and slow job of putting these unfortunate incidents into their
proper perspective." Due to "sensational newspaper accounts" and communist
propaganda, the school desegregation crisis had been "widely misunderstood and
misinterpreted." Instead of being a symbol of American racism, Little Rock should be
viewed as a natural byproduct of efforts to expand "freedom and equality," and American
information efforts should stress that other countries had experienced similar racial
conflicts when attempting to lower discriminatory barriers. Moreover, the events in
Arkansas should not be portrayed as representative of the country as a whole. Rather, the
school desegregation crisis would be more accurately described as a "rare misdeed" of a
"small minority." The "overwhelming majority" of the American people and the citizens
of Little Rock respected the law and the decisions of the federal courts. As evidence of
this, the State Department noted that school desegregation was proceeding in other areas
89

peacefully. Of course, the document also emphasized that the United States had been
"making progress toward integration" in recent years, and that ''tremendous strides have
been made in removing racial barriers." Integration had "already been achieved in most
parts of the country and would "inevitably spread" in other regions. 51
USIA officials faithfully followed these guidelines in the months that followed
through a variety of public information campaigns. As the crisis unfolded, the USIA had
worked diligently to "minimize the damage" by "summarizing anti-integration events on
a factual basis, supplying facts whenever possible to balance adverse sensational news
items, quoting editorial and official statements which indicate steady determined progress
toward integration, and informally suggesting to friendly editors possible constructive
treatment."52 However, in a semi-annual report to Congress a few weeks later, director
Arthur Larson conceded that the agency had not succeeded in "blanking out...
sensationalized stories of the issue" and that Soviet propagandists had "strongly
publicized every anti-integration incident."53 After Eisenhower's intervention, the agency
continued its efforts to reshape foreign public opinion about the crisis as the State
Department suggested. USIS posts issued press releases encouraging international
journalists to take a "second look" at school desegregation in the United States. For
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example, a USIA pamphlet on successful school desegregation in Louisville, Kentucky
was distributed as evidence that change was progressing peacefully in most parts of the
country. These efforts resulted in favorable stories in local news outlets in Paris, Geneva,
Rio De Janeiro, Sydney, and Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 54 Likewise, USIA broadcasts
and newsreels incorporated information about ''typical integrated schools" to offset
negative impressions about education in the United States. "Distinguished Negro
personalities," like Marian Anderson, also addressed the topic of American race relations
during tours subsidized by the agency. 55
Although the USIA officially reported that these activities had successfully
counteracted "false impressions" and that the program had not been "thrown off stride"
by the school desegregation crisis,56 others concluded that American efforts "were not
very persuasive." John Reinhardt, an American working overseas in 1957,
acknowledged that the USIA had "extensive programs about successful American
blacks," but insisted that "stories about Marian Anderson and Ralph Bunche never caught
up with Little Rock." He suggested that the agency was not successful in its attempts to
"show progress despite bloodshed" and that there was "practically no way to overcome
the worst racial incidents at home" when powerful images and critical American news
reports were widely available. 57 Events in the Spring of 1958 confirmed this assessment,
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when Vice President Nixon's goodwill tour of South America was received by 1,500
angry protestors at a Caracas airport in Venezuela, while people in the crowd shouted
"Little Rock! Little Rock!" 58
The impact of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis was long lasting. Little
Rock still seemed to operate as a cultural lodestone well into the early 1960s, and became
the marker against which subsequent events were measured. As other civil rights crises
unfolded-- when James Meredith attempted to integrate Ole Miss, or when Governor
George Wallace stood in the school house door of the University of Alabama to prevent
the enrollment of black students, or when school children were attacked by police dogs in
the streets ofBirmingham-- reports of these events often compared to them to the crisis
in Little Rock. For example, in 1961, a Pakistani paper suggested that violence against
the Freedom Riders in Montgomery and Birmingham "out-Little Rocked Little Rock." 59
Like its predecessor, the Kennedy administration worked to define the civil rights
movement and southern white resistance in different terms. A special planning task force
was assigned to "assure proper treatment of the subject of civil rights" by working with
international media outlets and distributing information through pamphlets, radio, film,
and television broadcasts. According to Rollie White, the deputy special assistant for
psychological strategy, a USIA "monitor unit" kept abreast of developments in the field
of civil rights and the agency produced a "continuing flow of materials showing hard
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evidence ofweek-in-and-week-out progress toward equality of rights and opportunities."
Moreover, public affairs officers were feeding journalists information about racism in the
Soviet Union and China to counter communist efforts to frame racism as a uniquely
Western problem. All American citizens traveling abroad through the auspices of the
Exchange Program were briefed by the Department of Justice about the "various
considerations involved in the U.S. race relations situation," and travelers were given
pamphlets with recommendations about how to answer questions about America's
treatment of minorities. 60
Although the Kennedy administration moved reluctantly to address the subject of
civil rights at home, American information programs abroad made the most of the
mounting victories and concessions won by demonstrators, widely distributed the
President's public statements condemning racism and discrimination, and disseminated
information about civil rights legislation under consideration.61 Although it took several
years, foreign public opinion polls revealed that international audiences were
increasingly convinced that conditions were improving in the United States.
Nevertheless, the majority of those surveyed continued to believe that treatment of
minorities in the United States was poor, and that changes could be attributed to the
forceful intervention of the federal government rather than shifts in white public
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sentiment. 52 Consequently, a 1962 summary of available survey data, press coverage, and
comment from international leaders concluded that racial prejudice was still the "chief
blemish on the image of the American people abroad." The USIA found that racism and
discrimination were the "American characteristic[s] most frequently criticized... in both
allied and neutral nations."63

In relation to school desegregation, international audiences were justifiably
skeptical about American progress in the field of education. While substantial
desegregation had occurred in border states like Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia,
KentUcky, and Missouri during the first ten years following the Supreme Court's
landmark Brown v. Board ofEducation decision, the glacial pace of change in rest of the
South had not given the USIA very favorable news to report. 64 By 1964, there had been
little or no progress in the 11 states of the Confederacy- the Southern Education
Reporting Service reported that only 1.18% of African American children in the region
were attending schools with whites. 55 As Benjamin Muse of the Southern Research
Council noted that year, "Virtually all the Negro children who had reached the third
grade at the time of the Brown decision had graduated or left school without ever
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emerging from the public-education ghetto."66 The USIA tried to disguise these statistics
by referring to the number of school districts that had achieved token levels of
desegregation, estimating that as many as one-third of school districts in border states
and in the south had successfully complied with the Supreme Court's mandate by 1963.
Measurement of this variable, rather than the number of students attending integrated
schools, obscured the fact that only a handful of students crossed the color line in any
given district, and that the vast majority of these were in border areas that the agency
itself admitted had a "less rigid tradition of separation of the races" and "lower
percentages ofNegro population." Moreover, such reports ignored the extent to which
dual school systems- consisting of"white" and "black" schools that students were
assigned to by default- continued to exist. 67
Internal USIA reports concurred with observers that resistance to school
integration was accomplished through a wide array of legislative maneuvers, ranging
from strategies designed to prevent any integration of schools to those designed to
encourage minimal compliance and token desegregation. As noted in Chapter One, these
measures had been so successful in Little Rock that only 118 of the district's 7,000
African American students were attending the city's predominantly white schools during
the 1963-64 school year. 68 The picture of Central High School painted by reporters like
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Gertrude Samuels of the New York Times during this period was a grim one. 69 In this
context, the USIA struggled to successfully sell "tokenism plus" in Little Rock or
elsewhere as evidence of meaningful school desegregation.
Indeed, after reading Samuels' description of the Little Rock school board's
"negative and resistant" approach to the integration of the city's schools, the USIA's new
film chief George Stevens Jr. was persuaded that the agency needed to revise its strategy
for dealing with the fallout from the 1957 Little Rock school desegregation crisis. 70
Stevens wanted to take a different approach to measuring America's progress with school
desegregation. He believed that the films created under his purview had the potential "to
open people's minds, get them in the frame of mind that is willing to evaluate events in
somewhat different terms." In regards to race relations, he admitted that there was "very
little use in making up lists of logical arguments to defend our record." Any honest
statistical measurement of the nation's progress toward fulfilling the mandate of Brown v.
Board ofEducation would fail to impress international audiences. However, Stevens

believed that if the agency's filmmakers emphasized the "emotional aspects of the
problem," and the "circumstances and complexities of the civil rights movement in the
United States," viewers might "sympathize with the depth and difficulty of it."71
In several films produced during this period, the USIA suggested that more
amorphous indicators of change, like American attitudes toward integration, were
69
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improving. Likewise, they produced portraits of successful African Americans like
Marian Anderson and Ralph Bunche to emphasize the opportunities that were available
to some black citizens in the United States. Most importantly, under Stevens'
stewardship the USIA film program would attempt to reframe the civil rights movement,
and the racial violence that accompanied it, by presenting the struggle for racial equality
as an example of American democracy in motion. As Mary L. Dudziak has noted, in
doing so, the agency attempted to neutralize a "potential threat" to American
relationships abroad and turn it into an "asset. " 72

Making a Moving Picture
The USIA's film program sat at the center of American attempts to reach out to
audiences abroad and influence public opinion. The International Motion Picture
Division (IMPD) was established in 1947, when overt propaganda activities were still
within the purview of the State Department, and continued as the Motion Picture Service
under the USIA. The program was designed to reach millions of individuals who could
not be persuaded through other media. Information officials believed that the "universal
appeal" of film would help the nation engage illiterate audiences and households that did
not own radios. 73
Moreover, motion picture advocates believed in the power of pictures. According
to IMPD Chief Herbert T. Edwards, the use of film in the information program was
"based on the premise that the evidence of the eye witness is the most conclusive, that
72
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such evidence is conclusive in human relations as in law, and that the sound motion
picture is the nearest equivalent to direct observation and actual experience." He
contended that the international film program was "taking America to the millions who
cannot actual visit this country." The films served the government's purposes by
"visualizing the American, his land, and his way of life" so that ''the people of the world
may see for themselves."74 However carefully the American image projected abroad was
crafted and manipulated, IMPD officials hoped that foreign audiences would accept the
premise that the "camera doesn't lie." If they did so, the entire information program
would be imbued with a sense of legitimacy and authenticity.
The films selected for the program were designed to counteract Soviet
propaganda and mainstream media reports while presenting an attractive portrait of
American ideals, practices, and daily life. As they were outlined in 1952, the primary
purposes of the motion picture program were:
(1) To show that the United States is a strong, determined, progressive
nation, conscious of its responsibilities as a leader ofthe free world; (2)
To develop psychological resistance to communistic ideas and
motivations, exposing the dangers of communist imperialism and pointing
out the need for the free world to be on guard and to protect itself against
the insidious as well as the overt tactics of communistic operations; (3) To
promote among free nations the strength to prevent aggression and to
secure peace through international cooperation and unification of ideas
and action; (4) To demonstrate to all free nations that their interests
coincide with the fundamental objectives of the United States, that we are
sympathetic to their aspirations, and that we are interested in the
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development of other peoples into strong, independent, productive
nations. 75
To accomplish these objectives, the International Motion Pictures Division quickly
assembled a large library of short documentary films that covered a broad array of topics.
Portraits of regular Americans- farmers, housewives, professionals, industrial workers,
students and teachers- were crafted to counteract images popularized by Hollywood. The
strength of American economic institutions was portrayed through films that focused on
the nation's small business and large industrial concerns. Documentaries that focused on
labor unions explored the relationship between management and labor and the standard
of living for workers. American citizens were shown voting and participating in other
democratic processes, and emphasis was placed on the daily operations of municipal,
state, and federal governments. The accomplishments of American artists, musicians,
and museums were projected across the globe to demonstrate the "cultural vitality" of the
United States. Scientific discoveries were celebrated, while other films portrayed the
application of new technologies to improve daily life. American concern for others was
demonstrated through "ordinary neighborliness," the activities of large philanthropic
organizations, and the nation's support of foreign aid programs. The motion picture
program also exposed the "false promise" of communism by distributing films that
exposed the Soviet Union's human rights abuses in Hungary and elsewhere. 76
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The USIA Motion Pictures Service acquired films to address these topics through
several means. From the outset, the film program inherited more than 1,000 films from
the former Office of War Information and the Office of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs. Many of these motion pictures were re-edited and updated with new
commentary. 77 Other existing were acquired from private organizations, industries,
newsreel companies, Hollywood studios, and other government agencies. These films
were re-edited to suit foreign policy objectives. In order to "help make the films more
readily understood by foreign audiences," to "bring them up to date," or to "increase the
emphasis of their themes," new music and sound effects were created, visual material
like maps and animation were inserted, and scenes were expanded or cuf.18 New
voiceover narration was also recorded in dozens of languages. 79
By the early 1950s, the majority of USIA's films were created by commercial
producers contracted by the government, or by film officers at United States Information
Service (USIS) posts abroad. 80 As Richard Dyer MacCann noted in his history of U.S.
Government motion pictures, "No vested interest in a free enterprise society could really
be expected to make the documentaries needed for foreign policy themes. The
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government had to make them." 81 By working with commercial producers, the film
service was able to "make use of the full resources of America's motion picture
industry." At the same time, USIS film officers creating documentaries on location
abroad could connect the themes described above to local issues and problems. For
example, they were able to spotlight the impact of American aid programs and outreach
efforts on local communities. 82 The film program aimed to provide its overseas posts
with enough content for a new one to one-and-a-half hour show every three weeks. 83
Consequently, by 1963, the USIA Motion Picture Service was distributing as many as
250 short documentary films annually (not including newsreels). 84
Unfortunately, this prodigious output resulted in films that were described by
USIA Director Edward R. Murrow as "dull"- more in keeping with the "average public
relations film" than high-quality documentaries. 85 In 1962, Hollywood director George
Stevens Jr. was brought into the United States Information Agency to revitalize the film
program. Stevens believed that the agency could improve the quality of its motion
pictures by establishing contracts with well-established producers and directors, and
providing them with the artistic freedom to craft original films. Shortly after he assumed
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his new position, the film chief asserted confidently, "Film is America's indigenous art.
We haven't begun to realize its potential in reaching people and we have so much to tell
them about us, about America, that's never been told." 86
To tap into the American motion picture industry's indigenous talent, Stevens
revamped the USIA's approach to film-making. Previously, the agency had hired a
writer to write the script, then hired a producer and director after the content of the film
had been finalized. As Stevens described it, "there was no communication between
these areas" and the filmmakers struggled to fulfill a vision they had no part in crafting. 87
Moreover, contracts had been awarded through a competitive bidding procedure that
awarded work to the lowest bidder without regard for other considerations. During
Stevens' tenure, the film chief changed this process. In order to attract more qualified
filmmakers, he decided to match individual filmmakers to certain subjects. The USIA
motion picture service felt it could defend this process before the Congressional
appropriations committee and the General Accounting Office if the agency built review
procedures into the contracts and retained budgetary control. 88
After matching a filmmaker who had a particular "affinity" for a subject, Stevens
allowed directors and producers to develop the films with relatively little agency
oversight in the early stages of production. The new film chief believed that this latitude
would result in a better product that communicated the agency's message more
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effectively. As he put it, "In the interest of candidness and spontaneity.... we try never to
trample on skill and grace." To get a project moving, Stevens' merely asked for a film
treatment that described the filmmaker's general approach to the subject to be
addressed. 89 In doing so, the agency allowed film producers and directors to bring their
professional experience to a project, bringing new ideas and concepts to USIA films in
order to maximize the potential of the medium.
Nevertheless, filmmakers working with the agency were still expected to create
films that "carried the freight" of the USIA's message. 90 Stevens retained control over
the subjects of the films and the foreign policy messages they were meant to
communicate. As Richard Dyer MacCann asserted in his history of U.S. government
films, when a filmmaker signed a contract with the agency, the artist agreed to become
"more or less a willing propagandist... an advocate of some part of his country's way of
life." This meant that the director was expected to be able "to justify his efforts- before,
during, and after production- in terms of attitudes to be reached, touched, and changed."
MacCann noted, this could be "a wearisome, nettling and sometimes destructive burden
for creative film-makers." 91 Moreover, during later stages of the production process, the
agency adopted more stringent oversight, requiring filmmakers to submit scripts, rough
edits, music selections, and other materials for agency approval. Thus, films produced by
the USIA during this period must be viewed as the product of a unique collaboration
between the filmmakers who created them and the agency itself.
89
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Operating under this new system, Stevens selected filmmaker Charles
Guggenheim to produce and direct the Little Rock project. Guggenheim operated a film
production company in St. Louis that produced industrial, educational, and political
documentaries. In 1956, he earned an Academy Award nomination for his film A City

Decides, which chronicled events leading up to the integration of St. Louis public
schools. Guggenheim's work came to Stevens' attention after the filmmaker wrote the
USIA a strongly-worded letter criticizing the didactic tone of the films the agency was
distributing abroad. While living in Brazil in the early 1960s, Guggenheim stopped to
watch a documentary program at the local USIS post on the way home one evening. The
American filmmaker was appalled by the quality of the production, and felt the film he
saw talked down to its audience. He wrote the USIA to tell them so. Years later Stevens
recalled, "There were shock waves around the building; people said some moviemaker
from St. Louis was saying he'd seen a film that made him ashamed to be an American. I
was looking for real filmmakers, and I said, 'Find that guy."' 92 It may have been
Guggenheim's previous work on the topic of school integration that led Stevens to tap the
filmmaker to work on the Little Rock project.
As it was explained to Guggenheim, one of the primary purposes of producing a
film about the Little Rock school desegregation crisis and American educational
opportunities was to "off-set the unfortunate impression existing overseas because of the
wide publicity given the Little Rock incident." Just as it had in the months immediately
following the crisis, the USIA hoped to stress the atypical nature of the conflict at Central
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High, and to underscore the federal government's forceful intervention through the
deployment of troops to protect the civil rights of the nine African American students. 93
Instead ofbeing a national embarrassment, the events of September 1957 could be
interpreted as "evidence of America's commitment to freedom of the individual and
justice under law."94
Likewise, the USIA hoped the film would favorably depict the "continuing
progress that has been made in the U.S. in integrating its schools." In order to do so,
filmmakers would take a biographical approach, revisiting not just Central High school
but also the "Little Rock Nine." The portraits of the students would demonstrate "that
these nine pupils completed high school and either are attending colleges of their choice,
or are working in Little Rock or elsewhere." 95 The painfully slow "tokenism" that had
been the focus of Gertrude Samuels' New York Times Magazine article would be
downplayed as the film highlighted the promising prospects of Central High's first black
students.
Guggenheim developed an approach to the film by collecting information on each
of the Little Rock Nine and their families from newspapers and interviews with some of
the students. The filmmaker compiled notes about the school desegregation crisis in
September 1957, and the experiences of the nine black students during the following
school year. These materials provided "useful background," and the fmal film would
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provide a brief account of the mob riot outside Central High School and its suppression
by presidential action. However, in an early film treatment, Guggenheim noted that an
"account of Little Rock particulars" would be "too much of a burden for the film to
carry." Instead, as the USIA intended, the film should focus on "the response of the nine
students .... to their ordeal," and the "continuing efforts of [N]egroes and whites in the
community to understand each other." Consequently, Guggenheim spoke to each of the
students he was able to contact about their educational goals, career aspirations,
involvement with civil rights organizations, extracurricular activities, and personal
relationships. It appears he also spoke to the Arkansas Council of Human Relations and
black leaders in Little Rock, including Daisy Bates, about the state of school integration
in the city. Moreover, as a master of a visual medium, the filmmaker also wrote down
his observations of the distinguishing features of the students' campus environments and
college apartments, as well as Central High School itself.96
Like other contemporary observers, Guggenheim concluded that Little Rock
school desegregation was "far from a clear-sky picture." In his background files, he
noted that there was "great bitterness" among black leaders over the "token nature" of the
school board's approach to the problem, and that there were likely to be prolonged legal
battles- and possibly even street demonstrations- in the city's future. Nevertheless,
Arkansas' capital was no longer gripped by the "unreasoning fear" which had
precipitated the conflict in 1957. Guggenheim acknowledged that as the feeling of panic
abated, "apathy has replaced much of it," but he seemed pleased that there were "more
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and more people willing to take a positive stand against the segregationist tradition."
While the film could not be a "series of bland statements in happy circumstances," the
filmmaker felt there had been some "substantial improvements" that could be
highlighted. 97
In order to enhance the credibility of the film and the USIA's message on

American race relations, Guggenheim suggested that the film should be narrated by the
students themselves. "If there is taking place a significant change in Little Rock, it is
only convincing if they say it is; they're the ones who have the base for comparison. If
each looks to his future with hope and confidence, he can say so better than anyone else,
and if he does say so that fact becomes meaningful information about America," he
wrote. 98 As the script developed, "Jefferson Thomas" became the film's primary
"narrator," revisiting the halls of Central High and describing the changes that had
occurred there. Thomas would also introduce four of the other nine students to viewers,
each of whom would reflect on the events of 1957, and describe their career ambitions,
educational experiences, and outlook for the future in the first person.
However, as the film developed, the rhetorical authority that conferred to the
Little Rock Nine proved to be little more than an illusion. While the five students who
participated in the project were members of the Little Rock Nine, the voices and
statements attributed to them were not their own. 99 The use ofvoiceover narration rather
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than lip-synched dialogue allowed the USIA to easily translate films into dozens of
languages. 100 It also allowed the agency to tailor the film's message to suit its own
objectives, and provided for considerable flexibility in script development and editing.
Guggenheim's notes and early film treatments reveal that some statements attributed to
the students in the film differed substantially from the director's written record of his
conversations with them. Moreover, some comments attributed to specific individuals in
early film treatments were presented as the perspectives of others in the final script. 101
The use of this technique allowed the USIA to continue to frame developments in
American race relations through a narrative of progress, while silencing some of the
opinions and sentiments of the students themselves and obscuring the reality of
conditions in Little Rock itself.
The final film combined stock footage from 1957 with filmed scenes of Jefferson
Thomas on the grounds and in the halls of Central High School, and footage ofMinnijean
Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Thelma Mothershed, and Ernest Green going about their daily
routines at college. The narration that was overlaid on this footage was carefully written
to carry the weight ofthe USIA's message about the crisis, school desegregation, and
American race relations. Each of the vignettes carried a different burden, but they were
designed to provide needed perspective on the crisis by emphasizing federal support for
African American civil rights, demonstrating that the majority of the American people
100

Wilson P. Dizard, The Strategy ofTruth: The Story ofthe U.S. lriformation Service
(Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961), 97.
101

See Notes on "The Nine," background, and early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little
Rode/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine of Little Rock," n.d; "Nine From Little Rock: A Film Treatment for
the United States Information Agency," Guggenheim Papers,. See also "Nine from Little Rock" English
script (July 17, 1964) showing changes for foreign versions (October 30, 1964), in Box 28, Entry 1098,
Record Group 306, USIA Papers. Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 295-296.

108

had respect for the law, and illustrating that the conflict in Little Rock was not
representative of the nation as a whole. The film also tried to underscore progress toward
integration, and the availability of educational opportunities for African Americans in the
United States. 102 More generally, the USIA hoped the film would persuade viewers that
American interracial relations were improving. 103 Like other USIA films, the final
product also carried messages about the superiority of the American way of life. 104
Since it had first published The Negro in American Life in 1952, the USIA had
measured progress in American race relations by comparing the present to the past. Nine

From Little Rock was no exception to this rule. The film opened with Jefferson Thomas,
one of the Little Rock Nine, observing white and black boys practicing track and field
events at Central High School in 1964. As he watched the students running and jumping
together from the other side of a chain-link fence, "Jefferson" explained to viewers that
so much had changed in Little Rock since 1957 that the black and white students on this
"ancient battlefield" attended classes and participated in sports "remembering not how it
was in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957." The narrator conceded that some might argue
that it would be best for the students to remain to unaware of Central High's history, and
for the country to look toward the future, stating, "Perhaps it is best for those today to
look where they are going and not where they have been." However, since that approach
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would not serve the USIA's interests, the narration underscored the importance of
looking back to the past, particularly for a "dark man in a country where the Negro is
demanding more and more an equal chance." The voiceover explained that as a member
ofthe Little Rock Nine, Jefferson Thomas had a "special reason for looking back." It
was only by examining the present in light of the past that one could determine "if you
are really moving forward or if the world is just moving beneath your feet."
As the narration continued, the documentary recapped the 1957 school
desegregation crisis through archival footage of the conflict. USIA officials were well
aware that images of the event had been distributed worldwide and had a significant
impact on foreign public opinion. Seven years later, as producer and director Charles
Guggenheim acknowledged in an early film treatment, Little Rock was still "remembered
as the scene of a mob riot against [N]egro students trying to go to school. " 105 If the film
did not incorporate the most infamous and iconic images of the conflict, the credibility of
the USIA's message could be called into question. Nine From Little Rock thus
incorporated stock footage of the nine teenagers approaching the school, close-ups of
men and women shouting in a mob milling front of the building, and ineffective attempts
to control the crowd. It also featured a violent attack on a black male reporter, and white
students leaning out of classroom windows to watch the chaos below. These scenes
established baseline against which viewers could measure the progress of the following
seven years.
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However, the film's narrator was quick to point out that this upheaval was not
representative of the nation as a whole. Supplementary materials printed and distributed
with the film emphasized that throughout their ordeal the Little Rock Nine maintained
their faith that "riot and disorder were unnatural and would pass" because "in the world
they had known" before September 1957 justice always prevailed against this "ancient
enemy" oflaw and order. Tension surrounding school integration had developed
because of a tradition of segregation that had taken root in the South that was "alien to
the older and greater traditions of American democracy." 106 In framing the past this way,
the film pointedly ignored the United States' long a tortuous history of racial
discrimination, white supremacy, slavery, and pervasive system of legal segregation and
extralegal violence.
Instead, the film script emphasized the singular circumstances that had generated
the crisis. "Jefferson" explained, "This was a special morning in a special part of
America. A place where Negro children had never gone to school with Whites before."
Moreover, the script implied that the whites on screen represented an extreme faction
even within the state of Arkansas, and suggested that some members of the mob were not
from the area. In attempting to explain the relative absence of moderate or progressive
whites, "Jefferson Thomas" simply asserted, "Hatred is easier to organize than
understanding."
Furthermore, although the film showed scenes of mob violence, the footage was
carefully constructed to emphasize the intervention of the federal government and the
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protection of the students' rights. The film cut quickly to stock footage of American
soldiers marching in front of the school, the use ofbayonets and barricades to control the
-

crowd and remove troublemakers, and the armed escort that shuttled the Little Rock Nine
to and from school every morning. This last scene was meant to illustrate the "warm and
pleasant relationship" that developed between the students and the soldiers. 107
Guggenheim believed it was important to emphasize that "The mob was quelled by,
presidential action, the students did go to school, and other [N]egroes are continuing to
go to school there. Their paths are being made easier by the continuing efforts of
[N]egroes and whites in the community to understand each other." 108

The fmal script

underscored the nation's commitment to the rule oflaw. "Jefferson" explained that
President Eisenhower's intervention, and the deployment of the United States Army to
carry out the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board ofEducation decision, demonstrated that
American laws were more than "just words in a book or idle talk in a classroom."
Indeed, the intervention demonstrated that the "entire strength of the nation may be used
to enforce in any part of the land the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution."
While the students were aware that many in Little Rock did not want the school to be
integrated, the presence of the soldiers indicated that there were "millions of others who
thought we represented something important."
As the film shifts back to 1964, the narrator suggests that the integration of
Central High was "both an end and that beginning." "Jefferson" explains, "From that
107
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moment on we would be watched- not only by those who looked at us as strangers- but
by those who wondered if we would live up to our new opportunity." The rest of the film
was dedicated to answering those questions affirmatively, to demonstrating that Central
High School as an institution, and the Little Rock Nine as individuals, had made
tremendous strides toward realizing their full potential. To this end, Guggenheim
intercut scenes of Jefferson Thomas surveying the changes at Central High School with
detailed portraits of four of the other Little Rock Nine attending institutions ofhigher
learning.
The film did not provide viewers with the kinds of statistics that had led The New
York Times Magazine to conclude that school officials in Little Rock had been "doing as

little as humanly possible" to comply with federal court orders to integrate. Indeed,
instead of being "lost in the crowd" as they had been during reporter Gertrude Samuels'
visits, the few African American students at Central were paraded in front of the film
camera. In one scene where Thomas observes the students in the hallway changing
classes, five black students strolled by in less than twenty seconds. Although the narrator
acknowledged that black students at the school were outnumbered by whites, he
indicated that this was nothing but a normal reflection of American society that would
prepare the teenagers for life in predominantly white institutions.
Rather than compiling "lists of logical arguments" to defend the school's record,
Guggenheim focused on the "emotional aspects of the problem," as USIA Film Chief
George Stevens Jr. suggested. The film did not measure Little Rock's progress through
statistics or other quantifiable measures of change. Instead, it focused on more
amorphous, qualitative indicators like shifts in the attitudes of white students toward
113

integration. For example, in one of the most intense scenes in Nine From Little Rock,
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voiceover describes the daily terror the original nine students experienced in the
hallways. As Jefferson Thomas walks through a crowded hall, the narrator notes, "Four
years ago a Negro walked this hall in fear. Some of the hate outside had come inside,
and there were a few who tried to impose their will on the many." The former student
does not describe the abuse he and the others experienced in detail, and the film does not
incorporate any footage of harassment inside the school because cameras were not
permitted inside the building during the crisis. 109 However, as he approaches a staircase,
"Jefferson" alludes to these daily occurrences by stating, "When we went up a stairway
we hung on to the railing." The scene reaches a climax as Thomas treads slowly up the
stairs with his hand sliding up the rail and a group of white boys meets him coming
down. The ominous music accompanying this interlude suggests that the situation is
dangerous, and the camera cuts to Thomas' hand as it clings to the railway in anticipation
of violence. To Thomas' apparent surprise, the white boy standing above him inquires if
he is in need of assistance, and Jefferson hesitantly asks for directions to a teacher's
room. After providing the location, Thomas and the white student part ways smiling and
Thomas watches the boy proceed down the steps almost in disbelief at how much the
racial climate had changed in the four brief years since his graduation. 110
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The film also depicts other scenes of peaceful integration, and unstrained
interactions between black and white Americans, when it revisits four of the Little Rock
Nine at college. In each of these vignettes, the camera's lens is firmly focused on their

individual experiences rather than the collective stories of African American students of
their generation. This was in keeping with the USIA's general desire to redirect
attention :from disheartening school desegregation statistics, and was in keeping with
their long tradition of highlighting "exceptional" African American achievements. This
approach also created relatable and engaging characters capable of capturing the attention
of international audiences. However, as the USIA :framed the experiences of the five
students who participated in the project, "their" stories were not only used to obscure
broader national trends but also to camouflage the real opinions and sentiments of the
students themselves. Guggenheim's descriptions of the students based on his interviews
with them, and his on-the-ground assessment of conditions in the city of Little Rock,
were often at odds with the narrative that unfolded in the film itself.
Minnijean Brown became one of the most well-known of the Nine after she was
expelled from Central for responding to repeated provocations. In the film, "Minnijean"
describes herself as the oldest, but the least serious of the students that integrated Little
Rock's flagship high school- a description that implies that she bore some responsibility
for her expulsion :from Central High School. However, it is quickly made apparent that
Brown has done a lot of "growing up" in the intervening seven years. She appears on
screen as a poised young lady, graceful in her mannerisms and dress, confident, and
engaged to be married. Like the others profiled in Nine from Little Rock, Brown is
shown pursuing her ambitions in college by working on the school newspaper and
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pursuing a degree in journalism. As she works in the semi-professional bustle of the
college daily's newsroom, she exlains that her dreams were inspired by the reporters
"who came from all over the world" to cover the school integration crisis at Little Rock.
She suggests that the press reported the story accurately and fairly, and indicates that she
hopes "to be able to take a story like that and put it into words" during her career. Like
other USIA materials, this scene highlights the importance of the free press in American
society. "Minnijean" informs viewers that she has already been offered a job when she
graduates- a comment that points toward the opportunities awaiting her in the workforce
as an African American and a woman.
Throughout this segment of the film, Brown moves freely through the integrated
environment at Southern Illinois University, interacting with white professors and a large
group of white and black friends. She describes the friendships she has developed in
college as "long and deep." In his notes for the film, director and producer Charles
Guggenheim observed that Brown traveled with a "mixed crowd in which the whites are
beat types, the kind to whom color is probably some little cachet." He also described the
student as a "militant integrationist." He wrote, "She honestly believes that only by
continuing to create crises is there a chance for the [N]egro to get what he wants- justice
in this society. The boys she knows are sick of non-violence; if it doesn't pay off at a
greater rate, they're switching over to violent revolt." 111 Indeed, within a year, Brown
would publicly criticize the 1964 Civil Rights Act as "just another token gesture" that she
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believed would do little to "break down the power structure" in the absence of effective
enforcement. 112
These kinds of opinions do not surface in the USIA film. Instead, the utopian
vision ofMinnijean and her friends cycling "over the river and through the woods" to a
picnic is meant to underscore the long distance between her experience at Southern and
the mobs that greeted her in front of Central High. In a recent interview, Minnijean
Brown Trickey described her reluctance to get involved in the project for precisely this
reason. Initially, she refused to be filmed because, as she put it, she didn't "want to be
part of the propaganda machine that says 'everything is okay."' Brown was brought on
board after several other members of the Little Rock Nine agreed to be participate.
Nevertheless, the film's misleading characterization of Brown's views and her
experience became manifest when a white student at Southern Illinois began hurling
racial epithets and screaming "Go home!" at her during filming.ll3 If the USIA's
filmmakers were shaken by this experience, it was not evident in the final edit of the
film. Instead, while the footage shows Brown gazing across a lake on campus in the
direction of her assailant, "Minnijean" reflects that "fear of the Negro ... was born of a
way of life that has been dead in this country since the end of slavery" and suggests that
the mob in Little Rock was composed of a small minority of "some Americans" who
were afraid to let that history go.
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Like Minnijean Brown, Thelma Mothers:P.ed was also attending Southern lllinois
University at Carbondale, and was training to be a home economics teacher. The film's
narrator "Jefferson" introduces Mothershed to viewers as he walks through the halls of
Central High and peeks into classrooms. He recalls, "Thelma used to say the problems
we had getting into this school were worth it- just. to be able to take courses from some
of the teachers." Like the example set by the journalists who covered the crisis for
Minnijean Brown, Thomas suggests that the instructors at Central inspired Mothershed
and others to pursue a career in education. In subsequent years, the Little Rock Nine
have described the commendable actions of some of their teachers, but they have also
pointed to the passive and even hostile reception they received from some instructors and
administrators. It is just as likely that many of the students were planning on pursuing
careers in education because it traditionally had been one of the few middle-class
professions open to well-educated African Americans. 114 Regardless, this statement also
points to the significant leeway given to Guggenheim to attribute statements to the Nine
in the first person. In an early draft of the script, he attributes a nearly identical sentiment
to Gloria Ray, another one of the students. 115 This kind of flexibility was possible
because none of the narrative voiceovers in the film were actually recorded by the Little
Rock Nine. Instead, they were dubbed by professional actors. 116 In the film, "Thelma"
indicates that she applied to Central to prepare herself for college by getting the best high
114
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school education offered in Little Rock. In doing so, she suggests that she was following
in the footsteps of her parents: "Going to college is a tradition in my family." This
statement may have been meant to point to the variety of educational opportunities
available to African Americans in the years preceding the historic Brown v. Board of
Education decision, while suggesting a certain degree of upward mobility.
Moreover, the narration implies that things will only get better for future
generations. Thelma describes the black and white children she interacts with in a
student-teaching environment as "happy, moody, difficult, and wonderful," but most
importantly she says, "They accept me for what I am." The narration indicates that this
vision of the future could be- or had been- realized even in Little Rock. After outlining
her aspirations, Thelma concludes, "After I finish college I want to apply for a job
teaching in Little Rock- maybe someday at Central High." This statement implies that
black teachers were welcomed in the halls of Central and other formerly segregated
schools. However, this was not the case. 117 In his production notes, Charles Guggenheim
acknowledged that the student would "probably wind up being assigned to Horace Mann
(still the all-[N]egro high)." 118 This probability is not even alluded to in the film, nor is it
acknowledged that Little Rock was operating under a freedom-of-choice plan that
permitted the existence of a dual school system during filming.
While the film merely suggested that it might be possible for Mothershed to
instruct white students "someday," another member of the Little Rock Nine- Ernest
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Green, the first black graduate of Central- is shown actually doing so. When
Guggenheim and the film crew visited Green, he was pursuing a master's degree in
sociology at Michigan State University and hoped to pursue a career with the NAACP. 119
In the film, "Ernest" tells viewers that he plans to "work in the field of Civil Rights as a

leader and an organizer." The student is shown participating in a demonstration on
campus and handing out leaflets, while a recording of the protest song "We are Soldiers
in the Army" plays in the background. Here, the narrator explains that racism is not just
a regional southern problem and that "even in the Northern states you'll find pockets of
discrimination-like you do all over the world." As civil rights protests accelerated in the
North, the USIA acknowledged the presence of de facto segregation throughout the
country, but framed it in such a way as to counter criticism from other nations who were
struggling with similar problems.
Nevertheless, the primary thrust of this part of the film is Green's emphasis on the
''tide rising against" such discrimination and his desire to be a part of it. America is in
the midst of a "revolution in thinking" that says "man, no matter how humble his birth,
what color his skin, must be permitted to go as a far as his mind and his aspirations will
take him." As he stands behind a lectern at the front of an integrated classroom and the
camera pans across the faces of the students listening, "Ernest" states, "I'm convinced
that a white American can never fully understand what motivates the Negro's desire for
equality. But the white American is becoming more concerned, especially my
generation, and that makes tomorrow worth dreaming about."
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Indeed, the film suggests that this kind of change can not only be affected by civil
rights protests, but also by creation of understanding through research in the social
sciences. In describing his participation in a study of the aspirations ofblack and white
children in segregated in schools, "Ernest" asserts that "the tools for truth in science are
now becoming tools for truth in human relations." The data he collects has the potential
to build "understanding" by wielding the "power of fact against those who would exploit
rumor and prejudice." Green was filmed computing and printing vast amounts of data,
and the camera focuses on the American technology aiding him in this task as the whirs,
beeps, and clicks of the machines fill the soundtrack. As the narration describes the
power of fact and "answers that have real meaning," a large panel is shown with numbers
blinking on and off but slowly turning from darkness to light. This segment of the film
seems to suggest that the social sciences could play an important role in a "campaign for
truth" waged not only against segregationists, but presumably also against communists
who were spreading "misinformation" to some of the same audiences targeted by Nine

from Little Rock.
Interestingly, based on Charles Guggenheim's production notes, Green himself
did not seem as convinced about the potential of academic social science to challenge the
status quo. Guggenheim wrote, "He takes a philosophically critical view of Michigan
State and American education; State is a big comfortable learning factory." According to
the film director, Green felt that Michigan State did not teach its students to "serve
society as critic." Rather, it offered "technical training and various kinds of
indoctrination"; cultural critique was as "unfashionable at State" as it was "in an
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American corporation."120 These sentiments were hardly a ringing endorsement of
America's institutions ofhigher learning or its corporate culture. Unsurprisingly, they
were not incorporated into the USIA film.
Elizabeth Eckford was the only student profiled in Nine From Little Rock who
chose to attend a predominantly black college- Central State in Ohio. The narration
emphasized that "like most American schools," Central was integrated and that 20% of
the faculty and student body were white. Notably, while there was no suggestion of
difficulty or resistance at any of the predominantly white colleges featured in the film,
"Elizabeth" explains that despite the changes at Central, ''there are still Negroes who are
against integration" seventeen years after the school opened its doors to whites. "The
Negro is like most Americans, possessing no monopoly on tolerance," Elizabeth
cautions. Apparently, just as the USIA strove to demonstrate that United States was not
the only nation struggle with racial friction in the wake of the Little Rock crisis, 121 it
wanted to underscore that it was not just white Americans who resisted integration. In
the narration, "Elizabeth" indicates that she and the majority of Americans hope "that the
few, the uninformed, will not be confused with the rest of us." Indeed, the students
filmed on screen appear to have embraced integration as they gather around- white and
black- to sing, clap and dance in a heart-shaped formation. Despite this happy scene
conditions in Xenia, Ohio, in the southern part of the state, were far from ideal. During
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filming, Eckford and editor Robert Pierce were refused service at a white restaurant in
town.122
Eckford may have been the most famous of the Little Rock Nine. She was the
student whose lonely walk through the mob gathered in front of Central in 1957 was
captured by photojournalists and sent around the world. As Guggenheim noted in his
background notes, ''None of the cameras present on that morning missed this
confrontation: Elizabeth in a pinafore dress freshened for the first day of school, with an
armload of books, expressionless behind her dark glasses; the guardsman in battle helmet
pointing his bayonet. Explanations of the picture that went around the world were to be
well-reasoned and even convincing but they did not make sense, although Elizabeth did
make the town of Little Rock world famous. " 123 In the film, the narration attempted to
complicate the story behind these iconic images. "Elizabeth" tells viewers that the mob
was encouraged by politicians who wanted to capitalize on the emotions surrounding
school integration. While she was "frightened" that morning, she "learned a great deal
about people" through the experience- not only those who were there, but also about the
"thousands who suffered with me and wrote to tell me so." The USIA wanted to
emphasize that white reaction to school desegregation was not monolithic. There were
some whites who turned "their heads in shame from the camera," and others who "spoke
out against intolerance" with "brave voices."
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The film acknowledges that Eckford's traumatic experience in 1957 still affected
her seven years later. She is featured as the most uncertain of the profiled students; she
has not "quite decided" what she wants to do with her life. "Elizabeth" explains, "If it
hadn't been for that morning in September 1957, I could have gone into law or education
and not thought much of it." But in 1964, her confidence seems shaken. "The world is
big place, and when I go out into it, I want to be sure that I go in the right direction," she
says. Indeed, in real life, Eckford was contemplating her future and weighing her
options. Although she would receive a bachelor's degree in education from the
institution in 1966, her enrollment status and attendance at Central State was sporadic
throughout the first half of the 1960s.124 Guggenheim was unable to interview her
directly while researching the film because she had left college for the term and was
working in Dayton. 125 Nevertheless, NAACP records suggest that she had returned to
Central in the fall of 1964. 126 Eckford may have been chosen as one of the profiled
students because of her international fame. However, the film underplayed the student's
difficulties- perhaps because the school desegregation crisis did not have the salutatory
effect on her that the USIA hoped to highlight.
Designed to be only one of several short films presented during programs
sponsored by the USIS, the film moves quickly to its conclusion. As Jefferson Thomas
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strolls the halls of Central, and examines the institution's awards and trophies on display,
he informs viewers that he will be taking an exam soon to become a certified public
accountant. "That means I'm supposed to be qualified to keep track of profits and
losses," he says. As a trained accountant, Thomas should be able to weigh the positives
and negatives in the school integration fight. However, the narrator demurs, "I'm not
sure I know enough yet to say what all this adds up to." He has not been able to count
"all the victories since that first day we went to school here." There is no mention of any
failures that might be written on the negative side of the balance sheet. Instead, Jefferson
points back to the evidence just presented to the audience and confidently asserts, "I
know there's been at least nine." In the student's closing remarks, the film alludes to the
ongoing struggle to achieve racial equality, but not directly. And like most USIA
statements on American race relations it suggests that the country will inevitable evolve
closer and closer to its stated ideals. As Thomas leaves the school building, and the
camera pans over the Little Rock skyline and focuses on the dome of the Arkansas state
capital and a church spire, Jefferson assures viewers, "In Little Rock there's a slow
bridge taking shape over that chasm of ignorance and tolerance." That bridge will be
built by the nation's youth, and the narrator acknowledges that "before it's finished we're
going to have our problems." However, "if Little Rock taught us nothing more," it's that
conflicts generated by attempts to expand and maintain freedom and equality "make us
better- much better."
Nine From Little Rock closely followed the USIA's new approach to underlining

the personal, individual, and "emotional" aspects of American race relations. The film
was designed to demonstrate that Little Rock school desegregation crisis, and the
125

perseverance of the first nine African American students to attend Central, had changed
the city, the state of Arkansas, and the nation. 127 In 1965, the information agency tested
the effectiveness of this new kind of message with an audience of Indian university
students and a control group to determine if Nine From Little Rock had a positive impact
on foreign opinion about American race relations and educational opportunities in the
United States. After collecting survey information, the USIA Research and Reference
Service concluded that the film had a positive impact in several areas. More viewers
than non-viewers felt that African Americans were treated "quite well" or "very well" in
the United States. Likewise, more viewers than non-viewers believed that treatment of
African Americans was improving and getting "better" or "much better." Those who saw
the film also reported that they had a more favorable impression of educational
opportunities for African American students in the United States.
However, viewing the film did not convince the Indian students that "most
American whites" favored school integration. Indeed, those who saw Nine From Little

Rock were less likely to believe that the majority ofwhites favored equal rights for
Americans. The Research and Reference Service speculated that this may have been due
to the scenes showing resistance to integration in Little Rock in 1957, and other
statements made about the "necessity for Negroes to struggle for equal rights." Indeed,
while more viewers than non-viewers had a favorable opinion about the United States
government's actions in relation to civil rights, many of those viewers seem to have
concluded that government force was "required" to assure equality. Forty-four percent of
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those who saw the film believed that "Little Rock's reaction to desegregation was typical
of what happens in other American communities faced with that situation." In short,
many of the Indian students believed that the improvements highlighted in the film were
the result of government action, not emotional changes or generalized shifts in white
attitudes toward integration and African Americans. 128 The film had not accomplished
one of the USIA's principle objectives.
Despite this mixed report, Nine From Little Rock was translated into seventeen
languages and distributed to ninety-seven countries. The USIA had a number of
distribution and exhibition strategies at its disposal. Every year, the agency distributed
thousands of prints to 200 USIS film libraries around the world. USIS film officers
regularly screened films on location, but they could also be checked out by individuals or
organizations with their own projection equipment. If needed, the Motion Picture
Service worked with groups to help them select films that addressed particular topics of
interest, and provided projection equipment and training in how to use it. Film officers
developed relationships with government officials, such as ministers of education,
agriculture and health, who helped promote screenings by appearing as speakers before
the showing of films related to their work. From the beginning, schools and universities
made extensive use of the film program in their classrooms. U.S. officials also
encouraged representatives oflabor organizations, church groups, women's
organizations, athletic associations, youth and community service centers, business
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groups and civic clubs to host screenings of their own. 129 Through cooperative
agreements with Warner Brothers, RKO, Twentieth Century Fox, and Paramount, the
motion picture service dramatically expanded its potential audience by as much as 200
million viewers by distributing its output through commercial channels to theaters around
the globe. 130 According to Wilson P. Dizard, the films proved to be popular with theater
owners in Latin America, Asia, and Africa "because they were free and usually dubbed in
the locallanguage." 131 For the USIA, this channel of distribution- more than any otherallowed the agency to conceal the hand of government since it provided the "opportunity
for ... films to be screened in conjunction with regular theatrical programs." Likewise, in
addition to being exhibited at international fairs, USIA films were also submitted as
entries for international film festivals. 132
However, the USIA's most innovative means of distributing and exhibiting prints
of its films were its roaming "mobile units," which serviced remote rural areas. Using
specially constructed four-wheel drive trucks built by the Jeep Willys company, U.S. film
officers took the agency's films to nearby villages and towns within a day's distance, and
far into the backcountry on journeys that could last as long as three months. The trucks
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were outfitted with a motion picture projector, a film strip projector, sound equipment
and a public address system, lights, viewing screens, and a tape recorder for making new
narrative voiceovers on location in local dialects. The roofs of the vehicles were
reinforced to serve as a platform for the projectionist, and the unit was equipped with a
built-in generator to power the projection equipment. An agency report described the
projectionists as "early-day pioneers" who "travel long distances over primitive roads
and sometimes where no roads exist." For these film officers, "Day-long deluges of
tropical rain, miles across desert land in blazing sun and dust storms, and trips into
mountainous territory are a routine part of the job to them. Much of the time, after a
grueling drive, it is up to the unit's crew to visit appropriate village leaders or officials,
gain their cooperation, and then proceed to set up equipment for the coming night's
show." Despite these challenges, the motion picture service viewed the mobile units as a
vital part of their operation. They were the only way to reach rural audiences in
communities where no theater existed. These audiences, composed largely of farmers
and agricultural workers, had "little opportunity to receive information through the
routine means known in the United States- newspapers, magazines, books, radio."
Moreover, those who were illiterate due to little or no formal schooling were not able to
utilize these materials even when they had access to them. Consequently, the film service
had a particularly important role to play in America's "battle for hearts and minds" in
these remote areas. 133
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By utilizing all of these distribution channels, the USIA increased the audience
for its films exponentially over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1949, the State
Department's International Motion Picture Division estimated that their film program
reached 100 million annuallyY 4 By 1952, the division reported that it reached 400
million viewers with approximately 30,000 people watching a USIA film in every hour
on any given day. 135 Twelve years later in 1964, the agency expected that 750 million
people would watch its films in more than 100 countries. 136
However, measuring the effect the films had on these audiences was harder to
measure. USIA officials struggled to provide an adequate measure of the film program's
impact in order to persuade recalcitrant Congressional representatives to support the
program. Like other United States propaganda output, the tone of the agency's films
shifted from the "hard sell" to a softer approach over the course of the 1950s. The
agency struggled to acquire appropriations for this long-term "soft sell" approach. At
budget hearings, congressional representatives often seemed to prefer a more direct
message. In this context, it often appeared that the "strongest indication of the
effectiveness of the program" was the "vicious attacks" made by the communist press on
the content of the films. 137 Additionally, the USIA distributed supplementary materials
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and discussion guides designed to underscore the messages and themes embedded in the
motion pictures, and to "augment and sustain their impact." 138 In order to determine
whether their films would be successful at reaching key groups, the agency consulted
anthropologists and other experts like Dr. Margaret Mead. 139 Additionally, as it did with

Nine From Little Rock, the USIA also commissioned surveys to determine whether
audiences understood a particular film or scene, to measure the degree to which they
were absorbing and internalizing the film's message, and to ascertain whether the films
were having a discemable impact on foreign opinion about the United States in general. 140
Staff members recorded the number of times a film was shown and how many viewers
had seen it. USIA officials also sent reviews of the films printed in local newspapers
back to W ashington. 141
Several USIS posts reported that Nine From Little Rock was well received. As
Mary L. Dudziak noted in her book Cold War Civil Rights, USIA Director Carl Rowan
told President Johnson, "In Africa where it is vitally important that we do our best to
keep the United States civil rights struggle in perspective, USIS Nairobi reported that

Nine From Little Rock was the 'best film the Agency has yet made on civil rights .... [I]t
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supports the high priority country objective of showing progress in the U.S. to our racial
difficulties." This opinion was seconded by USIS officials in Kampala, Uganda, who
declared, "This film closes the book on Little Rock and frees the mind to consider the
changed aspects of the struggle. " 142 The film was applauded in other comers as well.
Late in 1964, the film received the Gold Gate Award, first prize in its class, at the San
Francisco International Film Festival. 143 Shortly thereafter, Nine From Little Rock was
acknowledged with an Academy Award for best short documentary.

Closing the Book on Little Rock
Back in Little Rock, however, tension surrounding the glacial pace of school
desegregation was building. Although the USIA described Arkansas' capital as "a city
where school desegregation has been undertaken and carried through successfully,"144
Little Rock's Negro Council on Community Affairs and other civil rights organizations
were less sanguine about the city's progress. As noted in Chapter One, the Council
protested that the pace of change in Arkansas' capital was "painfully slow'' and accused
the school board of using the placement law achieve the "barest minimum" of
integration. The community affairs organization petitions for change were ignored, the
council scheduled a boycott and planned public rallies in protest of token integration. 145
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This threat produced some concessions from the board. However, generally speaking,
the board expressed "satisfaction with the pace of desegregation" in Little Rock, and
made no promises to move more quickly toward a unified school system. 146 In the
months and years that followed, the Council and other community organizations would
press for additional concessions and commitments from the school board.
Within a relatively short period, the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act And the
1965 Elementary and Secondary School Act would provide the black community of
Little Rock and sympathetic whites in the city with additional support for their efforts.
For the USIA, the enactment of this legislation, as well as the Voting Rights Act,
supplied the USIA with more ammunition in its campaign to reshape foreign opinion of
American race relations. In its daily bulletins, broadcasts, and publications the USIA
proudly compared the significance of this legislation to the Declaration of Independence
and Emancipation Proclamation, asserting that the new laws resolved the "political,
constitutional, and parliamentary" difficulties that had stymied efforts to eliminate
prejudice and discrimination. According to the agency, the passage of these laws by
duly-elected representatives of the American people illustrated that the majority of
American citizens stood behind changes in the field of civil rights. While these acts
could not resolve all of the nation's racial problems, the USIA confidently declared that
remaining tensions would steadily "diminish" as white and black citizens interacted
freely "in those public and private places that formerly separated them." With the
steadfast work of organizations "dedicated to brotherhood," and appeals to the national
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conscience, the agency affirmed that private citizens "in every region of the United
States" were committed to moving the nation toward "equality for all Americans." 147
The information agency made note of these changes and their potential impact in
the field of education in the printed supplementary materials that accompanied
Guggenheim's film. The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited the use of federal aid for
education in segregated schools. The USIA and other observers in the mid-1960s hoped
that this would provide sufficient incentive for southern school districts to move more
quickly with their desegregation plans, particularly with the passage of the 1965
Elementary and Secondary School Education Act which provided $1.3 billion dollars of
aid for improvements. The USIA emphasized that southern states, with relatively lower
standards living, could "not afford to forego" this windfall of federal money. The agency
assured international audiences that funds would not be provided to states "until the U.S.
Commissioner of Education is satisfied that they will not be spent for racially segregated
pupils." In making these determinations, "token compliance with the law will not be
enough"; the Commissioner had called for "full racial desegregation throughout the
United States" by September 1967. 148 Consequently, the supplementary brochure 9 From
Little Rock concluded optimistically, "These new laws, and others to follow, will make
school life easier and perhaps more rewarding for those Negro students who follow the
Nine From Little Rock in the pursuit ofknowledge." 149
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Public opinion polling and international press coverage revealed that these
substantive developments convinced many foreign observers that the United States
government was throwing its "full weight" behind the protection of equal rights.
Ultimately, it was the nation's concrete commitment to civil rights legislation that had
the most persuasive effect- not attempts to recast the civil rights struggle as an intimate,
emotional interaction between black and white Americans. An internal report written in
1966 reassessed the US information agency's approach to the subject of race relations in
this new context. "It was clear from all sources," the report stated, "that foreign peoples
have a predominantly bad opinion of the treatment ofNegroes in the US." No other issue
raised such "predictably and uniformly adverse" reactions or "strongly negative"
opinions. However, increasingly, international audiences seemed to believe that
conditions were improving. The foreign press generally supported the notion that the
federal government was "firmly committe4" to the "full participation of the Negro in US
life," although like the Indian students who viewed Nine From Little Rock, many
remained skeptical that public sentiment among white American citizens supported these
changes. But most significantly, the report suggested that persistently unfavorable views
of American race relations seemed to have "comparatively little effect" on general
opinions about the United States as whole, which remained predominantly positive. 150
Given these facts, the report suggested that the subject of race probably concerned
and preoccupied the agency "more than the facts warrant." Although this thorny issue
was a "professional problem for the propagandist," there was some danger of confusing
150
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"a kind of crusading masochism with freedom from hypocrisy" or overemphasizing the
salience of the issue in an attempt to resolve it. Since the passage of civil rights
legislation, the subject was "no longer so delicate to handle." With a "much more
positive story to tell," the agency should "avoid devoting massive sections of
programming to the issue, and responding dramatically to drama." Indeed, by placing
too much emphasis on the civil rights movement, the "struggle" for equal rights," or
"dramatic" change, foreign audiences might confuse the gradual evolution of the
American conscience and the application of the democratic process for "a successful War
of People's liberation. " 1s1
Looking to the future, the report recommended that the agency change its way of
approaching the question of race entirely. Instead of underscoring the "special triumph
of individual Negroes" or the civil rights movement as whole, the USIA should adopt a
tone of"matter-of-fact acceptance," portraying black citizens in the "context and
framework of normal American life." The USIA should no longer measure the present
against the past since on balance "it probably serves better to remind of an unfavorable
situation than an unfavorable one." Moreover, "before and after" statistics, measuring
progress in education, job discrimination, housing, and the like was equally
counterproductive since the numbers were "likely to be less than expectancy rather than
more." The report recommended that the agency devote its resources on the issue to
changing the perception that the white majority did not support civil rights protections by
scrupulously avoiding "black-and-white treatment" of racial conflicts and adopting a
Is I United States Information Agency, "Racial Issues in the US: Some Policy and Program
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"low key, mulatto" approach to the problem. 152 The USIA appeared to adopt this
approach in the years that followed. As the agency shifted its resources toward
explaining the nation's involvement in Vietnam, American race relations ceased to be a
central focus of information programming. 153

Nine From Little Rock is a significant and important film because it is one of the
first retrospective assessments of the 1957 school desegregation crisis and its impact.
This documentary was commissioned by the United States Information Agency as part of
a long term project to reshape the way foreign audiences viewed the crisis, and to help
ameliorate negative perceptions of American race relations- perceptions that were
viewed as damaging to America's strategic positioning during the Cold War. The film
forwards an interpretation of the civil rights movement and the campaign to desegregate
the nation's schools that the U.S. federal government hoped to promote at home and
abroad. It adopted several strategies which would continue to shape public memory of
the crisis and its impact in the years to come.
Like other USIA films and publications, the film was not distributed in the United
States. 154 However, as historian Kenneth Osgood has recently argued, the principle of
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"total war" that lay behind America's propaganda activities during the Cold War "made
distinctions between propaganda intended for 'domestic' and 'international' audiences"
meaningless. When possible, the USIA and other government agencies adopted a
"camouflaged" approach to its information campaigns that recruited individuals,
nonprofit organizations, independent news agencies, film producers, citizens groups and
corporations to deliver American propaganda messages. At times, government agencies
targeted domestic audiences and influenced public opinion to "sustain national
morale. " 155

In this context, the narrative of the civil rights movement promoted by the

United States government abroad n;my have reflected and molded historical
understanding at home. 156
Indeed, Nine From Little Rock's interpretation of the events of 1957 continues to
resonate in domestic public memory today. During a period of exceptional domestic
unrest, presenting the African American freedom struggle as "rags to riches idyll" and
the campaign to desegregate the nation's schools as an example of democracy in motion
served the interests ofthe state. Given the institutional resources behind this narrative, it
is perhaps unsurprising that the Little Rock school desegregation crisis continues to be
framed as a watershed moment in which the federal government acted firmly to ensure
that Southern states abided by the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board ofEducation
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decision. In public memory, the swift and forceful action of the 101 st Airborne and the
dispersal of the mob gathered outside Little Rock Central High School set a strong
precedent that ended southern massive resistance. What this narrative obscures is the
long-struggle that followed the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, in Arkansas'
capital city and elsewhere, to achieve more than token levels of integration and to realize
the full potential of the Court's decision declaring school desegregation unconstitutional.
Just as in the USIA film Nine From Little Rock, these facts remain hidden from view.
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CHAPTER THREE
"WE DON'T LIKE BUSING":
DISTRICT-WIDE DESEGREGATION AND STUDENT TRANSPORTATION, 1964-1971

In the early 1960s, the USIA had tried to repackage token school desegregation as
evidence of American progress in race relations. However, in Little Rock and elsewhere,
school boards and civic leaders designed evasive mechanisms like pupil placement acts
and freedom-of-choice plans to keep the number of African American students attending
historically white schools as low as possible. In 1964, nearly 99% of black pupils in the
eleven states of the former Confederacy attended historically black schools. After a
decade of school desegregation, dual school systems persisted throughout the South.
Although Little Rock became known as a center of massive resistance in 1957,
city leaders and school board members were even more committed to a policy of
gradualism and tokenism that promised to keep desegregation to a minimum. However,
the legal foundation undergirding this approach began to crumble in the mid-1960s as
courts began to demand school desegregation plans that were immediately and

demonstrably effective. As the NAACP exerted pressure on the school board through
litigation, political elites in Little Rock were forced to respond to these new requirements.
The Little Rock school board took a new approach to minimizing integration by adopting
geographic attendance zones in the residentially segregated city.
African American plaintiffs in Little Rock were dissatisfied with the zones drawn
by the board because they perpetuated the existence of identifiably white and black
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schools. By the late 1960s, the focus of the desegregation struggle shifted from efforts to
place a handful of African American students in historically white schools like Central
High to a broader initiative to achieve equitable and effective desegregation in all of the
system's educational institutions.

Increasing residential segregation in the city placed

Little Rock on the front line of efforts to push the courts beyond racially "neutral" student
assignment plans based on pupil placement criteria or geographic attendance zones. In
short, the city's civil rights community was determined to secure a unitary school system
with or without neighborhood schools. Consequently, by 1970, the Little Rock School
District was one of the first in the country urged to consider student transportation as a
more effective means of eliminating segregation "root and branch."
Adopting Freedom-of-Choice

As noted in Chapter One, Little Rock's pupil placement law had been applied to
keep the number of African American students attending formerly all-white schools as
low as possible in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, with the pending passage of
the Civil Rights Act, the school board's attorneys advised the district to revise its student
assignment policy. Consequently, in the spring of 1964, the school board adapted its use
of the pupil placement law to allow students in grades one, four, seven, and ten to choose
the schools they would attend for the next three years. Previously, students had been
assigned by the board and were required to apply for transfers to attend other schools of
their choice. Frequently, their requests were not granted. Under this new amended plan,
I

over 180 African American students elected to attend formerly all-white schools and most
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requests were granted for the 1964-65 school year. 1
Nationwide, the pace of desegregation accelerated throughout the South as both
Congress and the executive branch provided for vigorous enforcement of court orders for
the first time since the Brown decision. 2 The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
enabled the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to withhold federal
funds from school districts that refused to comply with federal school desegregation

.

guidelines. Combined with the threat of litigation, the availability of larger amounts of
federal aid for education provided sufficient incentive for many communities to move
more decisively toward integrating their schools. As many proponents of the legislation
expected, the pace of desegregation accelerated rapidly. In just a single academic year,
the number of black students attending integrated schools in southern states increased by
more than seven fold. 3
However, despite these developments and amendments to Little Rock's pupil
placement procedures, African American residents in Arkansas' capital continued to
encounter obstacles in their efforts to secure free access to the city's schools. In fall of
1964, Delores Clark, a new Little Rock resident was instructed over the telephone to
enroll her children at a white school. When she appeared in person to register, her
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children were denied placement and enrolled in a black school. Clark filed suit
challenging the district's student assignment policies. 4 Under this legal pressure, and
with the release of specific HEW school desegregation guidelines, the board formally
adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan in April 1965 after attorney Herschel Friday
explained that the pupil assignment plan did not meet the requirements of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 5 Little Rock's plan was adjusted again in November 1965 to comply with a
decision from the

gth

Circuit Court of Appeals and approved by Eastern District Court of

Arkansas. 6
The district's freedom-of-choice plan required students and their parents to select
or choose the school they wished to attend in grades one, seven, and ten, and by new
students entering the system. The student's choice was to be honored except in cases of
overcrowding when preference would be given to those students living closest to the
school; remaining students would be offered a second choice. 7 Students in other grades
were allowed to transfer into other schools, but they were not compelled to indicate a
preference and would continue to attend their current schools unless they took
independent action. 8 After the trial before the district court but before judgement, Clark's

4
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four children were voluntarily reassigned to nearby predominantly white schools. With
the adoption of a plan deemed constitutional by the federal district court and reassignment
of her children, Clark's suit was dismissed but she appealed to the 8th circuit. 9
Although the number of black students attending predominantly white schools
increased to 621 by the 1965-66 school year, the NAACP and the local black community
remained skeptical that the new "freedom-of-choice" plan would produce significant
desegregation. Nearly 7,200 black students were still attending historically black
schools. 10 L.C. Bates, Arkansas field secretary for the NAACP, suggested that the board
would manipulate the overcrowding provision of the plan to control integration. The
freedom-of-choice plan would not "make it any easier for Negro pupils to attend
integrated schools," Bates contended. The field secretary noted that the school board had
never fully complied with the court's orders, and insisted that further integration would
only be achieved with "more litigation and the holding up of Federal funds." 11 Thelma
Mothershed, one of the Little Rock Nine, publicly expressed her doubts that many of the
city's black families would exercise their choice due to fear that their children would be
harassed in virtually all-white schools. 12
Before the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, Clark and her lawyers challenged the
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constitutionality of"freedom-of-choice" plans, arguing that the plan would not create a
fully integrated school system. Given the school board's earlier commitment to moving
toward geographic attendance zones (under the court-approved "Blossom Plan"), at best,
"freedom-of-choice" could be considered part of an effective transition to an integrated
system. In and of itself it did not fulfill the constitutional mandate outlined in Brown.
Moreover, they objected to the mechanics of the approved plan, noting that students were
not required to make an annual choice of schools and that the plan did not include
provisions for notifying parents and students of their new options. Finally, they decried
the district's slow progress on the desegregation of faculty and staff. The presence of
racially homogenous staffs continued to identify schools as "black" or "white." 13
In December 1966, the 8th Circuit upheld the "freedom of choice" plan with minor

revisions. The court concluded that a "general attack" on this form of pupil assignment
was not "well taken at this time." The method had been tentatively approved by HEW
and other courts, and had not been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. According to
the

gth

Circuit's reading of the evidence, a plan that provided for annual choice- even if

that choice was not compulsory- "could prove useful in achieving a nomacially operated
school system." While the plaintiffs complained that only 8.5 percent of black students
were attending integrated schools during the 1965-66 school year, the court pointed to the
annual increase of students electing to attend previously white schools with more than 13
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percent of black students exercising their choice in 1966-67. 14 These statistics indicated
to the court "that the children are making effective choices that are being honored by the
Board and the actual integration desired by the plaintiffs is, in fact, taking place at an
accelerated pace." Moreover, the court suggested that "the system was not subject to
constitutional objections simply because large segments of whites and Negroes chose to
continue attending their familiar schools." Although the court acknowledged that the
system was "open to unconstitutional abuse in its individual application," and may not
"fully and adequately" fulfill the requirements of Brown, it had not yet "proved a failure."
The district court was ordered to retain jurisdiction to assure that students were not being
steered toward black or white schools, the board was required to inform parents of their
rights under the system, and the school district was ordered to end discrimination in staff
hiring and assignment. However, in closing, the Court of Appeals warned the school
district that the hour for "deliberate speed" and "flexibility" was "about over." If the
freedom-of-choice plan could not be applied in such a way to bring about "a fmal end to
unlawful discrimination," the courts would have to intervene. 15

Considering and Rejecting Alternatives
While this litigation moved through the federal courts during the latter half of the
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1960s, the Little Rock school board became "progressively more liberal," as the New

York Times put it. At the time, educational consultants observed that "liberals" in Little
Rock who supported desegregation were able to secure a majority on the school board
because of their ability to mobilize an electoral coalition that included the city's African
American community as well as sympathetic middle- and upper-class white voters from
the city's Fifth Ward in the West End. 16 With the support ofthis coalition, board
member James M. Coates Jr. persuaded his colleagues that the district's freedom-ofchoice plan might be considered constitutionally insufficient. The board voluntarily
decided to hire a consultant to draw up "an appropriate long-range plan" to implement
school desegregation throughout the district in the spring of 1966. A few months later, the
University of Oregon was selected to draw up the plan and make recommendations. 17
At the time, these developments did not alarm the public. Indeed, in September
1966, T.E. Patterson became the first African American elected to a seat on the board in a
city-wide election, and the board retained a liberal majority. With the support of
Superintendent Floyd W. Parsons, Patterson subsequently pushed through the
appointment of an African American assistant superintendent William Harry Fowler.
Fowler was charged with overseeing personnel, and pledged to move quickly to comply
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with the federal court's order to desegregate the staff. 18
However, support for the liberal majority on the board began to crumble as the
city of Little Rock approached the tenth anniversary of the 1957 crisis. The release of the
"Oregon Plan" in early 1967 unleashed a flood of resistance to school desegregation
strategies which moved beyond freedom-of-choice. The University of Oregon
consultants recommended that the district spend $10 million dollars to construct a series
of centralized educational parks to replace smaller neighborhood schools serving
residentially segregated communities on the city's periphery. It also recommended
supplementing the freedom-of-choice plan by guaranteeing African American students
25% of the seats in any school regardless of overcrowding, and called for the
establishment of a district-wide transportation system to ensure that students could reach
the schools of their choice. The plan also called for the development of "compensatory
education" programs for children with "educational" and "cultural deficiencies." The
writers of the Oregon Report severely underestimated the amount of opposition that
would greet their proposal. "The future of school integration in Little Rock appears
promising," they predicted after concluding that leaders of the community and school
administrators had accepted some modicum of integration,· and commenting on the lack
of organized opposition and the absence of "real obstacle[ s]" to change. 19
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However, affluent citizens from the city's West End did not receive the report
favorably. Students in this predominantly white section of Little Rock had been insulated
from most ofthe integration in the district due to the construction of new educational
plants in the western part of the city far from most black neighborhoods. Ten years after
the Little Rock Nine integrated Central High School, only five black students attended the
West End's Hall High. Traditionally, affluent citizens in the West End had developed
alliances with black voters to support moderate, rather than segregationist, school board
candidates. White residents more immediately affected by integration had accused
residents in the city's "silk-stocking district" of supporting gradual desegregation only
because their children were unaffected by it. In 1967, it appeared they were right. 20
West End residents formed the Education First Committee to rally against the
Oregon Report, the first comprehensive desegregation plan proposed in Little Rock that
would impact students in affluent parts of the city. Historian Ben F. Johnson has
characterized these developments as the "gentrification of segregation" in Little Rock,
noting that members of Education First "employed the language of neighborhood unity
and individual freedom rather than the citizens' council rhetoric of heritage and racial
integrity" in their effort to defeat the district's new desegregation plan at the polls. 21
Indeed, West End residents had learned ten years earlier that efforts ~o minimize and
control integration at the ballot box were more effective tools for shaping the school
district's future than massive resistance. During the next school board election, two of
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the liberal members who had supported the plan were defeated. The results were
interpreted as a public rejection of the principles outlined in the Oregon Report and it was
abandoned by the board. 22
James M. Coates Jr., the board member who had persuaded his colleagues to
develop a long-range solution to the district's desegregation problems, lived in Little
Rock's West End in the Fifth Ward. As one of the two board members defeated as a
result of opposition to the Oregon Report, Coates commented on the transformation of
school politics among Little Rock's upper-middle class "liberals" in the late 1960s. In his
position on the board, Coates had observed the perpetuation of the dual school system.
School officials facilitated Little Rock's suburban sprawl to the west by abandoning
"worn-out schools to Negroes in the center of the city" while "building nice new ones for
whites in the suburbs." Coates noted, "I live out there, too, but I know we can't keep on
getting away with that." In the former board member's estimation, the upper-middle
class whites in Little Rock who had demonstrated support for public education in 1959 by
demanding the reopening of the schools did so with the understanding that they would not
be effected by the city's integration plan, but once it threatened to touch their
neighborhoods their attitudes suddenly shifted. "Most of the people who are raising the
hell [over the Oregon Report] were the so-called liberals of 10 years ago," he observed.
"They want integration for everyone but themselves- and these are my friends and
22
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neighbors."23
Despite the defeat of Coates and shifting racial politics in the city, liberals on the
board still retained a 4-3 majority and directed Superintendent of Schools Floyd W.
Parsons and his staff to develop a comprehensive plan that accommodated some of the
concerns of influential white school patrons. The "Parsons Plan" called for the
desegregation of Little Rock's high schools by closing Horace Mann, a traditionally black
school, and busing students to the three other predominantly white high schools. This
provision was based on Parsons' conclusion that "whites will not attend historicallyidentified Negro schools," and that "integration will be a one-way street for the
foreseeable future." Under the Superintendent's plan, no white students would be bused,
and additions would be made to the remaining high schools to accommodate the influx of
African American students. However, school attendance areas would be redrawn in
"strip" zones from east to west across white and black sections of Little Rock in order to
counteract segregated housing patterns. Junior high schools would be unaffected by the
plan, but the creation of two elementary school "complexes" would create more racial
balance in the eastern and central parts of the city. 24
Members of the board were reportedly "surprised" by the "extent" of Parson's
proposals. 25 Some expressed concern that the provisions of the plan that called for the
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development of a busing system would undermine support among white school patrons
and that the phasing out of Horace Mann would erode support among black school
patrons. Nevertheless, they adopted the plan and placed a $5 million bond issue required
to implement it on the school election ballot. 26 In March 1968, the bond issue was
defeated 2-1 and two more liberal board members lost their seats, giving conservatives a
5-to-2 majority. 27
Despite these defeats, ten years after the 1957 crisis, the pace of integration
continued to increase under freedom-of-choice with 25% of black students choosing to
attend predominantly white schools during the 1967-68 school year. On the high school
level, many of these students chose to attend Central High. At Central, approximately
19% of the student body was African American with 425 black students attending classes
with 1,811 whites. 28 This progress persuaded a UPI reporter to declare, "Today,
segregation has been at least nominally banished from all Little Rock schools and all
other public facilities, and the city is as integrated as any in the South."29
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On the tenth anniversary, local news outlets played down the tenor of massive
resistance in 1957, making favorable comparisons between the disturbance in Little Rock
and the race riots occurring in northern cities in the mid-1960s. Former Gov. Orval
Faubus asserted, "if the so-called Little Rock crisis were to take place today, it would be
so minor no one would notice it."30 The Arkansas Democrat picked up on this theme:
The 'rioting' at CHS [Central High School] was exaggerated in press
reports that circled the globe and made Little Rock the symbol for
resistance to integration. Actually, crowd estimates in front of CHS never
exceeded 1,000 most of whom were nearby residents and the curious.
Only a handful of minor injuries occurred in scuffles. No one was shot; in
fact, no shots were fired. By contrast, riots at Watts, Detroit, Newark and
elsewhere recently have resulted in scores killed and property damage
running into the hundreds of millions. Back in 1957, a bowl of chili
spilled on a student at CHS was enough to grab headlines across the
country.31
This rhetoric sought to deny the moral weight of the 1957 school desegregation crisis
while simultaneously obscuring the city's ongoing struggle over school desegregation.
Nevertheless, even Daisy Bates contributed to this narrative, declaring that she was "as
harmless as popcorn popper" compared to more militant activists like Stokely
Carmichael. 32
However, some reports did make note of the city's crumbling liberal consensus,
and resistance to correcting the imbalance between the pace of integration in the central
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part of the city and the West End. 33 While Pulaski County NAACP President L.C. Bates
noted the historical significance of the crisis and its contribution to the progress of the
civil rights movement, his assessment of the amount of the change that had occurred in
the Little Rock school district was grim. In his view, there had been "some
improvement" in the schools but not "any significant amount." He contended, "In the
face of the Supreme Court decision, supported by the 1964 Civil Rights Law, it appears to
me that the school board even at this stage is in compliance just enough not to defY the
law."34 While celebratory assessments of Little Rock's progress made note of the 25% of
black students who were attending predominantly white schools, a different interpretation
of these same statistics pointed to another reality. By the beginning of the 1968 school
year, 75% of black students (6,000) still attended historically black schools with virtually
no white classmates. 35 Likewise, integration on the far west side of the city had never
exceeded more than token levels. The limitations of the city's freedom-of-choice plan,
and the tokenism it encouraged, were becoming increasingly evident.
Establishing Geographic Attendance Zones
In May 1968, the Supreme Court struck down the use of :freedom-of-choice plans,

like the one in place in Little Rock, that failed to dismantle dual school systems. Under

Green v. New Kent County, the Supreme Court held that school districts were required to
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take affirmative steps toward establishing unitary and nondiscriminatory school systems.
If a plan failed to eliminate segregation "root and branch," and a district retained schools
that were identifiably white or black based on the composition of their student bodies,
faculty, facilities or extracurricular activities, it was not sufficient. Moving forward, the
constitutionality of desegregation plans would be measured by their efficacy in relation to
other alternatives, such as zoning, that promised "speedier and more effective
conversion" to unitary systems. The Court noted that Brown placed the burden for
making this transition on school boards, not on students and their parents by using tactics
like freedom-of-choice provisions, and that further delay under the guise of"deliberate
speed" was intolerable. The Court declared, "The burden on a school board today is to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now" [emphasis original]. 36
Within a month of this decision, the plaintiffs in the Clark litigation petitioned the
Eastern District Court of Arkansas for further relief. In July 1968, the disti:ict court set a
hearing for the next month but specifically suggested that the school district should
consider alternatives in the meantime, such as a geographic zoning plan for student
assignment and a more comprehensive plan for faculty desegregation. At the August
hearing, the school district presented an "interim" zoning plan that was "incomplete and

36
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required more study," and requested that the freedom-of-choice plan be retained for the
1968-69 school year. This request was accepted by the court but the Little Rock school
district was ordered to file a new desegregation plan no later than November 15, 1968.
In the months that followed, the school board considered several options. Two members
proposed the retention of the "freedom-of-choice" plan with seats reserved for African
American students. However, due to the district court's unequivocal position that a
freedom-of-choice plan would not satisfy constitutional requirements, this plan was
rejected by the majority. John Walker, the attorney for the plaintiffs, also presented a
plan to the board that called for grade restructuring, the pairing of predominantly white
and black schools, and the transportation of students throughout the district to accomplish
integration. Walker's suggestions were also rejected. On the court's deadline, the
conservative board adopted an assignment plan based on geographic attendance zones by
a vote of 5-to-2?7
The plan presented to the court by the school board required nearly all students in
the district to attend schools based on their geographic residence. The only exceptions
were students attending the district-wide vocational school, the children of teachers, and
students in grades 8, 10, and 11 who were completing their education at the junior and
senior high school levels. The district court approved the plan on May 16, 1969 with
minor changes. The court redrew the boundary of the attendance area for the West End's
Hall High School to include 80 more African American students, and paired some
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elementary schools within a "floating zone" to enhance integration. The court also
allowed students in the racial majority at their assigned school to transfer to a school
where their race was in the minority, but no transportation was offered to facilitate these
requests. 38
This plan did not satisfy the African American plaintiffs in the Clark litigation.
Since 1957, residential segregation in Little Rock had increased. The eastern half of the
city was predominantly black and the western half of the city was predominantly white.
Pockets of integration in the central city were shrinking as whites relocated to the west
and the suburban outskirts of Little Rock, while African Americans were dislocated to the
east by urban renewal programs. 39 Over the course of the 1960s, the population of the
western sector of the city had increased by 26,000 and was approximately 96% white.
The eastern section of Little Rock had lost approximately 12,000 white residents and was
more than 90% black. 40 In this context it is hardly surprising that the Little Rock Housing
Authority was the first public housing agency in the country to be sued by t~e Department
of Housing and Urban Development for failure to comply with the 1964 Civil Rights
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Act. 41 The use of geographic attendance zones in a city like Little Rock challenged and
ignored the Supreme Court's insistence on the formulation and implementation of
effective school desegregation policies.
The school board had drawn the attendance zones under its plan from north to
south, reinforcing these segregated residential patterns. White parents in the city's West
End who continued to support integration sought to intervene in the Clark litigation,
charging that the plan "mirror[ed] the lines of presently existing patterns of racially
segregated residential housing in Little Rock." Like the African American plaintiffs, they
believed, "The plan accelerates and entrenches racially segregated residential housing,
thereby foreclosing, forever, the possibility of a nonracial, unitary system."42 Notably,
from the outset, the city had delayed implementation of even token integration until1957
when Horace Mann, the predominantly black high school on the city's east side, and Hall
High, the predominantly white school on the city's west side, had been constructed. It
was widely acknowledged at the time that the construction of these two facilities within
racially homogenous parts of the city would minimize the impact ofintegration.43 Under
its zoning plan, it appeared that Little Rock's school board hoped to capitalize on the
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foresight of its predecessors.
Indeed, by the early 1970s some suggested that the "deliberate speed" and
gradualism which had been the norm in Little Rock during the preceding decade had
facilitated rather than discouraged rising rates of residential segregation. As Roy Reed, a
reporter for the New York Times and an Arkansas native who had watched developments
in the city, noted, "Instead of smoothing the way for desegregation, going slow has
frequently encouraged whites to flee to all-white sanctuaries in the suburbs, secure in the
knowledge that only those schools in the older, central parts of the cities would be
integrated to any extent for many years to come." In Reed's view, the policy of
gradualism had enabled residents in Little Rock to exchange the "old system of racial
paternalism" for the northern pattern of residential segregation, "racial isolation and
distrust. " 44
When the geographic zoning plan was put it place during the 1969-70 school
year, 69% of black students still attended schools in which their race constituted 90% or
more of the student body. Only 4 whites attended Horace Mann. On other side of the
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spectrum, only 40 black students attended Hall High. Likewise, 45 black students
enrolled at Parkview High, a school constructed even further west to accommodate the
influx of white residents to the area. Racially identifiable schools persisted at the junior
high and elementary levels as well, many with even higher levels of segregation due to
their smaller attendance areas. 45 Before the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, the African
American plaintiffs pointed to these statistics, arguing that the plan adopted by the district
court failed to disrupt segregated attendance patterns. The plaintiffs contended that
"neither the neighborhood school concept nor the possible necessity of busing... excuses
the District's failure to achieve a unitary system devoid of racially identifiable schools."46
The school district defended its plan before the court as "constitutionally
faultless," and contended that the attendance zones had been drawn "without regard to
race." The district's attorneys went even one step further, arguing that any deliberate
attempt to create "racial balance" in the schools would "itself be a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment" because it would require the assignment of students according to
race. Indeed, the school board cross-appealed the portions of the district court decree that
adjusted the attendance zone of Hall High school to include more African American
students, and the pairing of elementary schools within the "floating zone" to facilitate
integration, because they departed from this principle. The school district defended the
neighborhood school concept as "educationally sound" and the only "feasible means" of
45
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operating the school system "in view of community attitudes.'>47
The board's sole African American member, T.E. Patterson, objected to this line
of argument. He noted that the board had pledged to work toward a unified system as
early as 1966, but that the current members were engaged in effort to "deter and slow
down the process of unification" through court litigation. Patterson questioned why the
school board had invested over $200,000 in attorney fees to defeat its own policy. He
urged his fellow members to be more forthright about their intentions and not to cloak
their desire to maintain segregated schools behind the rhetoric of racial neutrality. As
recorded in the school board minutes, Patterson asserted that the board should "either
change the policy and say it does not want the system unified, or leave the policy as
established and work toward a unified system." He was confident that school
administrators would be able to craft an acceptable desegregation plan if they were free to
do so. 48
As the case was pending, President Richard Nixon leant his support to the
majority's approach to school desegregation by publicly adopting a similar position in
March 1970. Nixon hoped to break the Democratic stranglehold on the South and win
some votes for the Republican party by pursuing a "southern strategy" that
accommodated the racial anxieties and concerns of southern white voters. In response to
growing resistance to wide-reaching school desegregation plans that went beyond
tokenism, the Nixon administration refused to use the tools at its disposal such as
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withholding federal aid or initiating lawsuits to enforce desegregation in noncompliant
school districts. In his 1970 statement, the President insisted that the administration was
"not backing away" from the constitutional mandate of Brown, but contended that there
were "limits to the amount of government coercion" that could "reasonably be used" to
effect social change. Moreover, he suggested that desegregation policy in the past had
demanded "too much of our schools," disrupting education, causing "heightened racial
tension," and resulting in "lasting psychic injury" to the nation's children.49
While the Supreme Court had ordered school districts to take affirmative action to
eliminate desegregation, Nixon argued that the Constitution did not require integration or
the creation of an artificial and arbitrary "racial balance" in schools. Neither the "laws
nor the institutions supported by law" should draw "invidious" distinctions based on race
by trying to achieve some rigid "mathematical formula," he argued. Consequently, the
President contended that lower courts that ordered districts to move beyond theoretically
neutral geographic attendance zones had gone beyond constitutional requirements
because segregated housing patterns were the result of "natural" choices rather than
official actions. Until the Supreme Court itself affirmed these questionable decisions, the
administration would "not consider them as precedents" that would shape HEW school
desegregation guidelines. As far as the President was concerned, the "neighborhood
school" was the "most appropriate base" for any school desegregation plan regardless of
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its efficacy. 5° Nixon's statements created more confusion in the city of Little Rock about
the school board's constitutional obligations according to Superintendent Floyd W.
Parsons. "When you have the President making his grand statement... and the Federal
courts ordering this and that, and you have the community divided down the middle, what
you've got is a genuine dilemma for the schoolman," he said. "Here in Little Rock, that
sort of thing from Nixon... just confuses people- mixes them up." 51
In May 1970, the majority on the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals provided
clarification on the issue of geographic zoning and school desegregation, rejecting the
President's reasoning and the legal position of the Little Rock school board. The court
dismissed the school district's argument that the "consideration of race for the purpose of
correcting constitutionally imposed segregated education" violated the 14th amendment.
While the appeals court applauded the progress the school district had made in
eliminating some segregation within its borders, the majority opinion noted, "the fmding
of some progress does not end the inquiry into whether the particular District has satisfied
its constitutional obligations" to produce an effective desegregation plan in light of all of
the alternatives available. While the assignment of students to schools based on
geographic attendance zones could be effective in some districts, such as the New Kent
County schools assessed in the Supreme Court's Green decision, it was not a ''universal
answer" for the "complex problems of desegregation" everywhere. The court noted that
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any plan submitted by the district should be designed "to promote desegregation rather
than to reinforce segregation." The Little Rock school board's plan had failed to meet
this standard, perpetuating rather than eliminating entrenched student attendance patterns,
and the Court of Appeals found that it was deficient and "constitutionally infirm."52
The court noted that the school board had already considered several plans that
would have provided for more effective desegregation. The majority opinion made
specific note of the so-called "Parsons Plan" that had been developed by local educators,
but abandoned due to community opposition and objections to the tax increase required to
implement it. The court reminded the school board that the Supreme Court had outlined
their obligations in the face of such opposition fifteen years earlier when the Little Rock
district had tried to accommodate "community attitudes" in 1957-59. As the 8th Circuit
interpreted Cooper v. Aaron (1958), the Supreme Court had unambiguously declared that
"community opposition to the process of desegregation cannot serve to prevent
vindication of constitutional rights. " 53
The 8th Circuit shaped its majority opinion within the framework established by

Green. It merely held that the district had not satisfied its constitutional obligation to
produce an effective desegregation plan. It did not find that geographic zoning or
neighborhood schools were "in and of themselves either constitutionally required or
forbidden." They did not rule on the "relative merits or demerits of the neighborhood
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school." Nor did they require or forbid the use of busing in the district to facilitate
integration. However, they did note that the state of Arkansas had long used busing as a
tool to preserve segregated schools. The case was remanded and the school board
ordered to adopt and fully implement a plan that would eliminate segregation in the
district "root and branch."54
Two judges dissented :from the court's opinion in defense of the neighborhood
school concept, arguing that "geographic attendance zones fairly laid out without racial
discrimination by a unitary system should meet constitutional standards." The two
dissenters favorably quoted President Nixon's statements in support of neighborhood
schools, noting that such an arrangement was a "well-established and acceptable means of
providing a proper educational program" and was the preferred method of school
assignment in all sections of the country. Busing, and other means of desegregation,
required a substantial outlay of resources and tax dollars better used for purely
educational purposes. In closing, the minority opinion set the stage for an appeal by
school district, asserting that the validity of neighborhood-based assignment could "only
be authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court."55
Desegregation through Student Transportation

The Supreme Court took up this precise question of neighborhood schools, racial
balance and busing in a group of cases from Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, NC; Mobile,
AL; and Clarke County, GA. Although Little Rock also filed for a review of its school
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desegregation plan, the high court chose not to hear arguments in the Little Rock case,
perhaps because one of the newest justices, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, sat on the 8th
Circuit and signed on to the majority opinion in Clark merely one week before he was
confirmed by the Senate. 56 Nevertheless, the outcome of the litigation would effect
school districts nationwide, including Arkansas' largest city.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation (1971), the Supreme

Court provided specific guidelines for the desegregation of large metropolitan areas, such
as Little Rock, that had maintained dual school systems and were residentially segregated.
The Court acknowledged that rural areas with consolidated school systems could make
the adjustments required by desegregation more easily than "metropolitan areas with
dense and shifting population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic
patterns." The Court noted that shifts and changes in a city's population could neutralize
I

or negate steps taken to desegregate schools before they could be fully implemented.
However, while sympathizing with the difficulty of the task facing school boards, the
Supreme Court did not absolve school districts of their responsibilities to confront these
complexities directly. Moreover, the Court noted that some decisions made by school
boards- such as the closure of facilities in integrated areas and the construction of new
buildings in racially segregated areas- frequently compounded these problems since the
location of schools influenced "patterns of residential development" in the nation's
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cities. 57
The Court asserted that "racially neutral" student assignment plans based on
geographic attendance zones were inadequate if they failed to "counteract the effects of
past school segregation" and created or maintained "artificial racial separation." In school
districts like Little Rock that deliberately used such tactics, "neighborhood zoning," and
gerrymandering to maintain dual school systems, courts could order appropriate remedies
such as the pairing or clustering of identifiably white and black schools, and the
transportation of students to noncontiguous attendance zones. While not requiring
schools to meet racial quotas, the Court suggested that the limited use of mathematical
ratios could be a useful tool in determining the efficacy of a school desegregation plan
and that school authorities bore the burden of explaining why any schools in a system
remained identifiably white or black. The Court conceded that busing or other methods
designed to effect desegregation could be "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and
even bizarre in some situations," but affirmed that these measures were required to
correct the effects of discrimination and eliminate constitutional violations in some cases.
The Supreme Court urged local judges to continue to reconcile competing interests in
desegregation cases, taking time, distance of travel, age, risks to the health of children, or
impingements on the educational process into account when ordering the transportation
of students. However, the Court emphasized that busing had been "an integral part of the
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public education system for years" and would not be considered an unreasonable burden
within appropriate limits. 58
Little Rock's liberal newspaper, the Arkansas Gazette, applauded the Supreme
Court's "finn" stance on school desegregation. The paper agreed that the Little Rock
school district had "stalled and dragged its feet with the best of them" through its sudden
allegiance to the neighborhood school concept. The Gazette contended that the Swann
decision reaffirmed the Court's commitment to rejecting the "separate but equal"
principle that had once been legitimized by the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. "Whatever
President Nixon and his Silent Majority, may not have learned from our national record
of apartheid," the editorial board noted acerbically, "the Supreme Court of the United
States has learned its own lesson full well."59
In contrast, the Gazette 's more conservative rival the Arkansas Democrat decried

the decision. Its editorial board lambasted the Court's vague and "fuzzy'' language about
the use of mathematical ratios to determine the efficacy of school desegregation plans.
This came dangerously close to authorizing the use of "racial quotas" in the Democrat's
opinion. An effort to achieve racial balance in a district's schools threatened to make
"school kids the creates of the state" and destroyed "the theory of individual freedom we
prize so highly in our country."60 The Democrat admitted that the use of freedom-ofchoice plans, like the one that had been in place in Little Rock, were little more than an

58

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation, 91 S.Ct. 1267; 402 U.S. 1; 28 L. Ed. 2d
554 (1971).
59

"The Court Stands Finn," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, April21, 1971.

60

"Anything Goes," Editorial, Arkansas Democrat, April21, 1971.

168

effective form of"subterfuge" designed to keep schools segregated. 61 But the Democrat
insisted that geographic zoning was inherently fair. Forcing children "to go to a different
school- one that he wouldn't normally attend- because some judge has prescribed the
number of whites and blacks that have to be in each school" was not mandated by the
Constitution, the Democrat insisted. lbis rejection of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of constitutional law contained echoes of the past and objections to the 1954 Brown v.
Board ofEducation decision. But by the early 1970s, the paper's editorial board justified

its stance by deploying the rhetoric of the civil rights movement itself. "Color shouldn't
make any difference" in student assignment, the Democrat asserted, "Either all of us are
equal before the law, or we aren't."62
While the Arkansas Democrat may not have accepted the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution, the lower federal courts quickly fell in line with the
high court's mandate. In 1971, the Eastern District Court of Arkansas issued a new
school desegregation decree shaped by the principles and guidelines outlined in Swann.
Instead of assigning students based on geographic attendance zones, the new plan adopted
a variety of techniques ranging from pairing and clustering to contiguous and
noncontinguous zoning with the objective of completely dismantling the dual school
system and eliminating racially identifiable schools. In practice, this meant that the
balance of white and black students within each school in the district should range within
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10% of the ratio in the district as a whole. The district was ordered to institute a
comprehensive busing program: students assigned to a school more than two miles from
their home would be provided with transportation to and from school. The district court
ordered complete integration for grades 6 through 12 at the beginning of the 1971-72
school year, and elementary schools the following year. 63
Although the African American plaintiffs in the case appealed for immediate
integration of the elementary schools and the school board cross-appealed for further
delay, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decree. Other elements
of the plan also survived challenge. For example, the school board objected to having to
shoulder the additional expense of busing students, but the court of appeals determined
that there was "no reasonable alternative" that would allow the district to meet its
obligation to establish a "nonracial school system." For their part, the African American
plaintiffs objected to the phasing out of the historically black Horace Mann High School
on the east side of the city, forcing African American students to bear an "unequal share
of the burden" of desegregation. However, the court of appeals refused to reinstate
Horace Mann as a graduating high school, accepting the school administration's
assurances that all secondary schools would be "sensitive to the aspirations of black
students. " 64
Fifteen years after the Little Rock Nine registered at Central High School, and
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after a decade long struggle to achieve more than token levels of integration, the Little
Rock school district finally implemented its first comprehensive school desegregation
program in secondary schools at the beginning of the 1971 school year. In an editorial,
the Arkansas Gazette expressed optimism that the busing plan would create stabilized
school patterns and discourage white flight to the west side of the city since there would
no longer be "'black' schools for whites to run from, nor 'white' schools to be running

However, this embrace of the student assignment plan was far from universal in
the district. A new private school, Pulaski Academy, was built in west Little Rock as yet
another outlet for students who wanted to avoid integration. The founder of the school,
real estate magnate Billy Rector candidly admitted that he built the school because, "We
don't like busing."66 As the transportation program went into place, the number of
students bused to school jumped from 0.2% to 27.3%, one ofthe most acute increases in
the country. The number of students attending public schools in the Little Rock school
district simultaneously declined by over 1100 pupils- a decrease of nearly 5%. HEW
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statistics indicated that the vast majority of students exiting the system were white as the
proportion of minority pupils in the LRSD climbed from 39.4% in 1970 to 43.8% in
1971.67 But perhaps the most disheartening statistic from this transition was the decision
ofjive of the seven members ofthe Little Rock School Board to enroll their children in

the county's emerging private schools. 68
In Little Rock, civil rights activists and plaintiffs in the Clark litigation viewed
their arguments against geographic attendance zones that perpetuated identifiably white
and black schools as a natural extension of earlier efforts to eliminate Little Rock's dual
school system. They viewed the school board's persistent defense of neighborhood
schools as just one more tactic of delay in a long term strategy of resistance to school
desegregation. It was well known that the geographic attendance zones proposed by the
board, and the schools which had been built to serve them, had been deliberately sited to
maximize segregation in the months immediately proceeding the integration of Central
High School. Indeed, in part, this understanding had fueled white flight to the western
part of the city where many families believed they could avoid desegregation altogether.
When the African American plaintiffs in Little Rock appealed to the courts for a student
assignment plan that permitted noncontiguous zoning, pairing, and the busing of students
to facilitate these arrangements, they were in every sense asking for a remedy to a
situation created and perpetuated by the school board. The courts affirmed this
67
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perspective, determining that there was "no reasonable alternative" that would fulfil the
mandate of the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown, Green, and Swann.
However, the resistance African American plaintiffs encountered in Little Rock
would surface elsewhere as local federal judges ordered metropolitan school districts to
adopt similar strategies in the wake of the Swann decision. Again and again,
communities that had refused to assign students to schools based on their residential
location, routinely busing children to distant educational plants to preserve segregation,
suddenly decried this attack on the "neighborhood school" and the unfair burden of
busing children long distances to ''unsafe" and purportedly "inferior" schools. This
argument certainly surfaced in Little Rock when over 1,200 white parents signed a
petition objecting to "unwise, discriminatory and dangerous" plans to bus their children to
"an unsafe [African American] neighborhood ... well-known for its violence, disruptions,
altercations, fights, stabbings and other criminal and indecent activities."69
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Swann, busing opponents
nationwide continued to argue that geographic attendance zones were "constitutionally
faultless," and that "race conscious" student assignment plans designed to eliminate all
vestiges of segregation were themselves violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Busing opponents contended vociferously that the newest generation of school
desegregation remedies were not natural extensions of previous efforts to dismantle dual
school systems. Instead, in their view, federal courts were merely attempting to create
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artificial racial balance in areas where residential segregation was not the product of
official action but natural selection and the impartial operation of market forces.
This debate raged in the nation's court rooms, legislative halls, and newspapers.
Increasingly, comparisons and contrasts drawn between the school desegregation efforts
of the 1950s- particularly the events in Little Rock- and the controversies of the 1970s
functioned as means to illuminate the contours of arguments on both sides. Throughout
the decade, the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis of 1957 was
actively deployed in service of contemporary political ends, not only in Arkansas' capital
but in the nation-at-large.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"FREEDOM IS SOMETHING WE MUST FIGHT FOR":
NEGOTIATING THE NARRATIVE BREACH

In Little Rock, African American plaintiffs and the school board argued about
whether the implementation of"race conscious" student assignment plans (facilitated by
busing) upheld or undermined the principle established in the Supreme Court's 1954

Brown decision and defended by the lOPt Airborne in 1957. By the early 1970s, after a
generation of delay and evasion, the justices on the Supreme Court and their colleagues in
the lower courts acknowledged that a variety of "race neutral" strategies had been
deployed to maintain racially isolated schools, particularly in residentially segregated
urban districts. The Swann decision effectively found that "color blind" student
assignment policies based on geographic residence alone had not been implemented as
part of a good faith effort to integrate schools. Consequently, federal courts embraced
busing as one of several tools that could be used to effectively dismantle segregated
school systems that were the result of generations of urban planning and district
gerrymandering. In the early 1970s, African American plaintiffs convinced federal jurists
that student transportation was simply another means to achieve the equal educational
opportunity promised by Brown.
But the debate over busing was not just waged in the court rooms. Increasingly,
representatives of the New Right argued that these use of"race conscious" remedies to
address segregation were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Districts that
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attempted to achieve a semblance of"racial balance," conservatives argued, continued to
assign students to schools on the basis of racial classifications that abridged individual
rights. Regardless of the intentions of school administrators or federal judges that
instituted these remedies, the ends (completely integrated schools) did not justify the
means. This argument was advanced with increasing force throughout the 1970s, and
threatened to spark another constitutional crisis when President Richard Nixon suggested
that Congress could limit the remedies deployed by courts in addressing school
segregation.
Nationwide, the anti-busing movement gained energy and strength as courts began
to apply busing remedies to school districts in the North that were also found guilty of
artificially maintaining racially isolated schools. Just as Little Rock had become a
national symbol of massive resistance to the first phase of school desegregation in 1957,
cities like Boston became flashpoints of resistance against busing and the authority of the
federal courts. In the midst of this turmoil, media analysts and reporters revisited the
Little Rock school desegregation crisis, drawing comparisons and contrasts between the
images of violent resistance to busing in Boston and headlines from Little Rock seventeen
years earlier. In this national conversation, the public memory of the 1957 school
desegregation crisis served as a rhetorical anchor that allowed some to argue that the
same fundamental issues were at stake while others contended that the circumstances
surrounding the two cases were completely different. Although federal judges held that
the principles at issue were the same- the meaningful implementation of school
desegregation, the recognition of the rule of law, and the enforcement of court orders by
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other branches of government- the debate that raged in legislative chambers and across
editorial pages suggested that many Americans viewed systemic efforts to address racial
discrimination as little more than illegitimate experiments in "social engineering."
As the arguments ofthe New Right gained traction in the court of public opinion,
a "narrative breach" surfaced in media accounts and political rhetoric regarding civil
rights. Earlier efforts to dismantle school desegregation in the South through token
integration or freedom-of-choice plans were increasingly embraced and celebrated, even
in Little Rock itself. However, efforts to achieve district-wide integration on a national
scale were not recognized or legitimized as natural extensions of these earlier campaigns.
The emergence of a strategy designed to cast the civil rights movement as a relic of the
past rather than an active force in the present and the future was carefully calculated not
only to obscure the continuity between earlier demands for access to equal education and
their reiteration in the 1970s, but also the connections between the strategies of massive
resistance and minimal compliance and the new rhetoric of "color blind" student
assignment. 1
This shift in political rhetoric shaped the tone of media coverage and spectrum of
public opinion in relation to school desegregation, and inevitably affected the position of
the federal courts themselves. By appointing four justices to the Supreme Court during
the course of his presidency, Richard Nixon-- and the concerns and anxieties that
propelled him to the White House-- would have a profound impact on the future course of
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school desegregation litigation. 2 Civil rights activists, the black press, and sympathetic
editors in the mainstream media recognized this threat to recently won gains and
struggled to maintain and foster a more active memory of the civil rights movement that
would speak to the concerns of the present, not only in the court room but among the
American people themselves.

Political Rhetoric: The Anti-Busing Movement Flourishes
After the Supreme Court approved the use of busing as a desegregation remedy in

Swann (1971 ), the federal courts found themselves increasingly isolated. The
enforcement efforts that had marked the late-1960s, and the critical support of the
executive and legislative branches, evaporated. A long time student of the politics of
school desegregation, Gary Orfield observed that within a year of Swann, "many political
leaders, much of the mass media, and some members ofthe academic community...
joined the opposition for the first time since 1954." In a study compiled for the
Brookings Institution, Orfteld concluded that the busing issue had become "explosive"
because it affected the "largest and most visible of public institutions"- the schools.
Consequently, busing orders could effect the lives of millions of families. Student
assignment patterns were one of the few areas of documented discrimination under the
control of public officials that could be changed "at once" by court order. 3
Moreover, as massive evidence of illegal actions by school boards mounted in
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southern and northern, rural and urban communities, school desegregation could no
longer be viewed as a regional problem. As the historian Adam Fairclough has noted, the
tactics of delay that unfolded across the nation in the wake of the Little Rock school
desegregation crisis of 1957, postponed "integration long enough for a 'white backlash'
to emerge in the North, just as the leaders ofthe Citizens' Councils ofthe 1950s had
hoped and predicted."4 Southern segregationists believed that if school integration
effected northern neighborhoods and communities, resistance to the Supreme Court's
orders would spread accordingly.
While busing opponents continued to define northern residential segregation as a

de facto "natural" phenomenon, courts concluded in many cases that the ghettoization of
American cities and the racial isolation of predominantly-minority schools was the result
of de jure discrimination and action by public officials- a determination much of the
American public never accepted. Federal busing orders were not discussed as the only
feasible means to remedy constitutional violations. Instead, they were described in the
mass media and public debate as an artificial and arbitrary attempt at social engineering.
As school integration proceeded slowly in urban cities on both sides of the Mason-Dixon
line in the 1970s, busing became a focus of public commentary as a "powerful" force of
change in comparison to other efforts to end discrimination which were already being
rolled back. 5
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In response to the backlash against busing, politicians at the state and federal level

considered various forms of anti-busing legislation. Anti-busing rhetoric was a
cornerstone of Richard Nixon's "southern strategy" in his pursuit of the presidency. At
the 1968 GOP national convention, Nixon told the southern caucus that he believed
federal judges or federal bureaucrats were unqualified to make local school decisions,
promised to appoint more conservative justices to the Supreme Court, and endorsed
"freedom-of-choice" plans. 6 Once in office, Nixon's Justice Department entered school
cases calling for further delays in the implementation of desegregation plans, asking for
higher burdens ofproofto determine constitutional violations, and opposing the use of
transportation as a remedy. 7 The administration also politicized the enforcement process;
appointed officials in HEW refused to withhold federal aid or put pressure on
noncompliant school districts. In 1972, the department was found guilty of subverting the
intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and failing to enforce recent Supreme Court decisions.
A federal court determined that HEW had "consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy which in is effect an abdication of its statutory duty." The Nixon administration
had been found derelict in its responsibility to uphold and enforce the law as instituted by
the United States Congress and interpreted by the courts. Administration officials were
ordered to take immediate action in more than 100 school desegregation cases and report
their fmdings to the court on an established timeline. 8
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Nevertheless, Nixon continued to rely on anti-busing rhetoric in his pursuit of a
second term and in direct defiance of the authority of federal courts. After opponent
George Wallace made a strong showing in a 1972 Florida primary, the President proposed
a busing "moratorium" and legislation that would permit the use of busing as a remedy
only as tool of"last resort" under "strict limitations" in a televised address. Nixon's
Equal Educational Opportunities bill restricted the ability of courts to assign students to
schools outside their neighborhoods. Moreover, the bill authorized school boards to
reopen existing court orders that went beyond the standards laid out in the legislation.
Nixon insisted school desegregation was "substantially completed" and any further
measures must be "achieved with a greater sensitivity to educational needs" without
"disrupting communities and imposing hardship on children." The President promised
that additional federal resources would be made available to compensate disadvantaged
children locked into what he acknowledged were "inferior" schools. What he did not
reveal in his address was that these funds would be diverted from other programs
designed to provide assistance to desegregating school districts. 9 In the weeks and
months that followed, Congress considered these proposals as well as amendments to the
constitution that would prohibit federal courts from utilizing busing or any other race-
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conscious remedy in school desegregation cases. 10
Civil rights activists contended that proposed anti-busing amendments and bills
under consideration in the Congress would render the promise of Brown illusory.
Without busing, minority students would be segregated into separate-but-unequal schools
that lacked the funding and resources to break the cycle of racism and poverty gripping
America's inner cities. As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted reminded
Congress, "to restrict busing in most communities is simply to restrict desegregation."
The Commission asserted, "What you really say to these children when you say 'no
busing' is 'stay in your place and attend your inferior schools.' ... No amount of talk
about new expenditures to create what, in fact, is a revision to the unconstitutional and
bankrupt policy of 'separate but equal' will long delude minority parents or even minority
studerij:s." 11 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
insisted that the anti-busing legislation was "no different from the doctrines of
interposition, nullification, and advocacy of defiance by manifesto"that were used to
delay implementation of 1954 Brown decision. 12 Just as those doctrines had threatened
the balance of power between state and federal governments, the NAACP suggested that
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the proposed anti-busing legislation threatened the disrupt the relationship between
branches of the federal government by undermining the integrity of the judiciary.
Moreover, the NAACP's General Counsel Nathaniel R. Jones warned that curbs on
judicial authority would "be interpreted as a clear signal to Negroes" that efforts to
produce change through the courts were futile and "that the battle for change must be
taken underground." 13
The Nixon bills also drew criticism from other quarters. More than 500 attorneys
signed a letter opposing the legislation as unconstitutional. The proposed moratorium
and Equal Educational Opportunities bill even sparked revolt within the Justice
Department. Nine black lawyers within the Civil Rights Division urged Congress not to
adopt the proposal in a public letter. "We as ardent students of the civil rights struggle
have concluded that the recent fervor in the area of busing is nothing more than a thinly
veiled attempt to sacrifice the rights of minority children to racist pressure groups and
political expedience," they asserted. Nearly 100 of their white colleagues supported their
position and called on Congress not to enact legislation that restricted the powers of the
courts to remedy unconstitutional segregation. 14
In Little Rock, the progress that had been made under the city's new

comprehensive desegregation plan would unravel if busing was eliminated as a remedy.
Arkansas' capital was listed by the Justice Department as one of 45 school districts with
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pending court orders that would be directly and immediately effected ifNixon's proposals
became law. 15 In the aftermath of the President's address, Superintendent of Schools
Floyd W. Parsons vocalized his belief that Little Rock qualified as one ofthe districts that
had "been required to go beyond the Supreme Court's requirements," and expressed
confidence that the moratorium could have the effect of halting busing completely at the
elementary school level and scaling back the extent of the city's desegregation efforts at
the junior and senior high schoollevel. 16 African American attorney John W. Walker
scoffed at Parson's assertions. He noted that Nixon's proposals to provide
"compensatory" funding to racially isolated schools only underscored the fact that
segregated schools throughout the South were and would continue to be unequal. The
President's proposals also exceeded the scope ofhis authority. "Obviously, the President
cannot run the judiciary," Walker asserted. 17 In opposition to Nixon's proposals, the

Arkansas Gazette also commented on the irony of the President's attempt to undermine
the authority of the federal courts when he had staked so much of his reputation on his
dedication to "law-and-order." 18
In this context, local African American leaders responded to the NAACP's
national call to action and vocally opposed the President's anti-busing legislation. The
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national civil rights organization framed the administration's actions as an attack on the
1954 Brown decision, and urged its allies not to "stand still while the protections we have
won at such cost are swept away by our enemies." Members were urged to write letters
to their congressmen, senators, local newspapers, and the President himself reminding
them that the "real issue is ending segregated education and that busing is only one waybut often a necessary way- to end segregation." 19 The national organization also urged
local branches to schedule rallies and mass meetings in opposition to the President's
proposals. 20
Within days of this appeal, 200 delegates from the NAACP Region Six leadership
conference converged in Little Rock. In a rousing address, NAACP board member Dr.
George D. Flemmings warned his colleagues that the Nixon administration and its allies
were not only undermining the enforcement mechanisms written into the Civil Rights
Act, but were now devoting "a lot of time and energy... into the idea of breaking down the
gains we've made in recent decisions ofthe Supreme Court." There was much to be
proud of in the arena of school desegregation and many accomplishments to celebrate, but
Flemmings urged those gathered to remain vigilant. "Everything that's not nailed down
is coming up," he said. "The slippage in civil rights is apparent on every hand."
Antibusing only "means on thing ... resegregation," Flemmings asserted. Segregationist ·
sentiment had resurfaced with a vengeance and would spread "like wildfire" unless the
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NAACP and other civil rights organizations moved quickly to put it out. 21

In a public resolution read in front of Little Rock Central High School, local civil
rights leaders responded to Flemming's address and condemned the President's antibusing message.

Like Governor Orval Faubus fifteen years earlier, the delegates

accused Nixon of acting "for selfish political advantage," and using his office "to
encourage a national mood of reaction and oppression by emotional appeals and obvious
deceit." As the delegates held hands circling the reflecting pond in :front of the school
and sang "We Shall Overcome," Rev. C. Anderson Davis, director of the NAACP
Houston Chapter, referred to Central as "the symbol of the Negro's struggle for
integration in the schools." The resolution contended that Nixon's proposal threatened
the "undermine the efforts of all those both black and white," like the Little Rock Nine
and their mentor Daisy Bates, "who had worked for desegregation." Although she was
no longer the president of the Arkansas state conference, Daisy Bates was still an active
leader in the organization. She reminded those gathered around the reflecting pool of
Elizabeth Eckford's courage as she walked in front of Central High "with a mob at her
heels," and urged the crowd to "rededicate" themselves to the "fight for :freedom." The
battle in Little Rock and elsewhere was not over, Bates contended: "Freedom is
something we must fight for every day and every hour.'m Little Rock had only recently
moved beyond token levels of integration due to court-ordered busing. Consequently, it
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was hardly surprising that the delegates pledged to challenge the President in "the
Congress and the courts" and to "appeal for justice before the nation and the world" in
order to prevent resegregation in this symbolic city of the struggle. 23
Leo Collins, a local radio personality and weekly columnist for Little Rock's
black newspaper The Southern Mediator Journal, also expressed his contempt for
Nixon's attempts to use "every weapon available to the President's office to overturn the
desegregation ruling of 1954." Collins contended that the furor over busing was just
another vehicle for trying "to cling to the segregated past." Common sense dictated that
integration could only be achieved with transportation for students. Nixon's quest for
power had led him to propose irresponsible and foolish legislation that "would take years
to undo ... while multitudes of school aged children's thinking would be tarnished and
their education impeded." Moreover, Collins decried the "dangerous precedent" the antibusing proposals established. If enacted, he argued, "the country would then be geared to
circumvent every decision the court made by a simple congressional act or by a president
selfish enough to work the American people into a frenzy and then ask them to vote to
butcher the constitution... one of the greatest documents every written." The real question
under consideration, Collins insisted, "Are we becoming a nation ruled by the simple
wishes of those who would have the gall to treat the constitution like the bylaws of some
fraternal organization, or are we still a nation of people willing to be governed by the
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laws that made this empire the greatest democracy the world has ever known?"24
As the contest over anti-busing legislation escalated, civil rights supporters
struggled to block administration efforts to curb the authority of the federal courts and
other attempts to divert money from school districts working through the desegregation
process. Only the use of the filibuster prevented Nixon's Equal Educational
Opportunities bill from becoming law. As Gary Orfield observed, the filibuster had been
used for decades to block progress on civil rights and was now being deployed to
preserve the gains that had been won only a few years earlier. Ironically, he wrote,
"longtime enemies of the filibuster system joined in the delaying tactic only to hear their
obstructionism denounced in southern accents." However, civil rights advocates in
Congress were not successful at blocking every piece of anti-busing legislation, nor were
the only proponents of such measures southerners. In 1972, a weakened amendment to an
education bill passed the House and Senate in direct defiance of a Supreme Court
decision which established that school desegregation orders should be carried out
immediately and without delay. Section 803 read that future court orders requiring
busing to achieve racial balance could be postponed until the appeals process was
exhausted. 25
Federal Courts Undeterred
This altered political climate and the passage of Section 803 emboldened the
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Little Rock school district to petition for further delays in desegregation at the elementary
level and a stay of cross-town busing. Desegregation in Little Rock's elementary schools
was scheduled to begin in September 1972, but the school board proposed a plan which
limited integration in the lower grades as much as possible. Under the plan, all fifth
grade students would attend predominantly white schools in the western part of the city
and all fourth grade students would attend predominantly black schools in the eastern part
of the city. Students in grades one through three would attend neighborhood schools.
The board argued that the city's youngest schoolchildren would be attending "integrated"
schools because of the presence of children of another race in the upper grade levels. 26
Despite this attempt to capitalize on the effects ofNixon's anti-busing rhetoric
and the strategy of delay legitimized by the U.S. Congress, the federal courts continued to
hold their ground. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the Little Rock
school board's argument was "without merit," and found that it was nothing less than a
"last ditch effort to retain a segregated school system in the primary grades contrary to the
Supreme Court's mandate that segregation be eliminated 'root and branch."' The

gth

Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the stay, noting that the Supreme
Court had already denied certiori for the integration plan in the secondary schools when
in refused to take up the Little Rock case in 1971. Moreover, it refused to countenance
further delay in grades four and five, arguing that the courts were not directly ordering
busing in these grades but were merely approving a plan advanced by the board. This
)

was clearly splitting hairs since the board never would have advanced a busing plan for
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grades four and five if previous court decisions had not pushed it to do so. 27
However, the school district did gain another year's delay through its petition for a
stay of cross-town busing under Section 803 in grades one through three, which would
now be scheduled to begin in 1973-74. This would give the school board "plenty of time
to exhaust appeals .... before the beginning of the next school year."28 Although the Little
Rock school district attempted to appeal the case to the court of last resort, the Supreme
Court refused to review the 8th Circuit's decision. 29
Little Rock's black press decried this latest attempt to thwart the desegregation
process. Leo Collins accused the district, and others like it of trying "to buck, duck, and
outright circumvent the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation order by coming up with
some leftover Orval Faubus schemes of how to evade the ruling." Collins expressed his
disbelief that "this nonsense" was still an issue ''with just a fraction more than one fourth
of the twentieth century left." He dismissed the argument of white parents that they were
merely trying provide their children with the best education possible. If that was really
their goal, the radio commentator and newspaper columnist insisted, they should "allow
their children to attend school unmolested by their stereotyped thinking." 30 In an
editorial, The Southern Mediator Journal asked in exasperation, "How long will Boards
of Education throughout the nation waste taxpayers money in filing cases and briefs
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through the courts in a fruitless effort to stop the wheels of progress?" It was time to "go
ahead" with other projects. 31
Shortly after the Supreme Court refused to consider the school board's appeal in
June 1973, the Little Rock School District and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund finally
agreed to their own "moratorium agreement," but the terms they agreed to were much
different from those the President had envisioned. After running out of options, both
sides agreed to implement the desegregation plan approved by the courts as expeditiously
as possible. The school district accepted its obligation to desegregate all12 grades
through cross-town busing, although kindergartens would continue to operate in
neighborhood schools. Both sides also agreed to try to establish a one-third black/twothird white ratio of personnel in teaching and administrative positions. The agreement led
to the creation of a Biracial Committee to resolve problems and concerns related to
desegregation, and the Legal Defense Fund agreed to assist the board in any way possible.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs agreed not to initiate further litigation for at least two years
(and for as long as the school board upheld its commitments) in order "to allow the
school board time to implement desegregation in an atmosphere free from litigation. " 32
School Board President Robert McHenry confidently told the press that he believed the
agreement provided a "model to be used by all districts throughout the United States.'m
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Philip Kaplan, attorney for the plaintiffs, also expressed his optimism that the city of
Little Rock could effectively "demonstrate the viability, flexibility, and crucial
importance of the role of education for all persons" in an environment where the parties
were committed to "working together." 34
When this agreement was implemented in the fall of 1973, school officials
reported that school opened smoothly and with a minimum offriction. 35 For the first
time, all students in the Little Rock school district attended integrated schools with
student bodies that were 39% to 77% black. 36 The Southern Mediator Journal applauded
these developments, noting that there "comes a time when people must grow up and act
mature even though they may not always agree." The Journal adapted President Nixon's
call for "law and order," and urged all parents in the school system to "insist that their
children respect the rights of others and remember that our schools exist for the sole
purpose of providing them the best education possible. There must be order and good
conduct if a good education is to be obtained. " 37
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Shifting Tone of Media Coverage
Even as the city of Little Rock fmally complied with the mandate of the Supreme
Court's 1954 Brown v. Board ofEducation decision and began dismantling its dual
school system, the national debate about busing continued with unabated ferocity. The
anti-busing movement spread and gained momentum when federal courts ordered busing
remedies in northern cities found guilty of manipulating attendance policies to increase
racial isolation. 38 In the midst of this upheaval, Little Rock continued to serve as a
symbolic site of the school desegregation struggle, acting as a rhetorical anchor for
ongoing conversations about race and educational policy, particularly in the national
media.
For example, in 1974, Boston became the center of the school desegregation
storm when a federal court determined that the city school board had deliberately created
and maintained racially imbalanced schools by concentrating minority students in inferior
facilities sized and located to serve residentially segregated neighborhoods. The court of
appeals affirmed, "It is beyond dispute that the defendants [the school board] took every
opportunity to maintain segregation where it existed and to foster segregation where it did
not. To use the Supreme Court's language, the neighborhood school concept has not
been maintained free ofmanipulation."39 As part of his desegregat~on plan, Judge Garrity
ordered African American students from Roxbury to be bused a short distance to nearby
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South Boston. When the school buses rolled into this nearly all-white enclave known as
Southie, mobs greeted the black students with stones, signs, and threats. The taunts and
angry faces of the gathered crowds generated comparisons between the events of 1957
and 1974, and Boston quickly became known as the Little Rock ofthe North. This
comparison generated its own debate, with some arguing that the same issues and
fundamental rights were at stake and others insisting that circumstances surrounding the
two cases were completely different. Notably, in the course of public discussion, few
commentators made note ofLittle Rock's own long struggle with the issue of student
transportation. During the early half of the 1970s, it was the turmoil of 1957 that
captured the country's imagination. It was not until the late 1970s that Little Rock's
integration "success story" was advanced as a model for the nation.
Little Rock's black newspaper, The Southern Mediator Journal, published a
number of editorials and columns on events unfolding north of the Mason-Dixon Line.
For these writers, the connections between the school desegregation crises in Little Rock
and Boston were self-evident. Dr. J.P. Cooley, a columnist and a dean at Shorter College,
observed, "For those who have said that the school integration crisis is behind us had
better do some more thinking. Twenty and one-half years have passed since the U.S.
Supreme Court has outlawed segregation in public schools. Yet, today the opposition is
appalling." Cooley contended that the mobs in Boston had revealed unmasked
northerners as the "greatest hypocrites of all"- African Americans who had fled injustice
in the south and migrated north found themselves just as segregated "politically, socially,
economically, religiously, and educationally." The "trouble" in Boston was that school
194

desegregation threatened the status quo in a community built "around and for white
society" just as it had in the south. 40 Another columnist also weighed in about the
hypocrisy of the "allegedly liberal North." Leo Collins asserted that Crispus Attucks, the
first martyr of the American Revolution, would be horrified if reawakened to the
"nightmare" of a city rebelling not "against foreign governments but against helpless
black children who want to do nothing more but receive a competent high school
education." The "ballyhoo" in Boston and the national outcry against busing revealed
"how whites think the country over." Due to segregation, the school system had clearly
failed to teach Americans to "live together with mutual respect for each other regardless
of ethnic or racial differences."41 Moreover, the nation still had not learned its lesson
from the 1957 school desegregation crisis or others like it. "It was hoped," to paper's
editorial board wrote, that after events in Little Rock had established "the right of blacks
to enter the public schools without segregation.... people all over the United States would
go about the business of making democracy work in all areas." However, the board sadly
observed, ''the Boston situation tells us that some segments of this country will never
learn... Truth ofthe matter is, the American people- in large numbers- do not want right
to prevail!"42
Sybil Stevenson, a Central High alumni who enrolled as one of a handful of black
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students in 1959, drew even more explicit connections between the experiences of
African American teenagers in Little Rock and the pupils riding buses into Southie. In
her view, the children in Boston and other communities violently resisting busing were
"change agents .... links in a chain which has been forged throughout our struggle in this
country; a chain of blacks committed to freedom and justice." This chain of change
agents stretched back in the past through the length and breadth of American history up
through the twentieth century to the Little Rock Nine and those who followed them, like
Stevenson herself, and was being carried on by a new generation of young people. Like
their predecessors, bused students were willing to "face perils as they participate in the
effort to bring about racial balance in our public schools" due to their commitment to
equal rights. 43
Nationally Roger Wilkins, President Johnson's former assistant attorney general,
described the scene in Boston as "reminiscent of hundreds of others flashed on television
screens at the opening of school in years gone by. There were angry whites chanting their
opposition to a Federal Court order, throwing rocks at black school children and
screaming defiance and hatred at a symbol of the Federal will to enforce the law." The
African American civil rights leader acerbically asserted that the only difference between
Little Rock and Boston was "geography and federal policy." School segregation persisted
in the North, not because the constitutional rights at stake in the region were
fundamentally different, but because the Nixon and Ford administrations encouraged
resistance to Northern desegregation, publicly attacked remedies designed to ameliorate
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it, and refused to withhold federal funds from institutions that supported it. A study by
the Center for National Policy Review revealed that HEW files "literally bulge[d) with
documented evidence" of discrimination and segregation in school systems. However,
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger defended his enforcement program, weakly protesting,
"We are doing our job under very difficult circumstances where there is a very strong
divergence of viewpoints between what the law says and what the public wants." Wilkins
called this a "breath-taking excuse for non-enforcement of the law by a man sworn to
uphold it." He contended that if the same policy had been followed in the fifties and
sixties in the south, dual school systems would have remained intact there as well. In this
context, the Wilkins concluded that the people of Boston were ''worse off than the people
of Little Rock" because they had been misled and failed by "demagogues playing antibusing politics" in the legislative and executive branches of the federal govemment. 44
Indeed, President Gerald Ford was strongly criticized by Mayor Kevin White of
Boston for voicing his opposition to busing as a school desegregation remedy in the midst
of the violence and racial tension gripping the city. Ford told reporters at a news
conference that busing was "not the best solution" for Boston's schools. This statement
was widely viewed as lending "aid and comfort" to anti-busing advocates in Boston, and
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some suggested that the President had even endangered African American school children
by encouraging resistance. New York Times columnist Tom Wicker observed that
President Ford's unwillingness to speak out in favor of desegregation recalled President
Eisenhower's refusal to publicly affirm the Supreme Court's Brown decision. However,
for Wicker the similarities ended there- Eisenhower had "recognized his duty" to enforce
a federal court order in Little Rock, while Ford "made no move" to support judicial
authority. This was hardly surprising considering that Ford had helped lead congressional
attempts to limit the use of busing as a remedy in school desegregation cases. Wicker
contended that the President's effort to "pay lip service to the law" while denouncing
busing only served to mask the fact that he offered no viable and effective alternatives to
student transportation. "That means there is no Federal policy for achieving
desegregation outside the South, as Southerners never believed there would be," the
columnist concluded.45
However, for many who opposed busing, the comparisons outlined above failed to
recognize the "critical difference" between the school desegregation crisis in Little Rock
and the controversy that gripped Boston. In the 1950s, Little Rock school children and
their parents had pursued a desegregated school system with students assigned to schools
regardless of their race. Despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, anti-busing
advocates insisted that students in Boston and other northern school districts had "long
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been assigned to schools solely on the basis of where they lived on a straight color-blind
basis." In these cases, the courts were mistakenly deploying a "race-conscious" remedy
to integrate schools. From this perspective, busing not only tried to impose an "artificial"
racial balance on "naturally" segregated communities, it also violated the "color-blind"
principle established in Brown and defended in Little Rock. 46
In the national media, this kind of rhetoric was presented as part of a legitimate
debate over the use of busing and the authority of federal courts to implement it. This
was a significant departure from the general tone of coverage during the Little Rock
school desegregation crisis over seventeen years earlier. In 1957, the mainstream mediaparticularly national news magazines and northern newspapers- had presented the
conflict in Arkansas' capital as a battle between a cornerstone of American democracythe rule of law- and the forces of massive resistance. For many reporters who covered
the story, these two sides of the conflict were not equal adversaries. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution was the law of the land, while those who
resisted its mandate were dismissed as "ri:fraff," "trash," and "unshaven men and :frowsy
women." Governor Faubus himself was vilified and portrayed as little more than a
"slightly sophisticated hillbilly. " 47
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In 1957, Little Rock's local newspapers had not been as dismissive of the forces

of massive resistance. With exclusive access to Governor Faubus, the conservative
Arkansas Democrat portrayed him as a "heroic figure working under enormous stress."48
In contrast, the Arkansas Gazette stood frrmly against Faubus' interference with Little

Rock school desegregation plan and even went so far as to accuse him of deliberately
cultivating violent resistance to justify his decision to deploy the National Guard in order
to keep the black students out of Little Rock Central High School. However, this
characterization ofFaubus' machinations implicitly depicted the Governor was a savvy
political operator, even if he was pandering to a "small and militant minority of whites,"
not a backwoods rube. 49
If the mainstream media's depiction ofFaubus and the forces of massive
resistance did not prevail in much of the southern press, it did help set the tone for future
coverage of the civil rights movement by national news organizations during the late
1950s and early 1960s. As other scholars like Julian Bond have observed, Little Rock
established the "key conventions" of civil rights coverage- "It had drama, tension, and the
ever-present whiff of real and threatened violence, all concentrated into a manageable
geographic area and relatively brief time frame." Moreover, the desegregation crisis and
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other early campaigns for social justice- like the Montgomery bus boycott- generated an
era of sympathetic coverage in which the media presented the nation's racial crisis as a
"confrontation between the forces of justices, respectability and decency and those of
bigotry, violence, lawlessness, and ignorance." During this period, civil rights activists
consciously encouraged these comparisons through their appeal to democratic and
constitutional principles, their respectable dress, and carefully orchestrated campaigns
that were designed to heighten such contrasts. 50
However, by the late 1960s, the news media no longer characterized the black
freedom struggle this way. With the emergence of black power and black nationalism,
and the wave of urban rioting that followed Watts, African American activists were no
longer sympathetically portrayed as the forces of"justices, respectability and decency,"
but rather were increasingly maligned as the representatives of"bigotry, violence,
lawlessness, and ignorance."51 While some have argued that this shift was precipitated
by expressions of violence, anger, and militancy in the movement and a corresponding
increase of white fear, others have suggested that the increasingly radical and systemic
critiques of American society that were emerging from the black freedom struggle failed
to resonate with white Americans, their representatives in the press corps, or the
economic and ideological forces undergirding mass media itself. 52
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If the national and mainstream media was not always overtly hostile to the
demands of civil rights advocates in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they did tend to
portray the nation's racial problems as a clash "between opposing forces equally
deserving of suspicion."53 Unlike the characterization of forces represented in the Little
Rock school desegregation crisis, the voices involved in the Boston busing crisis were
given equal weight and legitimacy. This trend was only enhanced by the fact that antibusing forces enjoyed support from prominent politicians- including Presidents Nixon
and Ford. Under the mantle of balance and objectivity, speakers on both sides of the
debate were provided with space to express and articulate their grievances, but many
reports did not acknowledge that the legal issues surrounding student transportation were
already settled.
The civil rights community's frustration with the media's approach the nation's
latest school desegregation crisis was palpable. In an op-ed in The Washington Post,
NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel R. Jones cautioned "writers and other
commentators" that it was a "fundamental error" to attempt "to draw legal distinctions
between Little Rock and Boston desegregation cases." Jones insisted that the issues were
simple. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that state-imposed segregation was
unconstitutional. Public officials had created and maintained segregated schools in Little
Rock and Boston. Their actions violated the equal protection clause ofthe 14th
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Amendment, and courts were required to develop remedial plans that remove all vestiges
of segregation from the system. In both cities, "resistance to judicial efforts" to eliminate
segregation "root and branch" had resulted in violence. Indeed, the cases were so similar
the Court of Appeals drew upon legal precedents established in Little Rock sixteen years
earlier when it refused to overturn the Boston busing order because of community
resistance and mob violence. "Rather than continuing fruitless journalistic probes for
legal distinctions that don't exist," Jones urged reporters, "it is time for all people of
decent instincts to come together to preserve the fragile but essential rule oflaw."54
The Court of Public Opinion
However, public opinion polling in the mid-1970s revealed that most white
Americans did draw distinctions between school desegregation in general and busing.
Polls unveiled a growing consensus in support of school desegregation, but increasing
polarization and opposition to school busing. This contradiction led some researchers to
conclude that factors other than racism animated the school busing debate. 55 However,
many civil rights activists rejected this interpretation of the data. As Jesse Jackson
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insisted, "It's not the bus. It's us." 56 Indeed, a 1975 Harris Survey reported that 74% of
respondents opposed "busing school children to achieve racial balance." However, the
children of many ofthese individuals were already being bused for other reasons. Even
among those who opposed busing for desegregation, 9 in 10 reported that school busing
was "convenient" in their experience and 7 in 8 expressed "general satisfaction" with
their children's busing. In summary, when people were asked about desegregation, they
insisted they were only opposed to busing, but when asked specifically about busing, it
seemed they were only concerned about student transportation when it was required to
integrate schools. From the perspective of civil rights advocates, reported support for
school desegregation was superficial and facile without support for the means to achieve
it.

57

Others pointed to polls which revealed that some portions of the African
American community were ambivalent about busing to demonstrate that opposition to
student transportation was not racially motivated. However, a poll in 1970 revealed that
even after the rise of the black power and community control movements support for
ongoing federal enforcement of school desegregation was twice as high among African
American respondents, with four in five calling for further action. Consequently, when
asked questions based on the premise that desegregation in urban areas could not proceed
without busing, African American respondents were much more likely than their white
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counterparts to favor busing. 58
Civil rights activists asserted that busing opponents had overstated the strength of
African American opposition to busing, and often failed to acknowledge the resentments
and fears that fueled it. Busing orders often placed the heaviest burden on African
American children and communities, with far more black children bused to white schools
than vice versa. 59 As a result, historically black schools like Little Rock's Horace Mann
High School were often closed, institutional traditions lost, and black teachers and
administrators frequently lost their jobs unless federal courts intervened. Moreover, after
twenty years of resistance to school desegregation, black parents feared for the safety of
their children in predominantly white institutions60
Among whites, Gary Orfield suggested that the contradiction between professed
support for desegregation and opposition to busing was nothing new. As early as 1944,
Gunnar Myrdal had probed the contradiction between professed ideals of racial equality
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and the practices of segregation in his work An American Dilemma. 61 While testifying in
a public hearing before Congress, Orfield observed that during "each successive
skirmish" in the school desegregation struggle, opponents of racial progress "insisted that
they were in favor of civil rights but that the next step was simply going too far." He
contended that many of the politicians pushing anti-busing legislation and fueling public
resistance to its use were the "same group that had led earlier battles." Opponents of
busing, he concluded, "were not united by something special about school buses, but by a
common record of hostility to racial change." 62
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights believed that public opinion had hardened
against busing because many politicians and anti-busing advocates opposing
desegregation had deliberately clouded the issues, and the media had not clarified them.
The Commission stated, "The issue of busing for desegregation more than any other
domestic issue in recent memory, has been discussed in terms that have clouded, rather
than clarified, public understanding. Myth has been confused with reality; groundless
fears have been substituted for fact; and appeals have been made to the baser instincts of
the American people."63 Despite evidence to the contrary, study after study found that
large majorities of white Americans did not believe that African Americans were
61
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discriminated against in public education. Consequently, many believed that the busing
plans ordered by federal judges were arbitrary, irrational, and unnecessarily expensive.
Many white Americans believed that integration had a minimal positive impact on the
education of black children and had a negative impact on the education of white children.
Moreover, it was commonly assumed that busing increased racial hostility and
encouraged white flight to suburbs and private schools. One study found that both white
and black respondents thought busing expenses were more than ten times their actual
local cost and took funds away from other educational programs.

64

Many of these beliefs

could be attributed to the public statements of anti-busing advocates. 65
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights tried to correct public misconceptions and
worked to "dispel the unfounded fears" that fueled the busing controversy. Contrary to
public opinion, the Commission emphasized that federal courts ordered busing to
dismantle segregated school systems that had been found guilty of discriminating against
students and violating the Constitution. Even in northern districts, school and housing
"segregation did not come about by chance or free choice." Moreover, judges usually only
ordered extensive district-wide transportation as a "essential tool" of last resort where
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desegregation could not be accomplished without it. Even then, the Supreme Court had
instructed local judges to take time, distance, and danger to children's health into
consideration. By the mid-1970s, the record demonstrated that local judges had done so. 66
The average travel time reported in districts busing for desegregation was 20 to 30
minutes. The Commission observed that under such circumstances pupils returned home
as soon as they would have if they walked from a neighborhood school. The Commission
noted that the percentage of students bussed had steadily increased during the course of
the twentieth century primarily because of school consolidation, not desegregation. In
1972, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimated that only 2 to 4
percent of children riding school buses were being transported for the purpose of
desegregation. These statistics countered claims that the nation was struggling under an
expensive "massive" busing program.67
The Commission also tried to dispel the myth that busing was not safe and
impaired student achievement. The National Safety Council named the school bus "the
safest transportation in the United States," and another study found that students who
were bused were three times less likely to be involved in an accident than those who

66

Statement of Mr. Theodore M. Hesburg, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, House
Subcommittee, Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to
Transportation and Assignment ofPublic School Pupils, 1 March 1972, 186-236. See also Statement of
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Concerning the President's Message to Congress and Proposed
Legislation on Busing and Equal Educational Opportunities, House Subcommittee, Hearings on the
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of
Public School Pupils, 1134-1135.
67

United States Commission on Civil Rights, Your Child and Busing, 7-8, 14. See also statement
ofHon. Stephen Hom, Vice Chairman, U.S. Commission of Civil Rights, House Subcommittee, Hearings
on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and
Assignment ofPublic School Pupils, 10 May 1972, 1589, 1597.

208

walked. 68 In addressing parental fears that their students would be bused to unsafe crimeridden neighborhoods, the Commission stated baldly, "If a neighborhood in which a
school is located poses a threat to school children, the school should be closed and the
children should be sent to another school.. .. no child should be made to attend it, whether
he walks to school or gets there by bus." Evidence of violence in desegregating schools
"overblown"; those incidents that did occur generally took place at the beginning of the
school year and quickly ceased. 69 The Commission countered claims that the education
suffered because of busing, noting that several studies found that black student
achievement improved in integrated environments while white students performed as well
or better. In contrast, the "compensatory education" programs promoted by many antibusing advocates had not demonstrated "lasting gains" in student achievement.
Moreover, an integrated environment offered students lessons beyond reading, writing,
and arithmetic- it offered instruction in "learning how to live and work with people of
different skin colors and cultural backgrounds."7° Children's safety and academic
achievement improved under integrated conditions.
The US Commission on Civil Rights also highlighted school districts that made
busing work to counter the negative images streaming out of cities like Boston and
Pontiac, Michigan. In this context, Little Rock, once a symbol of violent resistance to
integration, was named "one of the most successfully desegregated school systems in
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nation." As noted earlier, many of the comparisons drawn between Little Rock and its
northern counterparts failed to recognize that school desegregation litigation in Little
Rock had evolved over the course of nearly two decades. The record in Arkansas' capital
clearly illustrated that residential segregation in the city had increased as whites fled to
neighborhoods unaffected by early integration plans based on freedom-of-choice and
geographic attendance zones. The courts there had determined that the only way to
achieve a unitary school system was by abandoning the neighborhood school concept_ and
adopting a district-wide busing program.
In its promotional materials, the Commission hoped to capitalize on and redirect

the comparisons that were already being drawn between Arkansas' capital and the newest
foci of the desegregation struggle. The Commission suggested that if the city of Little
Rock- "the example segregationists used to argue that black and white students could
never go to school together in peace"- could transcend its divisions and successfully
desegregate through busing, the same could be accomplished almost anywhere. 71 Ernest
Green, Central's first African American graduate applauded the progress at the school.
"My general impression," he said, "is that Little Rock has made a better adjustment than
many Northern cities."72 The Commission hoped that cities experiencing racial tension
and violent resistance to school desegregation could learn from Little Rock's experience.
At the urging of John Walker, the attorney for the black plaintiffs in the Little
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Rock school desegregation litigation, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) deployed
an almost identical strategy in its effort to persuade the nation "that integration can be
made to work." In a pamphlet titled Little Rock, 17 years after," LDF solicited
contributions from donors, noting that the kind of progress it had fostered in Little Rock
could only be achieved through extensive and costly court litigation. The use ofbusing,
the LDF noted, had facilitated the shift "from token integration" to the desegregation of
"meaningful numbers" of students in the district. The positive assessments of students,
teachers, and administrators highlighted in the booklet were designed to counter the antibusing rhetoric circulating throughout the country. By the rnid-170s, the LDF argued that
Little Rock's citizens were uniquely positioned to "speak truth to hate.'m
Teaching by Example: An Alternative Model for the Nation?
As Little Rock approached the twentieth anniversary ofthe 1957 crisis, school
administrators, students, and local residents embraced their new role as a model school
district. However, while it was precisely the city's well-known resistance to school
desegregation that made it such a valuable symbol for the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, journalists and other commentators, many in
Little Rock preferred to keep the spotlight squarely on the present rather than the past.
While civil rights activists pointed to the central role played by pioneers like the Little
Rock Nine and countless others who participated in decades long litigation in achieving
this success, others sought to emphasize Little Rock's accomplishment and downplay the

73

"Little Rock, 17 years later," pamphlet (New York: NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, 1974).

211

struggle required to attain it. Vague references to 1957 merely served as a foil to
highlight the lack of racial tension in the city's schools. Moreover, the mechanics of the
process of desegregation- including the central importance of busing- were murky in
many public accounts, despite the efforts of civil rights organizations to place them front
and center. Frequently, the voices of"moderation" were given just as much credit for the
district's success as the civil rights activists who pushed for substantive desegregation
through nearly fifteen years of litigation. In most cases, the public memory of the crisis
seemed like little more than a dusty relic of the past. However, a more active memory of
the crisis persisted. For those who continued to push for improvements in the school
system and society at large, honoring the courage of the Little Rock Nine and others who
had participated in the struggle required a similar commitment to tackling the problems
that persisted in the city's schools.
Two decades after the school desegregation crisis in Little Rock, the mainstream
press focused on the signs of progress at the city's most infamous institution- Central
High SchooL Due to the city's busing program, Central's student body was half white
and halfblack in the mid-1970s. Although the numbers were striking, most reporters also
made note of a spirit of racial "harmony" and "cooperation" within the schooL At the
beginning of the 1976 school year, The New York Times reported that "racial violence had
practically disappeared" and "tension seemed nonexistent" at CentraL 74 Superintendent
of Schools Paul R. Fair stated proudly, "I think the problems we've experienced in the
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past have been in large measure eliminated. We have an apparent attitude of cooperation
here, not only among students but among the faculty." Teachers tried to balance the
content of courses, developing curriculum in African American history and literature and
Asian studies. 75 Over ten years, the school had been able to narrow the "achievement gap"
between black and white students, with black students scoring "considerably higher" and
white students scoring "slightly better" on tests. Student government, athletic teams, and
other organizations were completely integrated after years of delay, and both black and
white students expressed pride in the school's accomplishments. As one student put it,
"When the Central High Tigers are on the field, everybody sitting on our side of the
stadium is a Tiger, regardless of what color they are."76
Central's success was attributed to several factors. Some claimed that the "racial
harmony" at the school was due to the fact that many of the strongest opponents of
desegregation had moved to the city's West End during the 1960s to avoid integration.
(Of course this may have also contributed to the change in the racial politics of the Fifth
Ward described in Chapter Three.) Sybil Stevenson, a black alumni from the early 1960s,
suggested that this migration helped improve the racial atmosphere at Central, but had
probably had a negative impact on race relations in other schools in the city which still
experienced occasional outbursts of violence. Others suggested that the relaxed
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relationships between students were due to the fact that students who had reached high
school in the mid-1970s had been attending integrated institutions since the seventh
grade. Even though most students still socialized primarily with students of their own
race, and interracial contact largely ended at the school doors, students had become
comfortable attending classes and interacting with each other. 77
Many pointed to the active efforts of students, parents, and administrators,
particularly the school's African American principal Morris Holmes, to develop "good
rapport" and a positive atmosphere in the building. 78 Superintendent Paul Fair conceded
that every school district had to confront its own unique challenges, but urged urban
districts to devote considerable time and resources toward resolving racial issues. "I
didn't believe at first that this could be done," he said. ''Now I believe anything can be
done. It's obvious to me now that desegregation of schools is best. In order to build a
solid, cohesive community, you have to have it." Fair asserted that this was true in all
areas of the country. "The Constitution wasn't written to apply only to some sections and
not to others," he said. 79
By the twentieth anniversary of the 1957 school desegregation crisis, none of the
students attending Central High had even been born when racial turmoil in Little Rock
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captured the world's attention. Several told journalists that they had difficulty
understanding the tension in Boston and elsewhere. Greg Means, a white senior,
explained, "Really, we talk about what happened in Louisville and Boston and we laugh
about it.. .. We can't comprehend it. We don't see people here throwing rocks at school
buses. We don't see parents yelling at the police in front of school. It's all so hard to
comprehend." Pausing reflectively, he added, "Of course, none of us here can really
comprehend 1957 either." 80
Other students admitted how little they knew about the school desegregation
cns1s. The events of 1957 were covered only superficially in history courses, and many
students were "surprised to learn that their school helped blaze a new frontier for the civil
rights movement," according to the Los Angeles Times. At least one teacher reacted with
hostility to a reporter's questions about the crisis, accusing him of"trying to relive the
Civil War all over again." A school administrator admitted the controversy of 1957 and
the closure of all three of the city's high schools in 1958-59 was "purposefully played
down" because "a lot of people don't want to open up old wounds." Some expressed
discomfort that Central's long history of academic and athletic excellence was
overshadowed by its role in the nation's desegregation drama. 81
While the 1957 school desegregation crisis had not been forgotten, and the
celebrated integration of Central High School in 1977 would not have been possible if not
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for the courage of the Little Rock Nine, their parents, and Daisy Bates, the city seemed
more interested in demonstrating that it had transcended its past than in actively
remembering what had happened. Even the twentieth anniversary commemoration
ceremony at Central High School, "Twenty Years of Integration: A Model for the
Nation," was described by the Arkansas Gazette as "not so much on occasion for
recalling the 1957 school desegregation crisis ... as it was a time for noting the progress
that had been made since then." The ceremony was on occasion for "tuning up the choir
and tuning up the band in salute to those who helped build what one speaker called a
'new Central High School."' With some relief, the paper noted, "Heroes received rousing
tributes, while the villains, mercifully, were not mentioned." 82 Indeed, when Ralph
Brodie, the student body president in 1957-58, rose to speak, he asserted that only a
"small group of Little Rock residents were responsible for the city's bigoted, violent, and
prejudiced image," according to the Gazette. "For most of us," he insisted, "that image
remains entirely undeserved." Although Brodie saluted the courage of his black
classmates who had "done much to assure the rights of others," he also paid tribute to the
"moderate" and "quiet" voices who urged others to comply with the law. " 83
As the ceremony progressed, Ernest Green, the keynote speaker, received a
standing ovation along with his classmates Elizabeth Eckford and Carlotta Walls LaNier.
On the 20th anniversary of the crisis, much was made ofthe fact that Green had recently
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been appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor for employment and training by President
Carter, while former Governor Orval Faubus was no longer an important political figure
and had been forced to leave retirement and take a position as a bank teller. In his
address, Green referred to the 1957 school crisis only briefly, noting that events in Boston
and Pontiac indicated that school desegregation remained "unfinished business."
However, as might be expected of a man in his position, he asserted that unemployment
had become the nation's largest domestic problem and the majority of his speech was
dedicated to demonstrating that the Carter administration was committed to solving it. 84
Symbolically, as he stood in front of an integrated student body at Central High School as
a representative of the President of the United States, Green had triumphed over the
governor who had tried to deny him equal educational opportunity.
Many in Little Rock seemed to content to vaguely acknowledge the crisis as a
means of highlighting the city's tremendous achievements in the intervening years. As
one news report put it, "The turmoil of that September is easily remembered and that's
the way everyone wants it to remain- just memories."85 However, for civil rights
advocates, the crisis was more than "just" a memory that required little public discussion.
Daisy Bates, in particular, insisted on the need for citizens to have a more active and
acute understanding of the crisis and its relationship to the ''unfinished business" of
school desegregation in Little Rock and elsewhere. "We must make certain," she said,
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"that a lot of our youngsters see clearly how our modem times have been so greatly
influenced by these events." 86 Bates acknowledged that there was "no comparison"
between the educational system in 1957 and 1977. However, she pointed to many second
generation integration problems in the public schools and insisted that there was "still a
lot to be done." If Little Rock was truly to be a model for the nation, then concerned
citizens activists should take inspiration from the courage of the Little Rock Nine to
tackle the problems that still existed in their own communities. 87
Bates lectured the National Black Political Caucus on these points when the
organization gathered in Little Rock for its first meeting after the convention in Gary,
Indiana in 1972. After days of attending discussions about economic, social, and political
empowerment and community organizing, delegates gathered at Little Rock Central High
School to pay tribute to Daisy Bates and the parents of the Little Rock Nine. After
receiving a standing ovation, Bates underscored the importance of using the convention
as an opportunity reaffirm commitment to the civil rights struggle. Nine children had
done more to change the destiny of the country, Bates implied, than the 999 attending the
two-hour tribute to their actions and the bravery of their families. She had seen "much
talk but very little action" out of gatherings like the National Black Political Convention.
She told the leaders before her it was time to "put your money where your mouth is." If
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they were going ''to do something" [emphasis added] she would "be part ofit."88 Gary
Mayor Richard Hatcher embraced the content of Bates' address. Days earlier, he told the
press that Little Rock had been selected as the convention site because of "the historic
role has played in the civil rights struggle." Even more importantly, "it was also selected
because it is good, sometimes, to return to old battle grounds and reaffirm that
struggle. " 89
While Daisy Bates always acknowledged Little Rock's progress in the field of
civil rights, she continued to insist that the city had a long way to go. "We've changed
the practice of segregation, but we don't have integration," she said. "We've changed the
laws, now we need to change the hearts."90 Indeed, interviews conducted in February
1976 revealed that white and black residents in Little Rock had very different views about
the successes and failures of the school integration program. Although nearly all
interviewees agreed that relationships between black and white students had improved
under the plan, most similarities ended there.
Black parents, students, and teachers generally agreed that African American
pupils had access to better schools and instructional materials under the desegregation
plan. Many black teachers expressed their belief that equal educational opportunity could
only be attained through integration and agreed that the busing plan had improved
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educational equality. For their part, black students felt that "opportunity for a better for
education for all· students" was attainable in Little Rock. Due to their access to
educational resources, higher percentages of their peers were graduating from high school
and finding employment. When African American interviewees expressed dissatisfaction
with the busing plan, their complaints were primarily directed to the unequal burden they
felt the desegregation plan placed on black families, teachers, and historically black
educational institutions. Both parents and teachers reported that the closure of black
neighborhood schools, such as Horace Mann High School, had created resistance to the
busing plan within the black community and impeded the desegregation effort. Because
of these closures, black students were more likely to be bused than their white
counterparts to distant schools. Likewise, although the school district had been ordered
to eliminate discrimination in the recruitment and assignment of faculty, more black
teachers had been required to transfer to historically white institutions than vice versa. 91
White parents and teachers were more likely than their African American
counterparts to challenge the premise that the desegregation plan improved educational
equality in the district. Moreover, they implied that if the plan did so, it achieved this end
at the expense of white students. Although some parents believed that desegregation plan
had improved the school system through a general restructuring, interviewers encountered
"parental hostility about completely desegregating the school system." Many resented
that their children were "compelled" to attend interracial schools. Likewise, white
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teachers were "generally pessimistic" about school desegregation, questioning whether it
was really necessary and speculating that the plan might not work. While white teachers
felt that black students had benefitted from the integration of schools, they indicated that
desegregation hindered white students academically. White students themselves
suggested that the plan gave black students access to better educational facilities and
provided white students with the chance to meet people from other backgrounds, but they
did not believe the plan offered them any educational benefits. For their part, school
administrators did not believe the greatest problem facing the school system was the
unequal burden the desegregation plan placed on the black community, but rather "the
apathy of black students and parents, violence in and around schools, and financial
problems." The elements of the busing plan spoken of favorably were those that reduced
the busing of white students and allowed white pupils to continue to attend Hall and
Parkview High Schools in the city's West End. Parents also praised the feeder system
which allowed students to continue through elementary, middle, and high school with a
consistent group offriends. 92

In this environment, civil rights leaders like Daisy Bates believed with some
reason that Little Rock's public schools were still a hostile environment for black
students. "Second Generation" desegregation problems such as academic tracking,
inequitable discipline, and the expulsion of black students from integrated schools
became the new focus of the desegregation effort. The Southern Regional Council
reported that nearly 80% of suspensions from Little Rock schools during the first year of
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secondary school integration were African American students. This trend continued for
the next several years. 93 The Southern Mediator Journal received numerous reports that
black children in the district were "not attending school or dropping out of school for no
good reason. " 94 The Southern Regional Council referred to many of these students as
"pushouts" who frequently quit school because of the "intolerable hostility directed
toward them." The inequitable discipline these statistics revealed was hardly surprising
in a school system that insisted that the "apathy" ofblack students was one of its largest
challenges, or in a district where large numbers of African American pupils were moved
into historically white institutions with faculty members who were ambivalent about the
necessity of school desegregation and "pessimistic" about the impact of black students in
their classrooms.
In the mid-1970s, the Southern Regional Council suggested that disproportionate

numbers of minority suspensions and expulsions were part of a larger pattern of
continuing resistance to school desegregation. In a survey, the council found that
"suspensions are often imposed for reasons that do not warrant such extreme action."
Disciplinary problems were exacerbated by the fact that black students had been
transferred to schools dominated by white tradition. In many schools, black students
found themselves "excluded from extracurricular activities, tracked into segregated
classes and confronted with condescension and hostility." In some cases, "school
93
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confrontations are provoked through discrimination in disciplining black students, by use
of Confederate symbols, and the displacement of black principals, teachers and coaches
which leaves blacks students without models. " 95 The Southern Regional Council urged
school districts to reserve suspension and expulsion for "extreme violations" of school
rules, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed a number of suits around the country
that addressed these issues. 96 The Southern Mediator Journal urged black parents to
provide their children with "proper cultural training" that would enable them to strive for
success, maintain their self-respect and generate respect from others. 97 Daisy Bates-former publisher ofthe Mediator's rival, the militant but defunct Arkansas State Pressclearly believed that the "proper cultural training" required was more than lessons in
decorum and turning the other cheek. Understanding the sacrifice and perseverance of
the Little Rock Nine in 1957 could strengthen the resolve of black pupils twenty years
later.

Despite these problems, by the twentieth anniversary of the crisis, the Little Rock
school system seemed committed to the principle of desegregation. In 1977, the city
school board publicly reaffirmed its commitment to upholding its obligations under
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federal court orders and the moratorium agreement, pledging to "provide a system of
quality public education in a integrated school setting for the children of the Little Rock
community." The board asserted, "The achievement of the highest quality education in
the Little Rock Public Schools cannot be subjugated to any other policy in this District."
In previous years, this statement could have served as the preamble to the announcement
of yet another tactic or strategy for delaying desegregation. But in 1977, the board
announced, "It is the conviction of this Board that this goal cannot only be achieved with
integration but can be improved by it. A vital part of the education of any student is
learning to live with others. Integration of our schools is essential if our children, both
black and white, are to live in harmony in an integrated society." The alternative course,
which the board referred to as "separatism," produced nothing but "crippling"
consequences for generations to come. Twenty years after the Little Rock school
desegregation crisis, the school board acknowledged that the city was still wrestling with
"the scars" produced by massive resistance and the district's tradition of minimum
compliance and announced its determination to follow another path. 98

In this sense, by the late 1970s, the Little Rock school district had become a
model for a nation that continued to debate and reject meaningful and systemic school
desegregation. If Little Rock's school board had tried to capitalize on the Nixon
administration's anti-busing rhetoric and sought strategies of delay in the first half of the
decade, school administrators and district officials seemed to recognize just a few years
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later that the objections of white school patrons and their reservations about busing did

not permit them to ignore the mandate of the federal courts and the constitutional
imperatives that underwrote them.
However, developments in Little Rock also reflected national trends. While
school administrators seemed committed to the principle of integration, they were less
committed to the mechanics of the school desegregation plan that had allowed them to
achieve meaningful racial balance at Central High School. The school board's 1977
pledge contained only a lukewarm commitment to the busing program; the document
described student transportation as "expensive and difficult" program to administer,
although the board promised to continue to implement it until the district was "able to
institute a better program. " 99 This disjunction reflected national discourse in the 1970s,
which frequently paid lip-service to the idea of educational equity if not the means of
achieving it. It also mirrored national public opinion surveys in the decade that found
general support for school desegregation, but growing opposition to school busing.
For civil rights activists in Little Rock this ambivalence was alarming and
threatened to jeopardize the gains they had made to date. While Morris Holmes, the
African American Principal of Central High School, informed visiting reporters that the
school's guiding principle and the goal it strove for was "equity and quality" and
applauded the city's progress, even he had to acknowledge that the institution had
embraced the "spirit of equity" if it had not yet achieved "the fact of it. " 100 This was not
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enough for Daisy Bates or others in the city of Little Rock that had been involved in the
prolonged litigation that had produced district-wide desegregation. They wanted the
school district to embrace both the ends and the means of achieving school desegregation.
For them, educational equity was more than a vague and amorphous goal; it was a
concrete objective to achieve. They wanted school administrators to resolve the "second
generation" desegregation problems that continued to plague the district, to commit
themselves to fostering and cultivating an environment that encouraged the success of
African American pupils, and to publicly acknowledge the efforts and sacrifices that had
been required- and would continue to be required- in order to attain meaningful
integration.
However, in the city-at-large, the steps that had been required to achieve Little
Rock's new status as a "model for the nation" remained obscured in shadow even during
commemoration ceremonies. The "narrative breach" which had surfaced in the 1970s
between the celebrated campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the present was
manifest in Arkansas' capital as well. This willed amnesia created space for an
alternative narrative of school desegregation to surface in the city of Little Rock. Rather
than forthrightly acknowledging the contributions and sacrifices of the Little Rock Nine,
their parents and families, the African American students who followed them, or the
persistence of the civil rights community in the federal courts, some would argue that
Little Rock had always been more progressive than the country had given it credit for. A
selective public memory of the crisis and the years that followed- in which the forces of
white "moderation" deserved as much credit for the city's progress as civil rights
226

advocates for the school district's achievements- would become increasingly prominent
in the 1980s. This argument would circulate with increasing force even as white flight in
the school district accelerated, and the city struggled to maintain any semblance of
diversity in its schools.
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CHAPTER FIVE

A "LONG TERM REMEDY" OR A "STOP GAP MEASURE?":
SUBURBANIZATION, WHITE FLIGHT,
AND INTERDISTRICT DESEGREGATION, 1971-1990

Although the introduction of district-wide busing in 1971 did not produce a
precipitous drop in the number of white students enrolled in Little Rock's public schools,
each year the proportion of black students in the district climbed by two or three percent.
White families who had previously avoided desegregation by relocating to the city's
predominantly white West End moved even further west to the suburbs or enrolled their
children in private schools. Enrollments in Pulaski County, just outside the city,
increased by 80% of the course of several years. 1 In the early 1960s, less than 30% of
students enrolled in Little Rock schools were African American. In 1970, the year before
the implementation of the busing program, Little Rock's student body was approximately
40% black. Five years later, that number climbed to 52% and Little Rock became a
majority-minority school district. 2 Due to ongoing population shifts, by the fall of 1976,
the number of black students at some elementary schools reached 90%. 3
The city's new superintendent of schools, Paul Masem, tried to persuade a
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skeptical public that these changes were not due to white flight from integrated schools.
Masem had been selected, in part, due to his "intense devotion to desegregation" and
probably hoped to block any attempts to roll back an integration plan that threatened to
"resegregate" the schools as families left the system. He suggested that the decline in
white enrollment was to due to demographic causes such as a higher birth rate among
black families. Even if he was unpersuasive on this point, Masem reassured parents and
newcoming families that Little Rock was defying the "old philosophy" that a
predominantly minority school system could not achieve academic excellence. The city's
schools scored "above the national norm" on basic skills tests and 10 to 15 percent higher
on college entrance exams. Moreover, more of its students went on to institutions of
higher education than other suburban school districts in the state.4
But by the 1980s, school officials in Little Rock were increasingly concerned that
the district was reaching a crucial tipping point: many feared that when the percentage of
white pupils in the system dipped below 30% white flight would accelerate so quickly
that the district would become virtually all black. 5 It had become increasingly apparent
that the parents of young children and newcomers to the district were reluctant to enroll
their children in Little Rock's schools. While secondary schools remained relatively well
balanced throughout the 1970s, the percentage ofblack students in grades 1-3 had
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climbed to 72% by 1981.6

National Trends
Little Rock was not the only city experiencing alarming levels of white flight.
While older cities in the north and east had been segregated by race and ethnicity and
stratified by income for decades, whites were abandoning neighborhoods in the urban
core and relocating to the suburbs in larger and larger numbers. Moreover, as cities in the
Sunbelt experienced unprecedented growth in the final quarter of the twentieth century,
southern cities patterned themselves more and more after their northern. counterparts.
Many African American residents found it difficult to leave the urban core. Due to
discriminatory lending practices and restrictive covenants, many black families had not
had the opportunity to purchase homes in the postwar period, and consequently were
unable able to accrue equity or benefit from rapidly rising housing prices. Likewise, the
pervasive practice of "steering" buyers in the housing market continued to contribute to
the segregation of American cities. 7
As wealthier residents moved out of the city, urban school districts across the
country faced decreased revenues, decaying educational plants, and majority-minority
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student enrollments, while suburban districts passed millage increases, built new schools,
and educated the nation's most privileged children. Civil rights advocates became
increasingly alarmed by these disparities. With large numbers of minority children being
educated in struggling urban school districts, and the majority of white children attending
schools with little or no diversity in the suburbs, American educational institutions were
becoming more rather than less segregated.
By the middle of the 1970s, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and
other advocacy organizations found themselves facing nearly intractable problems in
urban districts. Some began to question whether it was prudent to push for the total
desegregation of city schools if that meant that all schools in a system would be more
than 80% black. It seemed futile to bus black students out of black neighborhoods to
attend schools that remained racially identifiable. In the face of these realities, some civil
rights leaders promoted a new course, turning away from desegregation and toward
compensatory education programs. 8 However, others claimed that these stark statistics
illustrated that states were failing to provide students with the equal opportunities the 14th
Amendment required. If states could not discharge their responsibility to desegregate
schools within districts, then they would have to find other means to eliminate
segregation "root and branch" even if that meant breaching district boundaries.
Civil rights lawyers tested this line of argument in several lawsuits, which
culminated in the Supreme Court's decision on interdistrict remedies in Milliken v.
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Bradley (1974). In Milliken, a federal district court in Detroit determined that state and
local school officials had fostered racial separation in the city's schools. Moreover, due
to white flight and the large percentage of black students in the district, the court also
found it impossible to develop an effective desegregation remedy within the district.
Since the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the states, and education was a function of
state government administered in cooperation with local school boards under the
Michigan constitution, the district court determined that it was the state's responsibility to
desegregate Detroit's schools by consolidating the city district with 53 surrounding
suburban school systems.
However, before the district court crafted its interdistrict remedy, the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court. In a split 5-4 decision, the high court rejected the district
judge's reasoning, holding that lower court's findings were based upon erroneous
standards and its determinations were supported by insufficient evidence that the
suburban districts had contributed to segregation within the city of Detroit. In Milliken,
the Supreme Court held that school district boundaries were more than "arbitrary lines on
a map drawn 'for political convenience."' Given the "deeply rooted" tradition of local
control of schools, the Court decreed that district lines should not be breached unless
plaintiffs demonstrated that the discriminatory actions in one district had caused
segregation in an adjacent district or that boundary lines had been drawn or redrawn to
segregate students. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart indicated that he would also
support an interdistrict remedy if it could be demonstrated that discriminatory state
housing or zoning laws had contributed to city/suburb segregation. In short, unless
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plaintiffs demonstrated that suburban districts were culpable, or that state action had
produced metropolitan segregation, the constitution did not require interdistrict
desegregation. The district court's proposed remedy, Chief Justice Burger argued,
exceeded the scope of the demonstrated constitutional violation. 9
In a stinging dissent, Justice Marshall rebuked the Court's decision. The court
was not "limiting" the scope of the remedy to the constitutional violation at hand, he
argued. Rather, the justices had provided "no remedy at all" to the children in Detroit,
guaranteeing that they would continue to "receive the same separate and inherently
unequal education in the future" as they had in the past. It was the state's duty to
eliminate segregation, and as Justice White also noted, there was no reason why the party
that had violated the constitution- Michigan- should be able to contain the remedial
power of the courts within the administrative boundaries of school districts it had
complete control over. Marshall asserted that the Court's decision was shaped by "public
opposition" to interdistrict desegregation rather than legal precedent and "neutral
principles of law." Four of the five votes overturning the lower courts were appointed by
President Nixon in the midst of the turmoil surrounding busing. 10 Marshall warned, "In
the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to
be divided up each into two cities- one white, the other black- but it is a course, I predict,
our people will ultimately regret." 11
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In the days following the decision James Nabrit ill, Associate Counsel for the
Legal Defense and Education Fund, announced that the organization interpreted the
decision as a "broad signal" that further petitions for interdistrict remedies were unlikely
to succeed. 12 Indeed, the heavy burden of proof now required of plaintiffs in interdistrict
cases made them almost prohibitively expensive to litigate. At a gathering sponsored by
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to discuss the implications of the Court's decision,
legal scholar Norman C. Amaker asserted that it would be extremely difficult to produce
evidence ofthe kind ofinterdistrict violations the majority opinion pointed toward.
Moreover, even on the "rare occasions" it was possible to do so, "it seems clear that one
would have to prove purposeful conduct, which, given the sophistication of the deceptive
art in race cases, is increasingly hard to do." Consequently, he concluded, ''the rarity of
the instances makes this particular game not worth the candle; the vast majority of
intrastate school district arrangements will be seen under the Milliken standard as
innocently arrived at." 13
Others expressed more optimism that the Court's decision did not completely
foreclose the possibility of interdistrict remedy, particularly since Justice Stewart had
indicated that he would take discriminatory housing and zoning laws into consideration
when weighing such a case. At another gathering, lawyers involved in litigating

12

James Nabrit III, Associate Counsel, Legal Defense and Education Fund, responding to Norman
C. Amaker, conference report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Milliken v. Bradley: The
Implications for Metropolitan Desegregation (Washington, DC: 1974).
13

Norman C. Amaker, "Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in School
Desegregation Cases," conference report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Milliken v.
Bradley: The Implications for Metropolitan Desegregation.

234

metropolitan cases across the country generally agreed that the best tactic moving forward
would be to build precedent for interdistrict remedies slowly by focusing on those cases
that offered specific and irrefutable evidence of state action that resulted in segregated
metropolitan communities and schools. 14

This strategy proved effective in large cities

like Louisville, Wilmington, and Indianapolis, where findings of intentional housing
segregation and other violations allowed federal courts to order interdistrict desegregation
even after Milliken. 15 In the early 1980s, the Little Rock School Board and African
American plaintiffs in the city's schools sought similar relief from the effects of white
flight by suing the surrounding suburban school district for contributing to the
resegregation of Little Rock schools.

White Flight and Resegregation in Little Rock
In January 1980, administrators in the Little Rock school district formally
acknowledged that the city's schools were suffering from "white flight" and an erosion of
public support for the school system. "Little Rock is fast developing into a black school
district," the report concluded. "The de jure segregation of 1957 is being replaced by de
facto segregation in the 1980s."16 Superintendent Paul Masem believed that past
administrations and school boards were partially responsible for the departure of white
patrons and the "resegregation" of the district. For nearly two decades, he asserted,
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school officials in Little Rock had "established a climate that was negative toward
desegregation." The school district had fought nearly every desegregation initiative in the
courts, members of the school board had repeatedly stated their commitment to
segregated schools, administrators had implemented desegregation remedies with the
intent of limiting rather than extending their effects, and the system had failed to close
achievement gaps between black and white students. In his doctoral dissertation, Masem
noted, "The behavior of the Board and the administration during this period did nothing
to eradicate the perceptions of whites concerning blacks intellectual and social inferiority.
On the contrary, the Board's behavior tended to reinforce those views." The school board
had done nothing to mitigate white concerns about the quality of education in the
desegregating school district, nor had officials taken any action to address the
"blackening" of the school system as whites fled for suburban institutions and private
academies. 17 As resegregation became more evident, "belief in the capacity of the Little
Rock School District to provide equal educational opportunities to all students" continued
to shrink. 18
In contrast to its predecessors, Superintendent Paul Masem urged the school board

to develop a "planned response" to the problem of white flight. He proposed a slate of
"action steps" designed to stave off further resegregation, improve the image of the city's
school system, and develop better communication with school patrons, newcomers, and
the general public. Masem also encouraged the board to pursue the possibility of
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developing a voluntary school desegregation plan with the adjacent suburban school
district, or failing that, the pursuit of an interdistrict remedy through the courts. 19
The suburban Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) surrounded the
Little Rock School District (LRSD). PCSSD had been created in 1927 through the
consolidation of thirty-eight rural school districts. It covered 755 square miles, and
included all students not enrolled in LRSD or North Little Rock School District (NLRSD)
in the county. It also included students living in predominantly white sections of Little
Rock that had not been deannexed to LRSD as the city itself expanded. By the early
1980s, 40% of the city of Little Rock lay outside of the Little Rock School District's
boundaries. In part, this situation explained how the city of Little Rock itself could be
nearly two-thirds white, while its student body was approximately seventy percent
black. 20 In Arkansas, school district annexation and consolidation required joint
agreement between the two districts involved. Following the implementation of the
court's district-wide desegregation decree in the 1970s, PCSSD had stopped deannexing
additional territory to the city. The Little Rock school board contacted their counterparts
at PCSSD seeking a voluntary interdistrict solution to climbing black enrollments in the
city's schools shortly after Superintendent Masem made his recommendations. Their
overture was not well received-- board members in Pulaski County passed a resolution
prohibiting school personnel from engaging in "cooperative efforts" with officials from
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LRSD. 21
After this setback, the board and the administration set to work implementing the
remainder ofMasem's "action steps." In an attempt to stabilize white flight, the district
launched a public relations effort designed to retain and recruit additional white students.
School officials helped organize a public school support group called Parents for Public
Schools. The group, comprised of nearly 1,000 white parents, developed an advertising
campaign, and created bumper stickers and T-shirts reading, "My heart's in the public
school system, so are my children." Local businessman Walter Smiley, the president of
the organization, explained that the purpose of the advocacy initiative was to assure other
white parents that "the blackboard jungle doesn't exist."22 Likewise, schools hosted
"open houses" to "sell" their services to parents, and urged parents to sign "enrollment
intent" cards created to assure uncertain school patrons that a critical mass of white
families intended to remain in the city's public schools. The district also asked real estate
agents to encourage new families to enroll their children in public institutions. 23
To bolster these efforts, Little Rock crafted a carefully calibrated public relations
campaign to promote the district's academic achievements. Central High School, the
city's flagship institution, featured prominently in this effort. School officials continued
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to refer the high school as a "model for the whole nation," pointing to its stable racial mix
and excellent academic reputation. The district widely publicized the school's excellent
test scores, high percentage of students continuing to college, and large number of
National Merit scholars. Principal Richard Maple also attempted to defuse perceptions
that the system was crime-ridden by citing the low number of disciplinary actions and
expulsions at Central. School officials arranged interviews for reporters with students
who left private schools to take advantage of the unique opportunities the school
provided, such as calculus, honors courses in English and science, advanced foreign
languages, and specialized classes in African American literature, creative writing, stage
management, child development and 'junior executive training."24 Indeed, as the 1980s
progressed, some reported that the district had turned the Central into "lavishly indulged
pet project" designed to "live down the notoriety of the past" and demonstrate that Little
Rock's schools were capable of providing excellent educational opportunities in an
integrated setting. "It's a black eye you've learned to live with," admitted a
communications specialist for the school board. "You put make up on it and show the
world that you still can look good." The New York Times noted that the school received a
disproportionate share of resources, experienced teachers, and special programs.
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pointed to the "quiet manipulation" of student enrollment to maintain the school's wellbalanced integration. 26
School administrators and teachers also recommitted themselves to closing
achievement gaps between white and black students. White parents frequently pointed to
the lower test scores of African American pupils as an indicator that the quality of
education in the district was declining. This initiative also responded to the concerns of
black parents who complained that many of the celebrated honors courses were attended
almost exclusively by whites. For example, Charles Hodge, an African American college
professor and administrator with a daughter at Central, charged that academic tracking
prevented Central from operating as a "truly integrated" school. "Central is a white
school," he asserted. "The benefits there are for whites.'m Although the program was
designed to reassure both black and white parents that quality education was possible in
the school district, in the fmal analysis, Superintendent Masem lamented, "The effort to
reduce racial disparity in academic performance was a huge educational success and a
resounding political failure." White parents merely shifted the focus of their "concern" to
the "social isolation of their children."28 Masem reported that white parents withdrawing
their children from the schools often justified their decision by suggesting that "their
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children would not have enough contact with their 'social and intellectual' peers if they
continued to attend Little Rock's predominately black schools."29
Consequently, the percentage ofblack students in the district continued to climb.
As white students left the system, several of the city's schools threatened to become
racially identifiable. The Little Rock school district had reached another crossroads.
Masem urged the school board to pursue an interdistrict remedy. However he warned,
"the political mood and the enormity of the task to be undertaken, not to mention the
social and financial cost, dictate caution." In order to meet the heavy burden of proof
required in interdistrict cases, the school board "would be unwise to leap ahead and seek
an interdistrict remedy without doing all its legal and political homework." As the board
was developing its case, Masem recommended that they consider "alternative
desegregation plans" that might offer "more hope" of attracting and keeping white
students in the system. 30 Thus, even as the school district began to pursue an interdistrict
remedy in the courts, it hedged its bets and reconsidered student assignment policies.
During this period, the school board created a Patrons Reorganization Committee
to study the various "white flight" prevention proposals offered by the administration,
while also asking the long-standing Biracial Advisory Committee to consider the impact
the various alternatives would have on desegregation in the district. 31 Significant
divisions between these two committees, and white and black patrons of the school
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district, developed as Little Rock considered its next steps. The Patrons Committee and
many whites in the district tended to favor approaches that accepted the inevitability of
some racially identifiable schools. In their view, it might be possible to stabilize white
flight in the district if Little Rock was able to reduce the number of students bused and
return some pupils to neighborhood schools. While such an approach would create some
all-black schools in eastern parts of Little Rock, it would also result in more evenly
balanced racial ratios in other city schools that would be more appealing to white parents.
Understandably, the Biracial Advisory Committee, charged with the task of the assessing
the impact these plans might have on desegregation in the district, looked on such
"alternatives'' unfavorably and questioned their constitutionality under Little Rock's
existing court orders. The Biracial Advisory Committee and most African American
community leaders rejected most of the proposed intradistrict reorganization plans, and
tended to favor an interdistrict remedy that would bring more white students into the
system and create more favorable racial ratios in the schools. 32
In June 1981, the school board received a report from its attorney Herschel Friday
regarding the legality of an internal reorganization and the prospects for an interdistrict
remedy. A lawsuit designed to restructure the district's boundary lines, Friday warned,
would be "long and costly" and extremely contentious. Obtaining proof of an interdistrict
constitutional violation with ongoing effects would require time and money. In his
opinion, "the chances for success within a meaningful time frame" were not strong. On
the other hand, Friday expressed optimism that the Little Rock School Board had
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demonstrated sufficient good faith in its effort to desegregate its schools after years of
compliance with the courts' orders. If the board asked for an order vacating the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it would have considerably more flexibility in its plans
for reorganization. Friday indicated that the board "would stand a reasonable chance of
success" if it made such a petition. 33
The board tested this theory a few months later when it adopted a reorganization
plan that would cluster white students in primary schools (grades 1-3) in homeroom
classes until they made up at least 35% of the students in a classroom. In proposing this
plan, board member Peter Sherrill stated his commitment to pursuing interdistrict relief
"as a long term remedy" for the school district's problems, but stated his conviction that
LRSD had reached a "critical point" and faced the threat of "accelerated" white flight if it
did not alleviate the concerns of white parents that their children would be racially
isolated in the city's schools. Superintendent Masem strongly objected to the proposal,
noting that the plan would create 79 homeroom classes composed entirely of black
students. Two thousand of the district's youngest pupils would be bused out of their
neighborhoods to attend completely segregated classes. John W. Walker, attorney for the
black plaintiffs in the Clark litigation, went to court to stop the plan the day after the
school board approved it. After a two-and-a-half hour hearing, federal district Judge
Overton sympathized with the difficulties the school board faced and expressed his belief
that its members were not trying to reinstitute segregation, but ruled that the board could
not adopt "a hurriedly conceived stopgap measure to appease white parents" by grouping
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children in classrooms on the basis of race. 34
Shortly after the ruling, Attorney John W. Walker announced his intention to file a
suit on the behalf of plaintiffs representing the city's African American students that
would result in interdistrict relief for the segregation of Little Rock's schools. Walker
indicated that he was not concerned with the mechanics of the plan- consolidation,
boundary expansion, or an exchange of students- but wanted it to create a school system
that was "at least something over 50 percent white." Walker rejected internal
reorganization plans that made concessions to whites to keep them in the school system.
However, he noted that this black clients wanted a school district with majority white
enrollment because it would result in "more balance, more sharing of responsibility and
more basic financial support for the public school system." While he acknowledged that
the Little Rock school board was also considering similar legal action, Walker pledged to
file an independent suit. He explained, "We don't know just how far they want to go" in
pursuing an effective interdistrict remedy. Moreover, he noted, a "partial basis" for his
suit would be the "complicity" of both the Little Rock and Pulaski County school boards
in the resegregation ofLRSD schools. 35 The Arkansas Gazette heartily endorsed
Walker's plans in an editorial. "The unacceptable alternative a few years hence would be
system of resegregated public schools, virtually all black and lacking adequate public
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support," the newspaper warned. "Too many in this community, black and white, have
worked too hard and long through adversity and historic confrontation to achieve and
preserve desegregated schools to let them face into a civic netherworld of
resegregation. " 36
Even as the school board solicited proposals from attorneys on how to proceed
with its own interdistrict lawsuit, it continued to consider proposals for an internal
reorganization. Despite the assessment of outside experts that there was no "necessary
consensus for a basic redesign of the city's plan," doubts about the legality of the options
under discussion, and opposition from Superintendent Masem, the Biracial Advisory
Committee, and black community leaders, the majority of the board believed that it
needed to take immediate action to mitigate the effects of white flight while litigation
worked its way through the courts. 37
On April26, 1982, the school board adopted the Partial K-6 Plan, which
reorganized elementary schools. The plan re-established some neighborhood schools,
creating four elementary schools in black neighborhoods that were nearly 99% black.
The concentration of 19% of the district's black students in these schools concurrently
reduced the black student population in six other schools in white or integrated areas.
This time, the school board hoped to circumvent the opprobrium of the federal courts and
claimed that the plan was not motivated by a desire to appease white parents or recruit
white students into the school system. Rather, they suggested that the plan was designed
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to "preserve" better racial balance and integration in the majority of the district's schools
while the board pursued a long-term remedy. 38 Nevertheless, despite official
protestations to the contrary, at least one public school official admitted that after nearly
three years of defeated school tax levies and the threat of insolvency, the measure was
designed "to provide a few more carrots to those whites who feel public schools are vital
to the viability of the community."39
However, when John W. Walker and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund took the
board to court to prevent implementation of the plan, the district's attorneys adopted the
official position that the plan was an "affirmative step taken to minimize resegregation."
The district argued that the board's adoption of the Partial K-6 plan was "preceded not by
recalcitrant attempts to preserve a dual system, but by nine years of desegregation," and
there was no evidence that the board intended to discriminate against black students.
Again, the board suggested that court supervision of the district's desegregation plans was
no longer even necessary. The choice facing the courts, the district argued, was the
continuation of the 1973 Plan which "would create a racially isolated district" or the
adoption ofthe Partial K-6 Plan which "would offer hope of maintaining quality
integrated integration." For their part, the African American plaintiffs argued that the
plan was unconstitutional because it resegregated four elementary schools and was "not
consistent with the School Board's obligation to dismantle the dual school system in
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Little Rock."40
Although the federal courts had rejected the school board's 65-35 reorganization
plan as a "hurriedly conceived stopgap measure to appease white parents," Judge Overton
found the school board's arguments in favor of the Partial K-6 Plan persuasive.
Likewise, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the district's contention that the plan
was not designed make the school district more attractive to whites and halt white flight,
but rather to mitigate the effects of white flight and maintain a semblance of integration.
The court held, "Although the possibility of white flight and... resegregation cannot
justify a school board's failure to comply with a court order to end segregation, it may be
taken into account in an attempt to promote integration." Notably, this assertion
seemingly ignored the fact that the Little Rock school district was still under court orders
to end segregation and had never been declared unitary. The 8th Circuit justified its
decision by noting that although 19% of black students in the district would be attending
racially identifiable schools, all of the white students in the district would be attending
fully integrated institutions. It insisted on measures of the plan that allowed black
students to transfer to those integrated schools at their request with transportation
provided by the school district. Moreover, despite the fact that Brown v. Board of
Education had declared that segregation was inherently unequal, the court also required
the board to monitor the schools to "ensure that equality is actually maintained" in the
racially identifiable institutions. It also urged the school board to make additional
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overtures to Pulaski County to establish a voluntary agreement to exchange and transfer
students across district lines, to provide some integrated learning experiences for the
students in the four all-black schools, and to adopt measures designed to reduce
achievement gaps between black and white students. Nevertheless, although it offered no
comment on the interdistrict case pending in the federal courts, the court of appeals
upheld the plan as a temporary solution while the board pursued "long-range plans to
ensure an integrated school system. " 41

Pursuing an Interdistrict Remedy
Indeed, the Little Rock School District had formally filed a suit against the
Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD), the North Little Rock School District
(NLRSD), the State of Arkansas, and the State Board of Education on November 30,
1982, charging that the defendants were responsible for the maintenance of a dual,
racially segregated public school system in the county and calling for the reorganization
or consolidation of the school districts with the assistance of the state. 42 After a lengthy
the trial, the Federal District Judge Henry Woods determined that PCSSD, NLRSD, and
the state of Arkansas had "contributed to the continuing segregation of the Little Rock
schools, and that an interdistrict remedy was appropriate. " 43 The court issued two
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separate decisions. The first, released in April 1984, focused on the constitutional
violations uncovered by the trial. The second, issued seven months later, focused on the
appropriate court-ordered remedy.
The Milliken decision had provided lower federal courts with clear guidelines on
the burden of proof required to order an interdistrict remedy. The Supreme Court held:
"Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by
consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district
remedy, it must be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district
that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." As Judge Henry
Woods later recalled, the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing by the Little
Rock school district more than satisfied these requirements. He wrote, "LRSD
demonstrated beyond all peradventure that the Housing Authorities, real estate operators,
school board members in the defendant districts, and the State of Arkansas had all
collaborated to produced a decided trend toward an all-black Little Rock School
District. " 44
In Little Rock v. Pulaski County, the district court determined that Little Rock had

been effectively defined "as the school district which provided educational opportunities
for black students." In the first half of the twentieth century, the Little Rock School
District maintained a fully accredited high school for black students. However, both
Pulaski County and North Little Rock failed to do so. Many black students from the
surrounding county and the rest of the state traveled to Little Rock to attend high school.
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Pulaski County even paid the tuition and transportation costs for African American pupils
in its district to attend schools in the city. Judge Woods concluded, "As far as the
education of blacks was concerned, school district boundaries in Pulaski County were
ignored." Indeed, the state of Arkansas commissioned a study which determined that
access to quality educational facilities in Little Rock, and their absence elsewhere, drew
black families to the urban center from the county and the rest of the state.45
After the Brown decision and the tumultuous Little Rock school desegregation
crisis, the pace of desegregation in Little Rock and the adjacent districts evolved
differently. While Little Rock began the process in 1957 and finally complied with
district-wide desegregation in 1973, Pulaski County's trajectory was much different. The
courts determined, "During the first two decades of tumultuous desegregation in LRSD,
PCSSD schools remained segregated and free from the problems which accompanied
state-resisted desegregation in Little Rock." A desegregation suit was not even initiated
in the county until1968. Moreover, at the time of trail in 1983/84, the district court
charged that Pulaski County had "failed to comply" with the desegregation decree ordered
by the federal courts, and Judge Woods expressed his displeasure that many of the
PCSSD Board of Education Members who testified "were not even aware of the contents
of the decree." Consequently, in the early 1980s, "student assignments continue[d) to be
made on a racially discriminatory basis" and twenty-nine of the county's fifty-one schools
were racially identifiable. The court also found that both PCSSD and NLRSD also
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maintained segregation by classifying large percentages of their African American pupils
as "educably mentally retarded" and tracking them into special education classes. Whites
who wanted to flee desegregation in Little Rock, could find a safe haven in these adjacent
districts. Indeed, the court found that Pulaski County's school sitings even encouraged
white flight. For example, PCSSD built Fair High School (13% black) in Little Rock just
outside of the LRSD's boundaries and only two miles from Parkview High School (56%
black). 46
In Milliken, the Supreme Court had also stated that an interdistrict remedy would
be appropriate in cases where district lines had been drawn or redrawn on the basis of
race. The Eastern District Court of Arkansas found this type of constitutional violation in
Pulaski County as well. The federal courts heard evidence that ''the state, the Little
Rock Housing Authority, LRSD, and PCSSD cooperated in the development of a major
all-black housing project which was intended to channel black residential development
toward the far southeast boundaries of the City of Little Rock, away from white
residential areas." In 1953, five hundred segregated public housing units were built in
Granite Mountain on land located on the eastern side of the city in PCSSD. However,
with the cooperation of state and local officials, and the passage of special legislation by
the Arkansas legislature, this parcel of PCSSD was transferred to LRSD- the "only
district capable of providing education" for the future residents. The court found that this
decision had ongoing effects. As planned, many more segregated housing units were
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constructed in this area as black neighborhoods which bordered on white residential areas
were razed. In 1983, the area was "still an essentially segregated black housing area
served by several schools which have overwhelmingly high black enrollments ranging
from seventy-one percent to one hundred percent black." The court also heard evidence
on the practice of"steering" black and white buyers in the private housing market. 47
The court also found that Pulaski County's refusal to deannex territory on the
western side of the city following the implementation of district-wide desegregation in
Little Rock racially suspect. By 1984, the City of Little Rock occupied ninety-one square
miles while the school district served only fifty-three square miles. The district court
determined, "Pulaski County Special School District's acts of freezing its boundaries to
discontinue the practice of allowing City and Little Rock School District boundaries to
remain coterminous springs from an unconstitutional racial motive." Moreover, Judge
Woods noted, that this policy had significant "interdistrict effects" which impacted
enrollment figures in Little Rock by as much as ten percent. Eight-seven percent of the
nearly 5,000 students that lived in Little Rock but attended schools in Pulaski County
were white. The courts concluded "that the boundaries between PCSSD and LRSD had
been maintained to keep LRSD predominantly black and PCSSD predominantly white."48
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The federal courts also found the state of Arkansas responsible for the interdistrict
segregation in Pulaski County. As noted above, state officials were aware of the lack of
accredited facilities for African American students in the county and its impact on
settlement patterns but did nothing to improve educational opportunities for black
students in Pulaski County or elsewhere. Its facilitation of the Granite Mountain transfer
had substantial interdistrict effects. Moreover, in addition to Governor Faubus' infamous
action to prevent the integration of Central High School, the state had implemented
numerous segregation laws designed to impede desegregation in the schools. When
Little Rock schools were closed in 1958-59 to prevent implementation of federal court
orders, the state legislature enacted a statute authorizing the state to pay for the
interdistrict transfer of students from desegregated schools in Little Rock to segregated
public schools in surrounding areas. These transfers continued to be "excessively high"
well into the mid-1960s. Even after the state had stopped resisting desegregation, it had
never taken affirmative action to assist local districts in their desegregation efforts or
sought federal aid for that purpose. 49
The district court determined that the only long-term solution to these interdistrict
violations was consolidation ofthe three school districts. It also ordered the
establishment of a uniform millage rate, the elimination of discriminatory practices, and
the creation of magnet schools to enhance educational opportunities in the area. The
State Board of Education was ordered to help oversee this process and to provide funds to
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facilitate student transportation and other remedial programs. 50 Judge Woods insisted that
the problems facing the Little Rock School District were so dire they could not "be
avoided by equivocation or half measures." What was at stake in the case he believed,
was "the collapse of support for public education."51 The defendants in the case
immediately filed an appeal.
As the case worked its way to the gth Circuit Court of Appeals, school
administrators in the three districts began to meet to discuss the logistics of consolidation.
Judge Woods also ordered all three communities to host public meetings to explain the
court's decision and the interdistrict remedy to the public. The tone of these meetings
were very different in the city of Little Rock and its surrounding suburbs. In Little Rock,
Superintendent Ed Kelly met with two hundred black and white parents to explain why
the case had been filed to prevent resegregation. Many of those present voiced support
for consolidation but expressed concern that their children would be bused far across the
county. School officials assured parents that the busing zones contemplated under the
plan would be smaller than any of the three districts involved in the case. In contrast, in
Pulaski County, Superintendent Lester placated parents who strongly objected to the
consolidation order by assuring them that the school district was prepared to appeal the
case all the way to the Supreme Court. According to reports, parental concerns about
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long-distance busing and student assignments went unanswered. Many of the parents
present warned that they would send their children to private schools or to public
institutions in adjacent counties if the consolidation order was implemented. 52
Newspapers in the Little Rock region were split on the court's orders: the
Arkansas Gazette supported Judge Wood's decision and the Arkansas Democrat opposed
it. The controversy surrounding school consolidation also had an impact on local politics.
Tommy Robinson, a former sheriff from Pulaski County, was elected to the House of
Representatives on promises that he would introduce legislation to Congress designed to
prevent federal courts from mandating consolidation. 53 When he followed through on his
plans, the Arkansas Gazette dismissed his efforts, noting that the bill had been referred to
the House Judiciary Committee where it would "most likely gather dust until the end of
time" like other legislation designed to curb the authority of the judiciary. 54 Former
Governor Frank White also used the issue to position himself in a bid for re-election
against incumbent Bill Clinton in 1986. White warned that consolidation would result in
confusion and "mass exodus" of students from the public schools. He took a position
similar to that of his "moderate" predecessors in 1957, asking for compliance with the
federal court order but calling on parents "to speak up for their children" and make their
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opposition known. 55
Indeed, White joined a delegation of representatives from the defendant school
districts who asked the Justice Department officials to file an amicus curiae brief in
support of their legal position. 56 The Reagan Administration opposed many mandatory
desegregation measures, including busing, and favored "parental choice" mechanisms
such as voluntary student transfers, magnet schools, selective school closings, and
"modest" adjustments to attendance zones. However, even as the administration touted
the promise of magnets, it slashed federal fmancing for them by 94% in its first term. 57
According to Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reynolds, the
federal government's responsibility in attacking segregation was limited to removing
"remaining state-enforced racial barriers to open student enrollment." While these kinds
of mechanisms had been dismissed by federal courts as inadequate in and of themselves
as early as 1968, Reagan administration officials assured the public that they were
dedicated to eliminating "disparities in the tangible components of education" that
remained between predominantly white and predominantly black schools. This led at
least one legal scholar to conclude that the administration sought "no less than a
relitigation of Brown v. Board of Education." 58 Indeed, under the Reagan administration

55

James Scudder, "White, Kelly Give Opposite Views on Consolidation," Arkansas Gazette,
January 11, 1985.
56

"Leadership and Consolidation," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, January 1, 1985.

57

Jim Bencivenga, "The landmark desegregation ruling and its 30-year legacy," Christian Science
Monitor, May 11, 1984, p. 21.
58

Drew S. Days III, "Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights,"
Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review 19, no. 2 (1984): 468-472.

256

the Justice Department did not file additional desegregation lawsuits. Instead, the civil
rights division filed briefs in support of the some of the same school districts the
government had formerly sued for intentional segregation, approving their appeals to
return to racially identifiable neighborhood schools. 59
Unsurprisingly, the Justice Department agreed to intervene in Little Rock v.
Pulaski County. However, given the strength of the evidence, it did not challenge the
court's findings. Instead, government officials argued that consolidation would be
"disastrous" for the area's schools and that the proposed remedy exceeded the scope of
the constitutional violation. 60 Ultimately, based on a narrow reading of Milliken, the 8th
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this aspect of the Justice Department's position.
On November 7, 1985, the appeals court sustained the district court's fmdings of
fact but determined that consolidation was not the "only remedy that would effectively
cure the interdistrict violations." While the court of appeals concurred that consolidation
would be a "cost-effective and efficient method of desegregating the three school
districts," it held that courts could not require consolidation and the dissolution of school
district boundaries unless there were no other alternatives that would be sufficient. In its
view, other "less intrusive" remedial measures were "better designed to restore the
victims of segregation in the Pulaski County Schools to the position they would have

59

Or:field, "Turning Back to Segregation," 17-18.

60

"Justice Enters Rights Case," The Washington Post, March 5, 1985, p. A13; Roy Reed, "Little
Rock a Symbol Again: The Resegregation of Schools," The New York Times, March 23, 1985. See also
editorial on Justice Department intervention in the case, Arkansas Gazette, March 7, 1985.

257

occupied absent discriminatory conduct."61
On remand, the court of appeals provided unusually specific instructions for
remedying the constitutional violations uncovered in Pulaski County. 62 For example, the
court of appeals asked Judge Woods to readjust the district boundary lines, making the
Little Rock school district boundaries coterminous with the city boundaries and
incorporating the Granite Mountain area back into the PCSSD. Pulaski County and
North Little Rock school districts were ordered to take appropriate intradistrict action to
eliminate all vestiges of segregation within their boundaries, making them less attractive
to whites fleeing similar measures in the Little Rock School District. All of the districts
were ordered to permit voluntary majority-to-minority student transfers within and across
boundary lines, with transportation costs to be paid by the state of Arkansas. To make
such transfers more attractive the parties were ordered to open interdistrict magnet
schools open to all students in the region. All three school districts were directed to
provide compensatory and remedial educational programs to black students, and the Little
Rock school district was told to take concrete steps to improve the quality of any
remaining racially identifiable schools in its system. Finally, the State Board of
Education was directed to monitor this process, providing funds for transportation,
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establishing and maintaining the interdistrict magnet schools, the compensatory and
remedial education programs for black students in the region, and quality education
programs in racially identifiable schools in LRSD. 63
The Little Rock School District did not appeal this decision to the Supreme
Court. 64 However, the State of Arkansas appealed the portion of the decision that found
the state liable for fmancing many of the interdistrict educational programs. As promised,
Pulaski County also appealed to the court of last resort. The school district challenged
the Court of Appeals ability to adequately "tailor" a desegregation remedy- particularly
boundary changes- based on "conjecture as to possible demographic effects" of past
actions without "any specific evidence of actual effects."65 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari without comment and the 8th Circuit's limited interdistrict remedy became the
"law of the case" governing desegregation in the three school districts. 66
Impact of the Remedy and Settlement Agreements

Even the 8th Circuit's limited interdistrict remedy had the potential to bring 6,750
new students into the Little Rock School District, 60% of whom were white. However,
many school district officials were pessimistic about whether these children would enroll
and stay in the city's public institutions. According to reports, Former Superintendent
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Paul Masem characterized the court's decree as a "band-aid measure that would do little
to reverse the demographic trends toward an all-black district." Others also agreed that
the remedy did not go far enough. The school board's first black president, Willie D.
Hamilton, expressed concerns that without consolidation of the three districts, LRSD
would be facing the same problems again within a few years. 67
Nevertheless, when Little Rock put its new desegregation plan in place for the
1986-87 school year, referred to as "Controlled Choice," Superintendent Ed Kelly and the
school board refused to capitulate to the demands of the city's white patrons. The
computer-based assignment system did not privilege a student's residential location in
their initial school assignment. Parents were able to request a transfer to an alternative
school of their choice but the request would not be granted unless it enhanced the
school's diversity. 68 In his report on the state of desegregation in the city's schools on
the thirtieth anniversary of the crisis, Robert L. Brown noted,
The overriding concept embodied in the plan... was equity, that is, equal
access to quality education. Racial percentages in all grades would be
strictly followed. There would be no bastions of excellence in the form of
programs, faculty, or principals at any one school such as Central High
School. There would be no favoritism shown to students living in any
particular area of the city. The underlying message was that the white
power structure would no longer govern the public schools. 69
Brown found that many whites in the district became "disenchanted" when the "school
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district refused to bargain with or cater to white patrons in exchange for keeping their
children in the public schools." He observed, "As a diminishing quantity whites were
used to having their way," but the school district no longer accommodated them. 70
Even with this commitment to provide equal and integrated access to quality
education in all its institutions, the district found it difficult to prevent the percentage of
black students at some schools from drifting higher and higher. Many white parents
categorically refused to send their children to predominantly black schools and enrolled
their children elsewhere. As individual educational plants became racially identifiable,
the school board refused to let the remaining white children transfer to other non-magnet
or magnet schools. Some white parents accused the district of holding their children
"hostage."71 In the face of this persistent hostility and unfavorable court decisions, the
school district's stance began to crumble within a few years.
For example, the interdistrict magnet schools required by the courts caused
serious problems for the district. As designed by the courts, the magnets were meant to
maintain a 50/50 black/white ratio with seats reserved for students from all three districts.
However, too few white students from suburban Pulaski County or North Little Rock
applied to attend the institutions. Despite the fact that white parents in Little Rock
threatened to remove their children from the system if they could not attend the magnets,
the district was reluctant to fill the vacancies with white students from LRSD. Their
transfers would increase the percentages of black students in several non-magnets above
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80%. The Little Rock school district also argued that if it filled the seats with its own
students, the magnets would lose their "interdistrict" character. Nevertheless, the 8th
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the school district to fill the vacancies. 72 Consequently,
by the next school year 17% of white children emolled in Little Rock's non-magnet
schools had either transferred to the interdistrict magnets or left the system for private
schools. 73
Given ongoing white flight from the district and the limitations of the interdistrict
remedy applied by the courts, some in Little Rock began to voice the opinion that it was
time for the school district to focus its attention on providing students with "quality
education" and "compensatory" programs designed to ameliorate the effects of
resegregation. 74 If white parents were "disenchanted" with Little Rock's desegregation
efforts, African American parents were no less so. Black school patrons had long born a
disproportionate share of the burden of desegregation. The closure of school plants in the
eastern part of the city meant that African American children were more likely to be
bused long distances at young ages to attend predominantly black schools in other parts of
the city. Moreover, the school district's long history of catering to the demands of white
parents, reserving seats for white students, the low percentages of black students in
honors courses, and disparities in student discipline, led many black parents to conclude
that their children would fare better in _neighborhood schools staffed with black principals
72
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and teachers. In 1987, Department of Human Services Deputy Director Thedford Collins
reported, "The notion that neighborhood schools are not all bad is growing [among
African Americans]." Although he acknowledged "there was a time when that would
have been an affront to the Movement," he sensed "a real resurgence of separatism."75
The rising currency of this approach to the district's problems was reflected in the
"settlement plans" submitted to the courts in 1988 and 1989 by the Little Rock, Pulaski
County, and North Little Rock school districts in the interdistrict lawsuit. Each school
district submitted an intradistrict desegregation plan and signed onto an interdistrict
agreement. The interdistrict plan continued to rely on voluntary student transfers across
boundary lines to interdistrict schools. Little Rock's long-range "desegregation" plan
designated 8 ofthe district's 31 non-magnet schools as all-black "incentive schools." The
"incentive schools" would receive twice as much funding as other schools in the system
and would provide compensatory education programs. The remaining schools were
identified as "elementary academies" that would be racially balanced. Under the plan,
sold as "controlled choice," white students were permitted to transfer to incentive schools
if they desired, and black students could opt to attend one of the elementary academies.
This arrangement was facilitated by the state of Arkansas' agreement to settle its
financial liability to the district for over one hundred million dollars. 76
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The Eastern District Court of Arkansas rejected the settlement agreements, finding
them "facially unconstitutional" and well outside of the bounds of the court's mandate to
dismantle desegregation "root and branch." The district judge observed that nearly onefourth of the elementary schools in the Little Rock school district would be all-black
"incentive schools." Notably, this included all of the historically black elementary
schools on the eastern side of the city. Consequently, while black children would be
bused to the west side of the city, virtually none of their white counterparts would be
bused to the predominantly black section of Little Rock. While the court made note of
the "double-funding" promised to the incentive schools, it was concerned that the district
made no effort to explain how the extra money would be spent. 77 In Judge Henry Woods
view, although black students could opt to attend an integrated elementary academy under
LRSD's proposed plan, this was little more than a reiteration of the "freedom-of-choice"
plans ofthe 1960s. However, he observed that instead of relying on the threat of violence
or social ostracization to keep black students in historically black schools, the district now
offered "a little extra encouragement to stay at home." The promise of double-funding
and the burden of busing would effectively discourage African American pupils from
choosing integrated education. 78
However, in 1990, the
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and approved the settlement plans. According to the appeals court, since the settlement
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plans had been agreed to by all of the parties including the African American plaintiffs in
Little Rock, their local counsel, and the NAACP Legal Education and Defense Fund, the
agreements should be "hospitably" received. Although the judges noted that the courts
should not approve a plan "which is either manifestly unworkable or plainly
unconstitutional," they asserted that the plans presented were "reasonable, good-faith
efforts to solve seemingly intractable problems, efforts involving give and take on the part
of all concerned." Although a "perfect" desegregation plan would not contain all-black
schools, the Constitution merely required districts to "achieve integration to the
maximum practicable extent." In order for majority black districts to maintain some well
integrated schools, it was "necessary to tolerate a small number of all-black schools."79
Therefore, the court of appeals approved the plan, but warned the district that its
commitment to provide double funding to the incentive schools and the establishment of
an independent Office of Desegregation Monitoring to make sure that the district honored
its commitments were "crucial" in its holding that the plans were not unconstitutional.
The 8th Circuit expressed optimism that the settlement plans would "lead to a period of
calm... perhaps even bring the parties a happy issue out of all of their afflictions." At the,
very least, the court hoped the decision would enable the districts to "devote more energy
to education, and less to litigation." 80 However, from his seat on the bench of the Eastern
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(8th

District Court, Judge Henry Woods was less optimistic. He worried that the districts
would once again fail to fulfill their promises and responsibilities under the settlement
agreements. "The problem with assuming the districts will fulfill their 'solemn
undertakings,"' he warned, "is that the black children bear all of the risk." 81
Clearly, the Little Rock school district continued to struggle with the legacy of
generations of segregation and discrimination throughout the 1980s. Nevertheless, the
narrative breach that had opened in public discussions about school desegregation in the
1970s continued to persist- and even widened- during the following decade. Although
racial diversity: in the district was threatened by white flight, and school officials pursued
an interdistrict remedy by arguing in court that Greater Little Rock's racial politics and
housing patterns continued to be shaped by Jim Crow era practices and statutes, they
distanced themselves from this legacy. By suing PCSSD, NRLSD, and the State of
Arkansas for interdistrict relief, the Little Rock school district accused others of fostering
and maintaining racial discrimination but did not accept its own full measure of
responsibility.
This distance enabled school board members and district attorneys to argue that
proposals put before the courts during the 1980s that knowingly created racially
identifiable schools in historically black neighborhoods were not a return to the
segregated practices of the past. Although many black school patrons read these
developments as the natural byproduct of the school district's long-standing
preoccupation with appeasing white parents and their children at the expense of their
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African American counterparts, district officials seemed to believe that a decade of
compliance with court-ordered busing and their own determination to pursue an
interdistrict remedy in the courts inoculated them against such charges. Indeed, they
argued that the creation of virtually all-black "incentive schools" and compensatory
education programs designed to make these separate institutions "more equal" were an
indication of their commitment to integration and racial diversity.
Little Rock,

one~

labeled "a city filled with hate," had been held up as a model of

success in the 1970s. This local story of achievement would not be abandoned willingly,
and was easily sutured into an emerging national narrative of progress, in which the
iconic conflicts of the civil rights movement prompted the nation to take action and pass
corrective legislation that purportedly brought the nation's practices in line with its
promises. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a nation on the cusp of the Reagan
revolution appeared ready to declare the civil rights turbulence of the 1950s and 1960s a
relic of the distant past. This general trend was clearly evident in Arkansas' capital as
well, even when interfered with the city's ability to fully come to terms with the
circumstances it faced in its own schools.
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CHAPTER SIX
"LET YOUR MODERATION BE KNOWN":
FIRST-HAND HISTORY, MEMOIR, AND MEDIATED MEMORY

By the eve of its 25th anniversary, the Little Rock school desegregation crisis had
been officially declared history. As noted in Chapter Four, the narrative breach between
past and present that had surfaced in the 1970s created a new market and new appetites
for retrospective accounts of the events of 1957. After a long hiatus, several first-person
accounts of the crisis were published and broadcast in 1980-81. Unsurprisingly, the
narratives that received the most acclaim in Little Rock were those that supported the
contention that the city had always contained more progressive and moderate elements
than its critics had given it credit for. However, even these narratives were not wholeheartedly embraced by white or black residents of Little Rock. Their appearance
provoked controversy about how the history of the crisis should be told, by whom, and to
what end. In Little Rock, these heated debates were informed by the city's desire to
reclaim its reputation as a progressive southern city, residual resentment of mediated
interpretations of the crisis in 1957, and the prerogatives of the culture industries that
circulated and distributed these accounts.
The three accounts that provoked the most conversation in Arkansas were written
by Governor Orval Faubus, Congressman Brooks Hays, and Central High Vice Principal
Elizabeth Huckaby. To one degree or another, all three defmed themselves as "southern
moderates" during 1957. The slipperiness of this term was evident in the during the
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school desegregation crisis itself, and continued to be thirty years later. Southern
moderates generally defined their views against the "extremism" of "die-hard"
segregationists or "radical" integrationists. While they did not endorse the Supreme
Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision or the principle of integration, they did
speak out in defense of the "rule of law" and the importance of preserving public
education. In his analysis of Little Rock's racial politics during the school desegregation
crisis, Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr. noted that referring to oneself as a "moderate" was a
"political expedient" in 1957. "The term 'Moderate' as a description of a person's views
concerning race relations is opaque," he observed. "People who claimed that description
defined it in as many different ways as there were people who claimed it." In his
interviews with Little Rock's leadership, this term was defined so vaguely that he
concluded it could only be applied as a ''temporal and temporary label." 1 Nevertheless,
most moderates typically promoted some form of tokenism that would enable southern
whites to minimize and maintain control over the pace of school desegregation.

In

taking this position, moderates were accused by both segregationists and integrationists of
supporting their opposition. 2
By the 1980s, it was imprecision of the term "southern moderate" that allowed
these individuals to claim their place in the annals of civil rights history. Even if they had
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defmed themselves a "segregationists" in the 1950s, some moderates were able to
capitalize on the accusations that they were "integrationists" thirty years later as evidence
that they had stood on the right side of history. In Little Rock, it became increasingly
popular to argue that white moderates, particularly business and civic leaders, had played
an important role in resolving the Little Rock crisis and moving the city beyond racial
stalemate in the years that followed 1957-59.
However, while imprecise, even the term "southern moderate" was bounded by
some limitations. The ability ofFaubus, Hays, and Huckaby to claim this label was
mediated by several factors, including their historical reputation and the receptiveness of
their audience. But it was also shaped by the willingness of various cultural gatekeepersnewspaper editors, book publishers, documentary producers, screenwriters, and network
broadcasters- to underwrite their accounts. In this context, the political memoir of
Governor Orval Faubus, which attempted to justify his decision to block the integration
of Central High School, was dismissed and derided as poorly-written and self-serving.
The man who was once the most powerful political figure in the state of Arkansas was
forced to self-publish his autobiographical account of the events of 1957. However, the
retrospective accounts of other southern whites, like Congressman Brooks Hays who tried
to broker a political solution to the crisis, and school administrator Elizabeth Huckaby
who struggled to keep Central High School open and operative during a turbulent school
year, were relatively well received and widely circulated as the eyewitness accounts of
"good people" who tried to do the right thing under difficult circumstances. All the same,
at times, even Hays and Huckaby faced criticism that their narratives focused too much
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attention on "embarrassing" events, and that the depiction of their heroism and the
definition of their "moderation" against other elements of the city's population came at
the expense ofthe majority of the citizens ofLittle Rock.

Orval Faubus: "I Was the Victim of a Circumstance"
Despite the reputation that former Arkansas Governor Orval Eugene Faubus
earned for himself when he stationed the National Guard around Little Rock Central High
School, he had been considered an economic progressive and a moderate on racial issues
during the frrst three years of his tenure. However, his public image underwent a
dramatic transformation in the fall of 1957. In the city of Little Rock itself, few believed
the governor had ~een motivated by a deeply ingrained racism or even a strong
commitment to states' rights. Nevertheless, Faubus was branded as a political
opportunist and a demagogue who played upon the strong emotions surrounding school
integration in order to secure a virtually unprecedented third term in office. In the public
memory of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, Faubus did not embody the heroic
white southern moderate who stood up for what was right. Rather, he was the canny
politician, manipulating events behind-the-scenes to serve his own ends with little or no
regard for the broader consequences of his actions.
Over the last third of his life, in the midst of financial insecurity, a troubled family
life, and several unsuccessful attempts to regain office, Orval Faubus dedicated himself to
reshaping his historical reputation. He tried to define himself and the position he staked
out in 1957 in relation to what he perceived to be "extremist" elements in his state. Until
his death in 1994, the former governor insisted that he had not deployed the National
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Guard in defiance of the federal court order to integrate Central High School. Instead, he
contended that he had acted to "preserve the peace" and prevent violence, and to maintain
the appropriate balance of power between state and federal governments. He granted
hundreds of interviews to journalists, historians, sociologists, political scientists, and
other interested citizens in an attempt to recast his legacy, bringing his considerable
charm and skills as a politician to this project. For example, his biographer Roy Reed had
worked for two decidedly anti-Faubus publications during his career as a journalist: the

Arkansas Gazette and The New York Times. Reed admitted to harboring a "lingering
antagonism" toward the former governor, but reported that Faubus was "unfailingly civil,
friendly, and, within the constraints we both understood, helpful" during the seventyseven interviews he recorded with his subject. 3 Washington Post staff writer Paul
Henderickson reflected on his own response to Faubus' appeal as the governor worked
tirelessly at the "impossible task of revising his page in history." As he spoke with
Faubus, Henderickson felt himself sliding into sympathy with the ailing politician.
"What you have to watch out for is the charm," the reporter warned. "It'll snake up your
leg, worm into your notebook. First thing you know you're liking the old guy, feeling
sorry for the old guy, seated here with a throw-pillow behind his head in his modest living
room in his pleasant subdivision home on the edge of this little mid-state college town."
Those who spoke with him found it hard to remember that the leather governor's chair
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that symbolized twelve years of control over Arkansas politics sat in the adjacent room. 4
In addition to granting interviews, Faubus also spent innumerable hours writing

and gathering material for his political memoirs Down From the Hills I (1980) & II
(1985). The former governor hoped that his first-person account would effectively
counter the analyses of his actions that had been penned and promoted by his enemies. "I
must get some writing done as I am now trying to do," he reflected in 1973. "It would be
tragic for me and for the history of the period in which I served as governor, if the
principal source of material for historians and future studies should be mainly newspaper
files such as the Arkansas Gazette. " 5 Faubus' account took the form of an apologia, a
form of autobiographical writing meant "to vindicate one's own beliefs and actions, often
in the face of official censure or public controversy." As James Goodwin has noted, "The
essential rationale of an apology is that the writer, in explaining the origins of ideas and
opinions behind actions, will rectify inaccurate and unfair judgement over his or her
conduct." 6
In order to convince skeptics, and overturn accepted wisdom, Faubus constructed

an unusual text. His first volume, Down .from the Hills, only addressed his first four
years in office (1954-1958) but it exceeded 500 pages. As ifhe wanted to overwhelm his

4

Henderickson, Paul, "Orval Faubus and the Shadow of History; In the Era of a Another
Arkansan, the Ailing Former Governor Strives to Stave Off a Segregationist Legacy," Washington Post,
January 25, 1993, p. Bl.
5

Orval Eugene Faubus to O.R. Baldwin, Pastor, North Little Rock, May 31, 1973, in Folder 5,
Box 13, Series 2, Orval Eugene Faubus Addendum (Faubus Addendum), Special Collections, University of
Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
6

James Goodwin, Autobiography: The SelfMade Text (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), 5.

273

opposition, Faubus provided details on every major piece of legislation, political
appointment, and behind-the-scenes development that marked the beginning of his
administration. He interspersed his own account with hundreds of editorials, news
stories, and political cartoons meant to reinforce his interpretation of events. In adopting
this format, Faubus engaged directly with the media that had shaped his image by offering
commentary on favorable and unfavorable press coverage. Predictably, he praised the
journalists and publications that had supported his positions and attacked the credibility
of those who had criticized him. As one reviewer observed, reading the text was "rather
like thumbing through a scrapbook, while the former governor recalls events and spins
yarns over a cup of coffee."7
Down From the Hills offered few new revelations, but it underscored the main

lines ofFaubus' defense as he strove to correct what he believed were distortions in the
historical record. A large portion of his first volume was dedicated to explaining and
justifying his actions during the most controversial episode in his career- the 1957 Little
Rock school desegregation crisis. In his memoir, he elaborated on arguments he had
made elsewhere in his writings, public statements, and oral history interviews.
First and foremost, the former governor adamantly rejected the contention that he
was a racist or an opportunist exploiting the issue of race for political gain. Rather, he
argued, he was a progressive governor who had taken a moderate stance on integration in
the years leading up to the school desegregation crisis. Faubus believed that the
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unrelenting focus on events in Little Rock had obscured his political accomplishments as
Arkansas' six-term governor. He insisted, "I was the most progressive governor in the
South, perhaps in the nation, but this goes largely unnoticed in the publicity of the school
crisis." 8 In his memoir, Faubus cited the progress the state had made in the field of race
relations during the first three years of his term. He pointed to the successful
desegregation of colleges, universities, secondary and elementary schools during his
tenure to emphasize that he did not intervene when communities or institutions chose
integrate voluntarily, peacefully and without the publicity that would attract the attention
of segregationists. 9 When asked to explain his intervention in Little Rock, this preamble
was meant to demonstrate that he had been forced to intervene due to developments not
of his own making.
Faubus wanted to defuse the suggestion that he had deliberately cultivated the
desegregation crisis to create a politically profitable issue. In contrast to Arkansas

Gazette editor Harry Ashmore's assertion that the events in Little Rock were "The Crisis
Mr. Faubus Made," the former governor insisted he "didn't consider [the crisis] to be any

8
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part of my making." The events as they unfolded, he said, were "not my fault." 1° Faubus
maintained the he was the victim of a smear campaign, led by editors at the Arkansas

Gazette, designed to tarnish his public image. The Gazette attempted to make him the
scapegoat for the entire affair because he declined to accept their "friendly advice" and
refused bow to their "overweening desire to dictate the decisions and polices of state
government." Consequently, Faubus claimed that Ashmore had actively worked to
"indoctrinate" members of the visiting press against him at the Little Rock Press Club
where both the "whiskey and the conversation" flowed freely. 11
In his memoir, Orval Faubus argued that Little Rock became a battleground in the

arena of school desegregation long before he intervened. The city had become the "focal
point of contest" between two opposing forces due to the irresponsible actions of school
authorities and the "little band of white integrationists" who supported them.
Superintendent of Schools Virgil Blossom, the school board, Congressman Brooks Hays,
and Arkansas Gazette Editor Harry Ashmore, hoped to become "instant celebrities" and
"overnight heroes" when Little Rock successfully desegregated. Faubus suggested that
these men hoped "to receive credit and praise for a plan and an accomplishment that had

10
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been achieved by no others." Instead of accomplishing integration quietly, this fanfare
attracted the attention of segregationists. 12 Faubus recalled, "The determination among
them grew that if the plan was to be a model for other areas and the South, they would
bend every effort to make it a model their way." 13
Faubus' claim that he intervened in the 1957 crisis to prevent violence and a clash
between these "opposing forces" has been challenged by skeptics since the day he placed
the Arkansas National Guard around Central High School. Critics claim that there was
no sign of violent resistance to the court-approved desegregation plan until the Governor
himself suggested that there might be during his testimony in court and in televised
speeches. For his part, Faubus insisted he deployed the Guard based on legitimate
evidence that violence was imminent. Indeed, the governor contended that his primary
source of information was Superintendent Blossom himself. 14 For those who suggested
that Faubus had acted precipitously or that there would have been no difficulty if he had
not escalated the situation, the former governor maintained that "subsequent events" and
the violence that broke out after he was forced to remove the Guard "completely
disproved this theory." In his writing, Faubus also grimly pointed to the racial riots and
violence that occurred in other American cities in the years that followed. In Little Rock,
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he said,
there was no property damage, no one was injured sufficiently to be
hospitalized and no one was killed. Contrast that record with the racial
riots which followed in more than 200 American cities, none of them in
Arkansas, in which many lives were lost, thousands were injured and
property damage ranged into the millions of dollars, and Little Rock and
Arkansas come out remarkably well.

In his own estimation, his use of the National Guard created a "calm and peaceable"
situation in the early days of September. 15
Faubus rejected the contention that he could have prevented violence and
protected the constitutional rights of the black students by placing the Guard around the
school to quash any resistance to the court order. The former governor suggested that it
would not have been possible to prevent every die-hard segregationist from venting their
anger if the Little Rock Nine were admitted to Central High. 16 He contended that
determined segregationists would only "heed my pleas and the pleas of others to remain
non-violent in their activity" if they were "convinced that the battle was being fought by
their leaders with determination and sincerity" through other channels. 17 Therefore,
Faubus ordered the National Guard to tum the black students away ifthey appeared at the
school. He also maintained that he gave the Guard instructions to protect the Little Rock
Nine if any problems arose while they were in the vicinity of campus. Faubus pointed to
the "polite" reception of the seven African American students who came to the school as
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a group and were turned away with their adult escorts. Moreover, he callously dismissed
the demonstration of racial hate that greeted Elizabeth Eckford when she attempted to
enter Central as the product of a carefully engineered communist plot to create
propaganda that reflected unfavorably on the·United States. 18
Faubus took no responsibility for the chaos and mob violence that erupted in Little
Rock in 1957. Instead, he insisted that it was the federal government's responsibility to
enforce its own court orders. He suggested that he could not enforce the federal court
order against the will of the citizens of Arkansas due to his responsibilities and
obligations as the executive officer of that state. He emphasized that he had sworn to
uphold both the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution, which were at
variance with each other on the integration issue. 19 Arkansas' recently passed antiintegration laws and constitutional amendments remained unchallenged in court. As
governor of Arkansas, he had a responsibility to uphold and respect state segregation laws
until they were declared unconstitutionaL

In later years, Faubus suggested that his

action in 1957 was not meant to halt integration but delay it so that the state segregation
measures could be litigated to their conclusion. Until then, he contended, he had an
obligation to "uphold and enforce" the state constitution or face the "clearly written
penalty of impeachment and removal from office ifl failed in that sworn duty." The
former governor said that he had begged and pleaded with the Justice Department to
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initiate litigation but the federal authorities had refused to do so.20
Indeed, although Faubus placed a large portion of the blame for the crisis on
school authorities and white "integrationists" who made Little Rock a battleground
through their public pronouncements and promises of success, he held federal authorities
equally responsible due to their "hypocritical" and "cowardly" refusal to take
responsibility for enforcing a federal court order or preventing violence. 21 Faubus
recalled,
It was with utter astonishment and some consternation that I learned that

the federal authorities would do nothing about any disorder and mob
violence that might be created solely by reason of its own actions- the
implementation of federal court-ordered integration- when without such
orders all would have been completely tranquil, peaceful and orderly in the
community.
While many claimed that Faubus acted to thwart integration for political gain, the former
governor suggested that it was not he who was playing political games but the national
administration. He contended that the Justice Department's do-nothing attitude was
calculated to "shift to others the 'dirty work' entailed by the enforcement of its almost
universally disfavored orders" and that the Republican national administration "meant to
avoid the unpleasant, unpopular, politically disastrous consequences of its own policies."
If state officials stepped into the vacuum, the burden, cost, and political repercussions of
enforcement would fall on their shoulders while "the idle hands of the federal minions
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remained unstained and unscarred."22 Faubus acknowledged, "I was in no mood to pull
the national administration's chestnuts out of the fire at my own political and physical
risk without any help from it and while its forces sat idly by."23 Even as he denied
playing political games, Faubus wrote as if the crisis centered around him and his future
ambitions rather than the African American students and the recognition of their
constitutional rights.
In describing the motivations for his actions in 1957, Faubus routinely cited his

desire to prevent violence, and his insistence that the federal government assume
responsibility for enforcing its court orders as primary objectives. However, in some
forums, particularly in Down From the Hills, Faubus suggested that he was also
championing the cause of states' rights and ''the struggle to retain for the people the right
to maintain their own schools." The central point in Faubus' states' rights argument was
that the Supreme Court Brown v. Board decision was "law by decree"; he questioned the
validity of the Brown decision as the product of "judicial dictatorship" rather than
legislative process. In this line of defense, Faubus moved away from his claim that his
hands were tied in 1957 because a conflict between state and federal law. Rather, he
suggested that "federal law was not involved." He argued, "The dispute was over a U.S.
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Supreme Court ruling. I ran into illegal federal force- not federallaw."24 Faubus
suggested that there was no justice in the federal courts for segregationists due to
"judicial prejudice" which resulted in the rejection of constitutional precedent and
evidence. 25
Although he acknowledged that those who opposed the court order were
segregationists who thought integration was "inimical to their interests," he avoided
positioning himself as such. He claimed that he was motivated by the desire to preserve
local control of schools and Jeffersonian democracy, not by a desire to keep black
children out of white institutions. 26 However, as others have noted, Faubus himself
usurped the authority of the local school board by preventing them from moving ahead
with a voluntary desegregation plan, which had been upheld (not ordered) by the courts.
Moreover, this rhetoric also ignored the fact that state segregation laws had been put in
place by legislators that did not represent all of the people since widespread voter fraud,
disenfranchisement, and the lack of a secret ballot sustained white supremacy. 27
In his final analysis, Faubus contended that he had successfully preserved the

peace and avoided doing the federal government's dirty work, but he lamented that he
and his constituents had been "overcome by the judicial dictatorship backed up by federal
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force." 28 As a result of the Supreme Court's action in Aaron v. Cooper, and the use of
military force during the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, Faubus asserted that the
people, school authorities, and law makers had lost all control of public education. He
suggested that unpopular policies like busing were resulting in a decline in the quality of
education for all students, black and white, and the proliferation of private schools. 29
Moreover, the use of"illegaljudicial means" and the usurpation ofthe people's rights
"over their protests and opposition" had weakened the populace's faith in the government
and respect for the rule of law. Consequently, the country suffered from "deep and
disturbing divisions," a lack of "law and order," a distrust of political leaders, and
disrespect for patriotism and government service. Faubus concluded, "Never has there
been less hope among good citizens for the enjoyment of liberty in an atmosphere of
decency. " 30
As noted above, these carefully constructed arguments were buttressed with
selected newsclippings and political cartoons that placed Faubus' stance well within the
mainstream of white southern public opinion in 1957. However, by the late 1970s,
Arkansas' longest-serving governor had become a political pariah. After his retirement in
1966, Faubus had never regained the influence and prestige he once accepted as his due. 31
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Those who had backed him in his campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s, threw their
support behind other candidates. After two unsuccessful bids for the governor's office in
1970 and 1974, Faubus was forced to recognize that he could no longer depend on his
former allies and that he had become "politically damaged goods." Without the
assistance or patronage of those he once called his friends, Faubus found it difficult to
make ends meet. As he wrote his memoir, the former governor struggled to pay off his
mortgage and other debts while his financial circumstances spiraled out of control. 32
Under these circumstances, Faubus may have hoped that the publication of his

apologia would not only reconstruct his historical reputation, but might also improve his
political prospects and financial outlook. However, after sending inquiries to publishers,
Faubus discovered that there was little interest in publishing such a large, expensive,
overly-detailed, narrowly-focused, and unconventional memoir. Faubus' attempt to
reshape his public persona was hampered by his inability to find a publisher willing to
distribute his views and by the skepticism of the public-at-large.
The governor's rhetoric- his justifications, explanations, and accusations- was
wrought from the political arguments, propaganda, and states' rights appeals of the past.

Down from the Hills was an apologia, not an apology. As Faubus' biographer put it,
"Orval never recanted."33 The governor's text was mired in 1957 and did not transcend it.
Faubus held out no hope of individual transformation, local change, or national progress.
Instead, Faubus defiantly concluded with dire predictions about the nation's future under
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the thrall of a "judicial dictatorship." His story was out-of-step with emerging, soon to be
dominant, narratives that celebrated the success of the civil rights movement. These
factors, combined with Faubus' political fall from grace and his status as a figure of
public opprobrium, may have discouraged potential publishers from moving forward with
the project.
The Arkansas Democrat reported that after Faubus "shopped around some for a
publisher," he "fmally decided to finance the book himself." The pro-Faubus paper tried
to frame this turn of events favorably, noting that this gave the retired governor "complete
freedom to write what he wanted to without editing and to use whatever material he chose
to." 34 Indeed, for a public figure frequently frustrated by mediated representations of his
words and actions, and a master of the persuasive stump speech, this may have suited
Faubus just fme. However, his lack of a publisher undoubtedly inhibited Faubus' ability
to reproduce, promote, and distribute the book. Nevertheless, he resolved, "Publication
must go forward or all the effort will have been in vain."35
The former governor arranged for the Democrat Printing & Lithographing
Company of Little Rock to produce the text. Struggling to stay afloat financially, Faubus
tried to sell as many advanced copies as possible at a discounted rate. He also sent
promotional letters and excerpts ofhis text to Arkansas media outlets, promising to send
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a personally autographed copy of the book if the materials were published in papers. In
all of these communications, Faubus apologized for the high cost of the book. 36 The
Arkansas Democrat dismissed his concern; given the weight of the book, the paper
laughingly commented, "The $25 price tag is not all that bad; that's only $8 a pound."37
Faubus also assumed responsibility for distributing the text, from a P.O. Box in
Little Rock. He personally autographed copies of the book if the purchaser wished, and
wrapped and mailed them himself. 38 The cost of shipping the heavy tome might have
overwhelmed the retired governor's limited resources because he took to delivering the
volumes personally through appearances at county courthouses throughout Arkansas in
the spring and summer of 1981. While delivering advance orders, the governor sold and
autographed additional copies. At one visit to the Clark County Courthouse, the local
paper reported that Faubus "greeted a steady stream of old friends and ever-faithful
supporters" during the four hours he spent in Arkadelphia. "This is a political book," he
said, "and I like to sell it in a political atmosphere." Indeed, the Daily Siftings Herald
commented that the scene was reminiscent of a "heated Democratic primary campaign in
the 1950's or 60's."39 Faubus sold his autograph for a quarter to those who declined or
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could not afford to buy the books. 40
Despite his efforts, Faubus' first-person account Down From the Hills was largely
dismissed as a poorly-written and self-serving narrative after its publication. Although he
still had some well-placed friends who promoted and praised the text in favorable
reviews, 41 most readers contended that the book offered little that had not been heard in
the former governor's public statements before. The Arkansas Gazette rejected the
"implied theme" that the narrative was "an objective history" of the governor's time in
office. "Above all," reviewer Leland Duvall asserted, "it is dedicated to the sympathetic
treatment of the author." Duvall wryly noted that those parts of the book that "could be
considered truly autobiographical"- rather than an assortment ofnewsclippings and
cartoons- "miss few opportunities to extol the author." Faubus offered no new
revelations, just more spin. Duvall wrote,
When Faubus was governor, he issued statements that served his purpose;
on other occasions, he held his peace. This practice, generally accepted
among politicians ... can be a bit of a disappointment to those who shell out
$25 in the hope they will learn something new about the turbulent period.
The best that it could be said about Down From the Hills, the reviewer concluded was
that "on the basis of shear weight," Faubus had produced "one of the heaviest
autobiographies produced by an Arkansan." The former governor contemptuously
dismissed such commentary, noting that although Duvall was a credible journalist, "he
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would have been fired if he had written anything good about me."42
Cartoonist Jon Kennedy reviewed the book for the Gazette's rival, the Arkansas

Democrat. True to his trade, Kennedy's analysis sparkles with humor. Hundred's ofthe
reviewer's cartoons had been included in the text, along with those ofpro-Faubus "penslingers" Cal Alley of the Memphis Commercial Appeal and Jack Knox of the Nashville

Banner. Kennedy's own work throughout the crisis seemed to strive for objective
neutrality by often presenting more than one perspective, or simply representing the most
recent developments and events in an ongoing series called "Highlights of the
Newsweek." The cartoonist was not surprised that Faubus' account did not try to strike a
similar balance. Kennedy readily acknowledged that the former governor's book was
undoubtedly a "self-serving account," but suggested that this would come as a surprise to
few readers. ''No one expects a book by Orval Faubus to be objective, and this one is
not," he wrote. Nevertheless, Down From the Hills offered readers a first-hand account of
the "main player's" perspective on the Central High Crisis. Even with its "drawbacks,"
unusual layout, and odd "potpourri" of clippings, quotes, and cartoons, Orval's
"explanations, opinions and background facts" were the stuff of "raw history." Kennedy
suggested, "as the man who brought about one of the great controversies of modem
American history, his own account of events leading up to and following the crisis has
got to have historical value. And it does." Nevertheless, Kennedy cynically noted that the
governor had waited until very few principle "players" remained to challenge his version
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of events. 43
Indeed, as the Arkansas Historical Quarterly commented then, and several
scholars have noted since, Faubus' account was at odds with other published memoirs,
such as those of Superintendent of Schools Virgil Blossom and Congressman Brooks
Hays. When weighing the veracity of these accounts, reviewer Walter L. Brown
suggested the balance tipped against Faubus. Brown asserted that the governor "skews
the facts," and selected clippings, cartoons, and columns "in defense of his well known
reputation for becoming a hero of the resistance." While his political skills were
legendary, his reputation for dissembling served him poorly historically. The Quarterly
hoped that Faubus would have the "leisure and the willingness" to write a more candid,
frank autobiography as "the work at hand leaves much to be desired."44
Despite his ''untiring revisionism" and "endless pleading and explaining to justify
the past to the future," 45 Faubus never quite escaped his reputation as an opportunist who
exploited racial tension when it served his electoral returns. The arguments which had
once been so persuasive no longer resonated with voters, readers, or reviewers. Without a
publisher, the man who was once the most powerful political figure in the state of
Arkansas, found himself spending the final years of his life selling his books out of the
trunk of his car at courthouse lobbies, Civil War re-enactments, and county fairs, and
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speaking "charmingly and lengthily and with much cordiality to the odd reporter or
historian or odd constituent" who sought him out. 46 In 1992, Diane Blair, a professor of
political science at the University of Arkansas reported that Faubus even "roamed the
crowd trying to sell copies of his autobiography" when Bill Clinton announced his intent
to run for president of the United States. 47 Although the inscription ofFaubus' tombstone
read, "When I come to this, my last earthly resting place, may it be said of me: In the rise
from obscurity, he served his country and the people well. He forsook not his own kindthe common people; he dealt fairly with all men; his promises were kept; his debts paid,"
the news of the governor's death was carried under the banner of"segregation's
champion" when it was announced in the obituary pages. 48 There could be no stronger
refutation of his efforts to reclaim the mantle of political moderation and pragmatic
necessity for himself and his legacy.
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Brooks Hays: "Let Your Moderation Be Known To All Men"
Former Congressman Brooks Hays emerged from the Little Rock School
desegregation crisis with a much different reputation. During the fall of 1957, Hays hoped
to broker a political solution to the school desegregation crisis, and served as a moderator
and go-between for Governor Orval Faubus and President Eisenhower. Fourteen months
later, as public opinion in his district became more polarized, Hays electoral support
eroded and he lost his congressional seat in the fallout from the Little Rock crisis.
Nationally, Hays' 1958 defeat represented the silenced voice of southern white moderates
and the strength of segregationist massive resistance. The popular press canonized him as
a martyr who had stood up for moral principles in the face of tremendous political
pressure. Twenty-five years later, while Orval Faubus searched for a publisher and an
audience for his memoirs, Hays' perspective on his own career and the events of 1957
was widely circulated in three memoirs. The former congressman's advocacy of gradual
change within the legal system, and his reputation as a political statesman, seemed to
appeal to audiences in Little Rock and elsewhere.
However, even Hays' narrative provoked controversy when it was translated into
a documentary that incorporated archival footage of the 1957 school desegregation crisis
in the early 1980s. Public debate about whether the program should air on Arkansas
Educational Television (AETN) was a product of residual resentment of mediated
accounts of the crisis and the way they had effected the public image of the city and its
residents. Consequently, the production of Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock generated
substantial conversation about which cultural gatekeepers should determine what kinds of
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historical accounts and images of the crisis should circulate in the public sphere.
Ultimately, Brooks Hays' considerable connections as former congressman enabled the
project to move forward, secure funding, and fmd an audience. His unmarred historical
reputation allowed him to project an image of himself as a southern "moderate" who took
a "moral" stance on civil rights, and to claim space for himself as someone who had
supported integration.
Hays was one of the first "players" to publish an account of his role in the Little
Rock desegregation crisis. His first book, A Southern Moderate Speaks (1959), was
released after his disastrous bid for re-election in 1958. However, in his preface, the
author claimed that the text was presented "exactly as written before the eight-day writein campaign that cost me my seat in Congress." Throughout the publication, Hays
seemed to be striving to explain his positions on civil rights and his role as a moderator in
the Little Rock school desegregation crisis to his constituents. 49 The congressman
claimed that his stance on American race relations had been "distorted" as reported by the
press and his speeches taken out of context. Consequently, he noted, "On occasion I have
even been judged harshly by my follow Southerners for suggesting possible alteration of
Southern patterns and have not been credited outside the South." Indeed, the desire to set
the record straight and achieve proper "credit" for his activities may explain his decision
to publish the book after he lost his congressional seat. A Southern Moderate Speaks not
only explained his actions and decisions in the past, but also could serve as an appropriate
launching pad for the moderate course of action he hoped to pursue through political
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appointments and other endeavors in the future. 50
In the text, Hays articulated the political and moral philosophy that guided his
conduct throughout his career. A dedicated Democrat and New Dealer, refused to align
himself with Southern Democratic conservatives in Congress. As his biographer James
T. Baker noted, Hays saw himself

in the role of spokesman for a new, emerging, moderate South, a South
that would accept progress and change if it could be sure the fabric of its
society would not be tom. He could imagine himself the man of reason
and sanity, standing forthrightly between Southern conservatives and
Northern liberals, between whites and blacks, offering a better, a moderate
way, and being heard, heeded, and perhaps even chosen to lead the
movement toward racial reconciliation. He would be the Southern
moderate. 51
Politically, Hays defined his moderation within the framework of a "states' rights
liberalism" that largely preserved white southern prerogatives by retaining local control
over the pace of change in American race relations. 52
In Hays' view, the question of civil rights was primarily an ethical and moral

problem best addressed by local civic and religious organizations, which had the
influence to shape public sentiment and create lasting change. From this perspective, it
was not the government's, particularly the federal government's, role to legislate social
change. 53 Rather, Hays believed it was more appropriate for the government to create a
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climate for change, in which southern states would be counseled, educated, and
encouraged to make progress on civil rights issues and would be given the space and time
to come to terms with such changes on their own timetable. Hays argued that any law
which violently tore apart the fabric of Southern life not only violated the nation's "dual
form of government with some powers reserved to the states," but also was destined to
produce nothing but frustration without the "sentiment of the people" sustaining it. 54
Therefore, gradual programs of change that allowed for adjustment, acceptance, and
education in the region produced less "bitterness and distrust" and would ultimately be
more effective in creating the change his conscience demanded. If this kind of approach
came at the expense of America's black citizens, Hays believed that the long-term
benefits outweighed any short-term sacrifice. 55
Brooks Hays' ability to walk this political tightrope unraveled following the
Supreme Court's Brown v. Board ofEducation decision (1954). A lawyer first and
foremost, Hays recognized the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution but signed
the infamous "Southern Manifesto" as an expression of dissent, a decision he later
regretted. 56 In the months that followed, Hays expressed hope that the South could come
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into compliance with the decision through a policy of "permissive integration" that placed
responsibility for school desegregation with local communities and school boards most
familiar with conditions in their respective localities. 57 For the Congressman, the school
desegregation plan put forward by Little Rock Superintendent Virgil Blossom and
approved by the school board represented the best hope for a moderate solution to the
racial crisis precipitated by Brown. Little Rock's school board was actively complying
with the court decision and respecting the rule of law, but controlling and directing the
pace of change in accordance with local conditions. Therefore, Hays and other moderates
hoped that the city's "slow, gradual, and voluntary integration plan could serve as a
model for many cities in the South. " 58 Had the plan been successful, it might have
validated Hays' own political philosophy that the proper role of the federal government
was to encourage the states to preserve civil rights and liberties, and that gradual change
was the best means of promoting racial "good will" and lasting improvement. 59
Instead, Little Rock's struggle came to symbolize a titanic struggle between
southern massive resistance to and federal enforcement of the school desegregation
decision. Hays had been working to avert such a conflict for sixteen years, but in 1957
the "clash between state and federal authority" unfolded in his own district. As a lawyer
and legislator, a states' rights liberal and southern moderate, Hays framed the conflict at
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Central High School as a constitutional crisis that generated questions about the proper
balance of power in a federalized form of government. 60 He felt obliged to intervene as a
U.S. Congressman, the President of the Southern Baptist Convention, and as a mediator
between the state and federal authorities. In arranging the Newport Conference between
President Eisenhower and Governor Faubus, Hays was acting in accordance with his
long-held views; he wanted to avoid overt federal intervention and enforcement of court
orders in Arkansas. Like Faubus, he hoped the President would grant a "cooling off'
period, or an appropriate period of delay to study national and state laws regarding race
relations in order to resolve the conflicts between them and determine how the Supreme
Court decision could be interpreted with sensitivity to local southern "traditions. " 61
Even after Newport failed to produce a resolution to the crisis, Hays hoped that
state and local government could be persuaded to assume responsibility for preserving
law and order, upholding the gradual desegregation plan ofthe duly elected school board,
and admitting the nine black students to Central High School.62 He only facilitated
requests for the use of federal marshals and appeals for troops when mobs threatened to
break down police barricades and undermine the rule of law. He regretted that his
"struggle to prevent the federal use of troops" was unsuccessful, but conceded that local
police "did not have sufficient manpower to preserve order" and praised the 101 st
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Airborne's efficiency in dispersing the mob. 63
Hays' long held belief that "extremists" were pushing the nation toward crisis
seemed to have been realized in Little Rock.. He expressed impatience with partisans
from "other states" who were determined to stir up resistance to the desegregation in the
city. 64 He maintained hope that Arkansas' capital "could yet become a symbol for
harmonious race relations" if its citizens worked to resolve the conflict through the
orderly processes oflaw. 65 In speeches before civic groups and in conversations with
community leaders, Hays tried to cultivate a spirit of conciliation, moderation, and
respect for law and order.
Ever the "moderate," Hays tried to avoid being labeled as a segregationist or an
integrationist. In his comments, he recalled, "I could honestly admit my opposition to
integration by military force, but when I spoke in support of the courts, I met with some
resistance." The congressman noted, "Some interpreted my attitude as fence straddling,
an accusation one must live with when one's personal views are not altogether popular
and one is trying to be persuasive and discreet. " 66 Indeed, while some southern
newspapers praised Hays' initiative, others accused him of betraying his southern heritage
and labeled him an integrationist for abandoning the course of massive resistance, the
NAACP accused him of"trying to tum back the clock of integration." Indeed, in
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retrospect, the legal "deliberation" of moderates like Hays proved more effective than
massive resistance at slowing the pace of change in the south to a crawl. Although Hays
said he was "grieved" by these "bitter attacks," he was resolved to "stick to a course that I
believed provided the only hope for lasting racial peace."67
In the midst ofhis 1958 re-election campaign, Hays faced charges that he was a

"race-mixer" and "fence straddler" betraying the southern way oflife. When the Newport
Conference failed, many voters assumed Hays had participated in the unpopular decision
to deploy the 101 st Airborne, an accusation the congressman vigorously denied. 68
Regardless, as the community became more polarized and voices of moderation were
silenced, Brooks Hays' electoral support steadily eroded. In the Democratic primary in
1958, Hays was able to successfully refute Capital Citizens' Council leader Amis
Guthridge's attempts to paint him as a "radical integrationist" and an ally of the
NAACP. 69 However, during Dr. Dale Alford's eight-day challenge for his seat in the
general election, Hays found it more difficult to counter charges that he had adopted a
weak-kneed approach to the racial crisis. 70 Alford argued that appeals for moderation
were "cowardly" calls for "surrender" during a time which called for "positive and
decisive action." In his own book The Case of the Sleeping People, Alford quoted at
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length a tract titled "The Curse of Moderation," which suggested, "The cult of
'moderation' is the cult of communism, though many who preach it are too stupid to
know it." Alford accused Hays of playing both sides of political issues while favoring the
federal government's positions in his actions. This kind of"fence-straddling," he
charged, was not enough to preserve the southern way of life. Alford stated, "I am
opposed to our officials speaking out in terms of moderation when we know that
moderation ends only in integration for us here at home.'m Ultimately, Alford was able
to define Hays' moderation as a liability and he successfully defeated the incumbent.
However, if Hays' moderation was a liability in the local political arena, it was an
asset in the national sphere. Ironically, the congressman's loss generated more respect for
the political risks that he and other southern moderates took by simply calling for the
preservation of constitutional government and the rule oflaw. On Face the Nation,
Howard K. Smith queried, "Mr. Hays, some of us did not realize how strong the feeling
was in your state and how antagonistic to any moderate course, and we felt that you were
sticking too near the southern shore. Would you admit the election confirmed your
judgement that the situation was serious?" Hays, with typical aplomb responded, "Yes, I
certainly would. Few people outside Arkansas realized just how serious it was. I was
like the hypochondriac who had difficulties getting any attention or sympathy. But he
had the last word, after all, for he directed that there be inscribed on his tombstone: I told
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you I was sick. " 72 The former congressman was canonized by the press as a political
martyr for standing up for his "principles" though little mention was made of what those
principles were, and little attempt was made to elucidate what Hays stood for as a states'
rights liberal. 73
Hays reputation as a "hero-martyr of moderation" served him well for the
remainder of his career. He reflected, "I had unintentionally became a momentary symbol
of something that would bring pride and satisfaction to a far greater degree than
continuation in office could have produced."74 He may have been defeated, but he noted,
"my moral position was impregnable."75 Although he never held elected office again,
Hays was able to capitalize on this publicity to secure appointments under the
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Even after he left government, and
took positions at Rutgers University and Wake

Fore~t

Ecumenical Institute, he was

celebrated as a true statesman and a moral force in politics.
This embrace of Hays, built on a lack of analysis by the press, would have
important implications for his legacy. In acting as a mediator in the Little Rock crisis,
Hays was above all fighting for the Little Rock school board's desegregation plan because
he believed that allowing local officials to control and define "all deliberate speed" would
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create the most "flexible" application of federal law. 76 He was trying to avoid a
Constitutional showdown between state and federal power, which he knew would
ultimately result in overt federal intervention and enforcement of the Supreme Court
decision. 77 Although he recognized the Constitutional rights of the Little Rock Nine, he
was not their advocate. At best, Hays hoped that token desegregation and minimal
compliance would appease the federal courts and satisfy civil rights organizations so that
the region could avoid "immediate" and "massive" integration. 78 When trouble arose in
Little Rock, he even spoke in favor of a "cooling off' period and the postponement of the
token desegregation plan to some time in the future that might be more favorable. 79
However, over the years, Hays emphasized the liberal aspects of his record and
suggested that his moderate positions were a smokescreen for more progressive
inclinations. In his final memoir, Politics is My Parish (1981), Hays suggested that he
adopted a moderate stance in order to "induce" his southern colleagues to move toward
fulfilling the "aspirations of our black minority for complete equality." 80 1bis belief was
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not articulated in his early writings. Nevertheless, these kinds of statements led Hays'
biographer, James T. Baker, to conclude that Hays was a unqualified "liberal" who
merely masked his views while he was an elected official. 81 Whether or not this is the
case, in his twilight years Hays was able to take advantage of the accusations leveled at
him by his opponents- that as a moderate he had been an integrationist who took a
"moral" position on civil rights during the school desegregation crisis.
Indeed, Hays hoped to preserve this legacy and his reputation as a moral force in
American politics when he returned to these themes in a documentary titled "Brooks
Hays: Return to Little Rock" produced by David Solomon, a young filmmaker and
former student at Wake Forest University, in 1980. In the post-Watergate era, Solomon
envisioned a film on Hays' life as part of a series called "Moral Crises in Government"
that would focus on politicians who took principled stands in the midst of the "moral
ambiguities" of most "political situations." Solomon believed Hays epitomized the kind
of politician he wanted to highlight in his series. The filmmaker described Hay as "an
eminent American at the summit of his career" who had adhered to his belief that
"political responsibility and moral commitment are inseparable" even when it cost him
his seat in Congress. Moreover, Hays made an ideal interview subject because of his
warm sense of humor and reputation as an engaging storyteller. As a retired politician
with no desire to run for office again, he was also "free" to review "his own role and the
role of others with genuine candor, forming the moral conclusions about events that must
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be formed if past events are to have any meaning for present and future. " 82
As the project developed, Solomon elaborated on his interpretation of Brooks
Hays' role in the Little Rock school desegregation crisis of 1957. In holding the exCongressman up as a man of"moral courage," the filmmaker idealized Hays' "moderate"
stand for law and order in the crisis. Solomon contended that Hays' willingness to serve
as a mediator between Governor Orval Faubus and President Ike Eisenhower was an act
of bravery and self-sacrifice for the greater good. From the filmmaker's perspective,
Hays refused to compromise his principles, and as a result, had been "brought down by a
whirlwind he alone had the courage to face." As Solomon noted, the basic premise of his
film was that Hays' embodied a "certain kind of moral stubbornness," "an ability to set
aside personal ambition and even personal welfare to affirm a moral principle in the face
of hostility and rejection and even hatred." 83 The focus of the film was to be Brooks
Hays, the sources of influence and inspiration that had informed his actions in 1957, and
the example he set for the present and future, not the crisis itself. Solomon asserted that
instead of"trying to dissect a tragedy," the film would build a "positive portrait of a
man." This approach, the filmmaker believed, would be instructive and inspiring. 84
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While developing the project, Solomon drew extensively on Hays' political
contacts. Although Solomon claimed that he had "gotten more rejection letters and been
kicked down more flights of stairs that you can imagine" while pursuing sponsors,
Brooks Hays' vast network of friends and associates helped get the project off the
ground. 85 When applying for a grant from the Arkansas Endowment of Humanities
(AEH), the Former Members of Congress, an organization Hays had founded in 1970,
wrote a letter of recommendation in support ofthe project. 86 The AEH ultimately granted
$18,000 toward the production of the film. As it moved toward production, "Brooks
Hays: Return to Little Rock" was sponsored by the Arkansas chapter of the National
Conference of Christians and Jews, an organization Hays had been affiliated with for
decades. 87 Likewise, another nonpartisan organization the congressman had founded in
order to bring young people to the nation's capital to see government at work, called
Close-Up, contributed a couple thousand dollars to the project. 88 These avenues of
funding and influence clearly illustrate why Brooks Hays was the subject of one of the
first documentaries to address the Little Rock school desegregation crisis.
After securing funding, Solomon assembled a director, scriptwriter, and associate
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producer to make his vision a reality. The filmmaker planned to intercut archival NBC
footage outside of Central High School in 1957, and scenes of the city, the school, and its
students in the late 1970s, with interviews of Hays' friends, including Eisenhower aide
Sherman Adams, Arkansas Gazette Editor Harry Ashmore, and House Speaker Tip
O'Neill. Kennedy aide and historian Arthur Schlesinger, a long-time friend of Hays, was
also recruited to give the historical documentary the "armor of authority."89 Solomon
reported that he had few problems persuading interview subjects to participate in the
project. "Brooks is like magic," he said. "A phone call from him can do just about
anything."90
The film producer hoped to distribute his final product to high schools and
colleges for instruction, but he also wanted to create a film that would be appropriate for
broadcast on public television. However, Solomon's celebratory portrait of Hays would
generate controversy in the congressman's native state when Arkansas Educational
Television (AETN) threatened not to air the program if it proved to be "embarrassing" to
the state of Arkansas or portrayed a "biased" portrait of the Little Rock school
desegregation crisis. These warnings provoked a storm of commentary about the role of
public television, mediated representations of the 1957 desegregation crisis, and the
appropriate balance oftragedy and transformation in historical accounts of those events.
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In the early 1980s, most commercial networks refused to air documentaries that

had not been produced in-house. Consequently, independent filmmakers turned to public
television as the sole outlet for their work. However, as Solomon would discover,
negotiating relationships with programmers at local television stations or the national
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) was frequently a process fraught with difficulty. 91
Unlike European public-television networks, like the BBC, American public television is
a decentralized system of loosely federated stations or affiliates that tap into a national
"library" ofprograms.92 1bis system has its roots in public television's inception, was
codified by the 1967 Public Broadcasting Act, and was reinforced by the Nixon
Administration, which channeled money to the local (and presumably more conservative)
stations in order to decrease the influence of national programming centers that the
President perceived to be "dangerously liberal."93 Some observers have praised the
democratic nature of this system as a network of "independent, interrelated" affiliates in
which "each station would be locally controlled and a source of programming," enabling
them to serve the needs of their specific communities while "guarding against the abuses
and limitations of centralization."94 However, others have suggested that this system has
crippled public television's potential, creating a "bureaucratic monster" that stifles
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creativity and steers away from controversy. 95
Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, southern public television stations sometimes
refused to broadcast nationally-distributed programs that addressed civil rights and race
relations. In 1966, the Alabama Educational Television Network declined to air Jack
Willis' Lay My Burden Down, which focused on the lives of rural African Americans in
the state one year after the Selma-to-Montgomery March. Local programmers claimed
the program did not merit broadcast because of its "insufficient educational value." The
same affiliate also refused to air Black Journal, a series produced by African Americans
for a black audience in 1970. After fielding complaints from angry citizens, the FCC
originally ruled that the station's programming decisions were "a matter of taste and
judgement," but reversed itself four years later and threatened to revoke the state's license
unless it made necessary reforms. 96 Since 1975, PBS affiliates had agreed to support a
"core schedule" of programs, largely consisting of series like NOVA, Masterpiece
Theatre, or the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour, but they could still decline to air other
nationally distributed programs not suited to local tastes. 97
The filmmakers hoped to complete "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" by late
1979 and planned to premiere the film in Arkansas. Solomon sent his prospectus and
other materials related to the project to station programmers at Arkansas Educational
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Television (AE1N). The film producer told reporters that he anticipated distributing the
program, which was being funded by the Arkansas Endowment of Humanities, to public
schools and libraries after "one or two initial viewings on public television." He also
indicated that the United States Information Agency might be interested in distributing it
abroad. 98 However, when AETN program director Fred Schmutz was informed that
Solomon planned to use archival footage from NBC, and was going to "utilize the
services of man in the News Department of NBC who would describe the difficulties
their news crew had experienced in Little Rock during the 1957 crisis," he took
"exception to this particular part of the film" and indicated that he would review the film
closely and would not air it on the network if there was "anything embarrassing to
Arkansas" in the final product.
Schmutz had worked for Little Rock's NBC affiliate KARK-TV in 1957. After
shooting footage outside Central High School, NBC News had edited and transmitted
programming to the network in New York from the local outlet. Schmutz recalled,
[T]he local outlet had no control over the content of the NBC film
segments. I personally was on the scene at the time the film was shot, I
was with the members of the NBC crew as they edited the film and
prepared it for transmission. On many occasions, I questioned the
particular incident which was featured, and suggested other incidents
which presented a more sane and intelligent approach to the problem. At
no time were my suggestions accepted, and on one early morning hour,
between hourly feeds to the NBC "Today" program, the newsman, Mr.
Frank McGee, informed me that those incidents which I had suggested
'would not sell.' In other words, they were interested only in that which
was sensational. As a result, I feel that the coverage originated by NBC
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was definitely biased. 99

In a letter to David Solomon and the Arkansas Endowment of Humanities, Schmutz
informed them that if the "sensationalism" of the NBC reports was incorporated into the
film, through footage "showing violence without showing the other side," AETN "would
have no interest in showing it." 100 Lee Reaves, a Faubus appointee and the director of the
Arkansas Educational Television Commission, subsequently told commission members
and reporters that he and Schmutz would review the documentary and would not air it if
they found it "biased," "unfair," or "embarrassing." 101
If AETN refused to broadcast the film, it was unlikely that Solomon would be
able to find another broadcast outlet in the state. Moreover, without the support of the
local public television affiliate, it was unlikely that the film would be broadcast on public
television anywhere since affiliates screen and recommend programs for national
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distribution. 102 In this decentralized system, gatekeepers like Fred Schmutz and Lee
Reaves have tremendous influence over which topics and perspectives are broadcast on
public television. In his study of PBS, B.J. Bullert found that programmers who made
these decisions were guided by their own biases as well as the perceived biases of their
viewers and subscribers. 103 Nevertheless, Bullert concluded that it was the gatekeepers
themselves who frequently became the most "active participants in debates about
contested social issues by deciding which views of reality will contend on the airwaves,
when they will be broadcast, and in what context." 104 While Schmutz and Reaves may
have been concerned that a documentary which examined the crisis through the lens of
the national media would alienate local viewers, subscribers and taxpayers (who paid
station bills), it seemed to be Schmutz' personal relationship to the construction ofNBC
news footage that drove him to warn Solomon and the Arkansas Endowment of the
Humanities about his objections and his intent. Relatively powerless in the centralized
structure of a commercial network, where the "local outlet had no control over the content
of the NBC film segments," Schmutz had considerably more power to control content as
a programmer of a local affiliate within the decentralized public television system. 105
Within a broadcasting system that celebrated "localism," he argued that national
perspectives on the crisis should not be privileged over local experiences.
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In articulating their concerns, Schmutz and Reaves suggested that a documentary
which incorporated the sensationalism of the NBC reports (which purportedly featured
"violence without showing the other side") would be "biased" and unbalanced, and not
suitable for broadcast on AE1N. 106 In the 1967 Public Broadcasting Act, the public
television system was charged with the responsibility to develop and air programs "with
strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of
controversial nature." 107 Since its codification, this clause has been used by politicians,
taxpayers, special interest groups, programmers and local affiliates to attack programs
they object to. It should be noted that the standard of"strict adherence to balance and
objectivity" goes beyond the requirements for "fairness and accuracy" imposed by the
FCC on all broadcasters. 108 Media critics have charged that these ambiguous standards
have created a "logic of safety" and a "culture of timidity inside public television."
Consequently, they argue, the system has avoided addressing some of the country's most
pressing social problems in favor of producing safe, noncontroversial programs. 109
Moreover, in his review of controversial independent documentaries on public television,
Bullert found that once the private deliberations and negotiations between stations and
producers entered the public sphere, charges of"unfairness" and "lack ofbalance" were
frequently used to undermine the filmmaker's credibility, and ''to shape perception of the
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work in question." 110 Thus, charges that a film "lacked balance" or was "biased," as those
terms were defined by station programmers, carried significant weight within the system,
particularly when applied to the work of a relatively young, unknown independent
producer.

In response, Brooks Hays publicly defended the project, noting that his life and
career were to be the focus of the film, not the desegregation crisis itself. The former
congressman insisted that the producers planned present the 1957 desegregation drama as
"part of the pattern of my whole life ... one whole event in my whole career." The film
would depict the moderate stance of a states' rights liberal, a statesman working to
support the rule oflaw. Consequently, he contended, "the total view will be favorable
and our image as law-abiding people will be preserved." He assured reporters that the
documentary would be "faithful to history."m At the annual banquet of the Arkansas
Endowment for the Humanities, Hays urged his audience to ''trust" the filmmakers. He
asked those present not to "entertain fears that Little Rock and Arkansas will be presented
in any except a favorable light" and suggested that emphasis would be placed on the
state's progress with school desegregation. 112 "I love my city," he asserted, "and I was
proud of the rapidity with which it healed wounds and moved into compliance with the
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law." 113 In making his appeals, Hays suggested that the film would not reproduce a onedimensional image of the crisis. Rather, it would counteract it by emphasizing the
moderate forces at work within the city. This argument, combined with the film's
proposed focus on Hays' "return" to a dramatically different Little Rock, appealed to
those who wished to reclaim the city's progressive reputation.
AETN's warning to the film's producers became a front-page news story, and the
subject of editorials and letters to the editor in both the Arkansas Gazette and the
Arkansas Democrat. Schmutz and Reaves were accused of acting as a "self-appointed"

"two-man censorship board." Their approach to "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock"
was identified as only one of a series of decisions made to suppress information that
might be considered "objectionable" or "unacceptable." 114 Many observers expressed
concern that the network had threatened not to air the production before filming even
began. The Arkansas Gazette noted, "It is regrettable that Schmutz and Reaves elected to
interfere in the production of this film, for all they have done with their threats of
censorship is to complicate the exercise ofthe producer's judgement. Solomon will have
to do his best both to maintain his professional integrity against the censors and avoid
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over-reaction in the process." 115
Several editorial boards questioned how an "unbiased" and historically accurate
documentary addressing the 1957 crisis could be anything but "embarrassing" to the state.
The Gazette asserted, "a film on 'Little Rock' cannot rewrite or scrub up that melancholy
chapter in our national history, nor make it appear that popular opinion in Arkansas was
not grievously in error at the time." Sensationalism, the paper noted, "is a highly
subjective term," but "one must concede that the performance of the rowdy crowd at
Central High was pretty sensational material, as was the first test of whether racism was
to prevail over the rule oflaw in this country." The crowd outside Central "was engaged
in something other than peaceful demonstration on a September mom," the Gazette
observed. 116 Columnist Richard E. Yates, conceded that the film would be embarrassing
to "many public men who played a leading role in attempting to defy the public courts"
and the "thousands of Arkansas voters who continued to support these public men," but
insisted that confronting the past would be a cathartic experience good for the state's
"soul." The film would be a valuable civics lessons for those too young or too forgetful
to remember the events of 1957-1958 and learn from them. 117
Some suggested that Schmutz's concern that the film would focus on
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sensationalism- but not the "other side" of moderate, law-abiding approaches to the issue
of school desegregation- made little sense. The entire purpose of showing the mob
scenes outside Central High School was to illustrate what Hays, and the state of
Arkansas, had transcended. Hays "was and is the very symbol of 'the other side,' as a
leading advocate of settling the Little Rock crisis peacefully within the rule oflaw." 118
Furthermore, the Tulsa World and others noted that it would be hard for viewers to
understand why Brooks Hays' "moderate" stance for law and order was so controversial
"without recalling the Great Faubusfear he rose above." Likewise, it would be difficult to
measure the state's "progress" without showing the "depths" to which it had
descended. 119 As one editorial commented, the Brooks Hays story "is one that began
badly," but "ended happily in Hays' emergence as a figure of national stature and, finally,
in the exemplary desegregation ofthe high school, Central, which was the scene of the
historic confrontation." 120
Because AETN was a state-financed public television network, Schmutz's and
Reaves' threat not to air the film also provoked commentary about the purpose of public
television. Hays himself expressed surprise that criticism of the project had come from
the public broadcasting network instead of"hard-core" segregationists. He stated, "I
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assumed they would understand the purpose and substance ofit." 121 In a letter to the
editor, Richard Stein wrote,
the concept behind programming on PBS stations is to offer an alternative
to entertainment and documentaries that are aired on commercial stations.
Many PBS programs are controversial in nature, but they are designed to
enlighten viewers on subjects that many times are too touchy to air on
commercial stations because of the involvement of sponsors who pay
millions of dollars for a 30-second spot.
Since AETN was "financed by public funds," Stein asserted that it was "morally unjust,
and perhaps even unconstitutional, for one or two men to dictate public television policy
to the citizens of Arkansas." 122 The Dumas Clarion concurred that public television
programs should challenge viewers and "stimulate the mind." The paper contended that
viewers needed to be confident that the network's programs were not being censored
because a handful of officials did not agree with the viewpoints or perspectives
expressed. 123
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton responded to the growing controversy by
assigning a member ofhis staff to investigate AETN's policies and its statements about
the Brooks Hays' film. Clinton told reporters he was uncomfortable with Reaves and
Schmutz's "premature" pronouncements about the film, and felt that Arkansas
Educational Television commissioners on the network's board should have renounced the
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programmers' position. The governor acknowledged that AETN had an obligation to
review programs to determine if they were acceptable for broadcast, but asserted that the
commission overseeing programming decisions should adopt a clear set of guidelines and
familiarize the public with its standards. From the governor's perspective, it was
"important" for Arkansans to learn about their recent history. "The idea that we should
not know about it or learn about it or see it is ridiculous," he said. The eight
commissioners on the network's board served by gubernatorial appointment and Clinton
told reporters that the controversy had given him a "keen awareness" of his responsibility
to appoint members that were "not interested in undue censorship."124 With two of the
commissioners' terms expiring, the Arkansas Gazette editorial board hoped that Clinton's
remarks would put an end to "any further talk of not putting on the show." The paper
quipped, "A word to the wise is supposed to be sufficient."125
As these events unfolded, Solomon and his production team continued to work on
the project, scouting locations for filming in Russellville, Hays' hometown, and Little
Rock in the a fall of 1979. During Hays' "return" to the Arkansas capitol, the filmmakers
wanted to capture him speaking with young people about the desegregation crisis, his role
in events, and the future of Central High School. The team decided to select a small
group of students to speak with Hays about these issues in a seminar-style setting. The
thirteen students were selected "on the basis of their interest in politics or government and
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for their ability to vocalize." Hays explained his "moderate" position during the session,
expressed pride that he took the "right tum" during the crisis, and claimed that he was a
supporter of a "morally correct law which ruled out segregation." 126 The crew also filmed
footage during a large pep rally where Hays' tried to charm the crowd by telling
humorous stories about his own youth. Film director Steven Jacobson and producer
David Solomon hoped to create visual excitement with shots from the pep rally scene,
stock footage from local TV stations and CBS's Face the Nation, as well as slow pans
across newspaper stills. 127

In the end, "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" was ready for release in August
1980. Given the controversy the production had provoked, Hays told the media he was
relieved that the film would be shown after the primary elections because his son Steele
Hays was running for a seat on the Arkansas Supreme Court. 128 Presumably, the former
congressman did not want another Hays paying the political price for his position in the
1957 crisis. On August 9, 1980, Brooks Hays' 82nd birthday, approximately 250 guests
gathered at Second Baptist Church in Little Rock to view the film for the first time. After
a standing ovation, Hays expressed pride in his actions in 1957, declaring, "We did the
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right thing- those of us who took this position." Filmmaker David Solomon, Arkansas
Endowment for the Humanities (AEH) Co-President Bob Terry, and Steven Janger of the
Close-Up Foundation also made remarks, and Arkansas Attorney General Steve Clark
spoke on the behalf of Governor Clinton. Congratulatory letters and telegrams from
President Carter, United States Senators Dale Bumpers and David Pryor, United States
Representative Ed Bethune, and others were read during the ceremony. The film's
sponsor, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, hosted a reception in honor of
Hays' and his wife. Marion Hays expressed gratitude that she and her husband had lived
long enough to "reap the rewards" of their "tolerance and faith" in the people of
Arkansas. 129
After premiers in Little Rock and Winston-Salem, the film was shown on AETN
and WFMY in North Carolina. In retrospect, Solomon suggested that the controversy
was "the best free publicity" the producers "could have gotten." 130 However, reviews of
the production were mixed. While some asserted that the film fulfilled its promise,
producing an "account of Hays' courage, devotion and inspiration" and reminded its
audience of "both the heroic and tragic" events of 1957, 131 others asserted that it fell far
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short of the mark. In placing the spotlight on Hays rather than the school desegregation
crisis, at least one viewer asserted that the film illuminated "almost nothing of what
prompted Mr. Hays and the Gazette to take their courageous stand.... I was left none the
wiser on the school crisis, how it was resolved, or even what Mr. Hays actually did." In a
letter the editor, the writer continued, "It seems incredible that this could be the same film
that some want to keep AETN (Channel 2) from showing. What could be controversial
about an encomium to Mr. Hays, whose stand time has shown to have been correct?" 132
Journalist Elizabeth Shores had followed the development ofthe project since its
inception. She also asserted that the film was fatally flawed because it barely explored
''the social forces and moral dilemma that made Hays career so courageous." In addition
to downplaying historical context, Shores contended that the film sidestepped Hays own
"ambivalence" about southern race relations, and his internal conflict about whether and
how to support the Supreme Court's decision that violated traditional social practices and
his own political philosophy as a states' rights liberal. Solomon's portrait, the journalist
wrote, was "incomplete"- "without some suggestion of the political dilemma, the
personal crisis of conviction challenged by unstoppable change is unclear." Moreover,
Shores suggested that the film lacked a "modem perspective" on events, and Hays
"return" consisted of nothing more than a "few brief scenes" shot at Central High
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School. 133
While a film which explored Hays' ambivalence toward school desegregation and
the political dilemma the congressman faced in 1957 might have been a worthwhile
project, it was not David Solomon's project. Instead, "Brooks Hays: Return to Little
Rock" was meant to enhance the congressman's reputation as a man of moral courage. It
idealized his moderate stand for "law and order" and gradual change, and celebrated the
ultimate triumph of his ideals in the capital city of his native state. Although residual
resentment of national news coverage in 1957 provoked threats of censorship and
stimulated controversy, the film was not suppressed. Politicians, papers, and historical
organizations did not hesitate to come to the defense of a man whose moral reputation
was "impregnable," and unlike Governor Orval Faubus, Hays and Solomon were able to
find an outlet to distribute their message. The film's defenders acknowledged that
"Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" explored potentially "embarrassing" incidents
surrounding the school desegregation crisis. However, it did so to highlight the heroism
of more moderate forces in the city and to illuminate the extent of Little Rock's progress
in the field of race relations. Discussing the crisis in this context had the potential to tum
a tragedy into a source of inspiration. However, within a few months, the controversy
surrounding another first-hand account of the crisis would reveal that some white
residents in the city felt that even this carefully contained narrative was being constructed
at their expense.
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Elizabeth Huckaby: "You Should Know Your Responsibilities"
Elizabeth Huckaby, Central High School's Vice Principal of Girls, had spent 39
years of her adult life working at the city's flagship educational institution. In her
administrative role, she had been responsible for investigating incidents, counseling
students, and enforcing discipline among the female student body. Throughout the school
desegregation crisis, Huckaby wrote daily bulletins urging students to practice "good
citizenship," recorded reports of racial conflict in the school, and mediated disputes
between students. Unsurprisingly, the vice principal had regular contact with the Little
Rock Nine during the 1957-58 school year, particularly the six girls who reported to her
regularly- Elizabeth Eckford, Carlotta Walls, Minnijean Brown, Melba Patillo, Thelma
Mothershed, and Gloria Ray.
The school administrator also kept a meticulous record of her experience.
Huckaby was a faithful diary keeper and recorded the day-to-day details of her life in a
small desk calendar usually used for keeping appointments. She also preserved daily
bulletins, written reports of "racial incidents" in the school, and other administrative
materials. Her quickly written notes preserve her immediate thoughts on the crisis,
students, events inside the school, as well as a more mundane record of what she made
for dinner and how many squirrels her husband Glen bagged on weekend hunting trips. 134
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In time, these records, as well as letters written to her brother living in New York, and
clippings from the Arkansas Gazette and Arkansas Democrat would serve as the basis of
her memoir.
After decades of reflecting on her experience, Huckaby published a first-hand
account ofthe tumultuous 1957-58 school year in 1980. Throughout the text, the vice
principal portrayed herself as a pragmatist struggling to keep Central High School open
and operable during the school desegregation crisis. Her account of the administration's
efforts in the midst of overt hostility and general apathy provoked significant debate in
Little Rock about the culpability of vocal segregationists and silent bystanders in 1957.
After Huckaby's book was published and adapted for television in nationally broadcast
docudrama, she faced charges that her memoir offered the public a "distorted" version of
events that vilified the community-at-large and white students in the school in order to
glorify the efforts of the administration to maintain calm and order. Several critics,
particularly representatives of Central's student body, argued that Huckaby's narrative
and the television adaptation of it lionized the administration at their expense and unfairly
characterized their actions. In defining her own pragmatic position against the stance
adopted by the majority of Little Rock's citizens, and using the dark days of segregation
to underscore the city's progress in more recent years, these reviewers asserted that
Huckaby obscured the generally progressive and "moderate" tone of the city's race
relations twenty-five years earlier.
Huckaby began writing a complete account of events inside Central "as soon as
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school was out" during the summer of 1958. 135 Fully expecting to return to her duties as
an administrator when school reconvened, she suddenly found herself with more time to
write on her hands when Governor Orval Faubus activated newly passed legislation in the
fall of 1958 and closed all of the high schools in the city. Throughout Little Rock's "lost
year," teachers reported to school and were paid as usual, but they sat in empty
classrooms. In order to boost morale, they taught each other the subjects they specialized
in, worked on curriculum development and other projects. 136 As Huckaby noted,
"freedom from paper grading and discipline of students" gave her time to write her
memoir. She finished a draft of her manuscript and submitted it to a literary agent by
May 1959. 137
The first version of Huckaby's manuscript was titled "Letters to Bill." The draft
basically consisted of transcribed letters Huckaby had written to her brother in New York.
The school administrator filled in narrative gaps and provided necessary context by
interspersing "explanatory material" gleaned from newsclippings throughout the text. 138
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This rather uninspired and stilted format may have hampered Huckaby's efforts to find a
publisher, or she may have thought better of it. The vice principal was one of 44 teachers
fired by segregationist members of the Little Rock School Board during the year of the
school closures for being "integrationists" or "collaborators." This controversial move
outraged members of the community that had otherwise remained silent throughout the
school crisis, and voters recalled the school board extremists. Huckaby and most of the
other teachers were reinstated. 139 Nevertheless, this experience may have made the vice
principal of girls reluctant to publish an account which compared the situation in Little
Rock to Nazi Germany and contained her relatively unvarnished opinions of students,
their parents, fellow administrators, the United States Army and the National Guard, the
NAACP and the White Citizens' Council, and members of the community at large. After
her brief flirtation with a literary agent, Huckaby put her manuscript away in her
husband's gun cabinet for the duration ofher career at Central High School. She wrote,
"Feelings were too high in Little Rock, the town too disrupted for me to consider trying to
publish my account. I wanted to keep my job at Central, as I did till I retired in 1969."140
However, in retirement, Huckaby found time to rework her manuscript into a
more traditional narrative format. The vice principal framed her account as a "success
story," which illustrated how the school administration persevered, protected the students,
and kept the school open. It must be noted that in Huckaby's narrative, the "crisis" at
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Central High School was first and foremost an administrative crisis, not a constitutional
showdown. Consequently, in her view, the important question to be answered about the
1957-58 school year was not whether the federal government had forcefully intervened to
protect the constitutional rights of the nine black students, or even whether the school
board's integration plan had been accepted and actively supported by the community, but
whether the school administration was able to maintain some semblance of normalcy in
the absence of these things. As she later explained, "the problem to be resolved," in both
the written and filmed versions of Crisis at Central High, "is to maintain Central High as
a school, in spite of organized opposition, for its 1800 students, including nine black
students." In her view, the narrative presented "a success story in that this is
accomplished, with many setbacks, by the students, teachers, and community." 141 She
contended that Central High's diverse student body in 1980 was a "living memorial to
those students and adults whose fortitude helped it endure" through one of its greatest
challenges. 142
In her memoir, Huckaby presented a school under siege. While she and her
colleagues struggled to make the best of a difficult situation, the vice principal suggested
that others abdicated their responsibilities. Successful school desegregation was nearly
impossible in the face of ongoing obstruction and harassment from the state government,
the indifference of businessmen and civic leaders, the active opposition of segregationists,
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and "half-hearted" support from the Eisenhower administration in the form of inadequate
numbers of troops and poorly enforced court injunctions. If Little Rock Central High
School faced a "crisis" for the duration of the 1957-58 school year, it was because the
school board and school administration carried the "complete burden" of trying to make
school desegregation work with little or no help and plenty of interference from
outsiders. 143
Elizabeth Huckaby knew from the moment the school board announced its
desegregation plan that she would be involved in the implementation of the policies and
procedures outlined by Superintendent Blossom. In Crisis at Central H~gh, Huckaby
suggested that she "was eager to play [her] proper role in the integration of Central High
School." Raised by a Presbyterian minister who proclaimed the value and common
humanity of each individual, Huckaby felt "that the decision of the Supreme Court on
May 17, 1954, had been eminently fair and just, that no public school system segregated
by law on the basis of race was consistent with democracy." 144 Before opening day in
September 1957, she believed that integrating a southern high school would be a "new
and exciting experience." 145 However, while Huckaby may have been committed to
making the school desegregation plan a success, her first loyalty lay with Central High
School. As Little Rock's flagship institution, Central High had a reputation of academic
and athletic achievement. Throughout the school year, the administrator was primarily
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concerned with maintaining the school's high educational standards and keeping things
running smoothly. She noted, "As public school teachers and administrators we felt that
education was our major responsibility and integration a secondary problem in the social
revolution of our times." 146 Huckaby described the decisions and actions of school
administrators from this perspective.
As Vice Principal of Girls, Huckaby had been responsible for investigating
incidents, counseling students, and enforcing discipline among the female student body.
Consequently, her account necessarily focused on the day-to-day harassment of the Little
Rock Nine, the punishment or dismissal of segregationist perpetrators, as well as the
anxiety of the faculty and staff as they searched the building after bomb threats, tried to
keep the school year on an even keel, and were harassed by segregationists and the state
police. Throughout, Huckaby defends controversial decisions made by school officials,
including the decision to only punish offenses witnessed by adults, but also the expulsion
ofMinnijean Brown after she responded to repeated provocation and the reinstatement of
a segregationist student leader. 147 Although she presented a litany of disciplinary
problems and incidents created by the school's strident segregationists in her memoir, the
vice principal also offered praise for the restraint of the majority of Central's students and
a vigorous defense of the administration's policies.
For example, early in the school year, Principal Matthews and Vice Principals
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Huckaby and Powell agreed to punish only those offenses that had been witnessed by an
adult. In practice, this meant that unless a teacher or a guard witnessed white students
harassing the Little Rock Nine, nothing was done- even when evidence that harassment
had taken place was presented (stolen books, scratches and bruises, ink spilled on
clothing, spit, etc.), a black student could identify their assailant, and when the
administrators themselves believed that a repeat offender was responsible. Although
teachers were able to maintain their authority in classrooms for the most part,
segregationist students took advantage of the administration's policy by isolating the
African American students in dark comers, stairwells, bathrooms, and the twisting
hallways of Central High to avoid detection. Students who were known to be "hard core"
segregationists and "repeaters" were frequently "counseled" about their behavior but
rarely suspended or expelled.
In her memoir, Huckaby acknowledged the administration's disciplinary
procedures "seems very little to have done," but defended the policy on two grounds. She
suggested that if the administration had decided to punish the actions of white students
without "teacher verification," they would have also had to punish reported actions of
black students. She argued that this position would have quickly resulted in the expulsion
of all nine African American students. She wrote,
Had we ever begun accepting those reports without teacher verification,
they would have been manufactured so fast and would have been so
heinous that, in no time at all, no black student would have been in school.
To protect [emphasis added] the Nine from such tactics, we frequently had
to leave them vulnerable to indignities, except for the vigilance of teachers
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and guards. 148
She also contended that given the prevailing racial climate in Little Rock, school
administrators had to be prepared to defend the suspension or expulsion of a white
student because of an incident involving a black student without any doubt about what
had transpired. Segregationist students and their parents often challenged such
punishments, and segregationist organizations in the city decried and publicized them. 149
Given this policy, the Little Rock Nine endured an endless litany of harassment
during their year at Central High School. While they reported many of these incidents,
especially when they involved vandalized lockers and stolen books (which were replaced
by Huckaby), ruined clothing, and violent physical assault, they quickly learned that little
came of such reports. Moreover, they were urged not to respond to provocation by their
parents, the NAACP, and the school administrators. Huckaby counseled the African
American students to "avoid physical retaliation" so that administrators "could be clear in
labeling these occurrences as attacks, rather than scuffles." 150
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However, throughout Crisis at Central High, Elizabeth Huckaby does not accept
full responsibility for the compromises that were made in the course of the year.
Although the vice principal acknowledged that the school administration's disciplinary
policies in relation to the harassment of the black students may not have always been
effective, fair or just, she contended that their decisions permitted the school to continue
functioning on a daily basis. In her opinion, the polices and practices she adopted were
necessary to keep the school operative. Huckaby contended that "the complete burden of
desegregation" had been placed on the school, 151 and that she, Principal Matthews, and
Vice Principal Powell were charged with making the plan a success with only the support
of the superintendent, five of six school board members, and "a few guards." She noted,
"The 'moderate' leadership of the city was paralyzed. Federal officials were apparently
not going to prosecute or punish those who were obstructing and opposing federal court
orders. And there was the constant indication that the state government was actually
assisting in, if not directing, the harassment." Under these circumstances, she asserted,
"we could only try to outlast them." 152
At the end ofthe school year, the school board filed a petition for a delay in the
implementation of the desegregation plan, arguing that it was impossible to maintain high
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standards of educational quality while teachers and students were distracted by the
controversy surrounding desegregation. Huckaby's testimony in court bolstered this
argument (and was cited in the Judge Lemley's decision granting the delay) when she
admitted during questioning that she had been forced to abandon her English classes and
devote her full time toward mediating conflicts between students, that there had been a
breakdown in school "decorum" and "routine," and that "hoodlumism and vandalism"
had been prevalent through the year. When cross-examined by Thurgood Marshall, she
denied that she desired a return or retreat to segregation, but stated that she hoped that if
the petition for a delay was denied that administrators "could get the full cooperation of
the court that ordered desegregation" in terms of convicting those that violated
injunctions against interference with the school plan and that she and her peers would
"not be left as school people to handle the problems alone." 153
In Crisis at Central High, Elizabeth Huckaby made it clear that she felt public

officials failed the students and faculty of Central High.

She asserted that the city was

devoid of moderate political leadership and compared Little Rock to Nazi Germany,
pointing to "leaders in school and town silenced by physical threats, principally to
children, and by economic boycotts." Segregationists speaking for a "rough and rather
inarticulate mob" stepped into this void of leadership. 154 Although the segregationists
were well organized, Huckaby did not believe they would have wielded much influence if
others had not abdicated their responsibilities, and the Arkansas Democrat had not
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published their "ridiculous charges" and "lies."155 She wrote,
Our worst error in judgement had been underestimating the opposition to
integration. The local leaders of that cause were, in general, not people
one would call the backbone of the community.... [W]e did not understand
that their lack of stature was fully compensated for by backing of the
elected leaders of state government and- a realization that was much
slower to come and even more bitter to accept- by the decision of the
federal government, under various political pressures, not to act further in
this crisis unless it was forced to do so. 156
Indeed, while Huckaby placed the "major blame" for the crisis on Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus, she was very critical of the federal government's failure to support and
enforce its own court orders. While Huckaby praised the "astonishing efficiency" of the
101 st Airborne troops President Eisenhower deployed to Little Rock, she noted that
mounting "political pressures" discouraged the federal government from intervening any
further. She wrote, "the 'troops' had been a political mistake and the Eisenhower
administration did not want to make any others." 157 Consequently, the Justice Department
did not prosecute any of the individual arrested outside the school for obstructing court
orders, and military officials were eager to drawn down troop levels as quickly as
possible- first the 101 st Airborne, and then the federalized Arkansas National Guard. 158
From her perspective, the ongoing trouble in the school was exacerbated by the reduction
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of guards.
Nevertheless, it cannot be underemphasized that Huckaby framed her account as a
success story. Since she viewed the crisis as an administrative problem, she restricted her
narrative to the events of the 1957-58 academic calendar. In her book, Ernest Green's
successful walk across the stage to receive his diploma was described as the culmination
of Huckaby's efforts throughout the school year. The administrator recalled, "We were
delighted with the success of graduation, ebullient with the lifting of the tensions of the
school year." Both the faculty and the leaders of the National Guard were glad to "to be
relieved of their responsibilities." 159 The book ended with no acknowledgment that Judge
Lemley granted the school board a "tactical delay," or that this decision was overturned
by the

8th

Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. It made no mention of the

fact that Governor Faubus closed all four of Little Rock's high schools during the 195859 school year to further prevent the implementation of the school desegregation plan, or
that his action was declared unconstitutional in tum. Moreover, it offered no discussion
of the teacher "purge" that specifically targeted Huckaby, Powell, and Matthews as
"integrationists" or at best "cooperationists" along with 44 other teachers. It contained no
reference to the efforts of the Women's Emergency Committee and the Stop This
Outrageous Purge campaign to recall pro-Faubus school board members. 160
Since these developments were not directly addressed, the text left the impression
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that everything proceeded smoothly after the school administration survived its crisis
year. Indeed, the Epilogue jumped from 1958 to 1980 without pause, and Huckaby
declared with pride, "The word in Little Rock now is not segregation. It is progress."
She reported that Central remains a "great school." It maintained a 50/50 balance of
white and black students through "a fleet of eighty buses that crisscross the town," and
had been administered by two black principals. It had maintained is academic standards,
and has retained a "tremendously loyal group of graduates." Huckaby asserted, "It stands,
a living memorial to those students and adults whose fortitude helped it endure." After
the commencement of 1958, she implied, Central graduated to the next phase of its
existence.. 161
After carefully crafting her account, Huckaby sent it to literary agent to find a
publisher in the early 1970s, but there was no interest. 162 Twelve years after the crisis,
the former vice principal's account was too dated to be considered "current" and too
recent to be considered "history." Random House rejected the text, and wrote that the
"material was interesting and salable five or ten years ago" but "the time for its
publication is past." Other publishers concurred. W.W. Norton & Company praised
Huckaby's writing but apologized: the "manuscript seems to us ten years to late."
Likewise, Dial Press queried, ''why on earth didn't she write the book 10 years ago?" On
the other side of the spectrum, American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc. rejected the
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account as "too recent." Other publishers refused the manuscript because it did not "offer
enough fresh material," was "written from too narrow a scope," or was "overdetailed."
One publisher felt that they "would have a difficult time in reaching the market" with a
book focused on civil rights and school integration because of backlash against "Black
Power, etc." 163
However, by 1980, in a new political climate which encouraged a sense of
detached distance from the civil rights struggles of the past, Huckaby's persistence finally
paid off. After a book editor mentioned her account to a film producer, Huckaby's
manuscript was picked up by Time-Life Films and readapted as a television docudrama
by screenwriters Richard Levinson and William Link. When the project was first
proposed, Huckaby was unenthusiastic about the prospect. She later recalled, "A movie
was not what I really wanted. I wanted a book- something real" [underline original].
However, she agreed to sell the rights to her manuscript with the understanding that a
book might be more salable if her story was broadcast on television. The strategy
worked. After the script was written in the fall of 1979 and the film was in production,
Huckaby finally found a publisher for her memoir- Louisiana State University Press- the
same publisher which had picked up Brooks Hays' final autobiography Politics is My
Parish. LSU Press moved quickly to try to get Huckaby's book published before the

docudrama appeared on television, and Huckaby's "true narrative" hit book stands in
October of 1980, nearly five months before the film aired on CBS in February the
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following year. 164
When Time-Life Film acquired the rights to Huckaby's book for adaptation, they
hired screenwriters Richard Levinson and William Link to write the teleplay and produce
the film. Together, the writers had created the popular television series Columbo, and
had written a number of "long form" television movies that explored controversial social
issues such as The Whole World is Watching (student protest), My Sweet Charlie (racial
stereotypes), That Certain Summer (homosexuality), The Gun (gun violence), and The

Execution ofPrivate Slovik (military execution). The two screenwriters believed that it
was "possible to confront issue-oriented material head-on" and maintain ratings if it was
done ''without polemicizing, without self-congratulatory grandstanding, and without
putting the audience to sleep." Above all, they argued, it was important to maintain
certain aesthetic standards; the exploration of controversial material should not become a
gimmick or an end in itself. 165 When adapting material for a screenplay, Link and
Levinson strove to remain "faithful" to the source material and to preserve the essence of
what had appealed to them in the original text. 166 Consequently, the screenwriters wrote
the teleplay from Elizabeth Huckaby's 800-page manuscript, and read her account against
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other books, public records, and interviews they conducted with other participants. 167
The seasoned screenwriters were attracted to the idea of writing the script from
the perspective of a vice principal inside Central High School. In press interviews,
Levinson said, "What fascinated us was dealing with a major historical event without
dealing with Eisenhower and Faubus ... You hire actors to play Eisenhower and Faubus
and you wind up with a waxworks tableau." 168 He recalled, "What appealed to us was the
workings of a school under an extraordinary crisis." 169 In the 1980s, "relatability" was a
guiding principle in movies created for television. Networks striving to target their
primary audience, women ages 18 to 49, created and supported storylines that this
audience could relate to. Consequently, many television films from this era featured
white, middle-class, female, and mostly suburban protagonists. Making a movie about
the crisis at Central High from the perspective of Elizabeth Huckaby was in keeping with
this broader trend. 170
Although they wanted to retain historical veracity, Link and Levinson reworked
the narrative, restructuring characters and dialogue "for dramatic effect," and placing a
strong emphasis on Huckaby's actions in the script. Despite these changes, the
screenwriters seemed to capture the essence of Huckaby's narrative on the screen. Like
167
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the author, they restricted their story to the events of the school year and focused on
developments inside the building rather than the constitutional drama often emphasized
elsewhere. Huckaby's criticism of the "silent majority," local moderate leaders, and
federal officials was more muted in the film than the book, but her critique of vocal
segregationists and Governor Faubus was clearly evident. The film portrayed a school
.administration struggling to keep the school open in a nearly "impossible" situation. 171
As the date of broadcast approached Time-Life Films and screenwriters Link and
Levinson actively promoted the project, picking up on Huckaby's emphasis on Little
Rock's progress and describing the televised version of Crisis at Central High as "an
American success story." 172 Producer Fryeda Rothstein assured the local press that the
film would not rebrand Little Rock as a "city filled with hate." Rather, she contended
that the production should be viewed as an opportunity to "change Arkansas' image."
She suggested, "It's a very pro-American story, that says cooler heads did prevail... We're
not doing this to excoriate, to sensationalize." She hoped the film would demonstrate
"how far we've come." 173 In press interviews, screenwriter Richard Levinson was
careful to distance the film from contemporary arguments about education and race. He
was quick to point out that his film was about integration, "not about bussing." He stated,
"There is ... a legitimate debate about bussing. But about integration there simply should
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be no debate. It's the law of the land." 174 Of course, this was a false distinction. As
noted in Chapter Three, court-ordered busing was also the "law of the land" in the 1970s
and 1980s, and in many residentially segregated communities, including Little Rock, it
provided the only means of achieving substantial integration of the public schools.
Indeed, the 50150 ratio of black and white students at Central High promoted by
Huckaby's publishers and film producers was only achieved after the school district was
ordered to achieve racial balance through busing.
Nevertheless, this narrative emphasis was well-received by the national media.
After broadcast, the television press applauded the performances and Joanne Woodward
was nominated for an Emmy for her portrayal of Huckaby. 175 The national media
embraced the film and asserted that it offered an "important lesson" about a "traumatic
period" in United Stages history-- namely that despite the difficulties and the
controversies involving race and the schools, the "good guys"- black and white- and the
nation had emerged victorious. 176 Bob Wisehart praised the film for refusing to "knuckle
under to sensationalism, hyperbole or knee-jerk liberalism always popular with the
Southern California film crowd." As he put it, the film was not a "an ode to a mean, dark
time," but rather "a legitimate American success story" about a revolution "reasonably
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peaceful" in the making. 177 Following the film's release, the faculty and staff at Central
High commended Huckaby for her "role in preserving the image of Central High." 178 The
author also received kind letters of support from family, friends, former teachers, and
some students (few of whom attended during the crisis years). Huckaby was "delighted"
with this response. 179
However, the book and film were not universally praised in Little Rock. Huckaby
reported, "When this book came out and the movie, I heard such comments, what does
she want to bring up all that old stuff for?" 180 Some felt that the film vilified the citizens
of Little Rock and demonized the white students at Central in order to underscore the
tenacity of the Little Rock Nine and the heroism of a faculty under pressure. Despite the
fact that Huckaby had dedicated her book to "those hundreds of boys and girls who were
at Central during the integration crisis but whose names are not in this story because they
were too busy just getting their lessons and helping at home ... to pay much attention to
their elders' stir and confusion over the color of their classmates' skin," 181 she was
criticized by Central High alumni for placing too much emphasis on the activities of
segregationist students.
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Ralph Brodie, President ofthe student body in 1958, released a public statement
asserting that Huckaby's account was "distorted." Brodie argued, that because of
Huckaby's narrow focus,
her manuscript does not develop a historical background with which to
judge the events or other people of that year; nor does it present with much
force the attitudes or actions of the responsible white students at Central
High, over 90% of the student body who, along with the faculty, obeyed
the law and held the school together that year. Rather the docu-drama
emphasizes the troublemakers who were a very small minority of the
nearly 2,000 students at Central. Even though the news media made no
distinction, the problems experienced inside Central that year were
relatively minor compared to the problems outside Central and those
invented by the media itself. In fact, those problems now seem
insignificant compared to the problems other schools have experienced
when faced with integration. There is a reason for that- there were many
responsible people inside Central who, regardless of their personal feelings
about integration, believed in both the rule oflaw and their obligations as
citizens to obey and uphold the law. This part of Central's story is not as
dramatic as the political confrontation nor as significant as the social
change made that year, yet in the face of history I believe that it is equally
important. 182
Brodie emphasized that the vast majority of students had accepted Brown v. Board as the
law of the land, along with the decision of the court in Cooper v. Aaron that Little Rock
Central High would have to be desegregated. 183 He bridled at the suggested that the
majority of students were "indifferent" about the integration process- "to say we were
'indifferent' implies that we didn't do something we should have done, or that we did
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something we shouldn't have done. And I don't think that's true." He also rejected the
contention that even students who did nothing were "culpable" because they hadn't
stopped the harassment. 184 In a small survey of members ofthe Class of 1958, the

Arkansas Gazette reported that Brodie's classmates "generally agreed with him about the
actions and attitudes of Central High students in 1957-58." Collectively they argued that
"peace and quiet prevailed inside the school as far as they could tell... they had little
contact with the black students and witnessed little or no harassment of them ... they
didn't comprehend the significance ofthe event at the time ... [and] that they have no
apologies to make." 185

In her correspondence, Huckaby responded to several students who had expressed
their dissatisfaction with the docudrama directly. As a former English teacher, she
pointed out that the TV version of her account was necessarily "built around conflict" and
suggested that the film exaggerated the activities of the segregationist students because of
the requirements of"good drama." She urged her critics to read her written account,
asserting that it provided a more balanced picture. 186
Huckaby believed that complaints about Crisis at Central High were due to the
constraints of docudrama as a medium not her own limited perspective. In her
correspondence with critics and in public statements, she repeatedly distanced her "true"
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written narrative from the televised docudrama and insisted that she had little to do with
the script or the film's production. 187 Although William Link suggested that Huckaby's
account already contained the "stuff of good drama," the former school administrator
demurred: "My writing did not contain drama, so film writers have to put it in the script."
Huckaby noted that the format required a "necessary consolidation of several characters,
including teachers and students, and of different incidents." 188 She expressed the most
anxiety about her own portrayal in the film. Although Huckaby recognized the need to
center the conflict around a "star," she worried that docudrama would make her actions
seem "noble" and "dramatic," when she simply could not imagine how she "would have
acted any other way." 189
Moreover, the vice principal privileged the veracity and accuracy of written
accounts over visual presentations. Huckaby wrote, "No film that attempts to recreate
events is entirely 'true."' The author noted, "Even documentary films which use only
footage shot during the events themselves are 'untrue"' due to the limited perspective of a
individual cameras, the selection, editing and reordering of footage, and narration which
reflects the filmmaker's "perception" of the "significance or meaning" of events. Of
course, written memoirs also suffer from similar limitations- the singular experience of
187
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the narrator, the selection and presentation of illustrative of events, and the interpretation
of their significance. However, the vice principal asserted that docudramas take "further
liberties with truth." The former English teacher noted, "Being a drama, [the film] must
present a problem to be solved and must use events to build to a climax or conclusion,
after some complications." 190
Huckaby seemed to think the film provoked controversy because it
"fictionalized" her narrative. 191 In their book, screenwriters Richard Levinson and
William Link acknowledge that the docudrama format can be particularly controversial
when used for film on television. Although "Crisis at Central High" was not shot in a
journalistic style, and the final edited product did not gesture toward the conventions of a
documentary or attempt to capture the aura ofhistorical veracity through the use of blackwhite film, its presence on the small screen and its broadcast through the same medium
that had spread the iconic images of the crisis in 1957 threatened to collapse boundaries
between fact and fiction. While novelists and playwrights have re-presented historical
events for centuries, Levinson and Link observed, "There are those who are convinced
that the TV viewer cannot easily distinguish between reality and dramatic truth, especially
when they cohabit the same piece offurniture." 192 Moreover; in a context in which even
the legitimacy of archived footage from NBC news broadcasts was questioned as a
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representation of"truth," it is hardly surprising that a format which re-enacted andrepresented the iconic images of 1957 generated concern and criticism.
Furthermore, the translation of a first-person written narrative into a visual
presentation may have had an impact on the story's reception. In a book written in the
first-person, the reader is continually reminded that the narrative represents the perception
of a single individual. Indeed, in her text, Huckaby called attention to the fact that the
book presented events and information "as I saw it, and it was told to me from day to day
by those who were there." This disclaimer was repeated at the beginning of the film, but
the viewer's attention was not called back to the Huckaby's unique perspective or
reminded that the movie is based on her interpretation of events through the use of the
first-person singular. Rather, viewers saw events unfolding from the camera's thirdperson perspective. 193 The third-person perspective of the camera lens may have
interfered with the viewers ability to understand the film as the product of Huckaby's
unique experience, memory, and narrative choice (coupled with those of the
screenwriters, the director, and the producer of the film). Consequently, the film lent
Huckaby's subjective description of events a concrete sense of reality.
However, complaints about Huckaby's narrative had as much to do about the
content of her message as its mode of presentation. It should be noted that Central High
student body president Ralph Brodie offered a critique of the vice principal's manuscript,
not the televised docudrama. Overall, the film may have provoked more commentary
simply because it reached a larger audience. Indeed, a close reading of the film and
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Huckaby's text suggests that the film was actually more sympathetic than the book in its
portrayal of Central's "silent majority" of white students. While the majority of white
students "going about their business" were largely absent from the pages ofHuckaby's
narrative, they had to be represented in the film because the medium required their
presence as extras filling hallways, classrooms, stadiums, and stairs. Indeed, even the
film's portrayal of the segregationist students was relatively mild since the filmmakers
selected representative incidents of racial harassment to stand in for the litany of daily
occurrences that make up a good portion of Huckaby's book. 194
What was similar in the two presentations was Huckaby's description of constant
conflict and tension throughout the school year, the lack of community support for the
desegregation plan or sympathy for the school administrators' efforts, and the
orchestrated efforts of segregationists to close the school and undermine public educators.
Consequently, Huckaby's explanations did not appease many of Central High's white
alumni. From their perspective, the school administrator and the screenwriters had
exaggerated Central High's problems with desegregation and demphasized the successes
of the year. In service of a carefully crafted narrative of local and national progress, the
white students of Central High felt they had been demonized and vilified in order to
underscore the bravery of school administrators and the Little Rock Nine, and to
demonstrate how the city and nation had come from the dark days of segregation.
Moreover, if some whites in Little Rock challenged Huckaby's account by arguing
that the city had always been more racially progressive than its reputation allowed, many
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African Americans asserted that the book and the docudrama told the story from the wrong
perspective. They argued that the "Crisis at Central High" was more than a series of
administrative difficulties and disciplinary decisions, it was a constitutional crisis that
raised questions about whether the nation would act decisively to protect African
American civil rights affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The principal
players were not Vice Principal Huckaby, Principal Jess Matthews, or Superintendent
Blossom. Rather, they were the members of the Little Rock Nine, their brave parents, and
their mentors from the NAACP- Daisy Bates and Thurgood Marshall. While the stories
of these figures may not have been considered "relatable" as television producers defmed
the term, Little Rock's black newspaper, The Southern Mediator, asserted, "The Little
Rock Story is Being Told Without the Help of Major Participants." Daisy Bates told
reporters that she had prepared a screenplay based on her memoir published in 1962, but
there was little interest because it was "the wrong color." Bates and several members of
the Little Rock Nine refused to sign waivers to permit their real names to be used in the
television docudrama based on Huckaby's narrative. 195 From their perspective, if the
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school year could be characterized as a "success" it was because of the tenacity of the
African American students and the black community at large, not because of school
authorities.

Some members of the Little Rock Nine and the city's black community not only
challenged Huckaby's defense of administrative decisions and her description of a
"successful" school year, they also refused to allow their story to be co-opted into the
uncritical narrative of "progress" she and others penned and promoted. Like many others
in Little Rock, Huckaby suggested that the city had overcome its problems with school
desegregation. Indeed, the administrator even went so far as to assert that Central ran
"much more smoothly" than "some of the newer desegregated schools" because of its
"long experience" with integration. 196 However, as noted in Chapter Five, while Huckaby
bolstered these claims by pointing to the school's nearly 50/50 ratio ofblack and white
students and record of high academic achievement, Little Rock was experiencing
demographic changes and "white flight" that would soon result in racial imbalance, urban
decay, and the "resegregation" of its schools. In the following years, calls for local control
of schools, an end to cross-town busing and court oversight, the proliferation of private
schools, and the creation of specialized magnet programs would become the new grounds
for white resistance to school integration. In this context, Little Rock's transcendence and
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triumph over the past would be called into question with more and more frequency.
Nevertheless, as these transformations were taking place in the early 1980s, book
publishers and broadcasters promoted the narratives of figures they believed the majority
of readers and viewers could relate to and respect. If Governor Orval Faubus' state's
rights rhetoric failed to attract the interest of publishers, the respect of the city's
newspapers, or the attention of many readers, the accounts of southern white moderates
Brooks Hays and Elizabeth Huckaby were widely read, watched, and broadly discussed.
While some criticism of these works was articulated by members of Little Rock's white
community, for the most part, critics suggested that the "moral" position these "lawabiding" citizens of the city had described was more widely shared than the authors
allowed. The city's newspapers, and political figures like Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton,
embraced their stories as representations of the moderate forces at work in Little Rock in
1957, and celebrated the ultimate triumph of their ideals.
Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that during the early 1990s many whites
in the city continued to embrace many of the "moderate" principles Hays stood for in the
1950s thirty years later- gradual change, minimal compliance with court orders, local
control of school desegregation, residential school attendance, the integration of
"exceptional" students in "special" programs, and flexible application of federal law. Or
that in the future, Elizabeth Huckaby's successors in Little Rock's school administration
would continue to defend their policies and attempt to explain tumbling test scores,
disciplinary problems, and racial isolation within Central High by suggesting they were
doing the best they could under difficult circumstances with little or no assistance from
350

city, state, or national leaders.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
"YOUR INTERPRETATION DEPENDS ON YOUR DENOMINATION":
REVIEWING AND REVISING THE DESEGREGATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

1990-1997

When the

gth

Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the District Court's

consolidation order uniting Greater Little Rock's suburban and city schools, many
observers in the city acknowledged that the limited interdistrict remedy applied to
segregation in Pulaski County was just that- limited. School district officials hoped that
the relatively balanced "elementary academies," interdistrict and magnet schools would
help the city retain white school patrons, support for the public schools, and effortlessly
integrated classrooms. However, the measure of Little Rock's desegregation plan would
also rest on the success or failure of its "incentive schools" located in historically black
neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, by the mid-1990s it had become clear that many of the provisions
outlined in the original desegregation settlement were not working: the number of white
students in the district continued to decline, the incentive schools were not attracting
diverse student populations, and compensatory education programs were not improving
the achievement gap between white and black students. In this context, the Little Rock
school district would argue with increasing force that the desegregation settlement was
too detailed and hampered its ability to address these ongoing problems creatively.
Officials also advanced a new definition of their obligations under the agreement. School
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officials contended that they could only control whether or not programs outlined in the
plans were implemented as promised- they had no control over whether specific
provisions produced results. With the support of Supreme Court decisions issued in the
1990s, district officials asserted that Little Rock's schools were being held to
"unreasonable" standards that far exceeded those imposed on other school districts. By
the eve of the 401h anniversary of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, the district
and the African American plaintiffs involved in the case returned to the drawing board to
reconsider and revise Little Rock's desegregation plans once again.
Failing Incentive Schools
For the district judge overseeing Little Rock's implementation of the settlement
agreement, Susan Webber Wright, the children attending the city's incentive schools and
the quality of their education were "at the heart of this controversy, at the heart of this
case." 1 The incentive schools were predominantly African American elementary schools
located in the city's historically black neighborhoods. They had been accepted by the
courts because the concentration of black pupils in these facilities allowed other schools
to maintain a more even racial balance in Little Rock's majority-minority school district.
The incentive schools were also provided with double funding to finance the
implementation of compensatory education programs meant to remedy educational
deficits that were the product of generations of racial discrimination and segregation.
Publicly, Little Rock school district officials expressed hope that extra programs offered
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at the schools- like preschool, after school activities, and summer instruction- would
provide an "incentive" for white transfer students to voluntarily desegregate the schools.
District officials promised to "sell" the programs at the schools and "recruit" white
students for this purpose. However, some officials, like Superintendent Mac Bernd
acknowledged that the incentive schools were part of a "deal" struck by the parties who
negotiated the plan. Bernd asserted, "There was an acknowledgment that it would by
very difficult to integrate those inner city schools. There was an acknowledgment that the
whites in the city wanted to go to their neighborhood school. And so the bargain was put
together as: 'Listen, we'll leave those schools basically black, double fund them, in
exchange for whites getting their area schools. "'2
After several years, it became clear that the incentive schools were an ineffective
desegregation remedy. Although the district's magnet schools continued to attract white
students from the Little Rock school district, and increasingly, from the surrounding
suburban districts, the incentive schools located on the east side of the city with
overwhelmingly black student populations did not hold the same allure. 3 Moreover, even
with the concentration of black pupils in the incentive schools, the favorable racial mix of
students promised in Little Rock's regular "elementary academies" failed to materialize
as the percentage of white students attending public schools in the district continued to
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decline. 4 Test scores revealed that the compensatory education programs meant to
address educational deficits among African American students in the city's poorest
neighborhoods were failing to close the "achievement gap" between white and black
children. Instead, the achievement gap was widening. 5 At secondary schools, African
American pupils continued to be tracked into remedial classes, while white students
attended honors and advanced placement courses in disproportionate numbers. 6 In
summary, whether one viewed them as a means of maintaining racial balance in the
majority of the city's elementary schools, "super magnets" designed to attract white
transfer students through special programs and extra resources, or as centers of education
specifically designed to prepare the city's most disadvantaged students to compete on a
more even playing field, the incentive schools were failing on all counts.
This failure ignited debate in the city about whether the desegregation settlement
was poorly designed and/or poorly implemented by the school district. John Walker, the
attorney for the black plaintiffs in the desegregation case, complained that district
officials had failed to deliver on their promise to actively recruit white students to the
incentive schools. Indeed, the Office of Desegregation Monitoring confirmed that
"virtually no recruiting" was done before the beginning of the 1993 academic year and
that the schools were under-emolled. District Judge Wright found that the school
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district's failure to recruit students and implement special programs in the incentive
schools was the result of"some serious foot-dragging and delay." Although school
officials sent 10,000 letters to white parents in the district asking them to consider
enrolling their children in the incentive schools in 1994, only 5 children applied.
Federal Desegregation Monitor Ann Brown told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
that while the district's plans looked good on paper, these statistics demonstrated that
"nothing has been accomplished."7 For example, although the desegregation plan
indicated that the district's biracial citizens committee would monitor recruiting efforts,
district officials never made any recruiting reports to the committee and they were not
requested. The district failed to contact special-interest, community or church groups
about the program as promised. Parent recruiters hired by the district were not told to
make incentive-school enrollments a priority. Moreover, the school district perpetuated
imbalance in the schools by releasing seats reserved for white pupils to black children
without seeking the approval of the courts. The Office of Desegregation Monitoring
reported, "The LRSD approached incentive school recruitment in a sporadic, piecemeal
fashion." 8 This lackluster effort to recruit white transfer students indicated that the
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district had never been seriously committed to desegregating the incentive schools.
Furthermore, an independent study by the Harvard University Graduate School of
Education found that the educational programs meant to remedy long-term educational
deficits attributable to segregation and discrimination in the district had been poorly
designed. The 1989 Desegregation Plan listed more than 100 specific programs that were
to be made available to students at the incentive schools. However, scholars Joseph
Feldman, Edward Kirby and Susan E. Eaton found that most ofthe school officials
interviewed "characterized the plan as a conglomeration of expensive techniques and
programs, rather than a coherent, goal-oriented strategy for ameliorating the educational
deficits of minority students." The research team reported that the educational remedies
were "developed without specific goals attached to them." Somehow, "it was simply
assumed that the assortment of programs would ... solve the low achievement... in the
heavily minority schools." The district's evaluations focused exclusively on whether
programs had been implemented, rather than their educational results. Indeed, even if the
district wanted to alter the programs offered at the incentive schools, the specificity of the
desegregation plan constrained them from doing so. 9 The district could add and fund
more programs in the schools- the plan was "a floor not a ceiling"- but it could not
replace any of those in place with new programs without falling out of compliance with
the settlement agreement. 10
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After analyzing conditions in Little Rock and several other cities with similar
programs, the Harvard scholars determined that although Milliken II compensatory
I

remedies were supposed to "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct," remedial education programs
were "often poorly designed" and were rarely rigorously evaluated to determine whether
the programs had any positive "effect on student achievement or educational
opportunity." Moreover, some school districts had been allowed to abandon the
programs without any substantive study of whether educational deficits that persisted as a
vestige of segregation had been eliminated. Feldman and his colleagues concluded that
courts and school districts like Little Rock increasingly viewed such programs primarily
"as temporary financial obligations to the plaintiff class .... a way for school districts and
states to serve a temporary and superficial punishment for prior intentional segregation."
More broadly, the research team urged school districts to pair such programs with racial
integration, noting that racial isolation and high levels of concentrated poverty had always
been correlated with low achievement. 11 In their view, Little Rock's failure to
desegregate its incentive schools hampered its ability to meet its broader educational
goals.
For their part, many Little Rock school officials argued that the district was acting
in good faith and fulfilling the commitments outlined in the desegregation settlement.
They attributed the district's ongoing problems to the plan's rigid design, rather than a
failure to implement its promises. If achievement gaps persisted, they contended, it was
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because the specificity of the plan constrained administrators and educators by not
allowing them to dismantle ineffective programs and try alternatives. After interviewing
all of the LRSD's living former superintendents, a University of Arkansas at Little Rock
(UALR) task force was left with the impression that the courts had unintentionally
created "an environment so complex" that it "cripple[d]" local decision making. The
district was like the giant in Gulliver's Travels, "tied down with a thousand strings" and
the obligation to fulfil even "minor" requirements outlined in the desegregation plan. 12
Furthermore, officials suggested that the school district had been unable to integrate the
incentive schools or meet racial-balance guidelines because there simply were not enough
white students left in the system by the mid-1990s to meet the benchmarks set in 1989. 13
As the UALR task force put it, "all gains [in white student enrollment] from the school
district boundary changes in 1987 had been erased by 1996."14 Persistent white flight to
the surrounding county had brought the Little Rock school district back to where it started
before the application of an interdistrict remedy.
Reframing Desegregation Obligations

Increasingly, Little Rock school district representatives argued that the goals
outlined in the plan were not only virtually unachievable, in light of recent Supreme
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Court decisions, they were also unreasonable since they held the school district to a much
stricter standard than other districts that had been declared unitary and released from
court oversight. 15 Indeed, in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions that provided lower federal courts with guidelines in determining how and
when to release previously segregated school districts from court supervision and their
affirmative responsibility to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination.
In Board ofEducation of Oklahoma City v. Dowell (1991), the Court held that
federal supervision of local school systems was always intended as a "temporary
measure" designed to facilitate a "transition to a system of public education freedom of
racial discrimination." School boards were entitled to be released from court supervision
if they had "complied in good faith" with their desegregation degree, and if they had
eliminated "vestiges of past discrimination... to the extent practicable" [emphasis added].
Under court supervision, school boards had an affirmative duty to dismantle dual school
systems and were required to demonstrate that their actions did not perpetuate
discrimination. However, after a district had been released and declared unitary, school
boards regained authority over local school decisions and were not obligated to maintain
patterns of student assignment or other measures that had previously been required by the
courts. In the future, plaintiffs would bear the burden of demonstrating that a board's
action, such as a decision to return to racially isolated neighborhood schools, was
motivated by an intent to discriminate instead of other demographic or educational
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factors. 16
A year later, the Supreme Court held in Freeman v. Pitts (1992) that districts
could be released from their desegregation responsibilities "in incremental stages,"
provided that the relaxation of judicial supervision would not undermine a desegregation
decree as a whole. The court ruled that school districts which had satisfied the court's
requirements for desegregation in particular areas, such as student assignment or the
equalization of facilities, could be released from oversight and the application of further
remedies in those areas. The Rehnquist court held that "partial relinquishment" of court
supervision could "be an important and significant step in fulfilling the district court's
duty to return the operations and control of schools to local authorities." In particular,

Freeman v. Pitts established that district courts could relinquish control over student
assignment in communities where school boards could demonstrate that racial imbalances
and racially identifiable schools were not ''traceable" to previous constitutional violations.
Although school boards bore the burden of proof in this regard, the high court indicated
that the bar would not be set very high. The court stated that "vestiges of segregation that
concern the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible, but they must be so real
that they have a causal/ink to the de jure violation being remedied." The court noted that
a school board's case was strengthened by the passage of time, and the intervention of
demographic changes, which made it "less likely that a current racial imbalance in a
school district is a vestige ofthe prior de jure system." Moreover, the causal link
between past violations and current conditions was "even more attenuated" if the district
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could demonstrate that it had complied with its desegregation decree "in good faith." 17
In Missouri v. Jenkins (1995), the Supreme Court held that states and school

districts could be released from their obligation to provide remedial education programs
(like those in place in Little Rock's incentive schools) even if students had made no
appreciable gains in achievement. The state of Missouri had been ordered to fund

Milliken II compensatory and remedial education programs in Kansas City. Once it had
implemented the programs, the state wanted to be released from future obligations to
continue funding them. The lower district and appeals courts rejected this petition, noting
that educational deficits in the district had not been erased. However, the Supreme Court
held that measurable improvement in test scores and minority achievement was not the
"appropriate test" in determining whether the state had fulfilled its obligations. In

Freeman, the Court had suggested that demographic factors independent of de jure
segregation could affect the racial composition of schools. In Missouri, the Court held
that "numerous external factors" that were not vestiges of state-sponsored segregation,
and were beyond the control of school districts or state authorities, could affect minority
student achievement. Consequently, courts should not hold school districts and state
authorities responsible for such deficits indefinitely. Rather, remedial programs should
be tailored to address specific deficits attributable to de jure segregation to the "extent
practicable." On remand, the majority's opinion noted that remedial education programs
had been in place in Kansas City for seven years, suggesting that the appropriate test in
such cases was the implementation of programs for a relatively brief period of time, after

17

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).

362

which remaining deficits could no longer be considered "vestiges" of past
discrimination. 18

In their pursuit of interdistrict consolidation in the 1980s, Little Rock school
district representatives had convincingly argued that residential housing segregation in the
city, racially isolated schools, and disparities in white and black student achievement
were the legacy of decades of state-sponsored discrimination and segregation. However,
in the wake of these three Supreme Court decisions, district officials increasingly argued
that they had desegregated the city's schools to the "extent practicable" in the absence of
a consolidation decree. Moreover, they relied heavily on the suggestion that many of the
remaining inequalities in the system were the product of "external factors" beyond their
control. Over the course of the 1990s, the district pushed for a relaxation of court
oversight, arguing that officials had worked diligently to fulfil their obligations under the
desegregation settlement. After studying the standards established by the Supreme Court,
officials believed the school district was entitled to unitary or at least partial unitary status
and the return of "local control."
With the Supreme Court's new emphasis on the "duty" of district courts to return
school operations to local officials as quickly as possible, District Judge Susan Webber
Wright called the parties in the Little Rock school desegregation case together toreexamine the settlement agreement. As the revenue stream negotiated with the State of
Arkansas to fmance expensive programs in the incentive schools was diminishing, Wright
hoped to help the parties "refine the plans and make them more workable." First, she
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planned hearings to determine which parts of the settlement plan had been satisfied and
could be released from court monitoring under Freeman v. Pitts. Following this step, she
planned to gather additional information and solicit the opinions of desegregation experts
about which parts of the plan were not being implemented appropriately or needed to be
modified. The judge suggested that revising the plan and adequately remedying the
constitutional violations at issue was the quickest way out of court. 19

In its preparation for the hearings, the Little Rock school district identified 2,097
desegregation obligations outlined in the 1989 settlement agreement. In July 1995, Dr.
Russ Mayo, Associate Superintendent for Desegregation, reported that the district had
"completely complied" with 42 percent of its commitments. An additional 51 percent of
the commitments were "ongoing" such as efforts to balance enrollments in the city's
schools. Mayo acknowledged that the school district had failed to meet benchmarks
established for student assignment, but told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette that the goals
established were "mathematically impossible" due to demographic changes. Mayo also
reported that the district had overlooked or postponed the remaining 7 percent of its
obligations, but was actively trying to fulfill them or had added them to "the district's list
of things to do." 20
By the following April, Mayo's estimate had almost inexplicably climbed to 70
percent compliance. To reach this more optimistic statistic, Mayo had changed his
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measure from "complete compliance" to "substantial compliance." While it was easy to
determine whether the school district had constructed a school or hired a certain number
of teacher's aides, other goals were more difficult to assess. Mayo suggested that reading
the settlement agreement was "analogous to reading the Bible ... Your interpretation
depends on your denomination." In Mayo's interpretation, the district had substantially
complied with a measure if it had implemented it, regardless of outcome. "We
substantially comply when we implement a provision as required by the plan, but that
doesn't always mean we get the results we want," the associate superintendent of
desegregation explained. 21 This analysis leaned on the logic of the recent Supreme Court
decisions: the appropriate test was whether a school district had acted in "good faith" to
eliminate segregation and discrimination to the "extent practicable." An outcome-based
measure unfairly held school administrators responsible for the impact of"numerous
external factors" beyond their control.
In the spring of 1996, the school district was convinced that its demonstration of

good faith was sufficient to merit unitary status and complete release from court
supervision. Miraculously, within a month of Mayo's report of70 percent compliance,
Little Rock's first African American superintendent, Henry Williams, stood in front of
Central High School and enthusiastically proclaimed that the district had complied with
96.3 percent of its 1,753 desegregation obligations (344less than previously reported).
Williams asserted that the district had amassed "irrefutable evidence" that the district had
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"done all that we can do." In his view, the presence of some racially isolated schools and
the widening achievement gap should not preclude the LRSD from moving forward.
School district attorney Chris Heller stated that the motion he planned to file in court
would demonstrate that the city's schools were more desegregated than others that had
been released from court oversight. 22
Others were less sanguine about the school district's prospects before District
Judge Susan Webber Wright. The superintendent had made his announcement without
consulting the school board, and School Board President Linda Pondexter was openly
skeptical about the administration's claims. "This is nothing short of a miracle," she
observed. "Six months ago we were told that we an unworkable desegregation plan.
Today we have 96 percent compliance. I believe in Biblical miracles, but let's get real."
John Walker, attorney for the African American families in the case, also dismissed
Williams' claims. In his view, black students continued to receive unequal educational
opportunities and disparate treatment. Walker said that he might "feel better" about
circumstances in the LRSD if he saw "evidence" that confirmed Williams report. But he
warned, "I think it will prove to be very embarrassing to this district if it turns out that
what he said is untrue."23
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In the days that followed, the Little Rock School District's case was bolstered by

the expert testimony of two witnesses in the settlement plan hearings. Dr. Herbert
Walberg, an educational psychologist from the University of Chicago, asserted that black
student achievement was strongly correlated to the socioeconomic status of a student's
parents rather than the degree of integration present in a school. While he acknowledged
some benefits to having students from different socioeconomic backgrounds attending
school together, Walberg also cautioned that disadvantaged students could become easily
"frustrated" in such environments. Moreover, he suggested that educational institutions
could only have a limited impact on reducing academic disparities, since students spent
only 10% of the time between birth and age 18 in school. Only "extraordinary measures"
such as strong teaching methods, a longer school year and day, a high-quality curriculum,
and homework could narrow the achievement gap. When asked if he knew of any school
district that had successfully reduced the achievement gap, Walberg claimed that he knew
of none. In short, Walberg suggested that if school districts had no hope of ameliorating
the "external factors" which impinged on black student achievement, they should not be
obligated to do so. 24
In the area of student assignment, Dr. David J. Armor, a research professor at

George Mason University, testified that it was "counterproductive" to try to establish
racial balance in minority-majority school districts. As a proponent of voluntary
desegregation programs, Armor spoke favorably of the kinds of institutions Little Rock
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had established like magnet schools and neighborhood schools with compensatory
education programs. However, he suggested that it was unreasonable to apply racial
balance standards to the district's regular elementary and secondary schools. To meet
balance standards, like those in Little Rock with a variation of 20%, it would be necessary
to mandate student assignment, a technique Armor insisted led to white flight. Moreover,
Armor suggested that such a policy had virtually no benefits and that mandatory
integration had no impact on black student achievement. Armor claimed that Little
Rock's goals were more "stringent" than the norm- these "unrealistic and unobtainable"
benchmarks made it difficult for the school district to comply with the plan's standards.
Armor reported that other school districts had been released from court supervision
without meeting racial balance requirements after they were exempted from compliance
due to "extenuating circumstances. " 25
However, the third school desegregation expert to testify in the case, Dr. Gary
Orfield of Harvard University, provided a different perspective on Little Rock's persistent
problems. Orfield characterized Walberg and Armor as "resegregationists." He
countered their claims that integration had a limited impact on achievement disparities,
noting that the test scores of black students had improved across the nation in the
previous generation. He also rejected their arguments that educational programs could
not continue to build and improve upon this success. As the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
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summarized his testimony: "Students learn in school... otherwise there would be no use
for education." Orfield urged the school district to weed out programs that did not
produce results through an ongoing evaluative process. He also encouraged the Office of
Desegregation Monitoring to measure student achievement instead of focusing on the
mere implementation of promised programs. After the hearing, Little Rock School Board
President Linda Pondexter applauded Orfield's "educational philosophies" and suggested
that they offered the district a more productive blueprint for the future. 26
Nevertheless, Superintendent Henry Williams asserted Orfield's statement did not
damage the district's case and that Walberg and Armor's testimony substantiated his
belief that the district was more desegregated than other school systems that had already
been released from court supervision. Attorney Chris Heller hoped that the testimony
gave the parties in the case and the community-at-large a "better perspective" on the
successes of the school districts in Pulaski County. "It looked like the districts were
failing to achieve certain goals, when, in reality, the problem was that unrealistic goals
were set in the first place," he stated. "We believed when we developed the plans that
certain things could be done. But no one in the country has been able to achieve them.'m
Indeed, many ofLittle Rock's opinion-makers seemed to have come to the same
conclusions. For example, a widely-distributed University of Arkansas at Little Rock
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(UALR) task force report, Plain Talk: The Future ofLittle Rock's Public Schools,
contended that the "major cause of resegregation" and white flight from district was the
"continued insistence of the federal courts that racial balance be achieved" rather than
persistent racial prejudice. 28 The report also suggested that there was "little reason to
expect any appreciable narrowing of the test score gap in the foreseeable future." The
task force asserted,
School districts in fact control their employees, their facilities, their
budgets, and their curricula; and they can deliver on commitments
involving these matters. But school districts do not control the decisions
of parents or students. Nor do they control the motivation and learning of
students- at best they can work to influence them. 29
The UALR task force concluded that the desegregation plan had become an "impediment
to progress" and "business as usual revised one more time" would make little impact on
conditions in the district. Instead, the task force emphasized that federal courts had begun
to "back away from the desegregation paradigm" prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, and
encouraged the district to seek unitary status and relief from court oversight. In a more
flexible environment, the UALR task force hoped the community would overcome racial
mistrust and develop a voluntary plan that made a "credible commitment" to "quality
educational opportunities for all children of the city."30
Columns and editorials in the city's newspapers also asserted that the district's
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intractable problems were beyond the control of school administrators. Robert McCord,
senior editor and columnist of the Arkansas Gazette (and former editor of the Arkansas

Democrat in 1957), asserted that the public schools had "solved their discrimination
problems better than anyone else." Larger issues that affected the schools- such as
"poverty, crime, segregated neighborhoods, unemployment, shortages of minority
teachers"- were "byproducts of discrimination that the schools cannot solve."
Applauding the Supreme Court's decision in Oklahoma v. Dowell, McCord appealed for
the return of local control and neighborhood schools. The city's problems could only be
solved "by responsive politicians working in governments that allow everyone to have a
say," not the courts. McCord dismissed claims that a return to majority rule would
undermine minority rights. Only a "super cynic," he said, could believe that the schools
would resegregate under an integrated staff, faculty, and school board. 31
Persistent reports about the widening achievement gap in the district provoked
more comments in the local press. In columns and editorials, the relatively liberal

Arkansas Gazette attributed the declining scores of black students on performance tests to
the legacy of segregation and poverty, and urged schools and students to attack the
problem directly. Senior editor Robert McCord stated firmly, "There's no evidence of an
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inability to leam."32 However, after the Gazette was purchased by its more conservative
rival the Arkansas Democrat, this kind of assessment became more muted. John R. Starr,
the managing editor who led the campaign to put the Gazette out of business, continued
to write columns in the 1990s. Starr, who had "already given up on Little Rock public
schools," urged readers to consider "the possibility that the gap in performance is not the
fault of the schools" and could not be closed there. Black and white students in the city
were being offered the same educational opportunities. Consequently, he argued, the
"real reasons" for achievement disparities were "either hereditary or environmental."
Starr acknowledged that some observers claimed that poverty put black students at a
disadvantage, but he dismissed these arguments as "convenient excuse[s]" that had not
been accepted when he was in school. This left readers to consider hereditary deficits. In
this regard, Starr suggested that it would be "futile" to advance an argument that black
students were genetically inferior to their white counterparts, not because it was incorrect
but because anyone who dared to do so would be "trashed" and people in positions of
power refused to "consider that possibility."33
With opinions like these circulating in the city, it was no surprise that despite
strong encouragement from District Judge Wright to revise and improve their
desegregation plan, Little Rock School District attorneys filed a motion seeking release
from court supervision in 1996. The district assured the court that if it was granted
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release, LRSD would not return to a segregated system. District attorneys underscored
the fact that the power structure of the system had changed- both the superintendent of
schools and the school board president were African American. 34 In response, John
Walker- attorney for the black plaintiffs- filed a motion ofhis own asking the Judge to
create an independent director to oversee the incentive schools, arguing that the district
had failed to implement the program properly in eighteen different areas. 35 Previously,
Walker had accused the district of mismanaging and even sabotaging the incentive
schools by failing to implement promised programs, permitting high staff turnover, and
cycling students in and out of the institutions. 36
Wright did not receive the school district's petition hospitably. "Mr. Walker has
more or less thrown down the gauntlet now," Wright warned the attorneys. "He has
stopped just complaining to me about my failure to do something about the Little Rock
School District's failure to implement the plan. We now have a motion before the
court.... And I must rule on it." Regardless of whether the plan was poorly designed, the
district had not implemented it well. "Maybe it was too hard; maybe you just didn't do it.
But your district agreed to do it," Wright stated. Indeed, the judge underscored the fact
that the settlement agreement in question had not been imposed by the courts but crafted
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by the parties themselves, including the school district.

Once again she called on the

parties to negotiate towards appropriate revisions and modifications. 37 By the beginning
of the 1996 school year, Judge Wright formally refused to release the district from federal
court oversight after reviewing a number of reports that indicated the district had "fallen
short" of complying with its desegregation obligations. 38
Renegotiating the Settlement Agreement

Negotiations over revising Little Rock's desegregation settlement in 1996 and
1997 were undoubtedly influenced by the Supreme Court's most recent school decisions.
However, the decisions did not have the direct impact in Little Rock that they had
elsewhere. While other communities operated under court-ordered desegregation plans,
parties in the Little Rock case had negotiated an agreement- a contract- that passed
constitutional muster in 1990 and was approved by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. 39
This court-approved agreement had become the "law of the case."40 Little Rock's
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desegregation obligations were both constitutionally and contractually required. 41
School district attorneys and Attorney John Walker agreed that the Supreme Court's
decisions did not change the terms of the settlement, and that some of the obligations in
the plan were stronger than those that had been overtumed. 42
Moreover, in 1991, the appeals court had provided explicit guidelines to the
district court for considering any modifications to the plans. The court affirmed that the
desegregation obligations outlined in the plan were "solemn and binding commitments"modifications could effect the "margins" but not the "core" of the settlement. The court
of appeals identified seven "crucial" components of the agreement "with respect to which
no retreat should be approved" by the district court:
(1) double funding for students attending the incentive (virtually all-black)
schools; (2) operation of the agreed number of magnet schools according
to the agreed timetable; (3) operation of the agreed number ofinterdistrict
schools according to the agreed timetable; (4) intradistrict desegregation of
PCSSD according to the agreed timetable; (5) the agreed effort to
eliminate achievement disparity between the races; ( 6) the agreed elements
of early-childhood education, at least in the incentive schools; and (7)
appropriate involvement of parents.43
Notably, while the appeals court insisted on the operation of balanced magnet and
interdistrict schools as well as the double-funding of incentive schools, it did not
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underscore the necessity of maintaining racially balanced student bodies in Little Rock's
traditional schools. On the other hand, the appeals court had emphasized the importance
of eliminating achievement gaps between black and white students, a desegregation factor
the Supreme Court had urged judges in other cases to "sharply limit, if not dispense with"
in Missouri v. Jenkins four years later. 44
In the negotiations, the Little Rock School District proposed a plan which retained
the district's

cor~

commitments as outlined by the appeals court in1991, but eliminated

many of the specific obligations enumerated in the 1989 settlement. The district
contended, "The activity-based system prescribed by the current plan has distracted
LRSD from its primary mission: education... The specific activities and timelines in the
current plan promote a checklist mentality." Moreover, the district noted that most of the
architects of the plan no longer worked in the district, and many of school system's
current employees no longer endorsed the programs put in place by their predecessors.
Rather than specifying compliance mechanisms, the school district's attorneys proposed
that the parties in the case reaffirm the settlement's core commitments, but provide
"education professionals" with significant leeway in determining how to meet their
goals.45
Little Rock's proposal was entitled the "Revised Desegregation and Education
Plan." Significantly, it substantially altered racial balance guidelines in the district's
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traditional schools. The plan proposed to eliminate satellite attendance zones designed to
bring students from distant homogenous neighborhoods together within one school.
School officials contended that due to demographic changes, many black students were
no longer being bused to predominantly white schools. Instead, they were being bused
out of black neighborhoods to attend predominantly black schools elsewhere and the
satellite zones no longer served their purpose. 46 In the future, Little Rock's students
would be assigned to traditional elementary, junior, and high schools based on
"reasonably compact and contiguous attendance zones." District officials promised not to
make "sudden or drastic" changes to the assignment plan, and pledged to reconfigure
attendance zones to make as many of these neighborhood schools as desegregated as
possible. However, the proposal emphasized,
the desegregation of LRSD to the extent practical does not require that
every LRSD school be racially balanced.... According, nothing in this
revised plan shall be construed as requiring a particular racial balance at
every LRSD school or as obligating LRSD to recruit students to obtain a
particular racial balance in every LRSD school.
The plan would rely entirely on voluntary desegregation mechanisms, like minority-tomajority transfers, for schools that fell outside the preferred 40/60 ratioY
In exchange for this relaxation of racial balance requirements, the district
recommitted itself to improving and equalizing educational opportunities for all students.
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For example, the district promised to improve minority achievement scores, and to create
programs designed to ensure that administrators did not discriminate against black
students in course placement or counseling services. Officials also pledged to reduce
discrimination in student discipline and participation in extracurricular activities. 48 The
district suggested that its proposal reflected its "belief that excellent education programs,"
rather than student assignment plans, provided "the best (if not only) opportunity for
meaningful long-term desegregation." Raising the specter of white flight, school
administrators warned, "Unless LRSD can turn the focus back to education, LRSD will
likely become a single-race, African-American school district."49
Although Little Rock school officials had previously downplayed their ability to
close minority-majority achievement disparities, they now promised to do just that. With
the district's rejection of an "activity-based system," the plan no longer listed programs
that should be implemented to address educational deficits. Instead, Little Rock promised
outcome-based results. Superintendent Les Carnine suggested that these provisions were
a "safeguard" that would ensure that the district was "more accountable" for student
performance, and claimed that the revised plan would enable the district to transfer
resources from "transportation and monitoring" back into the classroom to meet its
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goals. 50
Little Rock district attorneys emphasized that this aspect of the plan, as well as
promises to retain magnet and interdistrict schools, provide early childhood programs,
and promote parent and community involvement reinforced the "core commitments" of
the 1989 agreement. 5 1 It is likely that they hoped this demonstration of good faith would
persuade the courts and the black plaintiffs in the case to approve their revised plan
despite its return to neighborhood school assignments. Moreover, the district also had a
financial incentive to improve minority test scores. The balance of a $20 million loan
from the state of Arkansas, negotiated to :fmance the original plan, would be forgiven if
the district could raise the achievement scores of black pupils within 90 percent of their
white counterparts by the year 2000. 52 However, with the deadline looming, a survey of
Little Rock's teachers indicated that only 2 percent of white teachers and 17 percent of
black teachers thought it was "very realistic" that this kind of dramatic improvement
could be achieved in the space of a few years. 53
Although he initially opposed the LRSD proposal, Attorney John Walker
eventually agreed to most ofthe proposed changes after consulting with the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund and engaging in negotiations with a U.S. Department of Justice
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mediator. Walker extracted additional promises to hire a desegregation and education
expert to help the district develop programs designed to implement the provisions of the
plan. In the area of student achievement, the district committed to engage in ongoing
evaluations of its compensatory and remedial education programs, and to modify or
replace those that were ineffective. As far as Walker was concerned, this provision
eliminated the district's oft-repeated excuse that the specificity of the previous settlement
agreement prevented them from reaching their educational goals. The district also agreed
to hire an ombudsman to act as an advocate for students involved in disciplinary
procedures and to investigate complaints of discrimination. 54
In the area of student assignment, Walker may have thought he would be fighting

a losing battle if he opposed the elimination of the satellite zones and the weakening of
racial balance guidelines. As noted earlier, intradistrict racial balance was not listed by
the court of appeals as a fundamental component of the earlier agreement. Moreover,
Freeman v. Pitts had provided school districts with the means to escape mandatory
student assignment plans if they could argue, as the Little Rock school district now was,
that demographic shifts which were not directly linked to de jure segregation and past
constitutional violations affected a district's ability to maintain racial balance. 55
Walker also ceded ground in another important area. The proposed term for the
Revised Desegregation and Education plan was a mere three years, from the fall of 1998
54
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to the spring of 2001. At that time, under the new agreement, the judge would release
Little Rock from court supervision and grant the school system unitary status unless
another party could prove that the district had not complied with the plan. If Walker and
the black plaintiffs he represented, known collectively as the Joshua intervenors, wanted
to challenge the district's claims of compliance they would bear the burden of proof in
demonstrating that vestiges of discrimination remained. 56 Typically, the burden of proof
did not shift to plaintiffs until after a school district had been declared unitary. This
concession substantially weakened Walker's position in future negotiations and court
procedures.
Attorney Walker's agreement to these conditions surprised many observers. In
2002, it came to the district court's attention that the school district and the lawyers for
the African American plaintiffs had been engaged in simultaneous negotiations over the
settlement plans and attorney's fees. The school district had agreed to pay the Joshua
intervenor's counsel a lump sum of$2,000,000 to monitor Little Rock's progress with
school desegregation in the 1990 settlement agreement, and the attorney's request for
additional payment was denied by the district court in 1996. Nevertheless, during
settlement renegotiations, LRSD agreed to pay the plaintiffs lawyers nearly $850,000 in
additional fees for past and future monitoring work. When this agreement came to the
attention of the district court eight years later, the sitting judge conceded that there was no
evidence that the exchange of funds had a direct impact on the outcome of the settlement
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agreement, and acknowledged that Walker and his colleagues had "manned the barricades
of civil rights litigation in Arkansas for over four decades" and earned a "reputation for
never yielding on matters of principle." Nevertheless, he noted that the timing of these
simultaneous negotiations "raised troubling questions and lingering doubts" and fed the
perception that school desegregation litigation district had become a "cottage industry"
that lined the pockets of lawyers at the expense of the interests of students. 57
However, in April1998, Judge Susan Webber Wright was unaware of these
behind-the-scenes developments and approved the revised plan agreed to by the parties.
In doing so, she expressed serious reservations about its relatively vague outlines. As it

was written, the revised agreement presented "new challenges in regard to monitoring."
Although the Little Rock school district rejected the "checklist mentality" imbedded in
the previous agreement, the enumeration of specific desegregation obligations and
programs had made it relatively easy for the court to determine whether LRSD was in
compliance. Conceivably, one's "denomination" could have even more of an influence
on the interpretation of this new Revised Desegregation and Education Plan. However,
according to the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Wright concluded that even if a judge was
"uncertain about whether a settlement agreement will succeed in integrating a school
district or is concerned that insufficient detail may impede a settlement's successful
implementation," these concerns in and of themselves did not render the agreement
"unconstitutional on its face." Ultimately, the parties in the case had agreed to the terms
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of the agreement and consented to continued monitoring. 58 Whether or not their plan led
them out of court quickly was up to them.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
"THIS PLACE IS NOT AN ALIBI FOR ATONEMENT":
THE CREATION AND DEDICATION OF THE CENTRAL HIGH MUSEUM
AND VISITOR CENTER

In the midst of these protracted debates about the success or failure of Little
Rock's school desegregation programs, the city prepared to mark the 40th anniversary of
the 1957 crisis. Billed as the ''year of reconciliation" by state and city officials, 1997
offered Little Rock's power brokers the opportunity to celebrate the city's progress in the
field of racial relations while penitently promising to work toward resolving persistent
grievances. The anniversary presented the chance to reclaim the mantle of moderation for
the entire city. However, for some, this shining rhetoric and powerful symbolism stood in
stark contrast to the ongoing resistance to meaningful racial justice and desegregation in
the Little Rock school district. As plans to observe the anniversary and establish a
museum dedicated to the 1957 Little Rock school desegregation crisis unfolded, African
American community leaders and activists argued that the commemorative efforts were
little more than a public relations ploy designed to reshape the city's public image and to
mask the real face of race relations in Little Rock.

"Past Little Rock": Creating the Central High Visitor Center
Interest in building a museum or visitor center dedicated to interpreting the history
of the 1957 school desegregation crisis coalesced in Little Rock during the early 1990s.
A variety of community groups, organizations and individuals had a vested interest in
384

shaping the history of crisis that would be presented to visitors touring the facility.
Consequently, during the museum planning process, deliberations about the purpose of
the museum, the historical narrative it would share, and its mandate in the present
unfolded over the course of several years. Ultimately, the ability of civic leaders and
public history professionals to seize control of this process shaped the content of the
exhibition and its relationship to the rhetoric of "reconciliation" that marked the 40th
anniversary commemoration as a whole.
Little Rock's interest in creating a civil rights museum coincided with similar
efforts in cities across the south. In the space of a few short years, museums and
institutes dedicated to preserving and interpreting local and national histories of the civil
rights movement emerged throughout the region, including the Southern Poverty Law
Center's Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery (1989), the National Civil Rights
Museum in Memphis (1991), the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute (1992), the National
Voting Rights Museum in Selma (1993), the Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic
Site in Atlanta (1996), and the Ralph Mark Gilbert Civil Rights Museum in Savannah
( 1996). 1 In the city of Little Rock itself, as many as six new museum projects were under
development during the 1990s, such as the Arkansas Museum of Science and History, the
MacArthur Military Museum, and the Mosaic Templars Cultural Center, which was
dedicated to preserving Arkansas' black history after Reconstruction. The Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette referred to the proliferation of museum projects as the most visible
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manifestation of a movement it dubbed "Past Little Rock." The proponents of these
projects not only viewed them as opportunities to "enlighten, enrich, and encourage"
Arkansans to "visualize" their history, but also as tourist destinations and economic
engines that could provide the city with a "gateway to its future. " 2
In Little Rock, as elsewhere, interest in building a museum focused on the city's

civil rights history was supported by a diverse coalition of individuals and organizations
pursuing a variety of agendas. Across the region, some civil rights veterans supported the
creation of these institutions as a means to memorialize the movement, to critique
contemporary racial relations, and to inspire future activism. As Owen J. Dwyer has
noted, "antiracist communities have long memorialized the suppressed history" of the
African American experience, and chronicled acts of ''transgression, resistance, and
oppression." However, in previous years, these memorial activities had been "largely
confined to the private and semipublic spaces associated with African-American
communities."3 For example, in 1987, the national board ofthe NAACP met in Little
Rock and organized an observance to recognize the 30th anniversary of the school
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desegregation crisis. 4 In 1991 and 1992, the organization honored former NAACP State
President Daisy Bates by sponsoring two consecutive educational summits in her name
to discuss the "unfinished agenda" of school desegregation and to chart a course for the
future. 5 The appearance of civil rights museums on the public landscape was, in part, a
measure of the increased political influence of the African American community and
sustained efforts to reshape and restructure public cultural institutions. 6
For public historians and academic scholars, civil rights museums also offered an
opportunity to reshape the memorial landscape. For previous generations, preservation
efforts and interpretations of the American experience had revolved around the lives and
homes of the elite. With the advent of the new social history, a new generation of
scholars attempted to shift the focus to the lives of everyday people. Civil rights
museums provided public history professionals and academics with a unique opportunity
to chronicle the development of a social movement from the "bottom up." Moreover,
instead of valorizing social and economic inequities, civil rights museums provided
public historians with the opportunity to present a "vigorously public and authoritative
challenge to white supremacy." That said, most exhibitions focused on the black freedom
struggle did not escape from the traditional leitmotifs of public history, and the movement
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was frequently tied to the framework of a more traditional political narrative with an
emphasis on prominent leaders, institutions, court cases, and legislative victories. 7
Others who promoted the projects emphasized more pragmatic and profit-driven
concerns. Real estate developers and urban planners embraced the projects as a means to
revitalize decaying African American neighborhoods, which were frequently still
suffering from the crippling effects of previous incarnations of urban redevelopment. 8
Tourism officials and entrepreneurs pointed to the potential of these sites to tap into a
growing market for "heritage tourism," particularly for African American travelers.
However, in his documentation of the development of the Birmingham Civil Rights
Institute, Glenn T. Eskew observed that in order to "tum a stigmatized past into a
commercial asset," these memorial sites must offer visitors a "palatable," "constructive
message" to "accompany the negative racial history." In many of the civil rights
museums built in the 1990s, exhibit developers placed an emphasis on the "moral
righteousness of nonviolent protest," the "potential of interracial unity," and the "success
of qualified integration" at the expense of serious analysis of contemporary racial
problems and contentious issues. 9 Despite concern about the impact the imperatives of
tourist industry may have on the these sites, other scholars have noted that the promise of

7

Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 660-671;
Eskew, "The Won Cause," 38.
8

Brundage, The Southern Past, 305; Dwyer, "Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights
Movement,"15.
9

Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of Tolerance," 29-30, 52.
W. Fitzhugh Brundage has also commented on the lack of analysis on contemporary concerns (The
Southern Past, 319).

388

tourist revenue in several communities overrode protests about the presentation of this
contentious period in the nation's past. 10
Across the region, local and state politicians also embraced these projects. While
state officials were partially motivated by the desire to court African American votes,
civil rights museums were also appealing because of their ability to attract investment in
the tourism industry and local businesses. Moreover, as Owen Dwyer has noted, civil
rights memorials offered "state actors seeking to solidify (quite literally in granite and
marble) the discursive foundations of their office ... a way to clearly separate themselves
from the past and project a progressive image into the future."u Politicians pointed the
creation of civil rights museums as tangible evidence of racial progress. The construction
of "history" museums dedicated to the movement provided the palliative reassurance that
struggles that marked the 1960s and 1970s had been resolved and were relics of the
past. 12 As Birmingham Mayor David V ann put it in relation to the development of a civil
rights institute in his city, "the best way to put your bad images to rest is to declare them
history and put them in a museum." 13
In Little Rock, all of these constituencies shaped the interpretation of the school
desegregation crisis presented to the public in the 1990s and beyond. However, not all
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actors involved in the memorialization process have or are able to leverage their
influence, connections, and political resources as effectively as others. In Arkansas'
capital, a handful of well-positioned white business leaders and politicians effectively
steered and controlled the museum planning process, amplifYing their own interpretation
the 1957 crisis, while defining its relevance and limiting the influence of other
stakeholders. With their support, public historians and exhibit designers also played a
significant role in shaping the fmal exhibit, while a community planning committee was
redefined as an audience "focus group."
By most accounts, local restauranteur Mark Abernathy was one of the first vocal
advocates for a civil rights museum in Little Rock. Abernathy felt that the city could not
move ahead until it dealt with and embraced the events of 1957. 14 From his perspective,
the desegregation of Central High School was nothing to be ashamed o£ "I've been
amazed that Little Rock has never dealt with the issue," he later told reporters. "There
were as many heroes as there were villains; a lot took place to be proud of. It was a part
of history we were sitting on and doing nothing with." 15 Abernathy felt that the crisis
could best be understood as "part of the growth of a nation, [the] growth of a society."
Little Rock could "celebrate what happened" rather than hide from it. The restauranteur
believed that part of the reticence to engage with this past was due to ignorance and
uncertainty about what had transpired four decades earlier. Abernathy contended that few
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people his age or younger had a strong grasp of the history of the crisis, and a museum or
interpretive center could help educate the next generation of Little Rock citizens about the
events of 1957. 16 The development of such a project presented an "opportunity to benefit
from our past, clear away some debris and move forward," he said. 17
According to Abernathy, he encountered active opposition to this idea in the
1980s from several white business leaders. However, in 1991, he convinced the alumni
board of the Greater Little Rock Chamber of Commerce's Leadership Institute to allow
him to pursue the museum concept as a possible future project. As he developed his
thoughts about the museum, Abernathy met informally with African American
community leaders, including NAACP President Dale Charles, the editor of the state's
largest African American newspaper and Daisy Bates' successor at the Arkansas State
Press Janetta Kearney, Arkansas Judge Rev. Wendell Griffin, as well as Central High
School Neighborhood Association activists Annie Abrams and Ethel Ambrose. Others
also participated in these informal conversations about the project, such as downtown real
estate developer Jim Hathaway and Bill Worthen, director of the Historic Arkansas
Museum. 18
However, the museum project gained real momentum shortly after Arkansas
16
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Times editor Max Brantley published an editorial in his weekly newspaper calling for the
creation of a civil rights museum in Little Rock. Brantley directed attention to the
popularity of civil rights museums in other cities like Birmingham, Memphis, and
Atlanta, and acknowledged the effort to recognize the work of Daisy Bates at the planned
Mosaic Templars Cultural Center. But he characterized the planned African-American
history museum a "poorly funded, obscure repositor[y]" that simply could not do justice
to a story with "more than one hero, plenty of villains and world-wide significance." In
the proper order of things, he argued, such an institution "ought to come second to a
lasting monument to the school crisis at, or close by, Central High School," built and
funded with federal assistance. Indeed, the editor suggested that there would never be a
better time to push for the recognition of Central High School as a national historic site.
Bill Clinton, the former Governor of Arkansas, occupied the White House, the
surrounding neighborhood was in need of tourist dollars, and many of the key players
involved in the events of 1957 were still alive to share their stories. Brantley
acknowledged that members of the white business establishment might once have balked
at such a suggestion, but urged the Little Rock community to see the crisis in another
light. Little Rock "stands for something positive," he insisted: "It represents the federal
government's commitment to the Constitution: the victory of law over the mob." 19
Several months later, Brantley extended this triumphalist narrative into the present,
contending that Central High was already a "living monument to the civil rights
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movement, with its black principal, its majority black student body and its unparalleled
record of academic achievement."20 The city had nothing to fear and much to gain from
the formal recognition of this accomplishment.
Businessman Everett "Rett" Tucker Ill, the son of one of the "moderates" on
Little Rock's school board in the late 1950s and early 1960s,21 responded to this appeal,
contacting Brantley and expressing interest in the museum project. Tucker was the
incoming chairman ofthe Chamber of Commerce. He was aware that visitors attending
conferences and conventions in Little Rock frequently asked to see the high school but
that there was no interpretive information at the site. From his perspective, it was
unfortunate that tourists had to travel to Memphis to visit the National Civil Rights
Museum in order to learn about what had happened at Central. 22 Tucker acknowledged
that many Little Rock residents of his father's generation felt that the events of 1957 had
given the city "a black eye" and believed the less said about it the better. However, he
felt that people in his generation believed that "what happened in 1957 won't [simply] go
away." Tucker contended that building a museum about the crisis was one of the most
productive ways to deal with the desegregation crisis. "We can learn from the past," he
said. "It can be something we learn from, as we move forward together more." A
museum project would allow the city to demonstrate that Little Rock had "made
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progress" while acknowledging that the community still had "room to grow."23
Similarly, Skip Rutherford, a public relations executive who had worked closely
on Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, also contacted Brantley and commended him on
the idea. During the 1992 presidential campaign alone, he had escorted over 100 people
to the school grounds at their request. A visitor center or museum would provide people
with a place to learn more about the crisis. 24 Rutherford could not only bring political
connections to the project, but he was also a former member of the Little Rock school
board. Brantley urged the two men to meet and discuss the topic further. 25 As he
recalled, "we all had children in public schools [and] had an interest in an integrated
society even though [we] failed sometimes as individual[s]."26
The three men discussed the potential of building a museum dedicated to the crisis
for several weeks before they learned that similar discussions were underway at Mark
Abernathy's restaurant Juanita's. They quickly joined Abernathy's group, but became
frustrated with what they perceived to be a lack of tangible progress on the project. 27 To
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have its greatest impact, Tucker, Rutherford, and Brantley envisioned opening the
museum in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of the desegregation crisis. To meet this
deadline, they pushed for what public history student Elizabeth Grobmyer has described
as a "more aggressive approach" that moved swiftly "from the concept stage to a reality"
by embracing "structural discipline and political influence to move the process forward
along official lines." In order to move the project from the "restaurant table to city hall,"
the three men solicited the support of Mayor Jim Dailey. Dailey was equally enthusiastic
about the project's potential to rehabilitate the reputation of Little Rock and began
attending the monthly planning sessions. Due to their pre-existing political connections,
Tucker and Rutherford soon became the project's "liaisons" to the mayor's office. As
Grobmyer has noted, "Shifting the domain of the project from the vernacular to the
official had the effect of increasing Tucker and Rutherford's influence over the planning
process." Moreover, "Linking the opening of the museum to the fortieth anniversary of
the Central High crisis forced a time constraint on the team proposal that enabled the
more organized and politically adept team of Tucker and Rutherford to dominate the
loosely bound grass-roots museum supporters."28 These developments also set the stage
for conflicts over the purpose of the museum and its historical narrative.
However, while Tucker, Rutherford, and Brantley may have wanted to move the
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project along quickly through "official" channels, grassroots activists involved in the
discussions surrounding the museum had their own ideas. In February 1995, Central
High Neighborhood Association President Ethel Ambrose applied for and received a
$5,000 community planning grant from the Arkansas Humanities Council related to the
project. The conditions of the grant stipulated that humanities scholars and members of
the community had to be involved in project planning and evaluation. The money could
not be used for construction, renovation, or preservation, nor could it be used to promote
the fledgling museum organization. Rather, it was provided to facilitate the development
of the museum's purpose, design, and interpretation ofthe 1957 crisis.29 Ambrose used
these requirements to carve out space for community involvement. In June 1995,
residents of the Central High school neighborhood that she represented, African
American community leaders and political figures, historians and museum professionals,
as well as school district and city officials were invited into the process. With the
guidance of Arkansas Humanities Council granting agent John Matthews, work related to
the establishment of a museum was divided into committees. 30
This arrangement was formalized when the articles of incorporation for a
nonprofit 501(c)3, Central High Museum Inc., were drawn up in September1995.
29
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Although Rett Tucker was appointed President of the new organization and director of
the board, the contributions of the original grassroots group were acknowledged with the
appointment ofEthel Ambrose as Vice President and chair of the planning committee. 31
Moreover, the role of the planning committee was formally written into the organization's
by-laws, providing it with substantial influence, and some leverage, over the future
direction of the museum. Article VI read,
The Planning Committee shall operate independently from the control or
supervision of the Board and Officers of the corporation. It shall prepare
and periodically revise a comprehensive written plan sufficient to guide
the development and operations of the corporation, subject to approval of
the Board of Directors. 32
In the early stages of the museum's development, the board was primarily focused on

raising money to make the project a reality, soliciting private and public support, and
acquiring a facility to house the museum, while the planning committee discussed the
vexing issue of exhibit content and design. 33
The Central High Museum Board ultimately raised $750,000 dollars to underwrite
the establishment of the Central High Museum and Visitor Center. In the spring of 1996,
the board applied for a received at $225,000 community grant from the city of Little Rock
with the support of Mayor Jim Dailey. State Senator Bill Walker also acquired an
addition $75,000 in funding from the state of Arkansas. Several hundred individual
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donors and businesses also made contributions. This support allowed Central High
Museum Inc. to purchase a decaying gas station immediately across from the high school
to house the museum for $45,000. In 1957, reporters had used the pay phones at the
Mobil station to file their reports. It was one of the only historic commercial structures
still standing in the residential neighborhood surrounding the high school. The board
utilized the political connections of Skip Rutherford and Arkansas Senator David Pryor to
pitch a proposal to Mobil Oil. With an old picture of the gas station under his arm, Rett
Tucker requested $100,000 to help refurbish the building. The project was approved, and
Mobil Oil donated old gas pumps and period signage to complete the exterior restoration
of the station.. 34 The board envisioned transforming 900-square-foot interior into a small
visitor center, with the two service bays functioning as exhibit space and the rest of the
facility accommodating a book store and gift shop. A small addition behind the building
was planned to provide room for restrooms and office space.35
Members of the planning committee were concerned about the cramped
dimensions of the proposed museum and visitor center. According to committee member
Elizabeth Jacoway, members were "encouraged at every meeting to 'think big' and plan a
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museum that could be a model of its type."36 While most acknowledged the need to open
a facility for visitors before the 40th anniversary of the 1957 crisis, many participants
agreed that this effort should only be Phase I of a two part process. A small visitors
center could serve as an introduction, but committee members felt that the significance of
the Little Rock school desegregation crisis merited the development of a much larger
museum or even a civil rights institute that encouraged research and discussion of race
relations. While the board pressed forward to meet their impending deadline, the planning
committee continued to discuss their long-term vision for the evolution of the site. 37
While Central High Museum Inc. President Rett Tucker acknowledged these more
ambitious plans, he insisted that the organization stay focused on its immediate goals.
According to news reports, Tucker estimated that it might take as long as five years and
$2-3 million to develop a large museum. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce chairman
recognized that raising the funds necessary to support such a project could be difficult.
The board faced the challenge of raising funds in a competitive environment- not only
were six new museums be developed within Little Rock itself, but civil rights museums
in other cities like Birmingham, Savannah, Atlanta, Selma, and Memphis had already
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exhausted other potential streams of revenue. 38 Moreover, the effort to build a facility
dedicated to telling the story of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis provoked
some controversy locally. Although the nonprofit received some donations from locals,
others rejected the project. Rett Tucker kept one returned solicitation to remind himself
of this reality. A message scrawled across the card read: "[This] is a disgraceful waste of
taxpayer money. We ought to forget all about 1957 and how federal intervention
destroyed a fine institution."39 While other potential donors did not express as much
hostility to the project, or integration, many felt ambivalent about it. As Arkansas Times
editor and board member Max Brantley put it, some in the community felt, "It is one
thing to give money to ease the suffering of children, another thing to build a monument
to such suffering. " 40
With these considerations in mind, some members of the board believed it was
more realistic to raise enough funds to open the small visitors center and operate it for a
few years with the hope of turning control of the facility over to the state or even the
federal park system. 41 With Arkansan Bill Clinton in the White House, board members
approached Senator Dale Bumpers about pursuing designation as a national historic site. 42
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Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee announced his support for this plan and promised to
help secure state funding to operate the center while the organization pursued federal
recognition. At the ground-breaking ceremonies for the renovation of the Mobil station,
Huckabee explained that he hoped state support would help build a "bridge ... from a local
to a federal project."43 By the Spring of 1997, Democratic Representative Vic Snyder
announced that the National Park Service was considering the site as a federal park, and
Rett Tucker was confidently telling reporters, "Our goal all along has been to open the
doors with no debt and two years operating funds in the bank" [emphasis added]. 44 The
board was not particularly concerned about developing Phase II of the project,
anticipating that federal officials and public funds would shape the site in the future.
The board's decisions sharply curbed the role community representatives would
play in developing the site through the planning committee. As these events unfolded,
planning committee members were troubled by the board's narrow focus on the visitor
center and their relative lack of interest in pursuing the development of a more substantial
museum. As Cathy Collins, the Executive Director of Little Rock's Racial and Cultural
Diversity Commission and planning committee member, explained,
By the ... fall [of 1996], the relationship between the Board and the
Planning Committee had become strained. The Planning Committee
operated from a vision of the Visitor Center being only the beginning
piece in a larger effort. The intense focus on the Visitor Center by many
of the Board members left the impression that [they believed] the Visitor
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Center was sufficient.45
Moreover, if the site became a state or federal park in the future as the board envisioned,
and the second phase of development continued under government stewardship, it was
not clear what role community representatives would play in the years to come. It quickly
became evident that the board's control over fundraising, its manipulation of its political
contacts, its plans for the future of the site, and the decisions it made over site location
(such as purchasing the small gas station rather than available lots across the street)46 had
substantial impact on the planning committee's function, one that narrowed the future
institution's options and narrative scope considerably.
Rather than developing or defining a long-term vision for the site, the planning
committee's focus was restricted to creating a small exhibit within the service bay of a
gas station. By its very nature, the planning committee represented diverse points of view
on the crisis and its members discussed and debated this history and its presentation for
several months. These conversations were shaped by decades of contested memory about
what had transpired in 1957. Under the conditions of the Arkansas Humanities Council
grant, two historians had been invited to participate in the grourr- Dr. Elizabeth Jacoway,
an independent scholar who had been studying and writing about the crisis for two
decades, and Dr. Johanna Miller Lewis, a UALR professor who directed the university's
museum studies track and had recently completed an exhibit with the alumni organization
45
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of Little Rock's black high school. Both have commented on what they saw as a lack of
"historical" knowledge within the planning committee.
From Jacoway's perspective, few of the participants "had a real grasp of the very
complex legal, political, and social issues that converged to create the crisis in Little
Rock."47

Repeatedly, she urged other members of the group "to consider the

background and context!" She found herself"stewing about the shortcomings of the
planning committee" and the "misperceptions, justifications, distortions, and
oversimplifications" that marked its deliberations. Black and white participants were
divided by decades of mistrust, which Jacoway attributed to a "distorted or incomplete
understanding of 1957." She also was troubled by divisions among white participants
about the attitudes and motivations that explained white actions during the crisis, and
African American concerns about the "lionization" of the Little Rock Nine and the
"ultimate wisdom of desegregation." She wrote,
[as] the lone southern historian in the group, it was a humbling experience
for me to realize that everyone on the committee had their own
interpretation of the Little Rock crisis- replete with their own set of
information and experiences- and that my perspectives on the past carried
no more weight than anyone else's.
Jacoway noted wryly, "I could see from the outset that what we were about was not the
kind of historical reconstruction I had learned about in graduate school."48
Participants privileged their personal memory and perceptions about the crisis

47

As quoted in Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32. Lewis also
points to Jacoway's comments about her experience as a member of the committee.
48

Jacoway, "Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock," 2-3.

403

over an academic narrative of the event. Lewis noted that "the amount of passion people
displayed about their ideas and memories increased as they moved along a continuum
from being alive in '57, a Southerner, an Arkansan, a resident of Little Rock, or a
viewer/participant in actual events." Little Rock natives on the committee questioned
whether outsiders could "truly understand what had happened."49 Some believed that the
Eisenhower's enforcement of the Brown v. Board of Education decision had a positive
impact in relation to African American civil rights, while others believed that the crisis
and federal intervention had a negative impact on public education. 50 Lewis wrote,
"committee members showed no deference towards us [the professional historians] in
terms of expressing their opinions on what type of facility the museum should be, or
exactly why and how the 1957 crisis occurred."51 From Lewis' perspective, planning
committee members showed "little interest.... in knowing the facts," and at times
expressed "outright hostility to what historians had written about the crisis." Lewis
recalled that one committee member dismissed academic scholarship outright, stating,
"we don't care what the historians say."52

In part, this indifference to an academic narrative could be attributed to longstanding complaints that outsiders, journalists, and historians have not treated Little Rock
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kindly or fairly over the years. However, in 1993 and 1994, a national telephone survey
that explored popular attitudes towards "historymaking" found that most respondents
privileged intimate, personal, and eyewitness accounts of the past over interpretations
they believed were "mediated" by political and cultural agendas or professional and
commercial ambitions. The survey found that respondents trusted the stories of family
members or conversations with eyewitnesses more than historical narratives offered by
college history professors, high school teachers, or books. These trends were even more
pronounced among African American respondents who criticized traditional histories and
nurtured powerful "countemarratives" focused on the black experience.

In the broader survey, academic history fared better than popular or commercial
history in terms of trustworthiness, but was often described as "dull" or "boring" because
it failed to engage respondents. Those surveyed preferred the interactive experience of
visiting museums or historic sites, which they also rated as the most trustworthy of
historic sources. The surveyors found that "many respondents felt that the best of each of
the other sources could be found in museums." Museums gave visitors "a sense of
immediacy- of personal participation- that respondents associated with eyewitnesses;
they evoked the intimacy of family gatherings; and they encouraged an interaction with
primary sources that reminded respondents of independent research." Moreover,
respondents seemed to be most attracted to historical narratives that were useful-- that
could be used to evaluate the present and chart a course for the future. 53 Perhaps this was
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the kind of museum and museum experience members of the planning committee hoped
to create.
From Lewis' perspective, members of the planning committee seemed to think
that their "ideas about the crisis alone were enough to fill the exhibit." Dr. Jacoway
attempted to redirect the energy of the committee by distributing a list of secondary
sources with the hope that committee members would read these materials and familiarize
themselves with political, legal, economic and social issues related to the crisis that
concerned professional historians like herself. 54 Jacoway also decided to organize a
professional conference designed to provide the city of Little Rock with a "crash course
in southern history and race relations" in conjunction with the anniversary. 55 Dr. Lewis
suggested that committee members should immerse themselves in primary sources, like
newspapers and magazines, but was disappointed when no one volunteered to undertake
this research. Lewis became frustrated with the "overwhelmingly democratic" nature of
the committee's conversations and the endless debate about the public memory of the
crisis. Ultimately, she decided to ask the public history students in her History Museum
Interpretation class at UALR to research the exhibit as a group project. 56
Lewis asked her public history students to construct a detailed timeline from
primary and secondary sources to establish a strong foundation for the exhibit's

54

Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32-33, footnote 3.

55

A book was published as a result of this conference. See Understanding the Little Rock Crisis:
An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation, eds. Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred Williams
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999). Jacoway describes the impetus behind the conference's
creation in her introduction.
56

Johanna Miller Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32-33, footnote 3.

406

development. Public history graduate student Laura Miller led the project, which
stretched beyond the 1957 and 1958 school years to include an investigation of the period
from statehood in 1836 through the 1970s. However, the majority of the students' efforts
focused on the crisis years. Students explored newspaper accounts and archival
collections throughout the state to produce a document that chronicled events in day-today detaiL 57 Lewis asked them to produce an abbreviated timeline that contained the
information they thought should be included in the exhibit. By the spring of 1996, the
students presented their work to the planning committee, and Lewis distributed copies of
the timeline and a bibliography to the board. According to Lewis, her students had played
a "vital role" by filling the "giant, previously empty hole known as 'content."' The board
was "very pleased" with their work and developed an appreciation for the role the
university could play in translating its ideas into reality. 58
Indeed, Dr. Lewis would soon become the exhibit's project manager and curator.
The UALR professor was the only individual on the planning committee or the board
who had any experience curating an exhibit or contracting with companies for its
fabrication. As the board selected an architect to restore the Mobil station, Lewis sat in
on the meetings. Although several of the architects suggested that they could design the
exhibit as well, Lewis encouraged the board to contract separately with a dedicated
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exhibit designer. According to Lewis, few board members had interest in the
presentations given by designers in response to the request for proposals and the
community planning committee took the lead in selecting Quatrefoil Associates to help
design, fabricate, and install the exhibit. This decision was formalized by a vote of the
board in the fall of 1996. On September 10, Lewis was also officially named "liaison to
exhibit designer and architect."59
The board asked Lewis and a small exhibit team to continue their research, solicit
ideas for their exhibit, and report back to the board. Lewis forged ahead with exhibit
designer Abbie Chessler of Quatrefoil Associates, public history graduate student Laura
Miller, and Ronnie Nichols, a board member and the director of Arkansas' Old State
House. Lewis and Miller sat down with Chessler, reviewed their edited timeline, and
selected events they felt should be included in the exhibit. Chessler repeated this exercise
with the community planning committee in order to determine which events were most
important. The exhibit designer returned to the timeline and broke it into chronological
groups, suggested themes that could be explored in each section, and made
recommendations about the amount of space that should be dedicated to various parts of
the exhibit. Miller and Lewis organized their research, determined which themes would
be used, and wrote the exhibit text. The exhibit team also focused on collecting visual
material- photographs and news footage- that would help them tell their story and
connect visitors to the powerful imagery that defined the crisis for people across the
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nation in 1957.60
At this point, the planning committee's role in the design of the exhibit was
limited. The exhibit team had effectively taken control of the planning process, and the
committee was redefined as an "audience focus group." As Lewis acknowledged, the
committee was used to "assist us in devising our message" [emphasis added]. 61
Throughout the fall of 1996, the exhibit team continued to work with the planning
committee, soliciting their feedback on a variety of issues. Committee member Cathy
Collins recalled discussing various aspects of the exhibit design, including "outdoor
lighting, windows, signage, themes, historical concepts, word choices, and media
opportunities- artifacts, photographs, video, computer interaction, etc."62 However, while
the exhibit team solicited feedback from the planning committee, it sought official
approval of its ideas from the board.63
There is evidence that some members of the planning committee were not fully on
board with the historical chronology being assembled by Lewis and her team. The
mission of the museum had been defmed as: "To empower, infonn, enlighten and
challenge people by interpreting, documenting, discovering and preserving the history of
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the 1957 Central High crisis and its context."64 As a professional historian, Lewis was
primarily focused on informing her audience by interpreting the crisis. What she learned
:from listening to the planning committee's deliberations was that even this group,
"composed of people who were somewhat familiar with the crisis," had little knowledge
of"the facts" and "no patience for the nuances ofhistorical interpretation." What was
needed was an exhibit that informed members of the community about the "basics of the
story" and "concentrated on the events and the major players of the crisis" in a clear and
chronological narrative. Moreover, given the contested nature of the history of 1957 and
the heated debates within the committee itself, Lewis was determined to make the exhibit
as "historically accurate" as possible by utilizing quotes that "let the various participants
tell their own story," while avoiding "potentially explosive and probably unanswerable
question[s] .'.t>5
According to Collins, some planning committee members embraced this emphasis
on historical accuracy, but others "wanted to utilize the historical events as means for
promoting current day racial healing."66 These individuals placed more emphasis on
aspects of the mission statement that called for empowering and enlightening Little Rock
residents through an active process of discovery. In their view, the construction of a
chronological historical account may not have been as imperative. On October 2, 1996,
Annie Abrams, a neighborhood resident, civil rights activist and lay historian, expressed
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her frustration that some people seemed to view the purpose of the exhibit "as returning
to 1957" or "authentically recreating the thing." In her view, the purpose of the museum
was to "learn from but not return to" the events of the crisis years. 67 In contrast, historian
and committee member Elizabeth Jacoway rejected the notion that finding "solutions to
the myriad problems of Little Rock's ongoing racial conflicts" was the committee's
charge. Moreover, she found it difficult to understand how the community would be able
to heal its wounds or learn from the events of 1957 without a "reasonably accurate
historical understanding" of what had happened. 68
By December 1996, some members of the planning committee spoke frankly
about their inability to influence the direction of the exhibit. Annie Abrams felt that the
board was turning a deaf ear to the planning committee's effort to discuss the long-term
goals of the site. Janetta Kearney, editor of the Little Rock black's newspaper, stated
baldly, "We are not being included. We are being ignored." Moreover, from her
perspective, community representatives were being sidelined and African Americans
were not participating fully in the "decision-making process." Kearney complained that
there was "no color in anything that the group is doing" and suspected that the board
intended to "disband the Planning Committee." Bill Asti, a white committee member,
suggested that board members were typical "CEO types" who needed to be learn that the
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"community can do this work. " 69
At the board meeting in January 1997, the board officially tabled discussion of
Phase II of the project and redefined the role ofthe planning committee. Moving
forward, the planning committee would no longer operate independently of the board or
determine its own agenda. Instead, the board would establish the "direction the Planning
Committee will take" at its annual meeting and would select the board members who
would serve on it. The board expressed its hope that these "changes will facilitate a more
effective relationship between the Board and the Planning Committee."7° Committee
member Cathy Collins suspected that the "participatory nature" of the exhibit review
process was the "impetus for redefining the role of the Planning Committee." The
committee's conversations were perceived to be contentious and unproductive. In her
opinion, the board's "power play" effectively strengthened its ability to "control and more
effectively define the boundaries around the construction of the official memory of the
desegregation of Central High School."71 Johanna Miller Lewis had a different
perspective. The "parting of ways" between the board and the planning committee
eliminated the need to try to satisfy two different constituencies. According to Lewis, by
early 1997, the planning committee had become "superfluous" to exhibit planners, "since
they didn't control any money, didn't want to do any work and rarely agreed with the
board." With the fortieth anniversary months away, she and her team started reporting
69
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directly to the board about the exhibit's development. 72
In the spring of 1997, board members debated the finer points of the exhibit script

but did·not challenge the overall direction ofthe exhibit team's plan. Arkansas
Democrat-Gazette editor and columnist John Brummett characterized most "official
points of dispute" as relatively minor: "Why display a quote from Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. when, in fact, he had no role in Central high or the events leading to it? Why
not a quote from Thurgood Marshall or Daisy Bates? Good point, and it properly
prevailed." Only one point of contention arose which threatened to become a public
controversy. Two African American members of the board, state Senator Bill Walker and
state Representative Irma Brown, objected to the display ofthe Confederate battle flag in
the portion ofthe exhibit that addressed the Civil War. Walker argued that the presence
of the flag might anger and alienate some black visitors, and its display at the visitors'
center might be courting "unnecessary trouble." Ronnie Nichols, another African
American board member and the only member of the board represented on the exhibit
team, defended its inclusion in the name ofhistorical accuracy. Nichols suggested that
museum displays that provoke strong reactions actually help bring "history to life" for
visitors. Central High Museum Inc. President Rett Tucker expressed his support for
Nichols position, arguing that removing the Confederate flag from the visitors' center was
the like ''wanting to remove any Nazi symbols from the Holocaust museum.'m As a
72
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compromise, Walker continued to advocate removing the flag, but supported the display
of period photographs featuring segregationists carrying the flag in defiance of school
integration. Ultimately, the board took this position and the "flag flap" quickly died
down. As John Brummett noted, this controversy hardly addressed a core element ofthe
planned presentation. 74 Lewis and her exhibit team were willing to change these kinds of
"minute details" and were determined to "pick their battles carefully."75
The board and the exhibit team also sent copies of the script out to the Little Rock
Nine and Central High School student body representatives from the 1957 and 1958
school years for their comments. Lewis was primarily concerned with how the Little
Rock Nine would respond to the script. She has reported that the feedback from the
group was generally positive, particularly in response to a timeline that chronicled the
harassment that continued inside the school during the 1957-58 school year. 76 However,
this was precisely the part of the exhibit that provoked the most negative reaction from
white members of Central's student body. Craig Rains, 1958 Class President,
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complained that the exhibit made the students "look bad" by focusing on the "ugliness"
of the school year. Sounding a familiar theme, Rains contended that exhibit failed to
illustrate that "95% of the white students took no part in it.'m Rains and 1958 Student
Body President Ralph Brodie threatened to organize a protest unless their perspective was
included in the exhibit. The board tried to defuse this threat and address their concerns by
inserting a small panel entitled, "View From Inside the School" that emphasized that
most students obeyed the law and only "a handful of students verbally and physically
terrorized the Nine."
Johanna Miller Lewis has suggested that the inclusion of this panel did not
undermine the exhibit's historical integrity or "detract" from the sections that described
the experience of the Nine. Pragmatically, she has argued that a "rigid or stubborn
adherence to theoretical standards" without a "little diplomacy can doom a project from
the beginning," but there is no question that the board made a significant change to the
script, involving more than a "minute detail," at the request of the white students. 78 This
incident enhanced the perception is some quarters that the museum and the fortieth
anniversary commemoration really represented an attempt by white business leaders to
enhance the image of the city of Little Rock and capitalize on tourist dollars with a
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minimum of fuss. 79
The Central High Museum and Visitor Center formally opened on September 20,
1997 in a dedication ceremony featuring Governor Mike Huckabee, Little Rock Mayor
Jim Dailey, the Central High Museum Inc. Board and Planning Committee, members of
the Little Rock Nine, and several hundred onlookers. During the invocation, planning
committee member and African American activist Annie Abrams prayed that the museum
would serve as a "flagship" that would help guide the community of Little Rock through
"the turbulent waters that we will encounter as we travel the long journey toward
understanding our history in all its complexity." But she also implored God to provide
museum planners with the "courage and strength to go forward from here to complete the
wisdom of Mission Statement" and to fulfil the planning committee's larger vision. A
job, she implied, that was far from fmished. 80
After participating in the ceremony and cutting the ribbon to open the museum,
Elizabeth Eckford carefully folded a piece of the gold and black ribbon as a keepsake. 81
As the only member of the Little Rock Nine who still lived in Little Rock in 1997,
Eckford had been approached early on about participating in the planning process. She
walked out on an early meeting, and later told reporters, "I perceived that these people
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were trying to use me." 82 However, after some reflection, she decided to participate in
:fundraising efforts for the museum and was named to the Board of Directors in the hope
that the legacy of Central High School and the events of 1957 would be preserved "with
the kind of dignity it deserves."83 As she later recalled, Eckford realized that the Central
High crisis "had meaning for a lot of people for a lot of reasons." While she was
normally reluctant to talk about her experiences she was "trying to be cooperative" in the
spirit of the anniversary. But as she prepared to see the exhibits for the first time, some of
her ambivalence about the commemoration and visitor center resurfaced. She told
reporters that she planned to avoid looking at the famous photographs taken of her
walking through the mob outside Central forty years earlier by not wearing her glasses in
the exhibit. "I plan to stay about four feet away, and it will be a blur," she remarked.

84

And she had a very clear message for the museum's planners and its visitors: "This is a
place where we can begin the process of reflection," she warned, "but this place is not an
alibi for atonement. " 85

"All the World is Watching Us: Little Rock and the 1957 Crisis"
When the Central High Museum and Visitor Center was completed and installed
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in the gas station's former service bay, Johanna Miller Lewis and the exhibit team had
pieced together an exhibit that provided a streamlined interpretation of the 1957-58
school year. Throughout the exhibit, the textual panels were brief and succinct. By
focusing on documentable and widely-known "facts" in these panels, and representing the
views of various parties through published quotes, the exhibit team navigated through the
treacherous shoals of memory and public opinion about the crisis and mid-century race
relations. However, this approach contained its own limitations due to gaps and elisions
in the documentary record. Much of the daily harassment experienced by the Little Rock
Nine inside Central over the course of the school year was unrecorded. As might be
expected, in the years that followed, white students and members of the Little Rock Nine
advanced very different interpretations about what had happened inside the school and the
number of students who bore some responsibility for the terrorization of the African
American students. Many white students denied any involvement, and white student
leaders resented and resisted efforts to present a picture of the student body as
sympathetic to the segregationist cause. As Ernest Green noted wryly the year before the
visitor center opened, "I can't find anyone that I went to school with now that was
opposed to my being there .. .I go back to Little Rock and they're all my closest friends
today."86 Consequently, at times, the exhibit's focus on the documentable and the
unchallengeable minimized any accounting of the harassment experienced by the nine
black students, just as the decision of school administrators forty years earlier- to only
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address those incidents witnessed by a teacher- had done the same.
As visitors approached the exhibit, an introductory panel framed the significance
of Central High School's place on the memorial landscape in a manner that was in
keeping with the broader themes that echoed throughout the fortieth anniversary
commemoration. 87 In 1957, Little Rock became a "landmark battleground in the struggle
for civil rights" when "the state resisted the admission of black students to all-white
Central High School." The school desegregation crisis "tested" students, public figures,
and Arkansas citizens, but ultimately justice prevailed. Central was not a symbol of mobviolence, white resistance, or undisguised racism. Rather, the exhibit suggested, "Central
stands today as a concrete symbol of the Constitution's guarantee of equal rights under
the law." The visitor center itself was described as "a place to learn about a pivotal time
in history." It was also "a place to learn about how far we've come" and "how far we
have to go." The Central High School Museum and Visitor Center, unlike other civil
rights museums that preceded it, did not attempt to educate visitors about the entire scope
of the civil rights movement. From the beginning, the exhibit was dedicated to telling a
local history that had national and global impact.
Nevertheless, within the limited space available, Lewis and her team did try to
provide visitors with some necessary context. Inside the exhibit space, the first
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interpretive section entitled "All Men Created Equal?" briefly addressed the period
between the Declaration of Independence and Plessy v. Ferguson. Johanna Miller Lewis
later explained that this portion of the exhibit was designed to "set the stage for some of
the later legal issues of desegregation." 88 The next portion of the exhibit, "Can Separate
Be Equal?: 1897-1954" built from Lewis' previous work with the alumni association at
Dunbar High School. It exposed the inherent inequities built into the southern system of
segregation through a direct comparison of the facilities and resources provided to
students at all-white Central High School and all-black Dunbar High School. In public
education, the exhibit asserted, "funding was barely enough for one system of education,
let alone for two"- in this context, equality "rarely occurred" under the Plessy doctrine,
and "education for blacks suffered as a result." 89 Despite the dispiriting statistics it
presented to bolster this claim, the exhibit provided a nuanced interpretation of the
educational experience of Dunbar students. Building on Dr. Lewis's previous work with
the Dunbar Alumni Association, the exhibit was careful to note that Dunbar's excellent
academic reputation attracted black students from rural communities without accredited
high schools from all over the state. The school played an important role in "nurturing
the children of Little Rock's black community." Even when the opportunity arose, many
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parents chose not to expose their children to Central High School's "less supportive
environment. " 90
The exhibit then turned to Little Rock's response to the Supreme Court's 1954
Brown decision. Like many histories of school desegregation, the exhibit's narrative
unfolded as a series of school board decisions, lawsuits, and court rulings. In a section
titled "Struggle for Direction," the exhibit noted that shortly following the Supreme
Court's declaration that segregation in public education was inherently unequal, the
NAACP petitioned the Little Rock school board for immediate integration, but the school
board adopted a gradual desegregation plan instead. The NAACP took its case to the
courts. As a representative of the NAACP explained, the school board's proposed
desegregation plan looked "more like the old run-around deception, than an honest and
conscientious plan of the school board to integrate." The exhibit explained that although
the appeals court upheld the board's gradual desegregation plan, it retained jurisdiction
over the case. However, it did not illuminate why this was significant- as the crisis
developed, judges would not permit any retreat from the court-approved plan. In the
midst of this legal maneuvering, the exhibit noted, "political resistance to integration
began to stiffen." Again, the text focused on the actions of the Governor and state
legislators, and the passage of four segregation statutes in the spring of 1957. The exhibit
avoided a potentially more controversial assessment of how average citizens in the city
90
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felt about the Supreme Court's decree.
The most conspicuous omission in this first third of the exhibit was any sustained
discussion of local black activism in Little Rock. Although a small sidebar made note of
a suit filed to equalize the pay of black and white teachers in Little Rock during the
1940s, the exhibit did not chronicle other campaigns for equal rights like the voter
registration drives that had preceded the school desegregation crisis. Moreover, no
distinctions were drawn between the strategies of the national NAACP and local
concems. 91 Despite her prominence in most 1957 media accounts, the exhibit did not
profile Daisy Bates, the local leader ofthe NAACP and editor of the state's largest black
newspaper. Even more notably, it did not feature any in-depth information about why the
students who became known as the "Little Rock Nine" chose to emoll at Central, or how
their parents, neighbors and friends felt about the political machinations and legal
maneuvers that unfolded in August 1957. These elisions were consistent with exhibitions
at other civil rights museums that minimized the significance of social networks and local
organizing. As Owen J. Dwyer noted in his study,
Within the major museums, the movement is represented as having been
won on the streets, :from the pulpit, and in the courtroom- places
intimately associated with masculinized leadership in the movement's
iconic legacy. Little or no mention is made of the private and semipublic
spaces of citizenship: schools, neighborhoods, and homes where activists
found food, shelter, and community. 92
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The activities of local activists- particularly women- in these spheres were rarely
illuminated.
The central part ofthe exhibit, "A Time of Courage & Fear, 1957-58," focused on
the events that have come to be known as the Little Rock school desegregation crisis.
The largest wall of the exhibit space was covered with oversized reproductions of historic
photographs. These pictures included some of the most searing images captured during
the crisis: the mob surrounding Elizabeth Eckford as she tried to enter Central High
School, the 101 st Airborne stationed outside the school, students burning an effigy, troops
escorting the nine African American students inside the front door of Central, Ernest
Green processing in his graduation robes. As exhibit team manager Dr. Johanna Miller
Lewis stated, many of these images had become "ingrained in the nation's memory."
Consequently, the team decided to utilize these resources to tell the story of the Little
Rock desegregation crisis as much as possible. 93 To the right and immediately below
these photos, the events of the year unfolded in a dated timeline drawn from the research
completed by Lewis' public history students.
In the timeline's opening statement, the exhibit explained, "Opponents of
desegregation argued that the Supreme Court and the federal government lacked the
authority to impose its decisions on the states." This statement framed the crisis as a
constitutional conflict, rooted in arguments about states' rights. It did not focus attention
on the ideology of white supremacy that undergirded organized resistance to
desegregation. The timeline went on to chronicle documented facts about the tension
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filled days of September 1957- suits filed in court, public speeches made by the governor,
the national media attention focused on the city as the students were denied entrance to
Central High School, Orval Faubus' conference with President Eisenhower, the removal
of the Arkansas National Guard, rioting outside the building while the Little Rock Nine
attended their first day of classes, the deployment of the 101 51 Airborne, and the escort
provided for the African American students as they returned to classes. The exhibit
adroitly avoided speculation about the motives of various historical actors who
participated in these events. For example, it did not attempt to explain why Governor
Faubus deployed the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the Little Rock Nine from
entering Central High School- racism? political expediency? public safety? states' rights?
Moreover, it hardly acknowledged the public discussion and historical debates over these
questions.

In the second half of the timeline, the exhibit turned its attention to the "discipline
problems" which recurred at Central for the "remainder of the year" after responsibility
for protecting the nine African American students was turned over to the Arkansas
National Guard. Dr. Lewis hoped that this portion of the exhibit would fmally "answer
the all-important question of exactly what happened in the school" out of view of
reporters and cameras. 94 The exhibit highlights physical attacks, racial slurs, and
vandalism directed at the Little Rock Nine after November 14, 1957. Although the
events chronicled on the timeline were well documented in school records, the exhibit
acknowledged that at least one story was not "made public" due to a desire to "preserve
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the myth that everything inside Central was fme." The exhibit did not explain that many
other incidents were never recorded because of the school administration's policy of
ignoring attacks that were not witnessed by a teacher. At least half of the altercations
between white and black students recounted in the exhibit were related to the expulsion
ofMinnijean Brown. The timeline related the series of events which led to her departure
from the school, presenting the harassment Brown endured, her reaction to the taunts of
white students, and the disparate punishments meted out by the school district. On the
day Brown left Little Rock to fmish her education in New York, segregationist ringleader
Sammie Dean Parker was reinstated. The timeline also highlighted other representative
incidents. However, the use of this format could have left visitors with the impression
that the events featured were the sum total of those experienced by the Nine.
Even more troubling was the panel added to the exhibit at the insistence of
Central High student body leaders from 1957-58. This panel, titled "The View From
Inside the High School," was added to the exhibit to assuage complaints from some of
Central's white alumni that the exhibit painted an unfair portrait of"95% of the white
students who took no part in it. " 95 The added text emphasized that the majority of
Central's students did not participate in the harassment of the Little Rock Nine. Instead,
they assumed a guise of "sensible, peaceful neutrality" in the conflict between the African
American students and their segregationist tormentors. Student government leaders
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"pledged to obey the law and asked the student body to follow their example." The panel
underscored: "Most students did" [emphasis original]. Although some involved in the
exhibit planning process opposed the addition of this panel, Johanna Miller Lewis
asserted that "it did not detract" from the exhibit's overall interpretation of"the Little
Rock Nine's experiences."96
However, it should be noted that this interpretation ofthe views ofthe majority of
Central students was also evident in the selection of published quotations that
accompanied the exhibit timeline. Three of the four quotes included in the exhibit from
white Central students expressed relatively moderate sentiments. For example, the
anonymous statement of a white 16-year-old female, "If parents would just go home and
let us alone, we'll be all right.. .. We just want them to leave us be. We can do it,"
accompanied a photograph ofMinnijean Brown Trickey laughing as she stood outside the
school surrounded by white students. Exhibit designer Abbie Chessler and project
manager Johanna Miller Lewis both expressed their hope that the use of quotations in the
exhibit would allow the museum "to tell the story from many different points ofview."97
However, the relative lack of quotes from vocal white supremacists within the school, or
white students resigned to obeying the law despite deeply ingrained and clearly stated
segregationist beliefs, suggested that few white students opposed the presence of the
Little Rock Nine.

96

Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 41.

97

Chessler as quoted in Leslie Newell Peacock, "A Place to Learn: At last, a museum to remember
the Central crisis," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 12.

426

For their part, the African American students interpreted the "sensible, peaceful
neutrality" of the majority of their peers much differently. To some degree, the
concessions made to white students in the development of the exhibit were balanced by
Elizabeth Eckford's poignant comments in a videotaped film that played in a constant
loop at the end of the exhibit. As Eckford explained, the harassment the Little Rock Nine
endured from a small "organized group" would not have been as pervasive without the
"tacit cooperation" of the rest of the white student body. 98 Eckford's comments drew
attention to what some scholars have referred to as more "mundane and insidious form of
racism" that are often neglected at civil rights museums that focus on ''white supremacy's
most violent and widely scorned forms." 99 Nevertheless, Eckford's view of this issue was
presented as her personal opinion, while the perspective of Central High's white student
leaders was seamlessly and invisibly incorporated into the body of the exhibit text.
The next part of the exhibit informed visitors about "The Lost Year" of 1958-59
when all public schools in Little Rock were closed to avoid desegregation. The exhibit
explained that Governor Faubus closed the schools "pending a public vote on the issue of
immediate integration of all grade levels." However, the exhibit did not explicitly state
that the majority of Little Rock voters ratified the Governor's decision in that election,
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voting to keep the schools closed rather than proceed with desegregation. 100 The text
focused on the creation ofthe Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools and
its efforts to reopen the public high schools by electing "moderate" candidates to the
school board, and recalling "segregationist" members who voted to "purge" teachers who
had "upheld the law" during the crisis. The exhibit did not make it clear that some of the
WEC's "moderate" candidates, including Central High Museum Inc. President Rett
Tucker's father, Everett Tucker Jr., were self-described segregationists who only
supported court-ordered token integration as a means of avoiding complete desegregation
and retaining public education. 101 Moreover, it did not reveal that the WEC itself refused
to take a position supporting desegregation and refused to admit African American
women to its ranks. However, unlike many narratives of the crisis that attribute the
reopening ofthe public schools to the activism of this group, the exhibit did note that
high school education in the city did not resume until the federal courts ruled that the
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state's school closing laws were illegal. 102
The final portion of the exhibit, "The Continuing Struggle: 1960-1997," noted that
while 1960 "may have marked a new beginning for Little Rock's public schools" it was
"hardly a perfect one." The progress of the desegregation plan was "slow" and the black
community "impatient." The exhibit clearly stated that the gradual desegregation of
schools in the city was due to enforcement of the law by the federal courts. As this
process unraveled, the exhibit suggested that the "biggest change from 1957" was that
"Little Rock was no longer the sole battleground of school desegregation." Conflicts in
communities like Boston revealed "that the rest of the United States was not immune to
these problems." Despite its struggle with desegregation, Central continued to be a
"symbol of academic excellence." The fmal photograph in the exhibit, a large picture of
Central's integrated graduating class of 1996, underscored this assessment. As Johanna
Miller Lewis explained, this portion of the exhibition was designed to demonstrate that
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"despite the crisis and some other racial problems over the years, integration did
eventually take place." 103
Notably, however, the exhibit did not address Little Rock's recurrent problem of
white flight, the rising percentage of African American students in the city's schools,
Central's special status in the school district which contributed to its integrated
enrollment and academic success, or the ongoing school desegregation litigation. Again,
this was in keeping with other civil rights museums in the region. As W. Fitzhugh
Brundage has noted, these institutions rarely "address the benefits that whites in recent
times received from the maintenance of white supremacy," and topics like residential
segregation, police brutality, or economic inequality are "seldom considered." 104 A
reporter from the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette described the exhibit's parting salvo as
little more than a series of"platitudes" that did little to illuminate the evolution of race
relations in the city. 105 Exhibit designer Abbie Chessler put a more positive spin on the
exhibit's interpretation, telling reporters that the planners intentionally "left the story
open ended." 106
"The Stage is Set": The Fortieth Anniversary Commemoration

However, if the city's power brokers had been able to use their position on the
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museum board to limit community deliberation about the historical narrative presented in
the exhibit, and to frame it within the context of the rhetoric of reconciliation and
progress that surrounded the 40th anniversary, they were less able to control the debate
and discussion that surfaced in public forums and events designed to mark the milestone
throughout the city. Many of Central High Museum Inc.'s board members were also
involved in planning the anniversary commemoration. Most prominently, Everett Tucker

ill, president of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce and Central High Museum Inc.
also served as co-chairman of the city's anniversary commission. Little Rock Mayor Jim
Dailey hoped Tucker's appointment would result in seamless coordination between the
museum plans and commemorative activities. 107 As the official anniversary calendar
developed, two events anchored the week-long schedule of events- the museum opening
and a dedication ceremony featuring President Bill Clinton, Governor Mike Huckabee,
and the members of the Little Rock Nine.
Skip Rutherford had been involved in the museum project almost from its
inception. As a public relations professional, he had argued for coordinating the exhibit
opening with the 40th anniversary. Once that project was underway, he turned his
attention toward soliciting support for a large public ceremony and museum dedication.
Rutherford envisioned a ceremony held on the steps of Central High School that would
present a dramatically different image of Little Rock than the one broadcast to the world
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in 1957. Again, he solicited the support of political figures: Democrat Mayor Jim Dailey,
Republican Governor Mike Huckabee, and President Bill Clinton. He sought assurances
from the White House that the President would participate in the ceremony, recognizing
that the presence of the Arkansas native would assure national news coverage and
exposure. 108 Mayor Dailey was equally enthusiastic about the project and quickly created
the "Central High School Celebration Commission," with Tucker at its head, and charged
it with orchestrating the commemoration plans, preparing the school and its surrounding
neighborhood for worldwide attention, and promoting a positive picture of progress in
Little Rock. 109 Soon after the city's commission was established, its members agreed to
reach out to the Little Rock Nine, informing them about the city's plans and requesting
their input and involvement. 110
At the beginning of the year, Huckabee and Dailey delivered addresses
proclaiming 1997 as the "year of reconciliation." In his State of the State speech,
Huckabee- a skilled politician and pastor- announced his intention to use the fortieth
anniversary as an opportunity to "make amends" and to distance himself from the legacy
of his predecessor Governor Orval Faubus. He declared,
On that day in September, as the 'Little Rock Nine' come back to Central
High School, they will not be met by a governor who says, 'You can't
108
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come in,' but met by a governor who says, 'Please, come in and accept our
sincere apologies and give us your forgiveness for ever allowing such a
thing to take place among enlightened, supposedly God-fearing people. 111
Although some state legislators em~raced the governor's statement as "a beginning" that
was "long overdue," others expressed resistance to the anniversary commemoration or
skepticism about its purpose. Rep. Ode Maddox, a Democrat who had been sitting in the
legislative chamber since 1957, thought the planned ceremony ''just pours oil on the fire."
From his perspective, the desegregation crisis had "been discussed thousands of times"
and overemphasized by the media. "I think it's over and the least said about it the better,"
he said. "It's been apologized for, so why just keep on?" On the other side of the
spectrum, Rep. Judy Smith expressed support for marking the anniversary, but cautioned,
"One activity does not bring about reconciliation or a change in attitude. " 112
Indeed, discontent about the state of race relations in the state's capital city
provoked strong opposition to the anniversary commemoration. Dale H. Charles,
president of the Little Rock and Arkansas chapters of the NAACP, threatened to picket
the ceremony at Central High School unless the city addressed the serious concerns of the
black community, including dissatisfaction with the distribution of city contracts to
minority businesses, police brutality in African American neighborhoods, and ongoing
problems with the school system. Moreover, Mayor Dailey had failed to appoint an
NAACP representative to the anniversary commission. Although he apologized for this
"oversight," Charles expressed his disbelief that the nation's largest civil rights
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organization, which had played a crucial role in 1957, had merely been overlooked. After
all, the NAACP had orchestrated the 30th anniversary commemoration ten years earlier. 113
Charles asserted, ''Now, with the focus on the Little Rock Nine and racial healing,
everybody is talking about the new Little Rock. But the new Little Rock is the same as
the old Little Rock." While he acknowledged that the city had made "a few little gains,"
he insisted, ''there have been a lot of relapses as wel1." 114
Joy Springer, a monitor for school desegregation attorney John Walker,
emphasized that the Little Rock school system was still segregated, and that black
students were denied access to equal educational opportunities due to academic tracking
and disciplinary procedures. "What do we have to celebrate?" she asked. "Because
they're all in the same building? They're still being treated differently. The idea was to
provide equal education." Based on her work with the school system, Springer
concluded, "We have nothing to celebrate, from 1957 until now." 115 The desegregation
monitor insisted that the planned events were "not about race relations and
reconciliation." Rather, they were an attempt by "the city of Little Rock and the
Chamber of Commerce" to bring in tourist revenue that would shore up "the power
structure." She asserted, "This is just hype, a public relations sort of thing, to say, 'We
want to show the world that Little Rock is on the way to solving the problem' ... They
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want you to believe that." 116
Critics pointed to Little Rock's efforts to clean up the neighborhood surrounding
Central High School in time for the fortieth anniversary celebration as example of the
city's preoccupation with symbol rather than substance. The high school was freshened
up with new paint and landscaping, and City Director Joan Adcock created an adopt-ahouse program to "spiff up the tattered, weather-worn facades" of the houses across the
street. City officials also scrambled to repair sidewalks and remove trash from the innercity neighborhood. A disaster-cleanup crew from Michigan was even brought in to "tidy
up" vacant lots. Adcock insisted that his was about more than a "picture-taking"
opportunity, and Mayor Dailey suggested that these efforts were merely a "springboard"
for a "long-term" effort to revitalize the area. 117
Representatives of the Central High Neighborhood Association expressed
skepticism about these assertions, noting that little had been done to address the longstanding complaints of residents in the area until the approach of the anniversary
celebration. Moreover, they resented the city's decision to proceed with their plans
without consulting them. The association had already developed plans to make the area
more hospitable to pedestrians, which included improved lighting, wider sidewalks, and
better landscaping. Instead, a $28,000 donation from Nations Bank resulted in the
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creation of a brick logo in the middle of the intersection of 14th and Park, designed to give
the neighborhood a "sense of place." The new Central High Neighborhood Association
President Cliff Riggs described the addition as an "embarrassment" that did little to
enhance the neighborhood for its residents. Annie Abrams, a local activist and museum
planning committee member, told reporters that she hoped the damage from the city's
efforts could be minimized. Just as the contributions of community representatives in the
museum planning process had been sidelined, she felt this was another example of what
"they do for us instead of do with us." 118
For his part, John Walker, the attorney representing the black plaintiffs in the
ongoing school desegregation litigation, described a starkly different reality than the
image cultivated by the commemoration's planners through its carefully timed clean-up
efforts. "We have something comparable to Johannesburg in South Africa during
apartheid," he told reporters. "You have the black section and the white section, and you
have a repressive police force that views its mission as keeping blacks in their place."
The anniversary plans were a farce. Like Springer, Walker asserted, "To establish Little
Rock as a place that has overcome the bigotry and racism of the 1950s is a publicrelations venture more than anything." The symbolism surrounding the planned
ceremony was not an indication that the time was right for the federal courts to return
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control of the schools to local officials. 119 For Walker, the opposite was true. Over the
last forty years the school board had operated in "bad faith," and had used the passage of
time "to defeat the noble purposes of the Brown decision." Rather than being a symbol of
success, Walker suggested, "Those who said 'never' can point to Little Rock and see that
the promised concept of unity likely will not be implemented and the concept of separate
and ultimately unequal will continue to reign." After "40 years of noncompliant
conduct," there was little to celebrate other than the fact that most of the Little Rock Nine
had chosen other places to live as adults. Walker argued that black children in Little
Rock were still fighting for their constitutional rights in court and they continued to "wait
for the day when the city's actions measure up to its often stated good intentions." 120 He
warned that the issues surrounding the schools would never be resolved until a plan was
mandated by the court "that delivers for black children." 121
Comments like these encouraged members of the press descending on Little Rock
for the anniversary celebration to take a closer look at the city's schools. Throughout the
month of September, story after story made note of the academic disparities at Central:
the low number of black students enrolled in honors and advanced placement courses, the
persistent achievement gaps on standardized tests, and the disproportionate number of
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black students subject to disciplinary sanctions. Reporters also took note of the selfsegregation and social isolation of students in the hallways and cafeteria; most white
students ate a tables outside in the courtyard, while their black peers sat with friends
inside the building. 122 Local columnist John Brummett noted that despite the attempts of
city hall to dress up the city and the neighborhood immediately surrounding Central for
the media, reporters from around the country were not taken in by the "trumped-up
phoniness." US. News & World Report's coverage did not focus on the "superficially
enhanced houses" across from the school painted and resodded for the anniversary,
but on what was happening inside the building. Like other publications, the news
magazine tested the city's claims and "produced a story about how white kids get put
into honor classes disproportionately while black kids get left behind disproportionately."
Even more embarrassing, "they published a picture of a non-honors class, predominately
black, a couple of kids with their heads on their desks, perhaps asleep." Brummett
acerbically commented, "City fathers apparently forgot to transfer black students to honor
classes for that particular week." The lesson to be learned? "You can't fake it," the
columnist concluded. 123
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Skip Rutherford had been designated to coordinate public relations activities
related to the anniversary. He attempted to minimize any damage to the city's reputation
by emphasizing that the racial inequities on display in Little Rock were commonplace
throughout the nation. "Little Rock's disparity gap is America's disparity gap," he said,
"no different than you find in Dallas, Detroit or Chicago." 124 This explanation borrowed
from the same logic that undergirded the school district's attempt to escape from court
oversight in the 1990s. It had also been written into the Central High Museum and
Visitor Center exhibit text, which noted that Little Rock was no longer the "sole
battleground" in the desegregation struggle and "that the rest of the United States was not
immune to these problems." For many who argued from this perspective, ongoing
inequities in the city's school system were not the product of local decisions,
administrative actions, or educational policies. Rather, they were so widespread that
Little Rock and other communities should be absolved of any responsibility for
addressing them. This rhetoric obscured, perpetuated, and naturalized racial injustice,
just as claims about an immutable and unchangeable "southern way of life" had forty
years earlier.

In this context, John Walker and the local NAACP actively discouraged the Little
Rock Nine from participating in the anniversary commemoration. 125 However, after years
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of relative public silence, the group of former students collectively decided that the time
was right to return to Little Rock and use their story to effect change. In her recently
published memoir, Carlotta Walls LaNier recalled, "I wanted to see Little Rock
acknowledge its past, as ugly as it was, but it was equally important to me that
participants in the commemoration not get stuck there." 126 After multiple conference
calls among themselves, the members of the Little Rock Nine decided to participate in
the events planned for the anniversary as a group. However, they refused to publicly
endorse the project until they anniversary commission provided them with information
about the schedule of events. According to Elizabeth Grobmyer, "The Nine wanted a
pledge that there would be maximum student involvem~nt, adequate minority
representation in the events, and a guarantee that this event enjoyed the support of both
the government and the general public." 127 After President Clinton announced his
intention to use the fortieth anniversary as the occasion to launch a national conversation
about race relations, the Little Rock Nine formally committed to the event. 128 The
President's "Initiative on Race," and his emphasis on persistent discrimination in
America, dovetailed with their own ideas about how to mark the anniversary. In the days
leading up the formal ceremony, the Nine applauded the progress the city had made over
the intervening forty years, but spoke out boldly about ongoing problems in the city's
schools and the academic tracking documented in Central's classrooms.
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Melba Pattillo Beals, a journalist and public relations executive familiar with the
media made it clear that the Little Rock Nine did not view the commemoration as a
victory celebration. "What we're celebrating is the second phase of a war," she said.
"The battle won't be won ... until we can see equal and be seen as equal." 129 Beals
insisted that the battle for integration was always about more than putting bodies together
in a classroom. "Does anybody really think we wanted to go to Central High School
because we wanted to sit next to white people?" asked Beals. "We wanted to go to
Central High School because they were getting Rhodes Scholarships there. We wanted
equal access to opportunities." 13° Central's relatively balanced racial ratios were a mark
of progress, but they meant little ifblack students were not participating in the
institution's celebrated advanced placement and honors courses.
Terrence Roberts, a college professor and clinical psychologist, echoed and
expanded on these comments in an editorial published in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
forty years after he had been escorted up the steps of Central High School by the 101 st
Airborne. Writing in the "name of civil rights for all people," Roberts made it clear that
the anniversary was not an occasion for celebration. The anniversary was a "time for
reflection" and a "time for remembering the past so the future can be better informed."
But Roberts wrote,
as Little Rock's schools remain under federal court orders to desegregate,
as affmnative action programs are being dismantled across the country, as
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statistics continue to show disproportionate contributions of income and
wealth between racial groups, as one social barometer after another
mirrors the dismal state of black people in the poorest strata of our
economic hierarchy, it is clear to me that the time for celebration must be
postponed.... racism is very much alive in America.
To those who suggested that Roberts was "oversensitive" or "paranoid" and blind to the
"stellar accomplishments" of the present, he countered, "I cannot in good conscious
celebrate what some would label progress while so many of my fellow citizens of color
remain oppressed."
Roberts also rejected the rhetoric of"reconciliation" that had swirled around the
anniversary from its inception. He reminded his readers, ''to be reconciled there must
have been some friendship or harmony then in existence that can now be restored." In
this simple statement, the civil rights veteran swept away claims that Little Rock had been
a beacon of racial progress and harmony in the years before the school desegregation
crisis. He urged Little Rock to "confront the past" and "learn from it" rather than
promote and foster a version of history more to its liking. 131 In regards to the city's
schools, Roberts insisted it was time to move beyond "cosmetic" change, time "to stop
playing games about resegregation and integration and go about the business of building a
society that has in it the mechanisms that allow each and every citizen to do what he or
she has the ability to do." 132
Later that day, the anticipated public ceremony unfolded on the steps of Central
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High. 133 Little Rock Mayor Jim Dailey recognized distinguished guests and cabinet
members. He introduced Daisy Bates, the families of the Little Rock Nine and attorneys
Thurgood Marshall and Wiley Branton. In his opening remarks, the Mayor glossed over
the Arkansas State NAACP's decision to boycott the ceremony. He also ignored the
three dozen members of the local branch of the organization who were picketing the
event. Dale H. Charles told reporters who made inquiries about demonstration, "The
Little Rock Nine should not have accepted the invitation to come into this farce." 134 State
Representative Michael Booker carried a sign that read, "Isn't the celebration
premature?" Others carried posters stating, "Forty years later, Racism is alive and well
in Little Rock." Booker told the press, "The whole nation and world were watching this
event, and we wanted people to know that all is not well in Little Rock." 135 Nevertheless,
Dailey blithely welcomed "former and current members of the NAACP and NAACP
Legal Defense Fund from throughout our city, state, and nation" joining the ceremony
and thanked them for their "many contributions both past and present." Finally, the
mayor introduced Republican Governor Mike Huckabee by noting that unlike his
predecessor 40 years ago, this political figure had "been the voice of reason and fairness."
Huckabee's address drew on his experience as a Baptist pastor. He framed the
nation's problems with race relations as a "sin problem" not just a "skin problem." For
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the Governor, the ceremony and the museum exhibition open across the street, amounted
to a kind of public confession of sin and wrongdoing in preparation for true
reconciliation. Drawing a Biblical analogy, Huckabee noted, "In Proverbs it says, he who
conceals his sins does not prosper, but whoever confesses and renounces them will find
mercy." Just as the children oflsrael had wandered in the wilderness for 40 years,
Arkansans had ''wandered around in ambiguity, all kinds of explanations and
justifications" for what happened at Central in 1957. But he stated unequivocally, "today
we come to say once and for all that what happened here 40 years ago was simply wrong,
it was evil, and we renounce it." The actions of the individuals who participated in the
mob "may be forgivable" but they were "not excusable." These were themes he had
addressed throughout the city and state's self-proclaimed ''year of reconciliation."
As a politician, Huckabee acknowledged the controversy surrounding the public
ceremony but tried to tum public objections to his own advantage. To those who said
that the event was little more than a public relations ploy designed to burnish the image of
local politicians, Huckabee suggested that he arid Mayor Jim Dailey had been aware that
people might view the event that way from the start. "We had a great anxiety and fear,"
he said, "that we would end up with little more than simple ceremonies and testimonies
of those of us who are politicians coming to congratulate ourselves for all the things we
had done." However, Huckabee insisted that none of the political figures sitting on the
platform would claim that they were the ones who had "moved this generation." Instead,
he pointed to the bravery and courage of the Little Rock Nine, their parents, and the white
students at Central who had welcomed their peers and "also had to put up with the jeers
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and with the insults." For those who thought that the ceremony would only "open up old
wounds," Huckabee echoed the words of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Letter from

Birmingham City Jail and insisted that a little "tension every now and then" could be a
necessary and positive spur to change. For those who objected to the notion that Little
Rock had something to "celebrate," Huckabee noted that the official name of the event
had been changed from a celebration to a commemoration. 136 In his view, Little Rock
could "celebrate progress" and the "long way" it had traveled in 40 years, but the city and
the state were "not home yet." The city would have to "deal with" the legacy of the
school desegregation crisis until Dr. Martin Luther King's dream that "we will judge
people by the character of their hearts and not by the color of their skin" lived within each
citizen.
Yet, in the final part ofhis speech, Huckabee subtly undercut President Clinton's
planned remarks on his Initiative on Race. Drawing on his belief in the limited role of
government, Huckabee cautioned, "Let me remind us, government can do some things,
but only God can change people's hearts." Government could put children in the same
classrooms, "but government can't make classmates go home and be friends when school
is out." The Governor insisted, "Only God can give us the power to love each other and
respect each other and share life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness with every
American regardless of who he or she is." Huckabee's statements suggested that there
was no further role for government in the arena of race relations- the work that remained

136
This change was made at the request of representatives ofLittle Rock's black community
(Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little
Rock Central High School," 44-45).

445

was moral and personal, and could not be addressed through structural or institutio:q.al
changes. 137 He hoped that the new exhibit in the Little Rock Visitor Center would be a
catalyst for this internal change, a call to all people to stand up against overt expressions
of racism and violence, so that no one could ever ask again, "Why didn't somebody do
something?"
Following the Governor's remarks, First Lady Hillary Clinton introduced Ernest
Green, who spoke on behalf of the Little Rock Nine. Green also pointed to the
importance of individual action and personal responsibility, but urged his audience "to do
something" about the structural inequities and injustices that continued to mark American
society. The lesson to be drawn from the events of 1957, was not, as Huckabee had
suggested, that people did not speak out and act against racial injustice, but that the Little
Rock Nine, their parents, and supportive members of the black community did. 138 As the
courts reconsidered Little Rock's desegregation plan in the months leading up to the 40th
anniversary, school administrators and various experts had testified that there was nothing
that could be done about disparities in black and white student achievement and persistent
patterns of residential segregation. Green acknowledged that the current "general
consensus" among many scholars and social scientists was that the "chasm that exists
between the races .... is so great in length, breadth, and scope that no one can offer real or
137
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viable solutions to bridge that gap, at least not any time soon." Green rejected this
perspective, boldly stating, "I believe they are unequivocally wrong."
Drawing a parallel between past and present, Green noted that his parents and his
peers had rejected the claims of"recognized experts" forty years earlier who claimed that
the structure of American society could not be changed. The parents of the Little Rock
Nine took this stance because they recognized "the promise, the possibilities, and the
unlimited potential of an America united- one nation under God, indivisible with liberty
and justice for all." These "keepers ofthe flame" were "visionaries" who saw the
disparity between "the American dream and the American reality," but were willing to
"sacrifice their own personal comfort to merge the two." Forty years earlier, there were
also those in the white and black communities who said that if African American students
wanted an equal education than "the answer was simply study longer and work harder" in
the educational institutions available to them. "They were wrong," Green said, and
implied that those who made similar claims in 1997 were mistaken as well. "What we
needed was the same thing to which all young people are entitled," he asserted, "a
community that wanted to see us blossom not bleed, a society that encouraged us to reach
for our dreams and recognized us as whole persons." The Little Rock Nine endured
assaults on their bodies, attacks on their character, and attempts to suffocate their spirits,
because Little Rock was their home, they were determined to shape their own destinies,
and they had an obligation to be of service to the greater community. "Power concedes
nothing without a struggle" in the past or the present, Green insisted. For Central High's
first black graduate, his forty year journey had been painful but it was "well worth it."

447

What he hoped young people would take from his story was "the belief that he or she can
open a door, succeed against the odds, dream the impossible dream, turn no into yes, or
navigate uncharted waters." This anniversary was an occasion to turn the Little Rock
Nine into the "Little Rock 10, 10-hundred, 10-thousand, 10-million" as the nation faced
the challenges of the present. It was an opportunity to recruit the next generation of
social activists.
As Green finished his speech, the crowd erupted in applause. Fatima McKindra,
Central High School's student body president and member of the anniversary
commission, introduced Arkansas native Bill Clinton. 139 Clinton built on Green's speech
and pointed to areas where discrimination persisted and needed to be addressed. The
President claimed that watching the events in Little Rock unfold as a young man fifty
miles away had "made racial equality a driving obsession" in his life. The image of the
mob surrounding Elizabeth Eckford gave the nation a "very disturbing glimpse
ourselves." The desegregation crisis, the mob violence in Arkansas' capital, and the
deployment of the 101 st Airborne and forced him and his white peers to ask themselves,
"Where did we stand? What did we believe? How did we want to live?" As Clinton
addressed his audience, it was clear he hoped to use the anniversary as an opportunity to
honor the Little Rock Nine and to pose these questions once again.
Forty years after the desegregation crisis at Central High, Clinton emphasized,
"there is still discrimination in America." Access to academic excellence and education
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was still not equal. In 1997, children at Central and schools across the nation were
tracked into different academic programs. "Children of every race walk through the same
door but often walk down different halls ... they sit in different classes," Clinton said. The
President pointed to the self-segregation that marked students' social lives, noting that
black and white students frequently ate at separate cafeteria tables or sat in different parts
of the bleachers, "retreating into comfortable enclaves of ethnic isolation." In other
communities, many schools were composed entirely of one racial or ethnic group. In
America, Clinton asserted, "segregation is no longer the law, but too often separation is
the rule." The stubborn persistence of these trends had prompted "many Americans of all
races .... to give up on the idea of integration and the search for common ground." The
President made it clear that he found these trends alarming. Moreover, he warned, ''the
alternative to integration is not isolation or a new separate but equal. It is disintegration."
The eruption of civil wars and genocide around the globe illustrated that Americans
turned away from the vision of a United States of America at their peril.
Clinton spoke of the lessons the nation had learned from Little Rock and the civil
rights struggles that followed. The campus of Central High was "historical ground" just
as surely as Independence Hall or the battlefield at Gettysburg, locations where the nation
took "another giant step closer to the idea of America." In contrast to Governor
Huckabee's statement, Clinton insisted that the 1957 crisis had illustrated that the federal
government must act to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens. The nation needed
strong civil rights laws upheld by the courts and enforced by the executive. The sacrifices
of the Little Rock Nine demonstrated that freedom "ought to be" but "can never be" free.
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Freedom could only be realized with "responsibility for self, family, and the duties of
citizenship" and "a commitment to building a community of shared destiny and a genuine
sense of belonging." This realization was a call to action in the present. All Americans
should embrace "the vision of a color blind society," the President said, "but recognize
that we are not there yet, and we cannot slam shut the doors of educational and economic
opportunity." In direct contrast to the rhetoric surrounding achievement gaps in Little
Rock, Clinton also urged communities to set high academic standards for all school
children so that they would not replace "the tyranny of segregation with the tragedy of
low expectations."
Clinton's Presidential Initiative on Race was primarily an appeal for "a candid
conversation" on the state of race relations, in hope of creating a national dialogue that
would inspire citizens and public figures to take action. In Little Rock, the President
urged his audience to reach out to others who were "different from themselves" and begin
a frank discussion about these issues. 140 Ultimately, Clinton's Initiative on Race would
be described as a failure that inspired "talking about talking bluntly about race" but no
concrete policy initiatives. 141 To many, it seemed like anemic response to organized
efforts to unravel civil rights victories won in the 1950s and 1960s. When Clinton's
advisory board on race relations finally released its recommendations in early 1999, it
140

In Little Rock, the National Conference of Christians and Jews did sponsor a conference during
the 40th anniversary commemoration specifically to discuss the issue of education ("Central anniversary
schedule of events," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 3).
141

Jim Lehrer quoted in "Clinton at Race Forum, Is Confronted on Affirmative Action," New York
Times, July 9, 1998, p. 23, and in Renee M. Smith, "The Public Presidency Hits the Wall: Clinton's
Presidential Initiative on Race," Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 4 (Fall1998), p. 783; Hugh B.
Price, "Actions Speak Louder," Arkansas State Press, October 23, 1997, p. 7; Manning Marable, "A
Conversation on Race," Arkansas State Press, October 2, 1997, p. 5.

450

was dismissed in some quarters as little more than "a list ofplatitudes."142 Arguably,
Clinton's address in Little Rock set the tone for the initiative's outcome. He viewed the
anniversary of the crisis as an opportunity to take stock of how far the nation had traveled
since 1957, what it had learned, and what its challenges were in the present. He also used
the occasion to call for a kind of public engagement that might produce consensus about
where the nation should move in the future. He urged his audience, "let us resolve to
stand on the shoulders of the Little Rock Nine, and press on with confidence in the hard
and noble work ahead." However, he did not use his keynote address to outline specific
policies, legislative initiatives, or plans of action. 143
At the end of Clinton's address, the President, Governor of Arkansas, and Mayor
of Little Rock, climbed the steps to the front door of Central High School. The Little
Rock Nine left their seats and slowly followed as cameras rolled and the audience
watched. Reaching the fmal flight of stairs, they stopped, stood in a line, and waved in
response to a roar of applause. Carlotta Walls LaNier described the moment,
Thousands of people of all races, local residents as well as guests from all
over the world, assembled at the school to welcome us home. They
applauded and stood to their feet as we were presented. Then the nine of
us ascended the steps to the front entrance of our alma mater. President
Clinton and Governor Mike Huckabee were waiting there and held open
the door for us- a gesture that touched all nine of us deeply. Forty years
earlier, we had entered those doors under the protection of gun-toting
federal troopers, against the will of the state's segregationist governor.
Now, the president of the United States and a very different Arkansas
governor stood at the door to usher us through. There were few dry eyes
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among us. 144
As the final student stepped across the threshold, a voice intoned, "Ladies and
Gentleman, history_is again made at Central High School."
This was the image that Skip Rutherford and the others involved in the
anniversary plans hoped with speak louder than any controversial statements from those
who opposed the commemoration. They hoped this image would mark a turning point in
how the world viewed Little Rock. This occasion was "historic"in its own right. Some
members of the Little Rock Nine were among the first to recognize the power of their
return to Central. Terrence Roberts told reporters, "I felt like I was taking part in a very
important symbol-making ceremony.... The symbols of 1957 were still there, and today
we were making a totally new symbol. Symbols are important. They're like rites of
passage." 145 Minnijean Brown Trickey concurred, "It was pretty strong symbolism,
exactly the kind of drama that must happen so that people realize that we are taking this
seriously." She continued, "How do we undo 40 years ago the governor saying no? We
reverse it, we tum it around and do it over." 146
Despite the tone of reconciliation and recommitment struck by local, state, and
national political figures at the official 401h anniversary commemoration, not everyone in
Little Rock was thrilled with the picture of the city presented to the world- past or
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present- or the calls to action articulated at the event. Jim Johnson, the segregationist
candidate who had challenged Orval Faubus and pressured him to prevent the
desegregation of Central High School or face electoral defeat, wrote an editorial
articulating his take on the so-called "Central High School crisis."147 News writers,
historians, and politicians were reluctant to "recognize or understand the states' rights
issue of this constitutional conflict," he complained. This refusal had caused Johnson to
"implore the Lord" to spare him "the intolerance of those who have piously made a career
of advocating tolerance." From Johnson's perspective, the actions of Little Rock Nine
were not heroic, but rather, were a "belligerent intrusion into the lives of over 2,000
Central High students." Although they had become "proficient in reciting 'all the
troubles they've seen,"' Johnson suggested that many Central students in the last 40 years
also had stories to tell about racial violence that were directly related to the presence of
African American students and gangs in the school. 148 In another published statement
Johnson claimed that the results of the city's "experiment in social engineering" was a
lack of control over local schools and dictatorship by the federal government, forced
busing and "race mixing," reverse discrimination and the application of"quotas," the
establishment of elite private schools, and a school district that was "progressively"
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moving toward resegregation. 149 White parents of school children in Little Rock were
"reconciled" to the reality of integration in the city, he said, so reconciled that they moved
away to white suburban communities to avoid emolling their children in the school
system. They did so, not "because of bigotry or hate," Johnson maintained, but because of
their responsibility to keep their children safe. Johnson ended his comments with an
appeal for a color blind society devoid of the agendas of "special interests" and
"pandering to voting blacks" that would release the school district from ludicrous claims
that Central was still segregated. "If that could happen," he wrote with heavy sarcasm,
"we could have true reconciliation and with great conviction fmally sing that old spiritual,
'Free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty, I'm free at last."' 150
John R. Starr, a columnist for the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette who frequently
derided the school district's desegregation efforts and called for the return of local
control, was provoked by the NAACP demonstrations protesting the city's celebration of
racial progress. The complaints of John Walker and other black leaders "clucking their
tongues" about the lack of change were "hogwash," Starr claimed. "We're not where we
should be," he admitted, "but it should have become obvious by now that we're not going
to get there by government coercion." Echoing the words of Governor Huckabee, Starr
asserted that the "last step in the civil rights movement will be a change in the hearts of
men." But unlike the Governor, Starr did not believe that this change would be inspired
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by "dwelling on the evils of slavery and Jim Crowism" or by visiting the Central High
Museum and Visitor Center. Starr stated, "However much we may regret past
mistreatment of minorities in this country, that is behind us." The editor dismissed
claims that discrimination persisted in the city and the nation as a whole. He urged black
leaders who had "made fortunes" out of civil rights litigation, and white advocates who
preached about but did not participate in integration, "to sit down and quit telling the rest
of us to live together." "The Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity," he wrote,
"not equality of result." He went on to posit that ifthe wealth and resources ofthe
country were pooled and divided equally among all citizens, within a year differences in
income, status, and station would reassert themselves. Just like test scores and other
measures of academic success, these distinctions were the result of inherent differences.
Starr concluded, "I'd be willing to bet that the same folks would be in essentially the
same conditions then as now."
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Ironically, these conclusions, written by the Arkansas

Democrat's former managing editor and a columnist for the capital's newspaper of
record, unwittingly supported the claims of the local NAACP that not much had changed
in Little Rock after all.
Wesley Pruden, editor and chief of the conservative Washington Times, also.
weighed in on the commemoration. Pruden's father had been a leader of the
segregationist resistance in the city in 1957, and he objected to Little Rock's attempt to
showcase its progress through "denunciations of the past and everyone in it." The editor
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described the events as "Holier Than Thou Week down home," an opportunity for the
"Nice People of Little Rock" to bask in the "raucous music of piety, pretense, and selfcongratulation." Figures like Orval Faubus, and vocal segregationists made convenient
villains that allowed "white merrymakers .... to remember how noble they were when
everybody else was bad." The occasion also allowed politicians like Bill Clinton, "whose
career grew out of the culture of deceit and double-dealing that made 'the Little Rock
crisis' inevitable" to pose for the cameras. Pruden felt it was unfair and unwarranted to
call those who vocally and demonstrably resisted desegregation in the city "evil." Like
most southerners at the time, "they were men and women imprisoned in the own
experience." Moreover, the editor reminded his readers that even those who "counseled
desegregation" in 1957 did so to avoid "real integration," and only after they had built a
new high school for the "Episcopalian precincts" in the wealthier areas of the city so that
their own children would not participate in it. The real legacy ofLittle Rock, was an "old
story" of "rich liberal whites prescribing for others the medicine they had no intention of
taking themselves," Pruden insisted. 152
For their part, white student leaders from the class of 1958 continued to believe
that they were being unfairly cast in the same mold as Orval Faubus and members of the
mob outside the school. They wanted to be counted among the ''Nice People of Little
Rock." Student body president Ralph Brodie and senior class representative Craig Rains
announced their intention to write a book that would tell the "whole story" about "what
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did- and more importantly- what did not- happen inside Central." 153 Despite revisions to
the exhibit text, Brodie referred to the newly opened museum exhibit as an exercise in
"civic masochism." He asserted, "To invite visitors to our city just to show them our
warts with none of the positive I think is terrible." The former student body president felt
the actions of the vast majority of students at Central had gone "unrecognized" in the
commemorative events. 154
Craig Rains had been a sitting member of the anniversary commission, and as a
public relations professional, had initially been assigned the responsibility of working
with the media during the anniversary. However, these duties were reassigned to Skip
Rutherford after Rains voiced his objections to a draft of the museum exhibit and
Chairman Rett Tucker concluded he could not be a "team player" and stay on message.
Rains told UALR public history student Elizabeth Grobmyer that he hoped to use his
position on the commission to disseminate his perspective on the Central High crisis.
Grobmyer noted that the former student representative, "pointed to his choice of material
for use on the Central High School website as an opportunity to tell his side of the 1957
story." 155 Indeed, on the 40th anniversary's official website, Rains archived editorials
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from Central's student newspaper The Tiger to provide readers with "an idea of how the
2,000 students at Central faced the historic desegregation process from inside." The web
text assured visitors that these materials were "guaranteed open your eyes." On this
public interface, Rains minimized the harassment endured by the nine black students and
suggested that they had been welcomed by their white peers. The site asserted that "for
every act of harassment" in the school '"there were 100 acts of acceptance." Students felt
obligated to obey the law and were committed to getting a "first-class" education.
"Many" white students "helped the black students try to achieve the same thing, even
though they were faced with pressures that were very difficult for teenagers to
comprehend. " 156

In a public statement issued after the anniversary, Brodie and Rains expressed
their belief that the city and the state could and should take "pride in the attitude and
conduct of Central's 1957-58 faculty and student body and their positive contribution to
America's desegregation process." The student leaders acknowledged that the black
students were subjected to "sporadic harassment from a very small group" of Central
students, but claimed that 97 percent of students had sent a "powerful message" by
ignoring the demagoguery surrounding the integration of their school and going about
their studies. "Looking back," Brodie and Rains wrote in an editorial, "it is easy for some
to be critical ofthe students for not taking more active stands," but they insisted, "the
truth is that most white students did what they felt was right and all they knew how to
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do." 157 These student leaders were not only asking for public recognition that they had
minded their own business during the crisis, they were asking to be commended for it. 158
They seemed to be offering more of the ambiguous explanations and justifications
Governor Huckabee had explicitly and unequivocally renounced in his address at the
commemorative ceremony.

But more than these public expressions of discontent and dissatisfaction, perhaps
the most serious betrayal of the anniversary commemoration's purported purpose- its
calls for social justice and a recommitment to equal opportunity for all people-- was the
Little Rock School District's decision to present its proposed Revised Desegregation and
Education Plan the very next day in federal court. As noted in the previous chapter, this
plan proposed an elimination of satellite zones, a reduction in busing, and a return to
neighborhood schools. Moving forward, integration in the city would be promoted
through voluntary mechanisms like minority-to-majority transfers or emollment in
magnet and intradistrict schools. School officials believed that a tum away from
mandatory measures and efforts to maintain racially balanced schools would reduce white
flight. Although the city promised to improve minority student achievement, equalize
educational opportunities, and reduce racial disparities in discipline, its programs aimed
at achieving those goals to date had proven ineffective.
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Speaking at the "People's Celebration" held at the historically black Philander
Smith College on behalf ofthe Little Rock Nine, Dr. Terrence Roberts directly addressed
this issue. The People's Celebration had been organized by Arkansas State Press editor
and planning committee member Janetta Kearney as an alternative to the events organized
by the anniversary commission which she believed had been developed without
substantial minority representation. 159 As he addressed the gathering, Roberts stated
forthrightly, "In this national dialogue about... whether desegregation is still important,
the Little Rock Nine are firmly committed to the desegregation of schools." He called for
a ongoing commitment to integration and the kinds of improvements the school district
outlined in their plan. Roberts clarified, "We are talking about total access. We want it
all. We don't just want a taste." 160
Despite the President Clinton's warning that there was no "new separate but
equal," and that abandonment of the integration ideal would only lead to national
"disintegration," the Little Rock School District forged ahead with plans that would result
in more racially isolated schools. District officials accepted the "general consensus"

rejected by Ernest Green that the "chasm" between the test scores of black and white
students could not be breached. They pointed to the same national trends Skip
Rutherford's public relations team had used to deflect criticism ofLittle Rock's schools.
"Little Rock's disparity gap is America's disparity gap," they reasoned. Persistent
residential segregation, white flight, and other factors which undermined stable racial
159
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balance in the school system were beyond their control or the control of other government
officials. Like Governor Huckabee, they argued that local government had done
everything it could to address segregation and discrimination in education. Further
progress in the field of race relations would depend on individual changes ofheart. The
majority of Little Rock's residents, like the majority of white students at Central High
School forty years earlier, maintained a position of "peaceful neutrality" in relation to the
school district's proposed plans. They too, stood in silent witness as the city presented a
"desegregation" plan designed to appease white parents concerned about rising African
American enrollments and the "blackening" of the school system.
The position of the Little Rock School District suggested that the city had been
more interested in "talking about talking about race," and racial progress, than actually
working towards it. The school system's effort to escape both court oversight and a
commitment to real and lasting desegregation that could undermine racial discrimination,
confirmed the charges of the NAACP that the fortieth anniversary had been little more
than a "public relations venture" designed to escape the past rather than learn from it.
Little Rock, like other southern cities, seemed convinced that "the best way to put your
bad images to rest is to declare them history and put them in a museum."
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CHAPTER NINE
"THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH":
THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITARY STATUS,

1998-2009

The Revised Desegregation and Education Plan (1998) was approved by all the
parties in the long-running Little Rock school desegregation case and designed to last for
a period of three years. At the end of the term, in 2001, the Little Rock school district
would be presumed unitary and released from court supervision unless it could be
demonstrated that it had failed to make a "good faith" effort to meet its obligations under
the plan. Notably, an important footnote stipulated that the district did not actually need
to "obtain any of the goals" enumerated in the plan, it merely had to try to reach those
goals by following the "strategies described in the plan and polices, practices and
procedures developed" to remove vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable. 1
Presumably, this demonstration of good faith would assure the court and the black
intervenors in the case that LRSD would continue to work toward creating an equitable
educational environment even after court-release.
In the spring of2000, the Little Rock school district voluntarily filed an Interim
Compliance Report detailing its efforts to fulfill the terms of the Revised Plan. School
officials hoped that the preparation of this document would help the district assess its
own progress and provide the other parties in the case with an opportunity to make

1

Footnote 2, as described in Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District
No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 60.

462

comments or suggestions about the format and content of the report before the 2001
deadline. The document was also designed to "reassure the court, the parties, and the
community of the District's good faith efforts to be in total compliance with the Revised
Plan." No objections to the report, or the policies and procedures described in it, were
filed by the African American plaintiffs or their representatives. 2
Consequently, as the 2001 deadline approached, the Little Rock school district
operated under the assumption that it would granted unitary status by the federal court
soon after it filed its Final Compliance Report. In anticipation of this return of local
control, the Little Rock school board adopted a "Covenant for the Future" in which it
pledged to continue to provide schools with equitable resources, to work toward
improving the academic achievement of all students, and to maintain a nondiscrimination
policy. Essentially, school administrators and board members promised not to return to
"old practices" after being released from court supervision. As board member Baker
Kurrus explained, "I would simply say that at all times we should be doing the same, both
before and after unitary status, and that it would be my hope and endeavor that we always
would do these things and that we would never forget about our mission."3
However, despite the district's optimism, this quick denouement did not unfold as
planned. The Joshua intervenors, who represented the African American schoolchildren
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in the district, filed a number of objections to the fmal compliance report. While they
acknowledged that the district had employed most of the practices and procedures listed
in the Revised Plan, they charged that the district continued to operate under a
"compliance mentality." The intervenors argued that district employees had deployed the
strategies described in the plan mechanically without any intent to or belief that they
actually could eliminate racial disparities, and thus had failed to meet their "'good faith
obligation" to at least try to do so. This argument and others, particularly related to
student achievement and its assessment, stretched the school desegregation litigation well
into its fifth decade through a series of reports, objections, decisions, and appeals that
were not resolved until2009.
As this process unraveled, some African American members of the school board
began to question whether it was in the best interest of the school district to pursue
unitary status if the they meant to preserve the relatively desegregated schools that
remained within the district's boundaries. In the first decade of the twenty-first century,
Supreme Court decisions made it increasingly clear that unitary districts would not be
permitted to maintain student assignment plans that took race into consideration, despite
the fact that those plans were designed to maintain diversity. Moreover, in Little Rock, a
declaration of unitary status threatened to cut off the flow of millions of dollars of
desegregation aid from the state of Arkansas that was used to fund voluntary programs
like magnet schools and interdistrict student transfers. If the board had adopted its
"covenant for the future" in "good faith," some members wondered whether it would be
possible to fulfill those promises without the legal protection of a court order. It became
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increasingly clear that the school board would not be able to do "the same, both before
and after unitary status." Unitary status could change everything.

Partial Release
On March 15, 2001, the Little Rock School District filed its Final Compliance
Report with the U.S. District Court, which supplemented and updated the Interim Report
it submitted one year earlier. The district maintained that it had fulfilled all the
obligations listed in the Revised Plan and petitioned for an immediate declaration of
unitary status. The Joshua intervenors conceded that the school district had fulfilled its
promises related to the hiring of faculty and staff, provisions for special education, efforts
to increase parental involvement, and school construction and closings. They also did not
raise any objections about patterns of student assignment in the district, since the Revised
Plan had permitted a return to geographic attendance zones and weakened racial balance
requirements. However, Joshua did argue that the district was not in substantial
compliance with the plan in six areas, including their obligation to implement the plan in
"good faith," and efforts to remediate racial disparities in student discipline, academic
achievement, advanced placement classes, extracurricular activities, and guidance
counseling.4
From the perspective of the African American intervenors involved in the case,
many of these shortcomings were interrelated. Their attorneys argued that the district had
done little or nothing to remediate the achievement gap. Although the district had
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implemented a number of programs designed to improve African American achievement
and test scores on standardized tests, it had not fulfilled its obligation to evaluate those
programs in order to determine which were working and to replace those that were not. 5
The district's own test scores revealed an achievement gap ranging from 30-45% between
African American students and their white counterparts. Moreover, disparities became
more pronounced as students moved through the system. The intervenors noted, "the gap
starts off wide and gets wider with the active aid of district officials. Clearly, the longer
the Black students stay in the Little Rock School District, the farther behind they get."6
Indeed, the intervenors argued that the district's policies actively worked against
narrowing the achievement gap. When the district courted white families and encouraged
them to enroll their children in the public schools, officials "promised a different
education for ...white students." Because white students were a minority in the school
district, they were more likely to be admitted to magnet schools and other special
programs. Moreover, two-thirds of white students in the district were in enrolled in
enriched or advanced placement classes. The Joshua intervenors argued that guidance
counselors were not encouraging African American students to take advantage of the
same programs, and noted that regular and remedial sections were "primarily black" and
racially identifiable academic tracks were evident throughout the district's schools. The
intervenors concluded, "The district is thus one of substance for white students and staff,
5
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especially those who are within the sphere of influence of the economic and political
activities of the area, and one of show for the Black students and much of its staff."7
For their part, school district administrators testified that they had not promised to
close the achievement gap in the Revised Plan. Rather, they had promised to create
programs designed to improve African American achievement. From their perspective, if
they had implemented those programs, they had fulfilled their obligations. As
Superintendent Les Carnine explained the district's position, "We adopted programs to
remediate [the achievement] of African-American students. We believed that by doing so
we would effectively close the gap. But those are two separate things."8 Joshua argued
that this attitude was an indication ofbad faith. The African American attorneys argued,
It would be farcical for the court to approve relief upon the premise that
unitization has occurred when we have schools within schools, and where
the future holds great promise for a good education for those who start off
in the system doing best. The court is asked to require that the plan be
implemented as promised and that the district be disabused of the notion
that all it has to do is provide paperwork to the court to show the court
what it plans to do without having to be held accountable for actual
accomplishments.9

From the perspective of the black plaintiffs, the argument that the district did not have "to
deliver" on the plans was unacceptable and was an indication that Little Rock school
administrators had never taken their obligations seriously.
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Little Rock's newspaper of record, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, dismissed
these objections as frivolous. The newspaper's editorial page repeatedly insinuated that
African American Attorney John Walker continued to pursue his case against the district
in order to rack up more legal fees. 10 Walker rebutted these allegations, but frequently
refused to grant interviews to the newspaper's reporters because of the editorial board's
hostile position. 11 Columnist Dana D. Kelley led the charge against the lawsuit,
dismissing Walker's case as "hooey" and resurrected many of the same arguments that
had been wielded in the past. According to Kelley, students in schools and residents in
neighborhoods segregated themselves voluntarily- "not as adversaries, but just as a result
of human nature." The achievement gap was not the product of discrimination, but low
levels of parental involvement in the African Americ~ community and high numbers of
single-parent, female-headed households. 12 From Kelley's perspective, the Joshua
intervenors "might have a better case pushing for a social indictment against black
deadbeat dads, whose irresponsibility creates family situations in which the outcome of
children as students is statistically predictable, regardless of the quality of the school they
attend." Kelley proceeded to trot out other stereotypes in support of her argumentcomplaining that African American activists never objected to racial disparities when
they worked in their favor and pointing to the disproportionate number of black athletes
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in the National Basketball Association. Kelley objected to the kind of identity politics
associated with the "hyphenated American," suggesting that class-action lawsuits such as
the one being argued in Little Rock "marginalize[d] national identity and create[d] a
distorted sense of kinship." Kelley suggested that the litigants should embrace the
benefits and privileges they enjoyed as Americans. "African-American activists,
curiously, never want to extend the comparisons of their lot in life with their counterparts
in Africa, the bulk of whom would trade places with them in an instant," she remarked.
This script harkened back to the 1950s. Indeed Kelley even raised the specter of
communism, comparing "coercive and often divisive government policy" designed by
federal courts to remove racial disparities to the procedures of a "ruthless dictatorial
government." Even the communists, the writer noted, had failed to eliminate differences
in "health, education, employment level and social status." These disparities were
unalterable "facts oflife." 13
However, while listening to testimony related to these issues, U.S. District Judge
Susan Weber Wright seemed to think Walker's case had some merit and expressed her
own concerns about African American student achievement. In the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, the district was not constitutionally obligated to
close the achievement gap. Nevertheless, the Revised Plan was a contractual agreement
and under section 2. 7 it required the district to implement "policies, programs, and
procedures designed to improve and remediate the academic achievement of African
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American students." The LRSD was also required to assess each of these programs to
determine if they were effective. If they were ineffective, the district was required to
modify or replace the programs. 14
Judge Wright was particularly concerned that about the assessment provisions of
the plan. The district claimed it had conducted informal assessments, not written
evaluations, of the programs on a year-to-year basis. District Attorney Chris Heller
argued that the plan did not stipulate that the assessments had to be in writing. Wright
rejected this argument, asking him, "Typically assessments like that, if they're going to be
monitored [by a court], would have to be in writing, wouldn't you agree?" 15 A few
months later, Wright expressed even more irritation with the district when it became
evident that several evaluations referred to in its Final Compliance Report had not been
completed or were only in draft form when the document was filed. These inaccuracies
threatened not only to undermine the district's claims that it was in substantial
compliance with section 2.7, but also its contentions that it was taking its obligations
seriously and operating in good faith in its reports to the court. 16
Shortly thereafter, LRSD attorneys filed a motion to remove Wright from the case
after she publicly expressed skepticism that the district had fulfilled its obligations.
Wright refused to recuse herself, indicating that the timing of the motion implied that the
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district felt the hearings were not going well. "The [district] may harbor fear that its
'litigatory milk is about to curdle,"' she suggested. "The LRSD's sudden fear, whether
justified or not, does not provide good reason for this court to recuse. The hearing will go
forward." 17
Ultimately, Judge Wright did step down from the case when scheduled hearings
were delayed, and Judge William R. Wilson Jr. became the third federal judge to oversee
this phase of the litigation. In the final days of the hearings overseen by Wilson, Terrence
Roberts, one of the Little Rock Nine, testified about the attitudes he had encountered
while working as a desegregation consultant for the district. The Revised Plan required
LRSD to hire a professional like Roberts to help implement its provisions. 18 Roberts
suspected that the district's decision to hire him was "strictly public relations." As he put
it, "They could dangle me out in front of the public and say, 'See how good we are?'
We've actually hired Terry Roberts." Nevertheless, as he later recalled, he decided to
take the job to "get within the system and begin to try to figure out how to do some things
that could spark some change from inside." 19 As a consultant and clinical psychologist,
Roberts had visited schools and spoken with administrators. He concluded that "racist
attitudes were widespread" among district personnel, so he developed workshops
designed to help district employees cope with difference and understand their own
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attitudes toward diversity. 20 Roberts felt that many of the 500 to 600 workers who
participated in the program "came kicking and screaming... many were openly resistant
throughout." In his opinion, administrators were willing to maintain only "surface
involvement" and "agreed basically to go through the motions."21 In his testimony in the
court hearings, Roberts accused district officials of adopting a "compliance mentality."
Their interest was in "meeting the letter of the law" in order "to be released from court
supervision." The focus of the administration was not, "Let's do this because we are
interested in providing the most effective education plan we can devise for kids.'m This
preoccupation with fulfilling the requirements of the settlement agreement, in lieu of a
deeply-rooted commitment to addressing problems in the school district, raised concerns
for Roberts about what the district would do once it attained unitary status and was no
longer required to work toward addressing racial discrimination. Roberts predicted that he
would no longer be asked to serve as a consultant without the court mandate.23
In his recently published memoir, Terrence Roberts reflected on his testimony and

the moments immediately before he was called to appear before the court. In preparation,
he spoke with attorney John Walker and asked him what he thought would happen if the
courts ruled in favor ofLRSD. As Roberts recalled, Walker replied, "We will get due
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process, but we will not get equal protection." Roberts concurred with this assessment.
For him, the proceedings carried an undertone of traditional southern justice, where white
defendants [in this case plaintiffs] were put on trial and declared "NOT GUILTY!!!" He
later wrote, "As I waited my tum to testify in the district's case, my eyes wandered
around the room, and suddenly it hit me: I was staring into the faces of all the past
justices of the court. Their portraits were arrayed along the walls, and they all stared back
at me in silent monochromatic assent that this was their courtroom, not mine."24
After reviewing the briefs, testimony, and evidence in the case, Judge William
Wilson granted the Little Rock school district partial unitary status, releasing it from
court supervision in all areas except its obligation to assess and modify programs related
to improving African American achievement. In his opinion, Wilson acknowledged
Roberts testimony, accepting his observations, but rejecting his interpretation of the
district's "compliance mentality." Wilson wrote, "it is one of the bedrock principles of
school desegregation litigation that a school district can only emerge from federal court
supervision after it has carefully dotted all the I' s and crossed all the T' s necessary to
establish that it is operating in unitary and constitutional fashion." The compliance
mentality Roberts observed, Wilson concluded, was not due to indifference. Rather, it
was a "inevitable negative long-running byproduct" of the litigation itself. Removing the
district from court supervision would allow teachers and administrators to focus on the
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education of their students.25
When negotiating the terms of the Revised Plan, the Joshua intervenors had
accepted the burden of proving that LRSD had not fulfilled its obligations successfully. 26
This decision had dramatic and substantial consequences. In the normal course of a
school desegregation case, the Little Rock school district would have been responsible for
proving that it had dotted every I and crossed every T. In this case, it was presumed that
the district had done so, unless the intervenors could prove otherwise. And in Wilson's
assessment, the "isolated and anecdotal evidence" presented by Joshua failed to meet this
threshold. "There can be no question," he wrote, "that LRSD administrators, principals,
and teachers took their responsibilities under the Revised Plan seriously and exercised
their best efforts to comply with each section of the document." Wilson found that the
district had operated in "good faith" and expressed confidence "that LRSD can be trusted,
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in the future, to operate the Little Rock school system in compliance with the
Constitution, without the need for federal court supervision in those areas in which I
decide it is unitary.'m
The only area where Joshua had amassed sufficient evidence to prove that the
Little Rock school district had not substantially complied with the settlement agreement
was in its commitment to assess programs related to student achievement. Wilson
accepted the district's argument that it had no obligation to close the achievement gap.
While the district had made the commitment to do so in the original settlement agreement
in 1989, the Revised Plan accepted by the parties in 1998 stipulated that the district only
had to implement "policies, programs, and procedures designed to improve and remediate
the academic achievement of African-American students.'' Wilson found that the district
had implemented "many dozens" of programs and policies designed with this goal in
mind. While the district's test score results were "far from where they need to be," the
court determined that this was irrelevant. 28 However, Wilson found that the district had
done more than merely promise to implement programs. It had also promised to
professionally assess the programs to determine whether they were effective, and
promised to modify or replace those that were not producing results. In court, the Joshua
intervenors uncovered e-mail communication between district officials related to
deficiencies in the evaluation program, and were able to produce evidence that
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evaluations of some of the programs listed in the district's Final Compliance Report had
not been completed. The district's argument that it made informal and unwritten
assessments of programs from year-to-year was insufficient. Judge Wilson found that
LRSD's commitment to assess these programs was "crucial" and that the purpose of this
section of the plan was to make sure that the programs implemented "actually worked."
The district would remain under court supervision in this area alone for at least another
two years. School officials were ordered to complete the evaluations enumerated in the
district's Final Compliance Report that were in draft form or based on insufficient data.
Officials were also required to keep written records of all annual program assessments in
the future and to contract external professional evaluations of"key programs."29
The lawyers for the Joshua intervenors expressed their dismay in the wake of the
ruling and promised to appeal it. "Our position is the schools have become resegregated,
with the approval of persons in positions of responsibility," John Walker explained.
"You cannot have a desegregated school district when black students are treated
differently."30 Dale Charles, President of the Little Rock and Arkansas conference of
branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
decried the decision, calling it "The Second Crisis in Little Rock Public Schools." From
Charles' perspective, African American students found themselves in a worse position
than their predecessors in 1957. "In 1957 we could rely on the courts for some relief," he
29
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said, "but today we cannot depend on the courts to enforce the law." The low test scores
of black children in the district refuted claims by the school board and the courts that
"everything is fme." He called on voters to elect school board members who would be
committed to closing the achievement gap with or without the help of the courts. 31
For their part, school district officials embraced Wilson's decision as a historic
milestone. "It validates the good work that has gone into removing those vestiges of the
past," Superintendent Ken James asserted. "It gets us beyond the stigma of being under
court monitoring on an ongoing basis."32 School Board member Baker Kurrus expressed
his surprise that the NAACP would continue to criticize the district after the District
Court affirmed that administrators had successfully eliminated vestiges of discrimination
from the system. "It's not a situation where there are winners or losers. It is a statement
by the court validating everything that you would think the NAACP would want to
know," he said. "It's unbelievable that they [the NAACP] continue to look backwards
and they continue to think of the Little Rock district in terms of a 1960s race case when
we have transcended that. We have just got to focus on our mission, which is to help all
our students, most of whom are black. " 33
Walker and his team were not reassured by Kurrus' assessment that black students
in the district were doing "exceedingly well." They pursued an appeal of Wilson's
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decision, but the district court's order granting partial unitary status was affirmed by the
gth

Circuit Court of Appeals in March 2004.34 Within days, the Little Rock school district

filed a new compliance report, asserting that it had worked diligently towards complying
with Wilson's remedy and fulfilling its obligations to assess the programs related to
African American student achievement. They petitioned the court for an immediate
declaration of unitary status. Predictably, Walker refuted this claim, arguing that the
district's two global assessments of 1) literacy and 2) math and science test scores did not
fulfill the district's commitment to evaluate key programs designed to improve African
American achievement. 35
Judge Wilson agreed with the Joshua intervenor's position. After reviewing the
reports, Wilson expressed his consternation that "both the Literacy Evaluation and Math
and Science Evaluation contained only broad generalizations about [white and black]
student achievement based solely on standardized test data." They only analyzed whether
"literacy" or "math and science" scores had improved for a sample of grade levels.
Neither evaluation contained a "specific analysis of which of the dozens of Section 2. 7
programs actually worked in improving African-American achievement in the areas of
literacy, math, and science and which of those programs needed to be modified or
eliminated." LRSD needed to more than survey literacy test scores in general; it was
required to determine which programs- Reading Recovery, Accelerated Reader, Reading
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for All, Early Literacy Reading, Effective Literacy, etc.- had a measurable impact. 36
Without conducting these key "step 2" evaluations, district officials were only making
educated guesses about which programs were effective.
In turn, Little Rock administrators objected to this requirement. They asserted

that the programs they had implemented to improve African American achievement had
been pioneered elsewhere. The school districts that developed them had already
demonstrated their efficacy, and there was no need to verifY their success in LRSD. 37
Little Rock school district attorney Chris Heller contended that no district in the country
conducted formal evaluations of each and every program it put in place- to do so would
cost millions of dollars. 38
In his 2004 decision redirecting the school district back to the drawing board,

Judge Wilson dismissed Little Rock's claim that the evaluations were too costly. "It
seems to me," he wrote, "there is no higher or better use ofLRSD's resources than to
seek to improve the academic achievement ofthe overwhelming majority of its students
who are currently scoring at a discouragingly low level on standardized tests." Moreover,
he noted, the provisions requiring assessment and modification of curricular programs
had been formulated by the school district and approved by the court in 1998. "This is
medicine that LRSD knowingly and voluntarily decided it must take in an attempt to cure
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the historically low academic achievement of so many African-American students."
Wilson encouraged school officials to "realize that LRSD must make the long-term
commitment to solve this problem, not because a federal court says that it must, but
because it is the right thing to do." To this end, Wilson indicated that the district would
need to demonstrate in the future that it had "deeply embedded" a curriculum evaluation
process into its system so that he could be confident that the district would "dutifully
continue" the "battle" to improve African American student achievement even after it
was granted unitary status. 39
In the wake of this 2004 opinion, Little Rock school district officials and their

attorneys continued to protest that the burdens imposed by the district court were too
onerous and went far beyond their understanding of what was required when they agreed
to the Revised Plan. While interim superintendent Morris Holmes seemed resigned to the
court's decision, he worried that a preoccupation with evaluation threatened innovation,
creativity, and morale in the district. He also speculated that "the Little Rock School
District is facing the most rigorous evaluation program in modem time for schools.'"'0
According to the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, School Board member Baker Kurrus also
feared that debate over "two sentences" in the desegregation plan was costing the district
hundreds of thousands of dollars in lawyers' fees and "additional millions of dollars to do
program evaluations, which we are not geared up to do.'' As part of.its order, the district
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court required LRSD to "reinvigorate" its department ofPlanning, Research, and
Evaluation by hiring an expert with a doctorate degree and experience with statistical
analysis. Kurrus complained, "We are not a research institution. We are being blown out
of the tub because we don't know how to evaluate programs; nobody else does either,
incidentally."41
On appeal, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Wilson's order, although it
expressed reservations about the "highly detailed, complex nature" of the remedy. In
response to the district's professed confusion about what was expected of them, Wilson
had gone to great lengths to spell out how many and what kinds of evaluations needed to
be completed, and the standards by which they would be evaluated. He even suggested
what kinds of credentials internal and external professional evaluators should carry. The
Court of Appeals lent some credence to LRSD's contention that some of these
stipulations went ''well beyond those agreed upon by the parties in the Revised Plan" and
that the district court had "come close to crossing the line between proper judicial
enforcement of an agreed-upon undertaking" and the imposition of new requirements.
Nevertheless, the appeals court noted that LRSD had not challenged the court's decision
in 2002 when it first insisted on formalized written evaluations of key programs, and
consequently, the district court did "not clearly err" when it reinforced those provisions in
2004. The Court of Appeals' decision was hardly a ringing endorsement ofWilson's
remedy, and the circuit judges left the door open to revisiting the requirements again if
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the case resurfaced in another appeal. 42

Proposing a New Settlement
In the meantime, the Little Rock School District was required to rework its
evaluation process and resubmit materials proving they had complied with this provision
of the Revised Plan for a third time. The completion of this assessment obligation was
the only thing standing between the district and a declaration of unitary status. However,
it should be noted that the district had been operating under "partial unitary status" since

2002- in every area except for assessment and evaluation, the district had been released
from court supervision. It no longer had to seek approval for changes in a wide range of
school operations, including student assignment, hiring, school construction, academic
placement, and discipline. Under Freeman v. Pitts (1992), the district operated as

if it

were unitary in these areas. Some of the changes associated with this shift, particularly
changes in the student assignment plan and negotiations over state desegregation funding,
indicated that unitary status signified more than a return of local control. Partial unitary
status created new legal concerns and financial problems for the district, and some school
board members began to question whether completely escaping court supervision was a
desirable goal.
The shift in the school board's approach became particularly evident in 2006
when the residents of Little Rock elected a majority-black school board for the first time
in the city's history, increasing the number of African American representatives on the
seven-person board from two to four. Several of the new board members had
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campaigned on issues related to the school desegregation litigation, and Attorney John
Walker had actively supported their election.43 Robert Daughtery, the board's president,
told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette that these electoral victories indicated that the
community was "looking for change" and had elected a board capable of opening a
dialogue with the Joshua intervenors. "In the near future, you'll see the district working
more closely with the other stakeholders in the city," he promised. 44
Indeed, based on his understanding of the views of the majority of board
members, John Walker approached district representatives about settling the case out of
court instead of proceeding with hearings on the third round of program evaluations.
Walker told Judge Wilson that he doubted that the board's black majority saw "eye-toeye" with Little Rock school district attorney Chris Heller. 45 In his proposal to the board,
and in conversations with Heller and representatives of the Office of Desegregation
Monitoring, Walker suggested that he would settle the case out of court if the board was
willing to make a commitment to raising the average scores of black students within at
least 80 percent of the average scores earned by white students. 46
Heller discouraged board members from signing on to such a proposal, noting that
once the district was declared unitary, the board could adopt any measures it desired in
43
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order to improve African American achievement without the burden of new obligations in
a renegotiated settlement agreement. If John Walker was so confident that the board
supported his position, Heller asked, why not remove the case :from court altogether?
"What is there that ought to be done for kids, particularly African-American kids, that
this board is not willing to do? What requirement can Judge Wilson impose that the
board would not voluntarily adopt if it believed it was in the best interest of the children
in the district?" Heller queried. 47
Walker countered that settling the case out of court, instead of pursuing unitary
status, would allow the board to accomplish several objectives. First, regardless of any
future electoral outcomes, a decision to settle out of court and a contractual commitment
to raising test scores would bind all future boards even if they did not support efforts to
maintain racial diversity or targeted programs designed to improve African American
student achievement. A settlement was this school board's opportunity to permanently
stamp its perspective on school district operations. Second, under the settlement, district
administrators would be required to comply or face future consequences in court. If the
board took on this responsibility itself after a declaration of unitary status, members could
be subject to retaliation :from disgruntled voters. The settlement would provide them with
political cover. 48 And finally, Walker warned the board that the pursuit of unitary statusmeaning that the district operated as a single, desegregated system rather than a dual
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system of racially identifiable schools- jeopardized the stream of state desegregation aid
that came to LRSD as a product of the original1989 settlement. Without this money, the
district could be facing a budget shortfall of over $30 million a year and might be forced
to abandon voluntary desegregation programs like magnet schools and interdistrict
transfer programs that were popular with parents and enrolled roughly 10% of public
school students in Pulaski County49 •
Moreover, by 2007, it had become clear to the board that the achievement of
unitary status in areas like student assignment did not mean that they could necessarily do
the "same, before and after" the system was recognized as desegregated. Before a
declaration of unitary status, the Little Rock School District had been required to adopt a
variety of racial balance guidelines, transportation strategies, magnet and incentive
schools, and student transfer programs. However, after a declaration of unitary status,
these very same mechanisms- which were once constitutionally required- became
constitutionally suspect precisely because they considered a student's race when making
school assignments. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
sharply curbed school districts' ability to continue these kinds of desegregation practices

voluntarily, after they were released from the oversight of federal courts. Under the
weight of these decisions, unitary status signified more than the return of local control; it
also curbed local school boards' ability to utilize race-based strategies designed to
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maintain diversity.
Student Assignment and Racial Classifications
By 2007, Little Rock's school board had become aware of a strong trend towards
the resegregation of the city's schools as it changed its assignment policies in relation to
these decisions. Under the Revised Plan adopted in 1998, the Little Rock School District
had returned to a student assignment plan that assigned most students to schools based on
their residential location. The district abandoned the use of satellite zones that brought
students from distant neighborhoods together within the same school. District officials
maintained that changing demographics in the district had limited the zones'
effectiveness- in some cases black students from the central city were being bused to
schools that were once predominantly white but had become predominantly black.
Central High- the district's most closely watched school- was exempted from this change
and retained the large west Little Rock satellite zone that allowed it maintain racial
balance under the glare of the media spotlight. 50
However, although school officials suggested that the use of satellite zones had a
negligible impact on school desegregation, it quickly became clear that their abolishment
had a significant effect. Before the satellite zones were eliminated, only four of the
district's schools had enrollments that were more than 90% African American. With the
return to neighborhood student assignments, nine of the district's schools had enrollments
that were predominantly black, and an additional four elementary schools had enrollments
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that were predominantly white. 51 The district continued to maintain voluntary
desegregation mechanisms, including magnet schools, incentive or specialty schools, and
student transfer programs. Nevertheless, despite these provisions, almost 70% of the
city's middle and elementary schools fell outside the 40/60 ratio the district had formerly
used to determine if a school was "truly desegregated."
District officials maintained that the return of racially identifiable schools did not
signify the return of "inherently unequal" schools because they were committed to
distributing resources equally to every campus regardless of its racial composition. But
the Brown decision had maintained that segregated schools were inherently unequal,
regardless of whether facilities or other tangible factors were equalized because of the
stigma associated with racial isolation. And certainly, the district's own statements
suggested that they had adopted this new plan in order to appease white parents who did
not want to send their children to predominantly black schools. Repeatedly, district
officials emphasized that the return of neighborhood schools had stemmed the tide of
white flight and allowed LRSD to maintain steady levels of enrollment. This suggested
that the district implicitly recognized that, at least for these white parents, there was a
stigma associated with predominantly black and increasingly-isolated institutions. 52
These changes preceded the declaration of partial unitary status that released the
school district from court supervision in the area of student assignment in 2002. The
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Joshua intervenors had not pushed for racial balance in every school in lieu of negotiating
for stronger commitments to implement and assess programs related to African American
student achievement. Given the court battle they now found themselves embroiled in, the
persistence of the achievement gap and the trend toward racial isolation in the district,
they may have wondered whether the trade had been worth it. Nevertheless, the
declaration of unitary status in the area of student assignment produced even more
changes that went further than district officials themselves felt comfortable with.
In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in two cases involving student admission

policies at the University of Michigan. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the court held 6-3 that the
University of Michigan's admissions policy for undergraduate students violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unfairly discriminated against
Caucasians. Michigan routinely awarded students points for admissions factors
including "high school grades, standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum
strength, geography, alumni relationships, leadership, and race." Underrepresented
minorities were automatically granted 20 points out ofthe 100 required for admission.
This policy was designed to encourage diversity among the school's student body- and
the Court found that it certainly resulted in larger enrollments of minority students. The
Court determined that "virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant" was accepted to the school. However, the Court held that the equal protection
clause and precedent established under Bakke did not permit universities to use racial
classifications as a "decisive factor" in the admissions process. 53
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Nevertheless, in a 5-4 companion decision, Grutter v. Bollinger, which evaluated
admissions policies at University of Michigan's law school, the Court acknowledged that
the pursuit of a diversified student body at institutions of higher education could be a
"compelling interest" that justified the consideration of race in admissions, but only plans
that were "narrowly tailored" to achieve this end could be constitutional. In determining
whether a plan was narrowly tailored, the Court examined both admissions plans under
the test of"strict scrutiny." The majority held that "context matters" when reviewing a
race-based policies: "Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and
strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance
and sincerity of government's reasons for using race in a particular context."
In contrast to its decision related to the University of Michigan's undergraduate
admissions policies, the justices upheld the law school's admissions plan because it
provided a "holistic" and "individualized" review that considered a student's test scores,
personal statement, letters of recommendation, grade point and average, and an essay
"describing how the applicant will contribute to law school life and diversity." The
policy did not define diversity exclusively in racial terms, but did "reaffirm" the school's
interest in including African American, Native American and Hispanic students in
"meaningful" numbers. The Court approved this approach because the policy did not
reserve seats for underrepresented minorities, nor was race weighted so heavily that it
effectively "insulated" minority candidates from competing with other applicants.
Indeed, in some cases it was not considered at all. The Court asserted,
When using race as a 'plus' factor in university admissions, a university's
489

admissions program must remain :flexible enough to ensure that each
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.
The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a
race-conscious admissions program is paramount.
Significantly, the law school maintained that it did not set hard targets for the number of
underrepresented minorities enrolled in any given year, but rather sought to enroll a
"critical mass"of minority students to promote "cross-racial understanding and the
breaking down of racial stereotypes." The majority of Court approved this policy because
it :flowed from a pedagogical goal rather than a desire to achieve a proscribed "racial
balance." (Nevertheless, some members of the Court expressed open skepticism that this
language was merely camouflage for achieving unspoken racial quotas).
Despite supporting the law school's narrowly-tailored consideration of an
applicant's race as a potential "plus factor" in the admissions process, the Court warned
that even these types of race-conscious policies "must be limited in time." The purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment "was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race." Consequently, the Court determined, "racial
classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they
may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands" and they "must have a
logical end point." The Court urged the law school to substitute a race-neutral
admissions policy as soon as practicaL In the meantime, they urged the University of
Michigan to attach "sunset provisions" to its admissions practices and to conduct
"periodic reviews" in order to determine whether the consideration of race was still
necessary to achieve diversity. In conclusion, the majority inserted its own sunset
490

provision into its decision, predicting, "The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use
of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." 54
Although the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz (2003) involved
merit-based admissions policies in institutions ofhigher education, K-12 school districts
across the country took note of the high court's direction in relation to their own student
assignment plans. Historically, Supreme Court decisions related to higher education and
desegregation have been applied as precedent in cases involving public school systems.
In the wake of Gruffer and Gratz, Little Rock school administrators determined that they

would have to devise a "race-neutral" system of student assignment, in which a student's
nice could be considered in school placement but would no longer operate as a "key
factor." Junious Babbs, the assistant superintendent for administrative services who
would oversee the change, said the decisions required the district to alter its plan. "We
may not remain stagnant in our existing student-assignment plan," he explained. "If we
continue to retain principles that we now incorporate, that would not be a wise move on
our part." The school district hoped to "retain school choice and student diversity to the
extent practical," by including other measures of diversity such as socioeconomic status
and standardized test scores. The district's magnet schools would not be affected by the
change and would continue to employ racial balance guidelines, and students would
continue to be able to request majority-to-minority transfers because the other school
districts in Pulaski County involved in these interdistrict programs had not been declared
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even partially unitary. 55
However, the change would effect the district's specialty-program schools,
formerly known as incentive schools, that were located in predominantly black
neighborhoods. The district had embedded specialty programs in these schools in order
to provide white families who lived within the district with an "incentive" to help
desegregate these institutions. The district had reserved seats for white students in hope
of achieving a 40/60 racial balance. Under the new plan, neighborhood students were
given first priority for enrollment and seats were no longer reserved. Any remaining seats
were assigned through a weighted lottery, which took into account a student's race, test
scores, and family income. The more an individual student's demographic profile
differed from the profile of the school as a whole, the more times their name was entered
into the lottery. 56
Within four years, the impact of this change was significant. King Magnet
Elementary had been 53% black in 2003-2004, but was 77% black in 2007-2008.
Likewise, the percentage of black students at Rockefeller Elementary climbed from 58%
to 82%; from 66% to 80% at Romine Elementary; and from 62% to 92% at Washington
Elementary. At Dunbar Middle School-located in what had once been Little Rock's
premiere African American high school- the percentage of black students rose from 58%
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to 73%. 57 When these changes began to become public, Assistant Superintendent Junious
Babbs admitted, "We are not totally taken aback by what's happened." He acknowledged
that it was difficult for some district administrators who had worked for years to maintain
racial diversity to change the "paradigm" under which they operated. "We've been so
entrenched but we're gradually working out of it," he said. As required by the Supreme
Court, the district had to embrace a much "broader" definition of diversity. 58
However, just as the Little Rock school board was contemplating whether to
accept John Walker's offer to enter into a new settlement or continue to pursue unitary
status, the district was confronted with an even more drastic change. In December of
2006, the Supreme Court considered two cases from Louisville and Seattle that involved
student assignment plans that took race into some consideration along with other factors
when assigning students to schools in order to maintain diversity. The white plaintiffs in
these cases argued that any voluntary consideration of race in student assignment, that
was not mandated by the courts in order remedy de jure segregation, violated the
Constitution. Regardless of the intent of school districts, such plans violated the
individual rights of white students under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In districts that had never been found guilty of de jure violations or had
been declared unitary, only a "colorblind" student assignment policy that ignored race
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altogether was appropriate.

59

Just as in Little Rock, the school district in Louisville, Kentucky had been under
court orders to desegregate its schools for twenty-five years. Initially, the city had
adopted geographic attendance zones and a freedom-of-choice plan, but these limited
efforts did not effectively dismantle the dual system of schools. During the course of
litigation, the Louisville school system was consolidated with the predominantly-white
Jefferson County school district, and was ordered to adopt an extensive busing program
that enabled it to maintain racial balance in its schools. By the late 1980s and early
1990s, the district sought to reduce the disruption produced by this plan and to curb white
flight. A plan titled "Project Renaissance" weakened the district's racial balance
guidelines, redrew school assignment areas to reintroduce geographic attendance zones,
permitted majority-to-minority student transfers at the elementary level, magnet middle
schools, and "open" high school enrollment that introduced school choice within broad
racial guidelines. These adjustments were similar to those made in Little Rock during the
same time period, and had the effect of reducing the significance of a student's race in
school assignment. In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit petitioning for the
dissolution of the desegregation order. The Louisville school board opposed dissolution,
arguing that the system sill suffered from "demographic imbalance" that was the product
of de jure segregation. However, the federal court ruled in the parents' favor, taking the
school board's argument as "overwhelming evidence" that the district had fulfilled the
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"underlying purposes" of the desegregation decree- it was clear the Louisville School
Board had "treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal
obligation- they consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any
well-rounded public school education." The court seemed to express confidence that the
board would maintain this commitment and granted the district unitary status. After
attaining unitary status, the school district retained its student assignment policies in order
to ensure that their schools would not revert to their formally segregated state. Now, the
school district found itself standing before the Supreme Court trying to preserve the
remnants of a system that had once been mandated by the federal courts. 60
These cases produced a split decision under the title Parents Involved v. Seattle
(2007). As in Grutter and Gratz, the Court reviewed the Louisville and Seattle plans
under the "strict scrutiny" test to determine whether the use of individual racial
classifications was "narrowly tailored" to meet a "compelling" government interest. A
plurality of the court- including Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito-- argued that consideration of race in student assignment, regardless of the intent of
the school board, was unconstitutional and precluded by Supreme Court precedent
including Brown v. Board ofEducation. The plurality argued that the Court's previous
decisions had only recognized two interests as compelling enough to justify the
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consideration of race in school settings: 1) the remediation of de jure school segregation
with race-conscious strategies and 2) the desirability of cultivating diversity in higher
education. However, these justices emphasized that these cases were not governed by the
precedent established in the University of Michigan law school case. 61 They noted that
the diversity at issue in Gruffer was not strictly racial, involved an institution of higher
education, and that the plan had only passed the "narrowly tailored" requirement because
it involved an individualized review process that was not at issue in these student
assignment plans. Moreover, for a small minority of students in Seattle and Louisville,
race was the decisive factor in determining whether a student would be permitted to
enroll at a particular school. Finally, the number of minority students that the districts
sought to enroll was not tied to a pedagogical objective, but rather to the school districts'
overall demographics with margins of error up to 20% points. Consequently, the
plurality argued that the districts were not trying to achieve diversity but rather "racial
balance, pure and simple." The justices wrote,
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance,
rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of
diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our
existing precedent. We have many times over reaffirmed that 'racial
balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.'
This pursuit of racial balance- rather than diversity- was not a "compelling interest."
The plurality argued that the racial classifications used to assign students to
schools and retain diversity or racial balance in Louisville and Seattle were "inherently
suspect," because the use of such classifications "demeans the dignity and worth of a
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person" and promotes "notions of racial inferiority and leads to a politics of racial
hostility." Citing the implementation order in Brown II and the NAACP's oral
arguments in the case, the plurality contended that the intent of the Brown decision was to
"achieve a system of determining admission to the schools on a nonracial basis." They
concluded, "Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go
to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not
carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again- even for
very different reasons." If the districts and other members of the Court were concerned
about racial discrimination, they argued, "the way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the Court
had long drawn distinctions between the use of racial classifications for the purpose of
inclusion rather than the purpose of exclusion. The dissenters contended,
The plurality pays inadequate attention to [50 years of school
desegregation] law, to past opinions' rationales, their language, and the
contexts in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and reaches the
wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts precedent, it announces legal
rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local governments to deal
effectively with the growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to
substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and
it undermines Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary
education that local communities have sought to make a reality. This
cannot be justified in the name of the Equal Protection Clause.
In the dissent's view, the Court's decision was not an affirmation but a betrayal of Brown.

The dissent also rejected the plurality's argument that the Constitution prohibited
districts who had never been found guilty of de jure violations, or those that had been
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subsequently found unitary, from adopted voluntary integration strategies. Citing
precedent, Justice Breyer wrote, "we have understood that the Constitution permits local
communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do so."
Specifically, Breyer pointed to a passage in the Court's unanimous decision in Swann
(1971):
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate
and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example,
that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the
proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy
is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.62
This statement had been applied in hundreds of schools districts, like Louisville and
Seattle, and it had become an established judicial principal in the lower courts. Breyer
suggested that it was "not surprising" that this distinction between racial classifications
used to promote inclusion rather than exclusion had been so widely accepted because it
was "predicated upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
Amendment sought to bring "into American society as full members those whom the
Nation had previously held in slavery" by "forbidding practices that lead to racial
exclusion." The dissent contended that the plurality's opinion overthrew this longstanding interpretation of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and its application to
school desegregation, and predicted that its decision would produce upheaval in school
districts across the nation.
62
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The dissent argued that the entire purpose of subjecting the use of racial
classifications to the test of "strict scrutiny" was to determine whether the classifications
were designed to promote exclusion rather than inclusion. The dissent contended that the
districts were pursuing a "compelling interest" in "maintaining hard-won gains" and
seeking to "combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by... school
related policies, which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns,
employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes." These four justices
rejected the argument that the tools local officials had used in order to remediate de jure
segregation could or should not be applied after a declaration of unitary status. Several of
the conservative justices who contributed to the plurality opinion had repeatedly
emphasized the importance of returning educational administration over to local controlit was on these grounds that they had relaxed the legal thresholds required to attain
unitary status in the 1990s. Breyer pointedly highlighted the irony that these same
justices now sought to limit the actions of local school boards when they voluntarily
pursued integration strategies after achieving that milestone.
The dissent also cited educational benefits related to school integration, including
the minimization of the achievement gap between black and white students, and a
democratic interest in preparing children to live and work in a pluralistic society. These
were the kind of interests that the majority found compelling in University of Michigan's
law school's diversity policy. And the dissenters argued that they were equally
compelling, if not more so, in a K -12 setting.
The dissenters also argued that the plans passed the narrow tailoring requirement.
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The plans did not establish "quotas," but depended on broad ranges in order to ensure
that their efforts were effective- such measures had been used by federal courts
themselves since Green v. New Kent County (1968). The dissent rejected the contention
that race was the decisive factor in the admissions process, noting that the plans promoted
student choice and took other factors into consideration. Race only entered into the
equation if a school was over-subscribed and fell well outside the general racial
distribution in the school district as a whole. Finally, the dissent rejected the notion that
the districts' assignment plans substantially harmed white students. Unlike the University
of Michigan cases, these students were not denied admission. They were assigned to
another school which provided equal educational opportunity. Moreover, the dissent
noted that the school board's were not overly reliant on race-conscious tools, and in fact,
had sought to diminish their use over time in consultation with other community
stakeholders and school patrons. However, both districts had determined that raceneutral strategies alone did not allow them to retain the diversity they desired.
For these reasons, the dissenters would have upheld the plans in Louisville and
Seattle as logical applications of the established law surrounding school desegregation
reaching back to the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision. School segregation, they
argued, involved more than assigning students to schools based on the color of their skin.
It also perpetuated a caste system "rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of

legalized subordination." To suggest that the student assignment plans at issue here were
the equivalent ofthose in Topeka, Kansas in 1954 was a "cruel distortion ofhistory" that
trivialized the inequality that accompanied the system of segregation.
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Despite these arguments, the dissent fell short of the five votes needed for their
view to prevail. As the deciding swing vote, Justice Kennedy concurred with the plurality
and struck down the Seattle and Louisville plans. Nevertheless, he emphasized that just
as in higher education, the pursuit of diversity in the public schools was a "compelling
interest." School districts did not have to accept or ignore the "status quo" of racial
isolation in schools- they could take steps to address it and encourage a kind of student
diversity that took race into consideration as well as other demographic factors.
However, in Kennedy's view, the pursuit of this race-conscious objective did not justify
the use of invidious racial classifications that systematically typed individuals by race.
He urged the districts to pursue race-neutral means to achieve their race-conscious ends,
by utilizing strategies such as the selection of new school sites, the redistribution of
geographic attendance zones, and the establishment of special programs and magnet
schools. Because these strategies did not utilize racial classifications, they would not be
subjected to "strict scrutiny."63

Kennedy's approach to this question now governs the

way school districts must formulate their student assignment plans. Theoretically, his
opinion allows school districts to adopt voluntary strategies designed to foster diversity.
However, in practice, many school administrators note that the kind of techniques he
advocated will not be sufficient to prevent the resegregation of American schools.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved required the Little
Rock School District to eliminate any use of racial classifications from its student
assignment plan. In recent proposals, the district's attorneys have suggested substituting
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eligibility for free- and reduced-price school meals as an appropriate criteria for balancing
enrollments at magnet schools. Likewise, the majority-to-minority student transfer
program would be substituted with a program that allowed students from areas with high
poverty rates to transfer to more economically diverse schools. Officials hope that
programs designed to encourage economic diversity will result in racial diversity as well
because approximately 80% of Little Rock students eligible for free- or reduced-price
lunch are African American. 64 Although the use of socioeconomic status is not subject to
the same "strict scrutiny" as race, it remains to be seen whether such plans, which attempt
to approximate the results that would have been achieved by using race as a factor in
student assignment, will withstand constitutional challenge.
Unitary Status
This jurisprudence and the changes it required established that unitary status and
the return of"local control" meant that Little Rock's majority-black school board would
not necessarily be able to retain policies it believed benefitted African American school
children. Moreover, the types of strategies outlined in Justice Kennnedy's opinion in
Parents Involved required substantial outlays of funds. Resiting educational facilities or
building new schools required significantly more resources than simply relocating
students to the facilities available. From the perspective of some board members,
LRSD's ability to marshal the financial resources necessary to retain any semblance of
diversity in its system could be jeopardized by a final declaration of unitary status. In
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2007, the district continued to receive more than $30 million dollars a year in
desegregation aid from the state of Arkansas that it used to fund magnet programs and
majority-to-minority transfers. State legislators indicated that these dollars would be
phased out once desegregation had been "accomplished."65 As the district contemplated
the future, its ability to continue these popular programs in the absence of state assistance
was uncertain.
Indeed, concerns over this issue were so acute that all four African-American
board members testified against the school district in the third round of unitary status
hearings involving student achievement and assessment. Members of the board testified
that "they either did not believe, or did not have enough information to know" if LRSD
had fulfilled the compliance remedy outlined by the District Court in 2004. Moreover,
they expressed "reservations about whether it was in LRSD's best interest to be declared
unitary because LRSD could use millions of dollars of state funding that it now receives
under the settlement agreement with the State of Arkansas." Judge Wilson rejected this
line or argument, acknowledging the Board's concerns but finding that "a potential loss
of state funding ... cannot be, an appropriate consideration in determining whether the
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District is unitary."66 However, arguably, such a concern could be taken into
consideration, particularly if the majority of members on the school board believed that
district schools would revert back to racial isolation in the absence of state aid and the
programs it funded. Surely, such an outcome would suggest that the vestiges of state
discrimination had not yet been erased.
Regardless of the preference of the majority of the school board, the Eastern
District Court of Arkansas found the Little Rock School Board unitary in February of
2007. In so doing, Judge Wilson abandoned the portion of his 2004 remedy that required
the district to "deeply embed" the program assessment process in its curriculum, and
submitted to the opinion of some members of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals that this
requirement went beyond the stipulations of the 1998 Revised Plan. Wilson expressed
his confidence .that district administrators had assessed programs designed to improve the
academic achievement of African American students as the plan required. Evaluations
revealed that some of the programs had a positive educational impact and improved
achievement, while others demonstrated no statistical benefit. The Judge was pleased
that administrators and board members had recognized the importance of assessing
programs in order to determine which were effective and which were not. 67
Consequently, Wilson released LRSD from court supervision and monitoring,
announcing, "LRSD's Board can now operate the district as it sees fit; answerable to no
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one except LRSD's students and patrons and the voters who elected them to office.... I
want to express my heartfelt best wishes as LRSD begins to operate, as our Founders
intended, under control of the citizens of the City of Little Rock. " 68
Unsurprisingly, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette embraced the declaration,
parodying Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream Speech" and proclaiming, "Free at last,
thank God almighty free at last!" The paper's editorial board suggested that the
"principal function" of the case had been "to support generations oflawyers." Now that
the "legal detritus" had been cleared away, the district could focus on education. Any
credit or blame for conditions in the school district would fall on administrators, teachers,
and school patrons, and "folks in Little Rock"(including the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette)
would no longer be "able to blame any and all ofthe school's problems on the courts
anymore." Since the city had long born the stigma associated with the 1957 Little Rock
school desegregation crisis, the editorial board welcomed the court's decision as an
opportunity for Arkansas' capital to become "a national byword for academic
achievement." The paper also expressed its hope that the city's black and white residents
would be reconciled in the wake of the court's decision, moving forward with optimism,
"for there's no more efficient force in the world, as Judge Wilson recognized, than good
faith." 69
But many of those directly involved in the litigation were less sanguine. Although
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Little Rock School District Superintendent Roy G. Brooks applauded the decision, telling
the Associated Press, "I think this is a clear indication that 1957 is not 2007," Attorney
John Walker rejected Brooks' claim that the court's decision placed significant distance
between 1957 and 2007. Rather, he suggested, "In 2007, we have people in neckties
living in big houses celebrating the return to 1957, a return to the concept of white
supremacy." School Board President Katherine Mitchell, one of the four black board
members who had testified against the district, promised to provide district principals,
teachers, and staff with the resources to continue programs that had been effective, but
felt some trepidation as she looked toward the future. "I just hope and pray that the
district will do what it is supposed to do, that we really do select the programs and embed
those that help students be successful," she said. 70
Sensing this trepidation, Attorney John Walker floated another settlement
proposal, promising not to appeal the federal district court's decision if the district agreed
to his terms. Walker proposed expanding the authority of the Planning, Research and
Evaluation office responsible for developing programs related to African American
student achievement. More controversially, he also requested that the district pay up to
$1 million in his legal fees, hire his long-time assistant Joy Springer as an in-house
monitor, and retain his services if the district decided to go to court to preserve state
desegregation aid. One board member rejected the proposal as a "long-term employment
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contract" that would absorb educational resources, rather than a serious settlement.. 71
School District Attorney Chris Heller encouraged the board, once again, to reject
Walker's proposal, expressing his confidence that the judgement would be affirmed in the
8th Circuit Court of Appeals. "There is just no reason," he said, "to trade an opportunity

to end this lawsuit for good, which is very likely to happen in the

gth

Circuit Court very

soon, for more obligations that can be enforced in Court.... Even though the district would
be unitary, we would still be subject to enforcement of a complicated written agreement."
Despite these concerns, the majority of the board agreed to move ahead with negotiations.
However, the 8th Circuit's settlement director refused participate in any conference related
to the proposal because of the circumstances surrounding it. 72 John Walker proceeded
with his appeal, but the district court's judgement was affirmed in April2009 and the
Little Rock School District was permanently removed from court supervision. 73
Despite the official end to the school desegregation case, the Little Rock School
District continues to face substantial challenges related to race more than fifty years after
nine African American students attempted to enter Little Rock Central High School.
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Even the city's school board is deeply divided along racial lines as it considers the
district's future. Long-time resident Brownie Ledbetter has noted that "the tension
around the change from a white majority to a black majority" school board indicates that
the transition "seems to be an enormous change to many people." In her view,
controversy surrounding the board, and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette's references to
the four-person majority as the "Gang of Four" are part of the historical power struggle
that have gripped the city for decades. 74
In a city that is majority-white, the city schools are predominantly black. The

city's overall population is 55 percent white, but the school-age population is only 40
percent white since many young families opt to live in the suburbs. Of those who choose
to live within city limits, a large portion ofthem send their children to the private schools
that first emerged as the result of the 1957 school desegregation crisis and flowered in the
wake of court-ordered busing. According to the 2000 Census, roughly 13 percent of
white students nationwide were enrolled in private schools; in Little Rock, census data
revealed that 48 percent of white students had opted out of the public schools, placing the
capital among the top ten cities in the nation with the highest percentage of white children
attending private schools.75
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The city suffers from severe residential segregation, and neighborhoods are carved
up and divided by race along two major interstates: I-430 and I-630. 76 White flight
continues to move farther and farther west. Hall High School, built in Little Rock's silkstocking district in order to provide the city's wealthiest white families with the means to
escape token integration in 1957, is now 92% African American. With the end of racial
balance guidelines and the use of satellite zones, white students in the district are now
concentrated in as few as a twelve schools- many of these, including Central High, are
magnet schools, or facilities located in predominantly white neighborhoods in northwest
Little Rock. 77 However, even though magnet schools continue to promote some diversity
in the district, these programs are also under threat as the district contemplates the loss of
state desegregation aid. 78
Moreover, despite the protracted litigation surrounding programs designed to
improve African American student achievement and the assessment process, the
achievement gap lingers. In 2007, during the fiftieth anniversary of the school
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desegregation crisis, African American students scored 30 to 45 percentage points below
their white peers on standardized tests. 79 Many of the African American students who
emoll at Central High School enter as freshman with third grade reading levels. As a
result, many people in the city question whether the kind of "integration" being promoted
in Little Rock's magnet schools is real. Magnet programs, enriched classes, and
advanced placement courses are predominantly white, while regular or remedial classes
are predominantly black. Brandon Love, student body president in 2006-2007, referred to
this phenomenon as the "Tale of Two Centrals."80 In this context, it is easy to question
whether African American students are really being provided with equal educational
opportunity and preparation for their life after graduation: 83% of white juniors at Central
passed proficiency tests in 2006, while only 28% of their African American peers could
say the same; whites in Little Rock are twice as likely to have completed a four-year
college education; and the median household income for black families is roughly
$20,000 less than the average for white families in the city. 81
These types of problems confront urban school districts across the nation, and
some school administrators point to this fact as evidence that the educational challenges
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that confront the Little Rock School District are deeply rooted in social problems. This
perspective seems to promote a kind of fatalism- the problems are so large, so huge, that
they seem insurmountable. However, if the history of Little Rock has taught us anything
it must be that even the most unequal educational systems, and those that operate as an
entrenched part of the social fabric, are vulnerable to challenge.
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CHAPTER TEN
"JUSTICE IS A PERPETUAL STRUGGLE":
THE LITTLE ROCK NINE CONNECTING PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Over the course of fifty years, many voices have weighed in on the history of the
Little Rock school desegregation crisis-- reporters, pundits, and politicians; government
agencies and civil rights organizations; small documentary companies and giant media
corporations; professional historians and exhibit designers; school board members and
federal judges. But for many years, nine of the most important voices were relatively
absent from the public memory of the crisis- those of Melba Pattillo Beals, Elizabeth
Eckford, Ernest Green, Gloria Ray Karlmark, Carlotta Walls LaNier, Terrence Roberts,
Jefferson Thomas, Minnijean Brown Trickey, and Thelma Mothershed Wair. Many of
the Little Rock Nine shunned the public spotlight for thirty years or more, and several did
not even discuss the crisis in the privacy of their own homes. But recently, this group of
civil rights pioneers has intervened more forcefully in the public discussion of the history
they know so intimately and have made the collective decision to take an active role in
shaping how their story is told.
As the only senior in 1957-58 and the frrst to graduate from Central High School,
Ernest Green maintained the most public profile and was frequently called on in the
1970s and 1980s to share his perspective. Green's involvement in politics as a member
of the Carter administration and as a close friend of President Clinton made him one of
the most visible members of the Little Rock Nine. However, there is no question that
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each of the nine students has their own story to tell, and collectively, the group has come
to recognize that no single individual can serve as a de facto spokesperson for the entire
group. 1 In the last fifteen years, each of the Little Rock Nine has struggled to find his or
her own voice, his own perspective on the past, her own message to students in the
present, and her own vision for the future. This transition has been marked by the
publication of three memoirs, countless speaking engagements, hundreds of public
statements in the press, and the development of the Little Rock Nine Foundation.
Symbolically, it was recognized at the fiftieth anniversary commemorative ceremony.
While Ernest Green delivered a powerful address in 1997 on behalf of the entire group, in
2007, each of the Little Rock Nine addressed the audience gathered in front of Central
High School.
From Silence to Speech

Even in the midst of the media attention that accompanied the crisis in 1957, the
Little Rock Nine were encouraged to maintain a certain level of silence about their
experience. Their mentor, NAACP State President Daisy Bates urged them to minimize
their accounts of harassment inside Central High School. Arkansas Governor Oval
Faubus had based his opposition to desegregation on reports of mob violence and public
resistance to compliance with the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision. As an
experienced journalist, Bates feared that too many comments about the organized
harassment of the students might provide segregationists with the ammunition they
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needed to end integration in Little Rock. 2 Melba Pattillo Beals, for example, breathed a
sigh of relief when she was not one of the students called testify in court about her first
attempt to enter Little Rock Central High School. She feared that her public testimony
about the lynch mob that greeted her and her mother on the first day could be used by
Faubus as "yet another excuse to keep us out of schooL. lfl told the judge about the men
chasing us and shooting through our windows, the governor could use my words as
weapons against us." 3 When speaking to reporters, she "kept our instructions in mind:
Accentuate the positive- don't complain too much." The spin she put on her encounters
with white students in school "was not the whole truth but a version that wouldn't
jeopardize the integration. If I had told what really happened, one of the officials might
say we couldn't go back. I composed the story in a way that would make my day sound
okay."4
Some members of the Little Rock Nine even withheld information from their own
families, both to spare them the pain of knowing about the daily abuse and because they
feared their parents would not let them return to Central if they were aware of the extent
of the harassment. Elizabeth Eckford has described her mother as a hyper-protective
parent who earned the nickname "the Queen ofNo." Eckford maintained her silence
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about the daily harassment she encountered in Little Rock's Central High SchooL "I
knew that if I told my mother what it was like, I would not be able to continue at
Central," she recalled. Even years later, Eckford concealed the true depth of what she had
experienced, neglecting to tell her parents when a documentary about the crisis was
scheduled to air on television. "My mother died in 1992," she has said, "not knowing
what it was really like."5 Terrence Roberts also kept quiet about the physical and
psychological pain he experienced in the halls of Central. But he has noted that his
mother also did what she could to protect him from more anxiety at home. "My mom
kept information to herself because she didn't want me to worry about her," he wrote. "I
withheld information from her as well. While I could not conceal scratches or abrasions,
I did keep much of what happened to me each day away from her. She burned my hate
mail, and I lied about the pain I felt each day. We tried hard to shield each other."6
For some members of the Little Rock Nine and their families, their trauma
prevented them from speaking candidly about it with even their closest loved ones for
decades. Minnijean Brown Trickey never revisited the 1957-58 school year with her
mother. "By the time I thought it was important, it wasn't possible," she said. "Because
[my mother] said she didn't want to relive that."7 She was also reluctant to discuss the
crisis with her children. As she told historian Elizabeth Jacoway, "You can't talk about
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inhumanity to somebody who is sweet and innocent. You don't even want them to know
that exists. I didn't want to discourage them at a young age, so I didn't tell them."8 In her
recently published memoir, Carlotta Walls LaNier also revealed that she never directly
spoke to her husband about the crisis or told him she was a member of the Little Rock
Nine for more than a decade. She spoke to her children about it when the television
docudrama based on vice principal Elizabeth Huckaby's Crisis at Central High was
scheduled to air, but the subject did not come up again for many more years. Moreover,
LaNier and her mother "still have never sat down and held a serious conversation about
that time .... the wounds opened in Little Rock. .. are deep, and in some cases, still raw."9
Given this reticence to speak about the events of 1957-58 with even the closest
family members and friends, it is hardly surprising that many members of the Little Rock
Nine declined to make public comments about their experience or the civil rights
upheavals of the 1960s. In the sequel to her widely-read memoir Warriors Don't Cry,
Melba Pattillo Beals discusses the immediate aftermath of her year at Central High
SchooL While living in California and completing her education, local branches of the
NAACP periodically asked Beals to speak or participate in interviews. When she
declined, she recalled, "I felt I was betraying them." 10 She felt guilty about not
participating in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, or marching in protests for equal
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housing and economic opportunity. However, she refused to accept invitations to
participate in those events. "The last thing I wanted was to be cast in the role of a civil
rights leader," she wrote. "The thought of being in any 'struggle' at that time frightened
and depressed me." Her overriding desire at the time, as recorded her diary, was to "be
quiet and creep within myself." 11 Likewise, Carlotta Walls LaNier refused to take a
service representative position with a local telephone company in Denver after she
learned she would be the first African American employee to work in that capacity. She
took another job with the company at a lower grade because she "didn't want to be the
center of attention, a racial symbol, or the standard-bearer of anyone's expectations. " 12
When reporters and journalists were able to track down members of the Little
Rock Nine for special reports or articles on an upcoming anniversary, the pain of reliving
that experience could be traumatic. Elizabeth Eckford's solitary walk in the midst of the
mob gathered in front of Central High School was captured and immortalized in a
photograph that has become an iconic symbol of the crisis. It was her image which drew
the world's attention to events unfolding in Arkansas' capital. She was also the only one
ofthe nine students who continued to live in Little Rock for many years. Consequently,
she was frequently sought out by reporters even as she battled with depression and
anxiety stemming from her experience at Central High School. "To my kids," she
recalled; "reporters coming by were people who interrupted our lives and made mom
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cry." 13 When she did not feel like talking, she told her sons to tell persistent reporters that
she was dead. Even fifty years later, Eckford told Vanity Fair writer David Margolick
that the long conversations they were having in preparation for a feature article and his
upcoming book were too taxing. According to Margolick, Eckford told him, "Those calls
cause some backwash in my life that's hard to deal with.... I'm having trouble sleeping at
all." 14
However, when the history of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis began to
be recognized on a much larger and public scale in the 1980s, several of the Little Rock
Nine started to work towards coming to terms with the events of 1957-58. In their
memoirs, both Carlotta Walls LaNier and Melba Pattillo Beals describe the thirtieth
anniversary commemoration sponsored by the NAACP in Little Rock as an important
turning point. Carlotta Walls LaNier was bombarded with emotions and memories as
she walked the halls of Central High School for the first time since her graduation. She
realized "that burying a painful past doesn't necessarily mean you've moved beyond it.
It's often still there, simmering, waiting for some unexpected moment to erupt, spewing
forth every hurtful thing that you thought had gone away." When she found herself
crying on the front steps of Central High thirty years after leaving her hometown, she
knew, "even though I had built a new life clear across the country, I hadn't moved an inch
from Little Rock." She used the experience to reconnect with the other members of the
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Little Rock Nine, and left with the determination to "make peace with my past." As
LaNier put it, her emotional reaction "set me on a quest for healing and a greater
understanding of what we had been through. " 15
This process of sifting through memories and emotions can be difficult and
painful work. In the introduction to her book, Beals notes that she began writing about
her experience at Central High shortly after she left Little Rock, but she "could not face
the ghosts" that her diary and collected newsclippings called forth. "During intervals of
renewed strength and commitment," she wrote, "I would find myself compelled to return
to the manuscript, only to have the pain of reliving my past undo my good intentions."
After thirty-five years, Beals found that "enough time has elapsed for healing to take
place, enabling me to tell my story without bittemess.''' 6 Terrence Roberts refers to a
similar process in his text, which was published in 2009. "As I have attempted to put my
thoughts and feelings on paper in years past," he reflected, "I have invariably come up
against painful memories and have had to take time to sort through the unresolved
emotions of my time at Central. Now much of the emotional debris has been cleared
away, and I am ready to share my thoughts.''' 7 This effort to come to a greater
understanding-- to sift and sort through the emotional debris ofthe past-- is ongoing. In a
recent interview, Minnijean Brown Trickey explained, "one thing that happens is that I'm
figuring it out as we speak. I'm continuing to [try to] comprehend it and make it
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comprehensible to other people." 18
Despite the emotional backwash, the Little Rock Nine are determined to wade
through this process and share their personal experiences of the 1957 school
desegregation crisis. In the months leading up to the fortieth anniversary commemoration
in 1997, the group of former students collectively decided that the time was right to return
to Little Rock and use their story to effect change. In her recently published memoir,
Carlotta Walls LaNier recalled, "I wanted to see Little Rock acknowledge its past, as ugly
as it was, but it was equally important to me that participants in the commemoration not
get stuck there." LaNier called her other eight "comrades" and suggested it was time "to
take as much control as possible of our own legacy." The Little Rock Nine had long felt
that others had capitalized on their name. LaNier asserted, "We're grown now, and it's
time to stop complaining about people using us .... Let's take control of our name and get
on the same page about what we accept and not." After years of relative silence, the .
Little Rock Nine trademarked their name and launched the Little Rock Nine Foundation,
a non-profit organization dedicated to educating youth about their experience and
promoting the importance of academic excellence. 19

Rewriting History
In part, this shift was motivated by the desire to put the historical record straight
before they could no longer lend their voices to this task. While sharing their experience
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with students and others in recent years, the Little Rock Nine have collectively made a
number ofhistorical interventions, emphasizing aspects of the crisis and their
involvement in it that they feel have been neglected and presenting countemarratives that
challenge some widely held beliefs. As is evident in the proceeding pages, myths,
falsehoods, and partial truths about the crisis have circulated for years, and in some cases
their influence has increased over time.
Over the last five decades, a vocal portion of the city's population has argued that
Little Rock and Central High School suffer unfairly under the burden of history.
According to this perspective, the events that captured the nation's attention were not of
their own making. Rather, they were the product of the political machinations of
Governor Faubus's race-bating re-election team, or the result ofthe outside agitation from
groups such as the NAACP and the segregationist Citizens' Councils of America. A
variety of evidence is offered to support the claim that the crowds outside the school were
largely composed of individuals from outside ofLittle Rock. To the extent that locals
participated in the mobs outside or the harassment of children inside the school, these
individuals represented a small portion of the citizenry drawn from working-class "hard
core" segregationist sections of the city. In this narrative, the vast majority of Little Rock
residents accepted Brown v. Board ofEducation as the law of the land, were taken by
surprise by the vehemence and violence that overtook their moderate and progressive city,
and remained silent for fear of economic reprisals and social ostracization. 20

20
This perspective is articulated in a variety of forums, but was effectively captured on the record
in several (but not all) oral histories collected by Columbia University as part of its Eisenhower
Administration Project. It should be noted that which "outsiders" are blamed for the crisis varies depending

521

Most of the Little Rock Nine reject the notion that Little Rock was a
"progressive" or "moderate" city. The rules of segregation were firmly in place as they
were growing up. Carlotta Walls Lanier learned to "follow them like I learned to walk,
by observing those closest to me and following their guidance until I knew the steps well
enough to venture out on my own."21 While much has been made of the fact that Little
Rock peacefully integrated its buses before the school crisis erupted, Melba Pattillo Beals
and Minnijean Brown Trickey are quick to point out that Jim Crow reigned almost
everywhere in the city. Public accommodations, including restaurants, lunch counters,
movie theaters, swimming pools, and restrooms were rigidly segregated. African
Americans were denied employment opportunities and membership in local unions. 22 As
the historian John Kirk has noted, racial change that preceded the school desegregation
crisis was "little more than a tokenistic tampering with segregation." Moreover,
concessions were made to preserve the system of segregation by allowing local white
leaders to maintain control over the pace of change. 23
Race relations in the city affected personal interactions as well. Terrence Roberts
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recalls that "insulting remarks were commonplace... and even very young white children
showed little, if any, respect for people of color." Moreover, Roberts emphasizes that
racism was not the sole province of the uneducated or working-class segments of the city.
He insists, "it was the most upstanding citizens ... who, through their actions, both overt
and covert, presented the most formidable barrier to our full, equal participation in the
state."24 From Trickey's perspective, the notion that Little Rock was a moderate southern
city is little more than a widely accepted "social myth." As she puts it, "How in the hell
can a segregated, by law, town be considered moderate. I don't get it."25
As teenagers, the Little Rock Nine put this social system under pressure simply by
volunteering to attend Central High School. In the 1950s, strident segregationists
frequently suggested that they had been "handpicked" by the NAACP to challenge Little
Rock's segregated school system. Some even went so far as to suggest that the black
students were from northern communities and had been brought to the city to disrupt the
Arkansas' capital's harmonious pattern of race relations. Others contended that they were
being paid to emoll at Central High. 26 In contrast, the Little Rock Nine recall that they
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signed up to participate in the integration of Central High after school administrators
explained the school board's plan and asked those who lived in Central's residential area
to indicate their interest by placing their name on a list. Although it was a moment that
would have enormous impact on their lives, this call for volunteers was treated as a
mundane administrative detail. Several of the students did not even inform their parents
that they had signed up. 27 Furthermore, as the historical record makes clear, it was not
the NAACP but school Superintendent Virgil Blossom who screened the students who
would be admitted to Little Rock's white high schooJ.28 As Carlotta Walls LaNier
explained it, the students who ultimately became the Little Rock Nine "were not just the
best and brightest students academically, but we were student leaders from working- and
middle-class families whose backgrounds had been deemed acceptable by the school
system's white leaders for the moment at hand."29
When describing the decision-making process behind their decision to attend
Central High, several of the Little Rock Nine stress that in doing so they were not
rejecting the all-black institutions that had nurtured them through grade school, nor were
they acting out of an overriding desire to attend classes with white students. Indeed,
several of the Little Rock Nine had family members that worked in the city's all-black
schools. These institutions had their own strong educational tradition, despite the fact
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that the city's African American teachers had to cope with outdated course materials,
fewer resources, and lower pay. 30 As Gloria Ray Karlmark recalls,
Back then, we looked up to our teachers who taught us out of
professionalism and love, but also with the disgracefully disproportionate
public means at their disposal in the public schools in our community.
The community relied on their skills, their dedication to make up for what
our school lacked in publicly funded resources. It was difficult for us, but
we would show that despite the discrimination that we could excel.J 1
Terrence Roberts also has nothing but praise for the instructors that made the most of the
resources at their disposal. "Black teachers labored hard to help us become 'executives in
charge of our own education,"' he writes. "[They] were not only concerned with our
success as students in their specific disciplines, but in our success as human beings ...
They cared about who we were and what we were doing, or not doing, and encouraged us
not to stray from the accepted norms of behavior and performance." As a result, students
not only learned academic basics, but they also learned important survival skills that
would enable them to succeed even in the segregated South. 32
Terrence Roberts and others assert that they were not seeking a "better education"
in terms of the quality of instruction they would receive at Central High. 33 Indeed,
arguably, some (if not most) ofthe white teachers at Central refused to embrace and
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encourage them. However, they were aware that students at Central were given more
access to resources, including laboratory equipment and instruction in classes that were
not offered at Horace Mann. 34 Moreover, several of the students believed that Central's
national reputation might provide them with access to a wider field of choices in higher
education. 35 "Access to options," Roberts explains, "gives you more ways to respond to
life's demands, more ways of understanding what is happening around you, more
information about how to realize the potential that is yours to develop."36 This
fundamental promise of access to opportunity was embedded in the Brown v. Board of

Education decision, and as Carlotta Walls LaNier has noted, at fourteen, she was "old
enough to understand the historical significance of... enrollment in Central."37
What the African American students did not expect was the reaction their decision
to attend Little Rock's flagship educational institution would provoke. LaNier was
convinced that after getting to know her, her white counterparts would see her as just
another student who wanted "a fun an unforgettable high school experience." While she
was eagerly anticipating the first day of classes, she says, "I had no clue that... enraged
white parents and other citizens- including the Arkansas governor, who had gotten my
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parents' vote in the last election- were organizing to keep me away."38 Elizabeth Eckford
felt some anxiety about attending Central, but mostly because it was so much larger than
the school she was accustomed to. "My biggest concern was being able to fmd my
classes in such a big school, because I expected there would be some ugly talk at first, but
I thought that when people got to know me, they would accept me," she recalls. 39 Even as
Eckford approached Central and saw the mob gathered there, she remembers feeling ''just
a little bit nervous." The teenager believed that the Arkansas National Guardsmen
stationed around the school to "preserve the peace" would protect her. 40
When young people express surprise at this perspective, Minnijean Brown
Trickey explains, "We're forgetting what happened ... You're supposed to think that
you're just going to school! ...Nobody knew what was going to happen." Trickey
believes that Daisy Bates' memoir, which discusses attempts to organize some protection
for the students on the first day they tried to Central, has been used and interpreted in a
way that "does a lot of damage" and confuses readers. "I don't care how much people try
to revise history, I don't think anybody had a clue what was going to happen because it
hadn't happened before! And that's the, the kind of thing that disturbs me is that people
reach back, revise, and it becomes 'truth' somehow."41 Collectively, the Little Rock Nine
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seem to want to preserve some understanding of the historical contingency of the
moment. They were not acting out the stage directions of a predetermined script, but
were reacting to events as they unfolded around them. The disillusionment they
experienced as a result of the crisis- the loss of their innocence, as both LaNier and Beals
describe it in their memoirs- is a fundamental part of what they sacrificed in their effort
to improve access to educational opportunity for all students. 42
Some of the former students also chafe at the suggestion that Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus alone was solely responsible for the mobs that gathered outside Central
High. From Terrence Roberts' perspective, the governor acted ''with the complicity of
the people" when he provoked the crisis in 1957 and closed public high schools in the
city in 1958-59.43 Certainly, the majority of Arkansas' voters did not reject Faubus'
racial politics when they re-elected him to another four terms of office. Faubus, Roberts
contends,
did not act alone in blocking our admission to Central; he was simply the
identified leader of the opposition... The Guard had been instructed to bar
all nine ofus from entering the school's premises. And if the Guard had
not stood in our way, then most certainly the angry, shouting, deranged
mob of white protestors assembled in front of the school would have
fulfilled that assignment. 44
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For those who might suggest that the mob itself was composed of undereducated,
"hillbillies" from rural parts of Arkansas, Roberts replies, it was "the average white
citizen" not "some demented, deluded interloper, who filled the ranks of the mobs
surrounding Central High. " 45
While making the case that the harassment they experienced in 1957-58 was an
outgrowth, and not an aberration from the state of race relations in Little Rock, the nine
former students also point to the fact that resistance to integration continued once they
were inside Central High School and attending classes with teenagers who had been
steeped in the region's social mores. "Getting inside Central," Carlotta Walls LaNier
recalls, "was just the beginning of a brand new struggle. " 46 The Little Rock Nine refer to
themselves as "soldiers," "warriors," and "comrades," who entered into a daily "war" or
"battle" to claim the rights the Supreme Court had declared theirs in 1954.47 In their
accounts, they endured constant torment and suffered under the threat of even more
extreme violence. They are convinced that without the protection of the 101 st Airborne,
45
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or even the less vigilant oversight of the Arkansas National Guard later in the year, one or
more of them could have been seriously injured or killed. 48 A group of committed
segregationists inside the building "was willing to do whatever they could think of to
persuade us to reconsider our decision to come to Central," Roberts maintains. "They hit,
kicked, pushed, shoved, slapped, tripped, scratched, spat on, and verbally abused us
constantly."49 The Nine adopted a variety of survival strategies and attempted to ignore
the taunting and name-calling, but at times LaNier remembers, the insults "smashed my
spirit like bricks. " 50 Melba Pattillo Beals describes her own low moments this way:
"Nothing in my life was the same anymore. I felt so empty inside, like somebody had
scooped out the warm sweet part of my spirit that made me smile and feel grateful to be
alive."51 Even the white students who stood by silently and ignored the Little Rock Nine
had an impact. By turning their backs, they failed to acknowledge the humanity of their
black peers or their suffering. This was devastating in itself. 52

In recent years, white student leaders from the Class of 1958 have become more
vocal about their very different perspective on the crisis. An integral part of the defense
ofLittle Rock's reputation for "good race relations," is the contention that the harassment
reported inside Central High School has peen "exaggerated" by news reporters seeking
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headlines, historians casting the crisis as a black and white morality play, and more
recently, by the Little Rock Nine themselves.
In the 1990s, sociologist Beth Roy documented the reaction of some white

students to Melba Pattillo Beals' Warriors Don't Cry, the first memoir released by one of
the Little Rock Nine in 1994. In her interviews with Central High alumni immediately
after the book was released, Roy noted that white students dismissed and discredited
Beals' account. According to her informants, the physical abuse the Nine characterized
as racial would more accurately be described as harmless adolescent pranks, and the
social ostracization they experienced was common for new students white and black.
Some contended that Beals' account of harassment in the school was an outright lie,
others suggested it was an exaggeration, and many asserted that they never witnessed any
of the events described. Some simply suggested that Beals' account could not possibly be
true because they could not imagine that any American teenager could have endured such
torment. In Roy's words, the alumni argued that "Melba's book was a strategic construct
designed to discredit the white students, many of whom ... deserved credit for human
kindness to the black students." A few informants suggested that Beals had lied because
"she was hurt and resentful that she was ignored."53
While it is anything but certain that Beals wrote her memoir because "she was
hurt and resentful that she was ignored," it is certain that Central High alumni feel that
their perspective has been ignored by historians, the media, and commemorative events.
It may be this resentment that motivated them to contribute their stories for an anthology
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put together by student body president Ralph Brodie that was published in conjunction
with the fiftieth anniversary of the crisis in 2007. This project gave the alumni control
over how their stories were presented. Many refuse to speak about their experience in
other public forums and white students have even boycotted participation in the National
Park Service's oral history project for fear that their words will be taken out of context in
displays and exhibits at the national historic site. 54 Student body representatives such as
Ralph Brodie contend that the vast majority of Central students have been
misrepresented. According to Brodie, while the majority of students may not have
heroically defied their peers and befriended the Little Rock Nine, they should not be held
responsible for the decisions and behavior of a handful of hard-core segregationists. 55

In Central in Our Lives: Voices from Central High, Brodie and his co-author
Marvin Schwartz argue that white students at Central should only be held responsible for
their individual behavior. The students who harassed the Little Rock Nine could be
found at any school in the 1950s- they were the "sideburners" who could be "identified
by their wearing of leather jackets and the smoking of cigarettes." According to Brodie
and Schwartz, these students used the desegregation crisis to "express their anti-social
position."56 However, the text is not focused on explaining the behavior ofthe vocal
54

Doug Smith, "White Students NOT Enthralled," Arkansas Times, September 20, 2007, 40.
Ralph Brodie and Marvin Schwartz, Central in Our Lives: Voices from Little Rock Central High School,
1957-1959 (Little Rock: The Butler Center for Arkansas Studies, 2007), forward and introduction.
55

Brodie and Schwartz, Central in Our Lives; Roy, Bitters in the Honey.

56

Graeme Cope's demographic analysis of segregationist students at Central High who signed out
of classes when the Little Rock Nine first entered the school, or later participated in a walkout sponsored by
the Mothers' League, provides support for this assertion. While these students generally shared the
working-class background of many of their peers, many had been previously identified as "troublemakers"
and few were involved in the school's wide array of extracurricular activities. Nevertheless, Cope did find

532

segregationists. Rather it is focused on articulating the ''third side" of the story and
defending "1,850 students against the negative historical light in which they continue to
be cast." Central in Our Lives does not try to argue that white students in the school
intervened in the harassment. Instead, it offers justifications for why the students did not
act. The authors argue that the students at Central were repeatedly told "to maintain
order, avoid publicity, and, at all costs, avoid or immediately contain any confrontation."
They believed that school authorities would appropriately reprimand troublemakers; they
should not be held accountable for the failure of the administration to do so. Moreover,
the authors argue, responsible students probably would have intervened ifthey had seen
harassment take place. The halls of Central High twist and turn through five stories for
two city blocks. Purportedly, the actions of segregationist students were easily concealed
in dark comers and in crowded hallways. Students also should not be blamed for failing
to reach out to the Little Rock Nine when they had been raised in a society that favored
segregation. There was little or no preparation to "offset the initial, cautious distance
between black and white students," the authors write. Moreover, many ofthe Little Rock
Nine were shy and "kept to themselves." Brodie and Schwartz reject the contention that
the silence of the vast majority of students "enabled" the segregationists. The students,
they argue, should not be faulted for failing to exhibit heroic behavior. They write, "most

that close to a quarter of male sophomores and juniors, and a fifth of male seniors were involved in
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segregationist students who were usually "more conformist and compliant'' may have escaped detection.
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students had neither the opportunity nor the temperament to be heroes. They simply
conducted themselves with restraint and composure in an extremely challenging time.
That behavior may not merit the highest praise, but it certainly does not justify a
condemnation. " 57
Several members of the Little Rock Nine, including Terrence Roberts and
Elizabeth Eckford, have acknowledged that they were prompted to speak out when they
started hearing accounts like these that downplayed or dismissed the harassment they
experienced. 58 At the dedication of the new visitor center at Central High School
National Historic Site in 2007, Elizabeth Eckford spoke to an audience of hundreds
gathered for the occasion and a block of empty seats reserved for white members of the
Class of 1958. 59 She offered her perspective on history and the narrative put forward by
Ralph Brodie and others:
Allow me to share with you my view of history as recorded in the
thesaurus- it's a chronicle record, documentation, account, annals, saga,
diary, memories. We've heard from many, many memorists- the witness
to the times, the messenger of antiquity (50 years ago was not so long
ago). A voice sounding forever across the centuries the laws of right and
wrong, a sort of mask ritually colored, the great dust heap, a fraud agreed
upon. That terrible mill in which sawdust rejoins sawdust. When I was in
the fourth grade, my mother gave me an ancient history textbook. I've
loved history ever since, so I appreciate those who have gone on record
with their experience. Among all of us, we've struggled to talk bout the
past. None of us talked about it for twenty to thirty years. I started
walking through the painful past in the late 1990s when I began to hear
things that were totally outside my experience. Today I talk to students
57
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extemporaneously and I try to be accurate, because I've [read] the books
written by the historians of late, I read the biographies oflate, I read all
kinds of tales.
As a "habitual newspaper reader," Eckford was "dismayed" that the local paper suggested
that Central's student body "welcomed" the Little Rock Nine and that they attended
school for the rest of the year under the protection of federal troops. "Each of us was
followed from class to class by an organized group who assaulted us daily," she
emphasized. Moreover, the harassment she experienced amounted to more than an
adolescent prank. "Harassment is a very, very mild term. I'll tell you what it was to me."
Eckford confronted her listeners with the visceral power of her own memory: "It was
being scalded in the shower. It was being body slammed against the wall lockers every
day. And my only protection was the binder I held close to my chest to protect that part
of my body. And to further prevent being body slammed from the front, I stuck straight
pins all around the binder and bent them so they were not obvious." Each of the
anniversary commemorations of the crisis have placed an emphasis on racial
reconciliation, but Eckford insisted that this rhetoric was hollow without a direct
acknowledgment of her reality. "I know the difference between an apology and someone
who's just trying to make themselves feel good," she asserted.

"lfyou can't name what

you did, it's not an apology. We can never have true reconciliation until we honestly
acknowledge our painful but shared past."6° From Eckford's perspective, in the absence
of this kind of reckoning, historical narratives about the crisis would be little more than a
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"fraud agreed upon," certainly not a "voice sounding forever across the centuries the laws
of right and wrong."61
Similarly, in the introduction to his memoir, Roberts explained that he was
motivated to record his story in order to leave an accurate account for his children and
grandchildren, and out of a desire "to counter those ever more vocal revisionists who
would re-write history to say that things were not as bad as some would suggest, that the
nine of us were warmly embraced by the majority of white administrators, teachers, and
students at Central High. " 62 Roberts insists that his very different memory of events in
the halls of Central is bolstered by official documents and reports, archival footage, and
personal testimonies. "History cannot be rewritten in the face of overwhelming evidence
to the contrary," he writes, "but that does not seem to deter those who seem convinced
that things were not at all what they seemed to be." From Roberts' perspective, this kind
of willful historical amnesia is evidence in itself that "it is not yet time for celebration."63
Indeed, for Roberts and others, the stakes involved in establishing an accurate
historical record are high. Roberts writes, "history, all of history, is but the antecedent
action to all we fmd around us today." As a member of the Little Rock Nine, Roberts
confronted racism directly. In his view, it is only by understanding how racism has been
structured in the past that we can understand the institutional forces that continue to
circumscribe opportunity and access today. He notes,
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I write not as one who wishes to 'live in the past' but as one who wishes to
understand how the past is manifest today. I choose not to join the chorus
of those who say that we must forget what happened and get on with life.
I am firmly convinced that we will fail to accomplish our goal of creating a
truly integrated and equal society if we continue to avoid facing the truth
about who we are and have been. 64

In Little Rock, the only "starting point for making real change," Roberts asserts, is "some
kind of reasonable level of awareness" of what actually transpired in 1957.65

In recent years, the Little Rock Nine have attempted to force the city of Little
Rock to look its history squarely in the face. Narratives which ascribe the cause of the
crisis to outside forces- politicians, rabid rural segregationists, civil rights organizations,
overbearing federal courts- and excuse the inaction of the majority of the city's citizens
do not have the power to motivate people in the present to recognize and understand what
they might to do to challenge the status quo in their own time. This might be convenient
for those white students or community leaders who want to present their reaction to the
crisis as natural, understandable, and rational, but it eviscerates what some of the Little
Rock Nine believe is their most potent legacy and their most important message: that
people can be agents of change.

Be the Change
The message members of the Little Rock Nine share with young people returns
again and again to their capacity to change their school, their neighborhood, the country,
and even the world one action at a time. The history they share about the Little Rock
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desegregation crisis and their involvement in it is designed to demonstrate that even
ordinary teenagers can have a tremendous impact. While they are concerned with
leaving an accurate historical record, it is this focus that has pushed and motivated them
to work through the "emotional debris" associated with 1957 and speak about their
experience. They hope that the story they share- while painful- will also be
inspirational. As Ernest Green put it at the fortieth anniversary commemorative
ceremony, "If one young person out there that's seen the story of the Little Rock Nine and
can take from it the beliefthat he or she can open a door, succeed against the odds, dream
the impossible dream, turn no into a yes, or navigate uncharted waters ... then the Little
Rock 9 become the Little Rock 10, 10-hundred, 10,000, 10,000,000."66 The Little Rock
Nine hope young people will put their story to work in their lives and in society at large,
particularly in relation to the unfinished business of the civil rights movement.
For the members of the Little Rock Nine, the work they began in 1957 is not
finished. "We should not be deluded that we have reached some kind of racial equality in
our culture. We must not entertain the wishful thinking that racism is a thing of the past,"
Terrence Roberts warns. "The work our courageous ancestors began, and which we risked
our lives to continue, is far from over."67 In his writing, Roberts points to a number of
indicators that suggest that institutional and systemic racism continue to shape life in
America, including the disproportionate number of black males housed in prisons, the
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disparities between black and white income, and the racial isolation of the nation's
schools. It has become commonplace, he notes, to justifY these inequalities on the basis
of stereotypes. However, Roberts cautions, "It simply isn't true that black people are
somehow unable to compete equally because they are racially inferior, or that they are
more criminally inclined than white people, or that they simply don't take advantage of
opportunities to build wealth." Rather, these indicators are a sign that the nation has not
radically reshaped society in the wake of the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision or
undone a political, legal, and social system based on centuries of discrimination. Those
invested in maintaining the status quo have been unremitting in their efforts to undercut
Brown, and in Roberts view, "The 'old' school voices," continue to be "much more
strident and demanding than any speakers of the new gospel."68
When speaking to students, Terrence Roberts, Minnijean Brown Trickey and
other members of the Little Rock Nine hope to blur the line between past and present, and
demonstrate that the lessons of Little Rock are applicable today. Roberts rejects attempts
to sharply demarcate the "civil rights movement" as an epoch of a distant past. "There is
a seamless connection... between the past and the present, and also the future," he says.
"You cannot separate these time periods. People talk about them as if they were separate.
They say, 'the past,' or 'that was history.' That's erroneous." He explains, "If you see
the 'civil rights movement' as something that happened in a particular time frame, and
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now that's over... then you do not have the same kind of perspective about what is going
on today."69 Minnijean Brown Trickey emphasizes that this view that the civil rights
struggle is "over," "done," or "finished" is widely accepted and has consequences. The
Supreme Court's recent opinions reflect this view, she maintains. "Even the people who
are making decisions have little or no kind of comprehension of what the issues are," she
asserts. Without understanding the legacy of decades of discrimination and its impact
today, racism and its effects in the present have been naturalized. 70 The passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act did not mark some sort of final victory in the battle for civil rights.
"We have to remember that justice is a perpetual struggle," Minnijean Brown Trickey
asserted at the fiftieth anniversary of the desegregation crisis, "and we've got to keep
doing it, and keep on doing it until forever .... That's our responsibility and we must take
that responsibility seriously."71 To bring others into the struggle, Trickey views her job as
an effort "to link the past with the present." She believes the Little Rock desegregation
crisis is embedded with "lots oflessons" that students and others can use. 12 Terrence
Roberts also embraces this approach, so much so that his recently published memoir is
titled Lessons .from Little Rock. 73
Collectively, the Little Rock Nine do not promote the idea that racism has or will
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disappear naturally with the passage of time or the appearance of a new generation. In
their experience, as Roberts puts it, "time itself is neutral, and without concentrated,
sustained effort by human beings, change will not occur." The civil rights movement had
a revolutionary impact on daily life in the South because African American citizens,
including nine teenagers who elected to attend Little Rock Central High School,
demanded the recognition of their rights. 74 When speaking to young people, these civil
rights veterans hope that their listeners will take this lesson to heart: change is possible,
but only if you are committed to it, are prepared to take action, and are willing to sacrifice
to achieve it. Minnijean Brown Trickey passes on a lesson she learned from Gandhi,
"Our challenge today and tomorrow and forever is to be the change we want to see in the
world."75
In Trickey's view, one of the roadblocks that stands in the way of students fully
embracing this perspective is the dominant narrative of the civil rights movement. When
she speaks to young people, they attribute the success of the mid-century black freedom
struggle to the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Without a similar charismatic
figure to lead the way, they think their actions will not have an impact. Trickey offers
students a different assessment of King's role in the movement, and argues, "Dr. King
was the kind of leader in that he followed and he did what he was asked to do. He wasn't
out front screaming, 'come with me!' He was with." The impetus to move forward came
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from the people themselves. "As long as we have that sort of idea of leadership as being
one person, it causes young people not to feel any sense of their own individual and
collective capacity or capability," she believes.
In part, this is why Trickey also emphasizes that the Little Rock Nine were not

handpicked to integrate Central High School by the NAACP or any other civil rights
organization. She hopes that the independent decision of nine teenagers to claim their
rights will serve as inspiration to students today and give them confidence in their ability
to affect change. "We really are the change agents in our lives and in the greater...
societal mater. And we have both the responsibility to think.... and do something,"
Trickey says. 76 In 1957, "we chose ourselves!" she maintains. "Daisy [Bates] didn't
choose. Virgil Blossom thinks he chose us. We chose ourselves, and that's the lesson of
Little Rock. It's about what kids are capable of. This is what I talk to kids about.
'Choose yourselfl "'77
In their public statements, several of the Little Rock Nine have suggested that

change begins with recognizing and embracing this individual responsibility to reshape
the world. Elizabeth Eckford acknowledges, "people tend to think we're unusual," but
she asserts, "I am a most ordinary person." Eckford describes herself as an unlikely
pioneer in the arena of school desegregation, "a very shy, submissive child." But she
assures students and others, "even that kind of person, can fmd steel."78 Carlotta Walls
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LaNier also emphasizes that the "determination, fortitude, and ability to move the world
aren't reserved for the 'special people."'79 With this realization that even ordinary people
can affect extraordinary change, comes the weighty responsibility to remain vigilant and
challenge injustice wherever it exists even in the face of seemingly insurmountable
obstacles.
The Little Rock Nine encourage students to take up this mindset and apply it in
their own lives, not only the in relation to race but other manifestations of injustice or
inequality. Whether students are concerned about issues as disparate as the environment,
war, or discrimination, Minnijean Brown Trickey maintains, "We are talking about the
same thing- what is the formula that makes it possible to oppress, to make war, destroy,
all those things. " 80

Elizabeth Eckford shares a special message with young people about

bullying and social ostracization. Even if they do not think they are, "students can be
powerful," she says. She shares her own story and the harassment she endured daily in
the halls of Central High, but tells students about two of her peers that stood up against
popular opinion and spoke with her every day during her last class. Their simple action
"meant a lot to me," she recalls. "I tell students that they can be somebody's hope, they
can help somebody live another day. Especially if they reach out and engage a person
who's being harassed to let them know that not everyone despises them." 81
Regardless of the issue, the Little Rock impress on students that change cannot
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happen without people taking action. The decision not to act in the face of injustice is a
decision in favor of maintaining the status quo. Although he and his friends sacrificed a
lot physically and psychologically to integrate Central High School, Terrence Roberts
believes that it was worth it. "By doing nothing," he asserts, "we would have prolonged
the system of racial discrimination that restricted our lives simply because we were black
people."82 By extension, those who chose to do nothing in 1957- including the majority
of white students at Central High and the citizens of Little Rock- were making their own
choice to preserve the social system that had undergirded life in the city for decades. If
white students at Central High do not remember the harassment the Little Rock Nine
endured, Carlotta Walls LaNier has said, it is because "They turned away. They did
nothing. They said nothing. They chose not to see." People of conscience must "do
something," she writes. 83 Referring to holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel's concept of silent
witness, Minnijean Brown Trickey also maintains, "sometimes its not the people who do
the deed, it's the people who stand by and do nothing" that do the most to perpetrate
injustice. 84
Given this emphasis, it is hardly surprising that the fatalism that imbues most
discussions of racial inequality in the nation's schools today is particularly frustrating to
some members of the Little Rock Nine. It is not just the refusal of the federal courts to
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recognize that persistent double-digit achievement gaps or racially isolated schools are
vestiges of discrimination that have not been eliminated, but the suggestion that little or
nothing can or should be done to address these problems that is so dissatisfactory. These
are not problems that can be fixed by discussing them exclusively in the past tense or by
pinning hope on the promise that time itself will heal the rift that tears at the fabric of
American life. In their view, these problems require people of conscience to do
something and take action. Drawing on the wisdom of her grandmother, Melba Pattillo
Beals asserts, "Even when the battle is long and the path is steep, a true warrior does not
give up. If each one of us does not step forward to claim our rights, we are doomed to an
eternal wait in hopes those who would usurp them will become benevolent. The Bible
says, WATCH, FIGHT, and PRAY."85 Without concerted action, on the individual,
social, and political levels, the status quo will remain firmly entrenched.
Despite their frustration and concern about the problems that continue to plague
public schools in Little Rock and elsewhere, the Little Rock Nine remain optimistic that
solutions can be found. However, as the Little Rock Nine know very well, challenging
the status quo can require tremendous and often unacknowledged sacrifice. They endured
unrelenting harassment at school and at home for more than a year, suffering physical and
psychological trauma that continued to affect them well into their adult lives. In some
cases, their parents lost their jobs and their families were forced to relocate far from the
social networks that had sustained them in Little Rock simply to fmd work. For the most
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part, they believe their sacrifice was worth it. 86 As Melba Pattillo Beals puts it, "I take
pride in the fact that, although the fight for equality must continue, our 1957 effort
catapulted the civil rights movement forward a giant step and shifted the fight to a more
dignified battlefield. " 87
Although the battlefield may be more dignified today than it was in 1957, altering
the status quo will still require significant sacrifice on the part of students, their parents,
and school administrators, black and white alike. In the African American community,
Carlotta Walls LaNier hopes that students and parents can continue to sustain and
promote the values that nurtured her through her childhood and gave her confidence as an
adult. "It is hurtful now when I hear than in many urban schools, where the student
populations tend to be overwhelmingly black, it is not considered cool to be smart," she
writes. "It makes me downright angry when I hear that smart black kids often feel a need
to play down their brainpower just to fit in." She calls for concerted action on the behalf
of parents and community leaders to restore education to its ''vaunted place" as a
prominent avenue to a better future. 88
However, in order for students to embrace education, the schools they attend must
be prepared to embrace them. Terrence Roberts believes there is much that
administrators and teachers could learn from the black schools that educated him as a
young man. "I... think all children, regardless of race, need the experience of being
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totally and unequivocally accepted as worthwhile human beings, whatever school they are
enrolled in. Anything less is detrimental to their ability to learn and grow," he says. 89
Without this commitment to black students and their ability to flourish in the classroom,
African American children are placed at risk in schools in Little Rock and elsewhere. 90
"Today, it is not enough for high schools to offer academic excellence," Gloria Ray
Karlmark maintains, "they must together with the community excel in motivating their
students to acquire the kind of knowledge and social values that will benefit the
community and themselves."91
But the sacrifices required to maintain truly integrated public schools will not
have to come just from working-class African American families and public school
administrators. In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decisions related to unitary
status, the decision to maintain any semblance of diversity in the nation's classrooms may
require significant and voluntary sacrifices from white families and middle-class black
families as well. Gloria Ray Karlmark acknowledged this directly at the fiftieth
anniversary of the desegregation crisis. In her remarks at the commemorative ceremony
she noted, "Today it is rather a question of choosing to remain in the community where
one lives or choosing to move on to another community- one with more resources, one
that is able to offer public school students more social skills and educational
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advantages."92 In order to work, integration must be a two-way street. In the years to
come, parents of conscience may have to weigh the measurable benefits of affluent, but
largely mono-racial, suburban schools against their commitment to diversity and equal
opportunity. As Carlotta Walls LaNier puts it, "White families who believe in a
multiracial society have to be willing to make some rough choices and sacrifices too."93
'-

In order to rejuvenate the struggle for equal access and opportunity, and restore
diversity to American public education, the work only begins with individuals determined
to act as agents of change. Terrence Roberts cautions, "It must start with the self, it must
start with the individual, but it must not stay there." In order to maximize social change,
he maintains, ''this individual then has to figure out how to create alliances with others,
like-thinking people, and begin to speak about... the need to change, then how best to
make all this happen. " 94 If the Little Rock Nine can uses their story to inspire and
motivate individuals, and encourage them to work together in a new movement for racial
justice, then perhaps the wish best expressed by Minnijean Brown Trickey at the fiftieth
anniversary may come true. "Just as 50 years ago, the Little Rock desegregation crisis
catalyzed and invigorated social movements across sectors," she said. "Its my hope that
this fifty year commemorative ceremony will energize and invigorate the social
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movement that is absolutely called for in 2007."95

Conclusion: History, Memory, and Civil Rights
As the members of the Little Rock Nine have begun to speak out about their
experience individually and collectively, their public commentary has been shaped by two
overriding goals: 1) An interest in interrogating and challenging the public memory of the
civil rights movement and the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, and 2) A desire to
reframe the history of school desegregation and its relationship to the present. These two
goals have shaped and guided the development of this dissertation as well. Like so many
other civil rights veterans, the Little Rock Nine not only serve as models for social
change, but also provide scholars with an intellectual road map for the development and
articulation of their own ideas about the black freedom struggle and its legacy. Indeed,
much of the recent scholarship written about the "long civil rights movement" has been
shaped by this interaction between activists engaged in the struggle and historians
struggling to understand the evolution of American race relations.

However, even as

these more nuanced histories have gained prominence in academia, ''won cause"
mythology continues to dominate public discourse. This study has been grounded in the
belief that it is only by analyzing how this mythology rose to prominence, and
demystifying its hold on the nation's collective consciousness, that the space for broader,
more inclusive, and more complicated histories of the civil rights movement can be
created.
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In many ways, Little Rock is an ideal place to begin a re-examination of the
history and public memory of school desegregation. Perhaps more than any other conflict
related to the integration of American education, the Little Rock school desegregation
crisis has been sutured into the nation's narrative of progress. In most textbook accounts
of the event, the school desegregation crisis is presented as a constitutional showdown
between the federal government and the forces of massive resistance and states' rights.
After a brief discussion of President Eisenhower's decision to deploy the 101 st Airborne
and enforce the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown v. Board ofEducation, instructional
materials used in classrooms across the nation move on quickly to other iconic civil rights
conflicts- the sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the campaigns in Birmingham and Selma. In
these kinds of accounts, discussion of the process of school desegregation begins and
ends in Little Rock, Arkansas. It is as ifEisenhower's "decisive" action in 1957 was
sufficient in and of itself to bring the nation's promises in line with its practices.
However, as the history of school desegregation in Little Rock itself reveals, this is far
from the case. Indeed, the Little Rock school district has experienced and been shaped by
every phase of school desegregation litigation that has unfolded over the course of the
long civil rights movement. In this sense, Little Rock is representative of general trends
in the nation as whole, just not in the way that is usually suggested. 96
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the district embraced various forms oftokenism
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through pupil placement acts and freedom-of-choice plans. When these approaches no
longer satisfied federal courts, they adopted geographic attendance zones, but were
ordered to institute district-wide busing when it became evident that residential
segregation perpetuated the city's dual school system. While busing produced
meaningful diversity in the city's schools for the first time in 1970s, some white residents
continued to resist the full import of the Brown decision by relocating their families to
surrounding suburbs or enrolling their children in private schools. The Little Rock
district attempted to address these issues by pursuing an interdistrict remedy that would
result in the consolidation of city and suburban schools in the greater metropolitan area.
With the erosion of support for these kinds of sweeping changes in the federal courts, the
interdistrict remedy was limited to boundary adjustments, majority-to-minority transfers
across district lines and the development of special magnet schools.
As Little Rock became a predominantly black school district, it experimented with
various forms of "compensatory" education including the development of specially
funded but virtually all-black incentive schools. Like school administrators across the
nation, the district also tried to curb white flight by reintroducing various forms of
"controlled" choice, neighborhood schools, and pursuing unitary status in the 1980s and
1990s. However, as noted in the previous chapter, even many of these mechanisms have
been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court once a school district has been
declared unitary. Nevertheless, debate about racial diversity and educational issues
continues unabated in Little Rock. In an effort to retain the state desegregation aid
jeopardized by its release from court oversight, the Little Rock school district has filed a
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case against the state of Arkansas for allowing charter schools to proliferate in the capital,
arguing that these institutions have pulled pupils out of the public education system.
Neoliberal educational policies that emphasize individualism and school choice create
new challenges for civil rights advocates committed to achieving educational equity and
social justice for all students. The outcome of this next chapter ofLittle Rock's school
desegregation saga has yet to be written.
However, even as this story continues to unfold, the dominant narrative of the
Little Rock school desegregation crisis that is reiterated and represented in various public
forums tends to focus almost exclusively on the events of 1957-1959. These events are
defined and bracketed as "history"- as the relic of distant and foreign past that only serves
to highlight how far the city of Little Rock and the nation as a whole has come in the
intervening years. Framing the crisis and its relationship to the present as a narrative of
progress may be reassuring, but it many ways it impoverishes public discourse and
obscures the long roots of many of the seemingly intractable problems that face the
nation's schools today and continue to influence conditions in Little Rock.
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, other scholars have reflected on
the crippling effects of the dominant narrative of progress and have uncovered some of
the interests it serves. While their observations have generally focused on aspects of the
civil rights struggle other than education or the conditions confronting other communities,
many of their conclusions seem to apply to the situation in Little Rock and the public
memory of school desegregation.
Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano have suggested that this "won cause"
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mythology serves the interests of the state, enabling the civil rights movement to be "held
up as a shining example of the success of American democracy" and proof of ''the
vitality of America's legal and political institutions, and evidence of the nation's ongoing
quest to live up to its founding ideals of egalitarianism and justice. " 97 As Chapter Two
reveals, the United States government was deeply invested in weaving the story of the
black freedom struggle into the nation's overarching narrative of progress even before the

Brown v. Board of Education decision. In the wake of the Little Rock school
desegregation crisis, the federal government preferred to frame the events of 1957 in this
context as a triumph over the forces of massive resistance and states' rights in the South.
This image was projected to the world as evidence of the nation's commitment to
upholding the rights of American citizens and peoples of color during the Cold War.
However, the history of the USIA's efforts to reshape global opinion and the production
of the film Nine From Little Rock also reveals how divorced that narrative progress could
be from conditions in southern school districts.
Other scholars, particularly Jacqueline Dowd Hall, have emphasized how "colorblind" conservatives have utilized "won cause" mythology to support their political
agenda. 98 As Chapter Four noted, the New Right advanced a narrative that defined
ongoing controversies about access to equal and integrated education, like the battles over
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bussing that dominated headlines in the 1970s, as categorically different from the efforts
to attain educational equity that proceeded them. By weaving the iconic conflicts of the
civil rights movement into a narrative of progress, and framing the civil rights movement
as an unqualified "success," "color blind" conservatives and others were able to
undermine ongoing calls for social justice and educational equity. Using this rhetoric,
they argued that what had been broken had been fixed, and that the passage of corrective
legislation had purportedly brought the nation's practices in line with its promises.
Protests and court litigation that surfaced after the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil
Rights Acts were portrayed not as appeals for fair play but preferential treatment. Over
the last forty years, this view of school desegregation litigation struggled for supremacy in
the federal courts and has recently underwritten the Supreme Court's decision in Parents

Involved (2007).
However, this rhetoric resonated with many white Americans not only because it
underwrote a political agenda which helped to preserve their prerogatives, but also
because it resonated with their view of the nation as a beacon of democracy, freedom and
equality. Media scholars Allison Graham and Edward P. Morgan have suggested that the
dominant narrative of progress that has been projected to the nation in newspaper
retrospectives, documentary films, and fictionalized narratives has been underwritten by
the culture industries precisely because it appeals to white audiences- who wish to
believe that equality has been achieved. Indeed, the image that these audiences seem to
find most appealing are stories and films featuring the actions of moderate whites, rather
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than those focused on the grassroots activism of African American communities. 99 As
Chapter Six illuminated, this was certainly evident in the way that cultural gatekeepers
responded to the memoirs of Orval Faubus, Brooks Hays, and Elizabeth Huckaby.
Faubus' narrative, which unapologetically rehashed so many ofthe arguments of the
1950s and concluded with gloomy predictions about the nation's future, failed to find a
publisher. Whereas the more optimistic narratives of Hays and Huckaby were promoted
as the stories of "good people" who tried to do the right thing under difficult
circumstances, and helped create the climate where the nation's ideals could triumph over
the forces of demagoguery.
Glenn Eskew and Owen Dwyer have explored how the dominant narrative serves
the interests of heritage tourism, urban renewal, and the "new" new South. They argue
that southern politicians have supported civil rights museums, tours, and guidebooks
because they "turn a stigmatized past into a commercial asset," simultaneously attracting
tourist dollars and generating positive public relations. 100 As was evident in Chapter 8,
these forces were definitely in play in Little Rock during the 1990s when the city's
businessmen and civic leaders rallied behind the creation of a visitor's center across from
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Central High School. Their desire to capitalize on the full public relations potential of the
museum and the 40th anniversary of the crisis overrode their interest in fostering a
meaningful community dialogue about the appropriate function of the center or the
history it should encapsulate.
However, the proceeding chapters have also demonstrated that this dominant
narrative of progress has not gone uncontested. It would be reductive to argue that a
collective memory of the civil rights movement is being imposed on the public by the
state, culture industries and political elites, but not struggled for by activists, intellectuals,
or other concerned citizens. Those in Little Rock who have had a vested interest in the
desegregation of the city's schools, and the litigation that was designed to achieve it, have
not observed the evolution of the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation
crisis silently.
At times, the dominant narrative of progress served the interests of the civil rights
community, and it is important to be attentive to the way coalitions of interests have
coalesced and diverged over time in relation to the actual conditions in Little Rock's
schools. In the 1970s, organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights presented Little Rock as a "model community" that
demonstrated that school integration, particularly with the aid of court-ordered busing,
could be successful. The organizations seemed to believe that if the American public
could see that a city that had once been a byword for racial discrimination and massive
resistance to school desegregation was making it work, they might embrace changes in
their own community. Even more importantly, this narrative was put to work for the
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LDF and deployed as a means of demonstrating the effectiveness of their efforts in the
nation's court rooms and as a tool for soliciting additional support that would enable
them to continue the struggle.
In Little Rock itself, this narrative of progress did not universally foster
indifference or a denial of current racial problems. Daisy Bates and the city's civil rights
community, for example, used Little Rock's new status as a "model community" as a
vehicle for demanding the recognition of "second generation" school desegregation
problems, and a platform from which to denounce President Richard Nixon's statements
and policies in relation to busing. This points to the need to be attentive to not only the

construction of public memory, but also its reception among different audiences, and its
practical applications. As Michael Eric Dyson's has observed, a history of black heroism
and achievement has been "ceaselessly evoked in black communities in oral and written
form as an inspiration to continued thought and action in the same vein." 101 Certainly, that
impulse was and continues to be at play in Little Rock.
However, the civil rights community's embrace of progress in Arkansas' capital
was always tied to an understanding that the gains that had been achieved could be rolled
back. Indeed, when the tide began to turn against African American litigants in the
federal courts, particularly when Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s and 2000s
permitted the release of school districts from court oversight and return to relatively
homogenous neighborhood schools, it was widely recognized that this narrative progress
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no longer served the movement. Moreover, it also failed to reflect the reality of
American public education.
In this context, Little Rock's NAACP, some members of the Little Rock Nine,
and other observers have been increasingly critical of the celebration or
"commemoration" of the city's progress in race relations and its disconnection from
efforts to generate meaningful change in the present. If scholars and historians have
observed that this narrative can prevent Americans from recognizing and addressing the
"unfinished business" of the civil rights movement, civil rights activists in Little Rock
have worked diligently to assure that this does not happen. In newspaper articles,
memoirs, public forums, and commemorative ceremonies they have repeatedly contested
efforts to write off Little Rock's school desegregation drama as a relic of the past.
However, as noted in the introduction to this dissertation, African American
communities and their allies are not the only groups fostering and nurturing oppositional
understandings of the civil rights movement. "Unreconstructed southerners" like Jim
Johnson have rejected Little Rock's narrative of progress on the grounds that things have
gotten worse, not better, in the city's schools in the wake of"forced integration." As
Tony Horowitz has noted, white racists steeped in southern "lost cause" mythology have
defined the civil rights movement as the "second reconstruction." 102 This analogy is
multivalent- containing a critique of school desegregation as yet another example of
federal interference and "social engineering," while also pointing the eventual
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"redemption" of the region. Indeed, some legal scholars and students of school
desegregation believe that under the mantle of recent Supreme Court decisions this
process is well under way. 103
Critique of the dominant narrative of progress has come from other quarters as
well. Some whites in Little Rock, who would not argue that things are worse today than
they were in 1957, reject this characterization of the city's history on other grounds.
From their perspective, the city's progress in the field of race relations has been
overstated- not because of a lack of improvement in the schools- but rather because
Little Rock has always been a progressive and racially moderate city. As noted in
Chapter Six and in the pages above, this argument has been advanced with particular
force by white members of Central High School's Class of 1958 who feel that the
celebration of the school's diversity today and the courage of the Little Rock Nine has
come at their expense.
Clearly, the Little Rock Nine themselves have rejected both these
characterizations of the city's history. While they are committed to calling attention to
the ongoing problems in the nation's schools and the unfinished business of the school
desegregation effort, they certainly do not argue that things are worse today than they
were under Jim Crow. Nor do they accept the contention that Little Rock has always
been a bastion of progressive sentiment and moderate race relations. They forthrightly
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acknowledge that the city has made progress and that much has been accomplished over
the course of more than five decades to improve conditions for African American
students in Little Rock's schools. However, this does not preclude them from pointing to
the work that remains to be done.
That said, the narrative of progress that has become so prevalent in the public
memory of the civil rights movement must be reframed if it is to work to legitimize rather
than undermine on&oing struggles for social justice. It must be utilized as a platform for
making meaningful changes in our nation's schools that encourage a richer, more diverse
learning environment. It must be recognized as a source of inspiration for action to come.
As this chapter has illustrated, the Little Rock Nine have tried to utilize their own
histories in order to inspire students to "be the change" they want to see in the world. But
they have also provided a model for scholars, activists, and citizens interested in
connecting "scholarship with collective struggle, social analysis with social
transformation." 104 Through their efforts to reshape the public memory of the crisis and
its relationship to the present, the Little Rock Nine have demonstrated that the history of
the civil rights movement can be translated from the past tense to the future tense, and
rewritten in active voice rather than passive voice. This is a project that continues to
resonate with the nation's ideals and aspirations to become a beacon of freedom, equality,
and justice- but it does so in the "subjunctive" or "prescriptive" sense. 105
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